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
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
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


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THE
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VOL. X.

SYNTAX OF NEW TESTAMENT DIALECT, &c.

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
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A
TREATISE
ON THE
SYNTAX
OF THE
NEW TESTAMENT DIALECT.

WITH AN APPENDIX,
CONTAINING
A DISSERTATION ON THE GREEK ARTICLE.

BY
MOSES STUART,
PROFESSOR OF SACRED LITERATURE IN THE THEOLOGICAL
SEMINARY, ANDOVER.

EDINBURGH:
THOMAS CLARK, 38. GEORGE STREET.
MDCCCXXXV.



PREFACE.

THIS volume of the BIBLICAL CABINET contains that portion of Professor Stuart's Grammar of the New Testament Dialect, which embraces the SYNTAX, together with a separate treatise on the Greek Article, which it was thought would form an interesting sequel.

The first and second parts of the author's Grammar, which treat,—I. Of Letters and their Changes,—II. Grammatical Forms and Flexions, have been omitted, from the conviction that they would have greatly increased the expense of the work, without any corresponding benefit to the British theological student.

The following excerpt from the author's Preface, will explain his views of the importance and utility of an accurate knowledge of the New Testament dialect to the theological student :—

“ A Grammar of the dialect peculiar to the New Testament, is needed by all who critically study its original language. The time has been, when to call in question the pure *Atticism* of the New Testament writers was deemed and treated as an offence against the claims of inspiration. That period is now past. It is generally felt and acknowledged, at the present time, that if the *Purists* could have established the claims which they made for the Greek of the New Testament, one of the very best arguments of a critical nature, to prove that *Hebrews* were the real authors of this volume, would have been confuted.

The most accurate description which can be given of the Greek idiom of the New Testament, is, that it consists of *Hebrew thoughts invested with Greek costume*. The sentiment, the phraseology, and the colouring of the whole, are Hebrew ; which is just what we should naturally expect in a system of religious history, discussion, and precepts, composed by Hebrews. No *native* heathen Greek, unless by aid truly miraculous, could have composed such a book as to style and idiom. All is just as it should be, on the supposition that its authors were Hebrews ; the entire volume

is altogether in conformity with the demands of criticism, which takes it stand upon this basis.

But while we allow thus much, we must be careful not to extend the *Hebraism* of the New Testament beyond just and proper bounds. The *Purists* would allow of nothing but pure Attic Greek in it. Their antagonists, the *Hellenists*, after a long and arduous contest, drove them from the field. But, not content with this, they pushed their conquest, as victors are very apt to do, far beyond the bounds of sober consideration. The second generation of Hellenists found Hebraisms every where. Not only the phraseology, and colouring, and sentiment of the New Testament were represented as Hebraistic, but the construction and regimen of the great mass of words were deemed to be Hebrew; the meaning and regimen of the particles were Hebrew; the tenses of verbs and the cases of nouns were conformed to the Hebrew; the article was used in the manner of the Hebrew one; and even the syntax was, in innumerable passages, represented as being conformed to the model of the Hebrew. In a word, any difficulty as to the meaning of a Greek word, or as to its construction,

was solved, if possible, by a resort to the usages of the Hebrew language.

Time and farther examination have corrected these errors and extravagancies. Accurate and extensive investigation, such as has recently been made by Planck and Winer, has shewn, that there is scarcely a unique and peculiar *form* of a Greek word in the whole range of the New Testament, nor a single principle of syntax of any importance, which has not its parallel among more or less of the native Greek writers. It is true, beyond all doubt, that there are many words in the New Testament to which the writers have assigned a *sense* different from that which can be found in any of the native Greek authors. But this alters neither the form nor the syntax of such words. Nor is it to be considered merely as Hebraism. It arises from the necessity of the case. How could a Hebrew express ideas of a religious nature, and pertaining to the worship of Jehovah, in a language which the mere heathen had formed, into whose minds, in a variety of cases, no such ideas as the Hebrew writer designed to communicate had ever entered? One may answer this question by asking,

how a writer of the present day could express, in Latin and Greek, the ideas contained in a treatise on electricity, magnetism, or steam-boats?

The writers of the New Testament did just what all writers are ever obliged to do; where the language which they employ is not adequate to express their conceptions, they either coin new words, or else use old words in new senses. Both of these the New Testament writers have done; and done as often as they were necessitated to do it, but generally no oftener. Who can blame them for this? Or who can wonder that they should have so done? They must either proceed in this way, or refrain from communicating what they wished to write.

In the formation of new words, however, whether by composition or otherwise, they have followed throughout the common analogies and laws of the Greek language. From its syntax they scarcely, if ever, depart, even in the minutiae of it. Hence a Grammar of the New Testament idiom, must, for substance, be a grammar of the Greek *κοινή διάλεκτος*. and so it is exhibited, in the following sheets."

“The references for illustration and example are mostly taken from the New Testament; which all will acknowledge to be proper.”

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ERRATA.

- Page 73 lines 15 and 16, *for* the things which are seen *read*
the conduct of those who know
- 85, *passim*, *for* compliment *read* complement.
- 112 line 20, *for* $\text{ἵδω} \text{---} \text{ἵδω} \text{---} \text{πᾶς}$ *read* $\text{ἵδω} \text{ } \text{ἵδω} \text{---} \text{ὅς} \text{πᾶς}$.
- 144 — 7, *for* ὡς ἵδωξα μῆποτι , that I might have dis-
closed myself, *read* $\text{ὡς ἵδωξα μῆποτι ἑμαυτὸν}$, that I might
not have disclosed myself.
- 144 — 9, *for* invoked *read* closed.
- 152 — 12 and 18, *for* compliment *read* complement.
- 153 — 6, *for* complimentary *read* complementary.
- 193 — 19, and page 226 line 22, *for* casual *read* causal.

The above errata, which exist in the original, were not observed till
this edition was printed off.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. DEFINITIONS.

(1.) LANGUAGE consists of the external signs of ideas and feelings. It may be spoken or written. In the first case, it consists of *articulate sounds* uttered by the human voice; in the second, of conventional signs called *letters* and *words*, which are representatives of articulate sounds.

(2.) Grammar is that science which teaches the manner of forming and declining words, and also the manner in which they are joined together in order to construct sentences or parts of sentences. It may be divided, therefore, into two parts, viz. *formal*, *i. e.* that which respects the forms of words, and *syntactic*, *i. e.* that which respects the manner of arranging words together in order to express our ideas.

(3.) Every language is exposed to changes, and actually suffers more or less of them, through all the periods of time in which it is spoken. Any noticeable departure from what has once been a general custom, or the most approved usage, of speaking or writing a language, is called a *dialect* (διάλεκτος.) Among a nation widely extended, or consisting of various smaller tribes, dialects nearly always exist. In such a case, *the differences in the forms of words, or in their syntax*, are the things taken into the account in order to make out the notion of what is strictly called *dialect* ; which word is, and always must be, used in a *comparative* sense, when it is properly used. Departure, in more or less particulars, from some *supposed standard* or *predominant usage* among the more cultivated part of a nation, is that which general custom names *dialect*.

§ 2. OF THE DIALECTS OF GREECE.

(1.) The most ancient Greek language, if it were *universal*, could not properly be named *dialect*. In comparison, however, with most of the Greek which has come down to us, it may be so called. The most ancient Greek is, with

good reason, supposed to be for substance exhibited to us, in the poetry of Homer and Hesiod ; who, as we may with much probability believe, wrote the dialect which they spoke in common with the people around them. This *ancient* dialect (called also the *epic* dialect, because it is exhibited in the poems of Homer and Hesiod) appears to have been the common mother of all the later dialects of Greece ; and probably it differs from the spoken language, only as the language of elevated poetry commonly differs from that which is spoken by the mass of the people. New words, new forms of old words, and new modes of expression, are almost of course exhibited in the higher kinds of poetry.

NOTE. The supposition that Homer was acquainted with all the later and different dialects of Greece, and *designedly* introduced them into his poem, seems very improbable. Much more probable is it, that the language which he employed was the common mother of all the dialects. In this way we may easily and naturally account for all of his alleged dialectic peculiarities.

(2.) The Hellenians or Greeks, who immigrated through Thrace into Hellas (so called), consisted of several tribes, of which the two

principal ones were Dorians and Ionians. The *original* seat of the Dorians in Greece, was the Peloponnesus ; of the Ionians, Attica. From these sprung the *Doric* and *Ionic* dialects, which constituted the two principal dialects of Greece, from the time that the Greek nation came to be much known in authentic history.

(3.) The DORIC DIALECT, which was the most extensively spoken, prevailed in Hellas proper, viz. in Sparta, Argos, and Messenia; also in Crete, Sicily, Magna Graecia or Lower Italy, and in the Dorian colonies of Asia Minor. In the course of time, it became the appropriate dialect of *lyric* and *bucolic* poetry. It is exhibited in the fragments of Epicharmus and Sophron, and in the works of Pindar, Alcaeus, Sappho, Corinna, Theocritus, Bion, and Moschus. The *lyric* parts of the Attic tragedy, *i. e.* the chorus, also exhibit it. The peculiar characteristics of this dialect are a certain harshness or roughness in the construction of words, and a kind of indistinctness of sound occasioned by the frequent use of the close vowel *A*; which the Greeks called πλαττισμός.

NOTE. Branches or subdivisions of this dialect were the Laconic, Boeotian, Thessalian, and Sicilian

dialects; no specimens of which are preserved, excepting a few fragments. The Aeolic was also a branch or variety of the Doric. It became at length a cultivated language, and was spoken in Middle Greece, with the exception of Attica, Megaris, and Doris. Sappho and Alcaeus afford specimens of this species of the Doric.

(4.) The IONIC DIALECT was spoken originally in Attica. Numerous colonies emigrated, however, from this country to Asia Minor, which gradually became the principal, and at last the only seat of the dialect, if we include the islands which lie along its coasts in the Aegean sea. This dialect is characterized by softness of sound, and the resolution of the harsher sounds by the insertion of letters that mitigated them. The works of Herodotus, Hippocrates, and Anacreon, are composed in the Ionic.

NOTE. This dialect approaches nearer to the epic or old Greek than any other; so that the epic is sometimes called the *old* Ionic, and the proper Ionic the *new* Ionic.

(5.) The Attic dialect was formed out of the Ionian, by the remnant of the Ionian people which remained in Attica, after its colonies were sent out to Asia Minor. It holds a middle

course between the harshness of the Doric, and the softness of the Ionic dialect. The political importance of Attica, the high culture of its citizens, and the great number of excellent writers which it produced, caused this dialect to become far more renowned and more an object of study than any of the others. The works of Thucydides, Xenophon, Plato, Demosthenes, Lysias, Isocrates, Aeschines, etc., and also of Aeschylus, Euripides, Sophocles, Aristophanes, and others, being in the Attic, have immortalized the dialect in which they were written.

(6.) After the freedom of Greece was destroyed by Philip, the Attic language began to be adopted by degrees among all its different tribes, now united together under Alexander and his successors. Yet every tribe that had once been distinct, in adopting it, would naturally give to it a great many turns and modifications; and these of course would constitute departures from its original form. It was this general dialect, as spoken and modified by Greece at large, and particularly by those who were not natives of Attica, that came at last to be called the *common* or *Hellenic dialect*. Of course the *basis* of the κοινή διάλεκτος is Attic; but still the Attic as con-

tained in the *κοινή* is modified in some respects as to form and syntax. Thus modified it is the usual standard of our grammars and lexicons ; and departures from this are particularly specified by the names of particular dialects.

NOTE. Writers of this kind of Greek, *i. e.* of the *κοινή*, are Aristotle, Theophrastus, Pausanias, Apollodorus, Polybius, Diodorus, Plutarch, Strabo, Dionysius Halicarnassensis, Lucian, Aelian, Arrian, etc.

(7.) In Macedonia the Attic dialect received many and peculiar modifications. Moreover, the successors of Alexander in Egypt cultivated literature with greater ardour than any other of the Grecian princes. Hence Alexandria became the place where this peculiar dialect (sometimes called *Macedonian* and sometimes *Alexandrine*), particularly developed itself. A great number of the later Greek works proceeded from this source, and they exhibit the dialect in question.

(8.) The Jews, who left Palestine and settled at Alexandria during the reign of the Ptolemies, learned this dialect ; and when the Old Testament was translated by them into Greek, for the use of their synagogues, the translators exhi-

bited a specimen of the Alexandrine Greek, modified by their own dialect, *i. e.* by the Hebrew. For substance this same dialect, thus modified, appears in the New Testament, and in the early Christian fathers; yet not without many variations. Rost (the grammarian) calls this *ecclesiastical Greek*; it has usually been called the *Hellenistic language*; but might more appropriately and significantly be called *Hebrew-Greek*; which appellation would designate the cause and manner of its modifications.

§ 3. CHARACTER OF THE NEW TESTAMENT GREEK.

(1.) Soon after the commencement of the 17th century, a contest began among the learned in Europe, respecting the character of the New Testament diction. One class of writers claimed for it the purity and elegance of the old Greek; while others not only acknowledged a Hebrew colouring in it, but strove to shew that it every where abounded in this. About the end of the 17th century this last party became the predominant one; but the contest did not entirely cease, until about the middle of the 18th century, when the *Hebraists* became almost universally

triumphant. The *Purists* (as the former party were called) have now become wholly extinct, at least among all well-informed linguists and critics; but a new party (if it may be so named) has arisen, who have taken a kind of middle way between the two older parties, avoiding the extremes of both, and occupying a ground which seems to have a basis so well established as to afford no apprehension that it can be shaken. This third party bids fair speedily to become universal.

NOTE. So early as the latter part of the 16th century, Beza (*De dono Linguae*, etc., on Acts x. 46) acknowledged the Hebraisms of the New Testament, but extolled them as being "of such a nature, that in no other idiom could expressions be so happily formed; nay, in some cases not even formed at all," in an adequate manner. He considered them as "gems with which [the apostles] had adorned their writings." The famous Robert Stephens (Pref. to his New Testament, 1576) declared strongly against those, "qui in his scriptis [sacris] inculta omnia et horrida esse putant;" and he laboured not only to show that the New Testament contains many of the elegancies of the true Grecian style, but that even its Hebraisms give inimitable strength and energy to its diction. Thus far, then, Hebraism was not denied but vindicated; and it was only against allowing an excess of it, and

against alleged incorrectnesses and barbarisms, that Beza and Stephens contended.

Sebastian Pfochen, (*Diatrise de Ling. Graec. N. Test. puritate*, 1629) first laboured in earnest, to show that all the expressions employed in the New Testament, are found in good classic Greek authors. In 1658, Erasmus Schmidt vindicated the same ground. But before this, J. Junge, rector of Hamburg, published (in 1637, 1639) his opinion in favour of the *purity* (not the classic elegance) of the New Testament diction; which opinion was vindicated by Jac. Grosse, pastor in the same city, in a series of five essays published in 1640 and several successive years. The last four of these were directed against the attacks of opponents, *i. e.* of advocates for the *Hellenistic* diction of the New Testament; viz. against Dan. Wulfer's *Innocentia Hellenist. vindicata* (1640), and an essay of the like nature by J. Musaeus of Jena (1641—42).

Independently of this particular contest, D. Heinsius (in 1643) declared himself in favour of *Hellenism*; as also Thos. Gataker (1648), who avowedly wrote in opposition to Pfochen, with much learning, but rather an excessive leaning to Hebraism. Joh. Vorstius (1658, 1665) wrote a book on Hebraisms, which is still common. On some excesses in this book, Horace Vitringa made brief but strenuous remarks. Somewhat earlier than these last writings, J. H. Boecler (1641) published remarks, in which he took a kind of middle way between the two parties; as did J. Olearius (1668), and J. Leusden about the same time. It was about this time, also, that the majority

of critical writers began to acknowledge a Hebrew element in the New Testament diction, which, however, they did not regard as constituting *barbarism*, but only as giving an oriental hue to the diction. M. Solanus, in an able essay directed against the tract of Pfochen, vindicated this position. J. H. Michaelis (1707) and A. Blackwall (*Sacred Classics*, 1727), did not venture to deny the Hebraisms of the New Testament, but aimed principally to shew, that these did not detract from the qualities of a good and elegant style; so that, in this respect, the New Testament writers were not inferior to the classical ones. The work of the latter abounds with so many excellent remarks, that it is worthy of attention from every critical reader of the present time.

In 1722, Siegm. Georgi, in his *Vindiciae*, etc., and in 1733 in his *Hierocriticus Sacer*, vindicated anew the old opinion of the Purists; but without changing the tide of opinion. The same design J. C. Schwarz had in view, in his *Comm. crit. et philol. in Ling. Graec.* (1686); who was followed, in 1752, by E. Palaiet (*Observ. philol. crit. in Nov. Test.*), the last, I believe, of all the Purists.

Most of the older dissertations above named, with some others, were published together in a volume by J. Rhenferd, entitled *Dissertationum philol. theol. de Stylo N. Test. Syntagma*, 1702; and the later ones by T. H. Van den Honert, in his *Syntagma Dissertat. de Stylo N. Test. Graeco*, 1703.

2. The Purists in general committed several errors in their efforts to establish the *Graecism* or

classic purity of the New Testament. (a) They not unfrequently named that *Graecism*, which is the common property of all cultivated languages, and so is properly neither *Graecism* nor *Hebraism*.

E. g. in respect to διψῶντες τὴν δικαιοσύνην, Matt. v. 6, examples are adduced from various Greek writers, to show that the verb διψάω is tropically employed by them to signify *strong desire*. But so the corresponding verb in Latin is used; and in most other languages; and, consequently, such a usage is properly neither *Graecism* nor *Hebraism*, etc. The like may be said of ἐσθίειν used to signify *devouring, consuming*, etc.; of γενεὰ for a *particular generation of men*; of χεὶρ as designating *power*; and so of many like words. When Pfochen converted all such expressions into evidences of the *classical* elegance of the New Testament, he made claims which cannot properly be allowed.

As a specimen of the excess to which he carried his *classical* illustrations, we may refer to Matt. x. 27, κηρύσσετε ἐπὶ τῶν δωματίων. To vindicate this he brings from Æsop the following sentence: ἔριφος ἐπὶ τινος δώματος ἰστῶς, *a kid was standing on a certain house*.

(b) They did not make sufficient distinction between mere prosaic and poetic diction; nor between those tropes which are occasionally used and for special purposes, and those which have become the common property of the language.

E. g. to prove from the Greek *poets* that *ποιμάμαι* sometimes means *to be dead*; that *σπίγμα* means *offspring*; *ποιμάνειν*, *to rule*; *ἰδὲν θάνατον*, *to die*; *ποτήριον πίνειν*, *to participate of suffering*; and *πίπτειν*, *to fail, to be frustrated*; would not be to show that the diction of the New Testament, is the classic Greek of *prose*; although Georgi, Schwarz, and others have resorted to such proof.

(c) They did not make proper allowance for Hebraism, when an expression is common to the Hebrew and Greek languages, and when the natural probability is, that the New Testament writers chose the expressions in question from their feelings as Hebrews.

E. g. *γινώσκειν ἄνδρα* probably came from the Heb. *יָדַע אִישׁ*. So *σπλάγχνα*, as meaning *compassion*, *ξηρὰ* *land* in distinction from water, *χεῖλος* *shore*, *στίμα* *edge of the sword*, *παχύνειν* *to be stupid*, *κύριος κυρίων*, *εἰσέρχεται εἰς τὸν κόσμον*, etc., were all introduced, as we may well suppose, from the Hebrew, and they should not be accounted for by any parallels from Herodotus, Aelian, Xenophon, etc.

(d) The same word, if not employed in the same sense, can prove nothing to the purpose of the Purists.

E. g. Pfochen cites *ἦλθε... ἐν νητ μελαίνῃ* to show that *ἐν* is classically used in the New Testament be-

fore the Dat. of *instrument*; whereas in the passage cited it means *in*, not *by*. So χορτάζειν *to feed men*, is illustrated from Plato. Rep. II. where it is used for *feeding swine*; and many other things of the like nature.

(e) *Similar* meanings of words, but yet not fully the same, will not constitute good proof of classic purity.

E. g. εὐρίσκειν χάριν παρὰ τινὰ is not properly confirmed by εὐρίσκειν τὴν εἰρήνην—τὴν δωρεάν which Georgi brings from Demosthenes; ποτήριον *lot, destiny*, is not confirmed by κρατὴρ αἵματος from Aristophanes; nor πίπτειν, *to be frustrated*, by οὐ χαμαὶ πεσεῖται ὃ τι ἂν εἴποις from Plato; nor ἀπὸ μικροῦ ἕως μεγάλου, by οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρόν; nor δύο δύο by πλέον πλέον, etc.

(f) The Byzantine historians cannot be safely appealed to as examples of pure Greek, because the lateness of their productions, and the plain fact that their style was affected by the New Testament, render them unsafe authorities in such a case.

E. g. to confirm the classical use of στηρίζειν τὸ πρόσωπον and ἐνωτρίζεσθαι, as Schwarz has endeavoured to do, by examples out of Nicetas; or ἡ ξηρὰ, *dry land* by Cinnam. Hist. as Georgi has done; is little to the purpose.

(g) It should now be added, that many phrases

of the New Testament, of which the Purists could find no parallel in Greek classic authors, are passed over in silence by them, and kept entirely out of view. No wonder, therefore, that their opponents, the Hebraists, gained a victory in the end, which seemed to be complete. All, however, that was contended for, and that was supposed to be won by the Hebraists, could not afterwards be retained.

NOTE. The best works on the true dialect of the New Testament, are Salmasius, *De Lingua Hellenistica*: Sturtz, *De Dialecto Alexandrina* (1809); and Planck, *De vera Natura et Indole Orat. Graec. N. Test.* [Biblical Cabinet, vol. II.] Almost all the introductions to the New Testament contain more or less in relation to this subject; but none of them can be fully confided in, which were written before the essay by Planck, just mentioned, made its appearance.

(2.) *Ground-element of the New Testament Greek.* When all Greece was united under one dominion, during the time of Alexander the Great and his successors, both the *written* and *spoken* language underwent some change. The first, taking the Attic for its stock, grafted upon it many words that were common and general Greek, and even some provincialisms; this is ἡ κοινὴ διάλεκτος. The second, i. e. the language of intercourse, taking

the same basis, adopted and intermixed more or less words from all the different dialects ; among which the Macedonian dialect was especially the predominant one. It was by the *speaking* of Greek, that the Hebrews in Alexandria and elsewhere became acquainted with this language ; and of course the Greek which they wrote, would partake of the character of the Greek *spoken* in the times succeeding those of Alexander.

NOTE. That the Jews of Alexandria learned Greek by intercourse with those who spoke it there, is manifest from the nature of the case, and from the fact that the Jews, almost without exception, were averse to the *learned* study of the Greek language. Philo and Josephus are among the exceptions. The style of the latter, when compared with that of the LXX. in those parts of his works (for example) which relate to the Old Testament History, shews that he had cultivated the classical Greek of the times ; while the Septuagint exhibits a kind of Greek quite discrepant from that of Philo or of Josephus. Subsequently to the period when the Septuagint version was made, the Greek style of the Jews was of course affected more or less by this version. Hence the apocryphal Greek writings of the Jews, and the New Testament, partake more or less of the style of the Septuagint. Still, as the Septuagint is a *translation* of the Hebrew Scriptures, we might naturally expect it would abound more in Hebraisms than the

writings last named, which were *original* productions; and such is the fact. The New Testament writings are more free from peculiarities as to words or phrases, than the Alexandrine version.

The ground element, then, of the New Testament diction, is the later Greek as modified at Alexandria; i. e. the Attic dialect, modified by the intermixture of words used in other dialects, especially in the dialect of the Macedonians, and as employed in the language of intercourse. In other words, its predominant ingredient is the Attic dialect; while its subordinate constituents are principally the Macedonic dialect, mixed with the peculiarities of those to whom Hebrew was vernacular.

NOTE 2. The κοινή διάλεκτος, then, i. e. the later Greek, as modified by the times which succeeded the period of Alexander's reign, is nearest of all the profane Greek writings to the diction of the New Testament. Hence the study and comparison of the *later* Greek authors is peculiarly important to the interpreter of the New Testament. The difference between their diction and that of the New Testament, arises principally from two sources; viz., first, the Hebrews wrote from their acquaintance with the *conversation-Greek*, which naturally allowed more latitude than the written Greek to departure from the Attic style, and more frequently indulged in the

use of words not classical, in constructions not agreeable to the strict rules of syntax, and in assigning to words new meanings; and secondly, every Jew, in speaking or writing a foreign language, would necessarily introduce many of the idioms of his own vernacular language.

(3.) The peculiarities of the New Testament diction may be classed under two heads, viz. *lexical* and *grammatical*.

1. The lexical relates to the choice of words; the forms of them; the frequency with which they were employed; the new and different meanings assigned to them; and the new formation of them.

(a) Words were chosen from all the dialects; (1) The Attic; e. g. ὕαλος, ὁ σκύτος (masc), ἀεὶς, φιάλη, ἀλήθειν, πρύμνα, ἰλιώς. (2) The Doric; e. g. πιάζω, κλίβανος, ἡ λιμὸς, ποία. (3) Ionic; e. g. γογγύζω, ἐήσσω, πρηνής, βαθυὸς, σκορπίζειν, φύω (intrans.) (4) Macedonic; e. g. παρεμβολή *camp*, ῥύμη *street*. (5) Cyrenaic; e. g. βενὸς *hill*. (6) Syracusan; e. g. εἰπωί (Imper.)

(b) New forms (mostly prolonged ones) were given to words; e. g. ἀνάδεμα (ἀνάδημα), ἔκπαλαι (πάλαι), ἑξαπῖνα (ἑξαπίνης), καύχῃσις (καύχημα), ἀποστασία (ἀπόστασις), πετάομαι (πέτομαι), βιβλιαρίδιον (βιβλίδιον), ὁμνύω (ὁμνυμι), μοιχαλὶς (μοιχάς), etc. etc.

(c) Uncommon or poetic words are used in com-

mon style ; e. g. αὐθένειν, μεσονύκτιον, ἀλλάλητος, ἑσθῆσις, ἀλέκτωρ, βρέχειν *to irrigate*, κοράσιον.

(d) New and different meanings, e. g. παρακαλῆν *to beg*, παιδεύειν *to chastise*, ἀνακλίνειν *to recline at table*, ἀποκριθῆναι *to answer*, ξύλον *living tree*, νέκρωσις, in a passive sense, ὠφώνιον *wages*, πῶμα *corpse*, etc. etc. The New Testament has many such words.

(e) Words were formed *de novo* ; e. g. by composition, as ἀλλοτρισιπίστυκος, ἀνδρωπάρεσκος, μονόφθαλμος, ἀγαθουργῆν, οἰκοδοσοποιῆν, etc. Nouns in -μα are frequently formed ; as κατάλυμα, γέννημα, βάπτισμα ; nouns with συν, as συμμαθητής, συμπολίτης ; adjectives, in -ινος, as ὀρθρινος, ὀψινος, πρωῒνος ; verbs in -όω, as ἀνακαινώ, δολιέω, σθενόω ; also in -ίζω, as δειγματίζω, ὀρδρίζω ; also new forms of adverbs, as πάντοτε, παιδιόθεν, πανοικί, etc. etc.

2. The *grammatical* peculiarities are limited mostly to the forms of nouns and verbs. Some of these in the Hebrew-Greek are new ; or not classically used in certain words ; or are foreign to the Attic book-language. The use of the *dual* is superseded. In a *syntactical* respect, the Hellenistic dialect has little that is peculiar. There are a few examples of verbs constructed with cases different from those that are usual in classic Greek ; conjunctions that elsewhere are joined with the Optative and Subjunctive modes, are here sometimes connected with the Indica-

tive ; the Optative is seldom employed in oblique speech, etc.

NOTE. That each country and even province, where Hebrew-Greek was spoken, had some peculiarities of its own, is almost certain from the nature of the case. But it is difficult for us, at present, to ascertain the limits of these peculiarities. We only know, that in the Hebrew-Greek there are a number of words which are not found in any of the later Greek authors.

(4.) Any nation which continues the use of its own language, and also learns to speak a foreign one, will intermix that foreign one with many idioms of its own. Such was the case, as has already been hinted, with the Jews at Alexandria and in Palestine. The general tone of style, in the writings of these Hebrews, naturally inclined to the Hebrew. Many turns of expression would be merely Hebrew, translated by the corresponding Greek words ; which were altogether intelligible to a Jew, but, scarcely at all so to a native Greek. In a *lexical* respect, also, the native language of a Jew would have much influence. He would naturally extend the meaning of a Greek word, that in a single respect corresponded well to one meaning of a Hebrew

word, so as to make its significations correspond in all respects with those of the Hebrew one. In some cases, the difficulty of fully expressing the Hebrew in Greek words already extant, would lead him to coin new ones, which might better correspond with his own vernacular tongue. In a word, the manner of thinking and feeling, which was peculiar to the Hebrew, would still remain when he spoke or wrote Greek. His style, then, would consist of Hebrew thoughts clothed in Greek costume. But as the native language of Greece was not, and from the nature of the case could not be, so formed as to convey all the conceptions and feelings of Hebrews, no way could be devised of conveying them in Greek, except by some modifications of this language, *i. e.* either by assigning a new sense to words already extant, or by coining new ones. The Hellenists, therefore, have done no more, in general, than the nature of the case compelled them to do, in order to express their ideas in Greek. What they have thus done, constitutes the Hebraism of the Hellenistic dialect:

NOTE. By *Hebrew*, in this case, is meant the *later Hebrew*; made up, in a great measure, of Chaldee and

Syriac, and often called the *Syro-Chaldaic*. The idioms of this, however, are for the most part so like to those of the Hebrew, that no important error will arise from calling them and treating them as Hebrew.

(5.) The reason why the Greek of the Septuagint and the New Testament is called *Hellenistic*, seems to be derived from the usage of the New Testament in naming Jews *Hellenists*, who spoke the Greek language; see Acts vi. 1. It is a matter of no consequence, however, as to the name which we give this dialect. We may call it, indifferently, the *Hebrew-Greek*, or the *Hellenistic dialect*. Joseph Scaliger (in Euseb. p. 134) was the first who gave it this latter name; which has been very generally adopted.

NOTE. The principal books which exhibit collectively the so called *Hebraisms* of the New Testament, are Vorstius, *De Hebraismis*; Leusden, *Philologus Hebraeus*; and Olearius, *De Stylo Nov. Test.* In these and other similar works, however, several errors have been committed. (a) The authors have not paid due attention to the idiom of the Aramean or Syro-Chaldaic language, which was the vernacular tongue of the New Testament writers. (b) They have not accurately observed the difference as to Hebraizing, between the different authors of the New Testament; which, in some cases, is very considerable. (c) They have not shewn the relation of the

New Testament to the Septuagint Greek; which, with all its points of similitude, is still considerably discrepant. (d) They have put much to the account of *Hebraism*, which is the common property of both Greek and Hebrew; yea, of language in general; e. g. φυλάσσειν νόμον, αἷμα *slaughter*, ἀνὴρ with an appellative (as ἀνὴρ φονὴς), παῖς *servant*, μεγαλύνειν *to praise*, etc. (e) They have made some things into *Hebraisms*, by putting a forced construction upon them; e. g. Eph. v. 26, ἐν ῥήματι ἰνα, construed as an equivalent to עַל־דְּבַר אֵין, *in order that*; Matt. xxv. 23, χαρὰν *feast*, like the Arabic فِي تَهْنِئَةٍ; Matt. vi. 1, δικαιοσύνη *alms*, like the Chaldee כְּרִיּוּתָא, etc.

(6.) *Hebraism*, properly so called, may be divided into two kinds, viz., *perfect* and *imperfect*.

(a) **PERFECT HEBRAISM** is that which has no parallel in the native Greek, and which is modelled altogether after the Hebrew.

E. g. σπαραγχνίζεσθαι, ὀφειλήματα ἀφίεναι, πρόσωπον λαμβάνειν, οἰκοδομεῖν *to edify*, πλατύνειν τὴν καρδίαν, πορεύεσθαι ὀπίσω, οὐ πᾶς (for οὐδεὶς), ἐξομολογεῖσθαι ἐν τινι, etc.

(b) **IMPERFECT HEBRAISM** is that which has some parallel in the Greek, but which, having a more perfect one in the Hebrew, was probably derived from the Hebrew idiom.

E. g. *σπέρμα offspring*, from עֶרְוָה; *ἀνάγκη trouble*, from מַצָּח, צָר; *ὡς ἀπάντησιν, לקראת*; *πέραν* *της γῆς, וְאֶפְסֹדֹתָיִם*; *χίλος shore, שָׁפָה* etc. Now although Greek parallels may be found to these expressions, and to others of the like kinds, yet they are not of common occurrence, and therefore the probability is, that the New Testament writers derived them from the Hebrew.

NOTE. The reason of employing both these kinds of Hebraism has been already stated. No Hebrew would divest himself, without much learned training, of the native element of his own peculiar style. When he wrote Greek, he would of course clothe Hebrew conceptions in Greek words. Hence his departures from the native Greek, in cases of perfect Hebraism, Hence too the probability, that in respect to the imperfect Hebraisms he drew from his own native tongue.

(7.) The simple historical style of the Gospels, of the Acts, and of the Apocrypha, exhibits this influence of Hebrew in its most complete state; because here religious technics (which a Hebrew must employ in speaking of religious matters) are less frequent. And here the use of prepositions is more frequent than in native Greek; minute circumstances (like ἐγράφη διὰ χειρὸς παντὸς ἀπὸ μικροῦ ἕως μεγάλου, etc.) are more commonly inserted; and besides this, the accumulation of

pronouns, especially after the relative; the formula *καὶ ἔπειτα* in the transitions of narrative; the simple construction of sentences, in which the parts of a complex one are rather co-ordinate than subordinate; the unfrequency of conjunctions and of the accumulation of connective particles; much uniformity in the use of the tenses; a want of periodic rounding, and of the union of subordinate propositions with the main one; the unfrequent use of participial constructions in the widely extended latitude of the native Greek; the direct citations of another's words in narration where the Greeks commonly employ the indirect one; the neglect of the Optative mood—all these things characterize the Hellenistic Greek, and separate it from that which is common among classic authors.

NOTE. The Hebraisms of the New Testament, as has been stated above, are divisible into perfect and imperfect. This division has reference to their internal nature. But if we look at the sources whence they are derived, or the causes which operated to produce them, we may class these under four distinct heads, each of which deserve particular notice.

(a.) Where the original and fundamental meaning of a Greek and Hebrew word were the same, a Hebrew name naturally attached the same secondary or

derived meanings to the Greek word as belonged to the Hebrew one; e. g. δικαιοσύνη and צְדָקָה agree in their original meaning, and so it was natural for the Hebrew to attach to δικαιοσύνη the secondary sense of *liberality, kindness*, because צְדָקָה sometimes bore this meaning. So ὀφείλημα, not only *debt* but *sin*, like the Aramean חֻבָּה; so νύμφη, *bride* and also *daughter in law*, like בִּלְהָ; εἷς *one* and *first*, like אֶחָד; ἐξομολογεῖσθαι τινι, *to praise one*, like הוֹדָה לְ; ἔρω-τᾶν, *to ask* and also *to beg*, like שָׁאַל. Very frequent is this usage in regard to a secondary sense which is *tropical*; e. g. ποτήριον, *cup* and *lot*, like כּוֹס; σκάνδαλον, *offence* in a moral sense, like מַכְשׁוֹל; γλῶσσα, *tongue* and *nation*, like לָשׁוֹן; ἐνώπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ *in the view or judgment of God*, like לִפְנֵי יְהוָה; ἀνάθεμα, *that which is devoted to destruction*, like the Hebrew חֶרֶם, etc. etc.

(b.) Peculiar Hebrew phrases were literally translated by corresponding Greek words, which, when put together, constitute an idiom altogether foreign to native Greek; e. g. πρόσωπον λαμβάνειν for נִשָּׂא פָנִים; ζητεῖν ψυχὴν for בִּקֵּשׁ נַפְשׁ; πεινῆ ἔλεος (or χάριν) μετὰ τινος for עֲשֵׂה חֶסֶד עִם; ἄρτον φαγεῖν (*to sup*) from אָכַל לֶחֶם; υἱὸς θανάτου for בֶּן־מוֹת; ὀφείλημα ἀφίεναι for שָׁבַק חֻבָּא (Talmudic); πᾶσα σὰρξ for כָּל בָּשָׂר; etc. etc.

(c) Derivate Greek verbs were formed so as to correspond with derivate Hebrew ones; e. g. *σπλάγχνα* from *סְפִלְפִלָּה*; *ἐγκαίνια* from *חֲנֻכָּה*; *ἀναθεματίζειν* from *אָנָּה מְאֵד*, like *הִקְדִּישׁ* from *קָדַשׁ*, etc. etc.

(d) The religious views and feelings of the writers of the New Testament occasioned a kind of *technical* use of many Greek words, in a sense quite different from that of classical usage; e. g. such words as *ἔργα πίστεως*, *πιστεύειν εἰς Χριστόν*, *δικαιοῦσθαι*, *ἐκλήγασθαι*, *οἱ ἅγιοι*, *ἀπόστολος*, *βάπτισμα*, *δικαιοσύνη*, and many others, used particularly by Paul in his epistles. This was altogether unavoidable; inasmuch as the classic Greek could furnish no words, which, according to the *usus loquendi* of the Greek, would convey the ideas of a Hebrew in relation to these subjects.

(8.) As to the *grammatical* character of the New Testament diction, in general this does not differ from that of the later Greek. The common laws of syntax are applicable almost throughout; at least, there is seldom any departure from them. Even some of the nicer peculiarities of the Greek language, such as the attraction of the relative pronoun, and the distinction between *οὐ* and *μή* in negations, (which are quite remote from the Hebrew idiom), are

somewhat strictly observed. The peculiarities of the later Greek itself (which also belong to the New Testament) consist more in the forms of words, and the use of peculiar tenses, than in any diverse *principles* of syntax. In all parts of the New Testament, indeed, Hebrew modes of thinking and feeling, of course develope themselves. In the *grammatical* mode of expressing these, however, the most important variation from the native Greek is, that prepositions are more commonly employed in the government of nouns, etc., than was usual among Greek authors.

NOTE 1. The meaning of words changes much easier than the forms; the forms much easier than the syntax; so that while the later Greek (and consequently the New Testament Greek) admitted many variations in the meaning and even in the forms of words, it still retained the common syntax, with some little enlargement. Accordingly we find, in the New Testament, several forms which were not current, at an early period, or else belong to some of the dialects. Of the latter are (a) *Attic* forms, such as ἡβουλήθην (η for the augment), ἡμελλε, βούλει (2nd pers. for βούλη), ὅψει; (b) *Doric*, as ἦτω (for ἔστω); ἀφίωνται (for ἀφείνται); (c) *Aeolic*, such as the Opt. in -εια of Aor. 1st. (d) *Ionic*, as γήρει, εἴπα (Aor. I.) Of the forms not used in the more ancient language,

we may cite the Dative, *τοῖς*, Imp. *κάθου*, Perf. *ἔγνωσαν* (for *ἐγνώκασιν*), Aor. 2 *κατελίποσαν*, Imperf. *ἰδοιοῦσαν*, Aor. 2 *εἶδαμεν*, *ἔφυγον*. The regular forms of tenses, in certain verbs, not employed more anciently, are employed in the New Testament; e. g. *ἡμάρτησα* (for *ἡμαρτην*), *αἶξω* (for *αἰξάνω*), *ἤξα* (for *ἤκω*), *φάγομαι* (for *ἔδομαι*), etc. In consequence of this, there is an increase of the forms of verbs and of the tenses actually employed in the later Greek. To all this must be added, that a new gender is assigned to some nouns; e. g. *ὁ* (instead of *ἡ*) *βάτος*; *τὸ ἔλεος*, *τὸ πλοῦτος* (neut. instead of masc.), which casts them into the 3d instead of the 2d declension.

NOTE 2. As to *Syntax*, the peculiarities consist mostly in using *ὅταν*, in a few cases with the Ind. Praeter; *εἰ* with the Subj.; *ἵνα* with the Ind. Pres.; the construction of such verbs as *γεύεσθαι* with the Acc., *προσκυνεῖν* with the Dat.; such formulas as *Δίλω ἵνα*, *ἄξιός ἵνα* (instead of the Inf.); the employment of the Subj. instead of the Opt. in historical diction and after the Praeter; and in general the rare employment of the Opt., (which has entirely disappeared in modern Greek). Moreover the Inf. Aor. is oftener used after *μίλλειν*, *δίλειν*, etc.; and a disregard to declension (so conspicuous in modern Greek) appears just in its inceptive state; e. g. *εἷς καθεῖς, καθεῖς ἀνὰ εἷς, εἷς παρ' εἷς*. A similar disregard to case and tense also appears in a few cases. The Dual is altogether neglected.

Even the Seventy, in their version, have in general conformed to the Greek Syntax. Some depar-

tures from a diction purely Greek would of course be expected. Instead of the Opt., they say (with the Hebrew,) *τίς με καταστήσεται κριτήν* ; They also say : *θανάτῳ ἀποθανεῖσθαι, מוֹת תָּמוּתוֹן* ; *μισῶν ἐμίσησας,*

שָׂנֵא שָׂנֵא. They also imitate, in some cases,

the Hebrew composite verbs, (which are made by a preposition following them) ; as *φείδεται ἐπὶ τινι, οἰκοδομεῖν ἐν τινι, ἐπερωτᾷ ἐν κυρίῳ*, etc. The New

Testament, however, which is not a *translation* of the Hebrew, but an *original* work, is more free from these peculiarities. Yet in general, even here, the

the use of prepositions is more frequent than with

the Greeks, viz. in such cases as *ἀποκρύπτειν τι ἀπὸ*

τινος, ἐσθίειν ἀπὸ τῶν ψυχίων, ἀθῶος ἀπὸ τοῦ αἵματος,

κοινωνῶς ἐν τινι, etc. ; the like to which may indeed

be found in the ancient Greek. But in some cases

the imitation of the Hebrew has led the writers of the

New Testament to adopt expressions which would

sound in a singular manner to a native Greek ; e. g.

(a) Such as *ὁμολογεῖν ἐν τινι, βλέπειν ἀπὸ* *to beware of,*

προσέειπε πέμψαι *to send again*, and the form of the

oath in the *negative* sense, *εἰ δοθήσεται*. (b) The re-

petition of the same word, in order to signify distri-

bution ; as *δύο δύο* *two by two*, (instead of *ἀνὰ δύο*).

(c) The frequent and varied use of the Inf. with *τοῦ*

before it. (d) The imitation of the Inf. abs. in He-

brew joined with a definitive mood and tense ; as in

μισῶν ἐμίσησας above. (e) The frequency of nouns in

the Gen., which stand in the place of adjectives.

(f) The often repeated use of the Inf. with a preposi-

tion in historical narration. Nos. a, b, may be classed

among the *pure* Hebraisms. The rest are to be found in native Greek, although not with the like frequency.

(9.) On the whole, when we consider that many of even the niceties of Greek syntax are observed in the New Testament, *e. g.* the separation in the use of the Praeter tenses, the construction of verbs with *αἰ*, the attraction of the relative pronoun, the singular number of the verb with *neuter* plurals, such idioms also as *οἰκονομίαν πεπίστευμαι*, etc.; moreover, the periphrasis for the Opt. which the Seventy use, is here not employed; there is, in fact, very little reason for the charge of *ungrammatical* composition against the writers of the New Testament. Much has been said, on this subject, by writers for and against the *purity* of the New Testament, which is very inapposite, or has little foundation. Patient, protracted, and widely extended examination, has at last corrected the errors of both parties, and brought the whole matter very near to the middle ground which those consummate Greek scholars, Robert Stephens and Theodore Beza, seem first to have occupied.



ON THE
SYNTAX
OF THE
NEW TESTAMENT DIALECT.

There are various methods of arranging a Syntax ; but the most facile, and that which is more usually followed of late, is to treat of the parts of speech in the natural order in which they would occur to the mind ; the noun with its various adjuncts coming first ; then the verb with its various moods, tenses, regimen, etc. ; and lastly, the various particles which serve as a modification of these. Special peculiarities of phraseology, etc., may then be annexed.

ARTICLE.

§ 1. THE ARTICLE BEFORE LEADING NOUNS.

(1.) The article is a declinable part of speech, which, when employed, is usually prefixed to nouns, adjectives, or participles, for the purpose of specification or emphasis.

NOTE 1. *Specification* may be either on account of *individuality*, i. e. when one individual is distinguish-

ed from others of the same species, or when one species or genus is distinguished from other species or genera ; or it may be on account of quality, attributes, condition, actions, circumstances, etc., in which case the attributes, etc., are as it were individualized or specified, when the article is employed ; e. g. *ὁ ἀετὸς the eagle*, when one is distinguished from several of the same kind ; *ὁ ἀετὸς or οἱ ἀετοί*, when either the singular or plural is used *generically*, so as to distinguish this species of birds from other species. Other specifications of attributes, etc., are such as follow ; viz., *εἰσὶν οἱ λέγοντες there are [some] who say*, where this class of persons is distinguished by the particular action attributed to them in *λέγοντες*. So *οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ ἡγησόμενος there is no one who will lead*, where this action of leading is made to distinguish the individual who performs it ; *ὁ σπείρων the sower, ὁ πυράζων the tempter*, etc., in which latter cases we convert the participles into mere nouns in translating them. The cases of specification which belong to the class above named, are almost without number ; e. g. *ὁ ἀγαθὸς or οἱ ἀγαθοί, ὁ κακὸς or οἱ κακοί* and so *οἱ φιλοσοφῶντες, οἱ ἀποφυγόντες, οἱ δοκοῦντες*, etc. ; almost all adjectives and participles being capable of such a use, because they are attributives ; and so, likewise, a multitude of attributive nouns, as *ὁ βαπτιστής, ὁ βασιλεὺς, ὁ ἡγεμὼν, ὁ χιλιάρχος*, etc.

NOTE 2. The article, it should be understood, is not rigidly confined to nouns, adjectives, and participles ; but when adverbs, the Inf. mode, a part of a sentence, etc., take the place of a noun or adjective

i.e. become so *ad sensum*, then the article may be, and often is, prefixed to them.

(2.) The article, (*a*) Is usually placed before nouns that designate any thing which is *single* or *monadic* in its kind, or which (from the nature of the case) is deemed by the speaker or writer to be single.

E.g. ὁ οὐρανός, ἡ γῆ, ὁ ἥλιος, ἡ σελήνη δικαιοσύνη, ἡ φιλοσοφία, ἡ αἰρετή, τὸ καλόν, τὸ κακόν, etc.

(*b*) But on the very ground that these things are so definite in their nature as to leave no room for mistake, the article is often omitted where it might be inserted.

E.g. in the New Testament ἥλιος, γῆ, οὐρανός, θάλασσα, νῦξ, ἀγορά, ἀγρός, θεός, πνεῦμα, ἅγιον, πατήρ, ἀπὸρ, πρόσωπον, ἐκκλησία, δέσποιν, θάνατος, θύρα, νόμος, νεκροί, κόσμος, διάβολος, ὥρα, ἀρχή, κύριος also δικαιοσύνη, ἀγάπη, πίστις, κακία, πλεονεξία, ἁμαρτία, etc., although *monadic*, are more or less frequently employed *without* the article, as may be seen by reference to the Greek Concordance.

NOTE 1. On the ground of *single* objects may be placed the proper names of individuals, countries, cities, rivers, etc.; which, as is universally acknowledged, employ or omit the article almost *ad libitum scriptoris*. In the New Testament, the names of *countries* and *rivers* more frequently take the article

than the names of *towns*. The names of *persons* vary so much, that no general principle can be stated; excepting that where the names are indeclinable, it might naturally be expected that the article would be added in order to distinguish the case. This often happens, but not always; see in Matt. i. 1—16, where throughout vers. 2—16, both usages are developed. And so elsewhere.

(3.) When a word not definite and specific in itself, is rendered so by some adjunct, (pronoun, adjective, participle, noun, or noun with a preposition, etc.), it may, like monadic nouns, admit or reject the article.

E. g. in Matt. iii. we find in quick succession, ταῖς ἡμέραις ἐκείναις, τῇ ἐρήμῳ τῆς Ἰουδαίας, ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν, τὴν ὁδὸν κυρίου, τὰς τρίβους αὐτοῦ, τὸ ἔνδυμα αὐτοῦ, τὴν ὁσφὺν αὐτοῦ, ἡ τροφή αὐτοῦ, τὰς ἀμαρτίας αὐτῶν, etc.; most of these nouns, being in their own nature indefinite, are here made specific by the adjuncts united with them.

On the contrary; ἐπὶ πρόσωπον αὐτῶν, Matt. xvii. 6; ἐν βραχίονί αὐτοῦ, Luke i. 51; ἐν δεξιᾷ αὐτοῦ; Eph. i. 20; ἀπὸ ὀφθαλμῶν σου, Luke xix. 42; τοῦ κυρίου, 1 Cor. ii. 16; ἐν πλὴν Δαυὶδ, Luke ii. 11; ἡμέραν κρείττω, 2 Pet. ii. 9; πύλην φυλακῆς, Acts xii. 10; all without the article. And thus also saepe!

(4.) When, from the nature of the case, the speaker or writer can be supposed to mean only

one particular object, the article is *usually* prefixed; although even here, in some instances, where there is no danger of mistake, the article is sometimes omitted.

NOTE 1. The cases of this nature may be resolved principally into two classes; viz. either, (a) Well known or celebrated objects; e. g. τὸ ποτήριον, in Matt. xxvi. 27, means *the cup* by which drink was usually served at the table; τὸν νηπῆρα in John xiii. 5, *the wash-bason* which was usually placed in a guest-chamber; τῷ ὑπηρέτῃ in Luke iv. 20, *the servant* who usually waited in the synagogue; τοὺς ἀγγέλους in James ii. 25, the well known *spies*, etc. Cases of this nature are very frequent, and are not always to be judged of by the knowledge which the reader may possess. Enough that the objects were *well known*, or *definitely conceived of*, by the writer and his cotemporaries. Not unfrequently, merely *implied* antithesis occasions the use of the article; and then special stress is of course intended to be laid upon the noun which it accompanies; as John vii. 24, τὴν δικαίαν κρίσιν κρίνατε, *judge the righteous judgment*, in opposition to that which is unrighteous. When antithesis is expressed, of course it justifies the same usage in respect to the article; as πόλεμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ κινδύνων, without the article; but when spoken in the way of *contrast*, the usage would be different, as ὁ πόλεμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ κινδύνων, ἡ δὲ εἰρήνη ἀκίνδυνος.

(b) Objects that have already been mentioned, either directly or indirectly; e. g. directly, as Matt.

i. 20 ἄγγελος, i. 24 ὁ ἄγγελος; Matt. ii. 1 μάγος, ii. 7 τοὺς μάγους Matt. xiii. 25 ζιζάνια, xiii. 26 τὰ ζιζάνια Luke ix. 13 πάντες ἄγριοι καὶ ἰχθύες δύο, ix. 16 τοὺς πάντας ἄγριους καὶ τοὺς δύο ἰχθύας; and so often, every where. *Indirect* mention also admits the article; e.g. Eph. vi. 12, ἡ πάλη *the contest*, viz., the one implied by what is said in ver. 10, 11; τῇ οἰκίᾳ, Acts ix. 17; refers to what is said in ver. 11; τὸν ἄγγελον, Acts xvi. 13, refers to the ἄγγελος mentioned in Acts x. 3, 22.

NOTE 2. The reader must not suppose the above rules in *a*, *b*, to be imperious in all cases. Whenever a speaker or writer chose to employ a word already mentioned, in a sense less specific, or when (from the nature of the case) there was no danger in respect to its being regarded as specific, provided it really was so, he could omit the article; e. g. Matt. xiii. 27, ζιζάνια, which had been already twice mentioned, but which in this case required a somewhat more indefinite sense.

(5.) The *subject* of a proposition, (*a*) More usually takes the article, and the *predicate* omits it. But, (*b*) Sometimes the reverse of this is the case. (*c*) Sometimes both subject and predicate take it or omit it.

E. g. (*a*) Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος, John i. 1, where ὁ λόγος is the subject; ὁ μισῶν τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ ἀνθρωποκτόνος ἐστίν, 1 John iii. 15; and thus in a multitude of cases, because in general the subject of a proposition is specific, and the predicate is not so, but is designed

merely to mark quality, state, condition, character, etc., without individuality in the mode of expression.

(b) Often a pronoun demonstrative or personal, without the article, is employed as the Nom. or subject, while the predicate has the article; as αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀγγελία, 1 John iii. 11; οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ εἰκων, Mark vi. 34; ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν οἱ λαλοῦντες, Mark xiii. 11; et saepe alibi.

(c) The third case is very common; e. g. ἡ ἀμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία, 1 John iii. 4; ἡ ἐκβολὴ ἡ παλαιά ἐστιν ὁ λόγος κ. τ. λ. 1 John ii. 7; ἡ κεφαλὴ ὁ Χριστός ἐστὶν, 1 Cor. xi. 3, ἡ δὲ πύρα ἡ ὁ Χριστός, 1 Cor. x. 4; ἡ ζωὴ ἡν ἐν τῷ φῶς, John i. 4; and thus in a multitude of cases. On the contrary, both subject and predicate sometimes omit the article; as πολλοὶ γὰρ εἰσι κληροί, Matt. xx. 16; Id. xxii. 14; and so in the classics: αἰτία τούτων φύσις ἀγαθή, Ael. Animal. III. 24; thus the proverbs, πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀνθρώπου and καλὸς Θεσαυρὸς . . . χάρις ἐφειλομένη.

From facts such as these, it appears that the subject and predicate, *as such*, neither take nor reject the article; but the addition or omission of it depends entirely on the *specificness* of words employed.

(6.) Nouns in apposition, explanatory of a preceding noun, usually take the article; but sometimes it is omitted.

E. g. Ἀγγέλως ὁ Βασιλεὺς, Ἰωάννης ὁ Βαπτιστής, etc. But, on the other hand; Σίμων Βυρσεύς, Acts x. 32; Ἄνα προφήτης, Luke ii. 36; Γάιος Δερεβαῖος, Acts xx. 4; Τιβερίου Καίσαρος, Luke iii. 1; Φαραὼ Βασιλεύς,

Acts vii. 10, etc. Both of these usages are common in the classics. In cases where the object of the noun in apposition is to mark something specific and individual, which is altogether appropriate to the person or thing named, the article is employed; but when there is no special design of this nature, it may be omitted, as in *Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος, Βρέγος Γαλατῶν βασιλεύς*, etc. In the classics, indeed, examples are not wanting, where the article in such cases even stands before the first noun, and is omitted before the second; as *ὁ Ἄλφς ποταμός*, Herod. I. 72, 75; *τὸν Τηρίαν ποταμὸν*, Thucyd. VI. 50; *τὸν Χρύσην ἀρητήρα*, Hom. Il. α, 11, et alibi.

(7.) Verbs signifying *to be* or *to call*, usually take *anarthrous* nouns, i. e. nouns without the article after them; but this custom is not uniform.

E.g. *ἐν σῶμά ἐστι, ἐν πνεύμα ἐστι, οὐκ ἔστι φόβος*, Matt. v. 9, *οἱ τοῦ θεοῦ κληθῆσονται* Matt. xxiii. 10, *μηδὲ κληθῆτε καθιγῆται* and thus often. On the contrary; *λέγεται ὁ ἄψινδος*, Rev. viii. 11; *καλεῖται ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ*, Rev. xix. 13. So Xen. *Cyrop.* III. 3, 4, *ἀνακαλοῦντες τὸν εὐεργέτην τὸν ἄνδρα πρὸν ἀγαθόν*. See also *Anab.* VI. 7. *Matth. Gramm.* § 268. Examples of the article after the substantive verb, see above under No. 5.

(8.) When the gender of nouns in the same case connected together, is *different*, if the article

stands before the first noun, it is commonly inserted before the second, etc.; but this practice is not uniform.

E. g. τὰς σεβόμενας γυναῖκας . . . καὶ τοὺς πρώτους τῆς πόλεως, Acts xiii. 50: ἐν τοῖς παραπτώμασι καὶ τῇ ἀκροβυσσίᾳ, Col. ii. 13; τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὴν ἰσότητά, Col. iv. 1; et alibi saepe. Yet the contrary usage exists; e. g. τὰ ἑτάλματα καὶ διδασκαλίας, Col. ii. 22; εἰς τὰς ὁδοὺς καὶ φραγμοὺς, Luke xiv. 23; τὴν δύναμιν καὶ πλοῦτον, Rev. v. 12; Luke i. 6; xiii. 49, et al. So Plato: οἱ παῖδές τε καὶ γυναῖκες· ὁ σωφρονῶν καὶ σωφρονούσα, et al.

(49.) Nouns connected in the same case and the same gender, usually omit the article after the first noun; but not unfrequently they insert it.

E. g. μετὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων καὶ γραμματέων, Mark xv. 1; διὰ τῆς φιλοσοφίας καὶ κενῆς ἀπάτης, Col. ii. 8; ἐπὶ τῇ θυσίᾳ καὶ λειτουργίᾳ, Phil. ii. 17, et alibi saepe. And the like in respect to adjectives and participles; e. g. τὸν ἁγίον καὶ δίκαιον, Acts. iii. 14; and so Acts ii. 20, etc. Participles; οἱ . . . λατρεύοντες καὶ καυχώμενοι . . . καὶ . . . πιστεύοντες, Phil. iii. 8; and so in John xxi. 24, et al. saepe.

Yet the contrary usage is almost equally common; e. g. οἱ ἀρχιερεῖς καὶ οἱ ὑπηρέται, John xix. 6; τῶν ἀρχιερέων καὶ τῶν ὑποκόπων, Luke viii. 24. Luke xi. 37, et al. saepe. The general principle seems to be, that

where the particulars belong to one genus, the article is not repeated; but where they are entirely separate, it is inserted. Yet this principle is very often violated; as appears by the examples above, and as is manifested from the best Greek writers; see Matth. Gramm. § 268, Anmerk. 1.

GENERAL REMARK. Such are the general principles respecting the article, when employed, or not employed, as connected with the leading or principal nouns in a sentence. The subordinate uses of it remain to be developed. In the mean time the student should well note, that the Greeks have three distinct methods of exhibiting their views in regard to the *definiteness* or *indefiniteness* of any object. For example; ζῷον means *animal*, i. e. every and any animal; τὸ ζῷον means *the animal*, i. e. a specific individual in a certain condition or with certain particular attributes; ζῷον τι means *an animal*, i. e. a particular beast, or an individual beast, considered simply as individual, but not as distinguished by particular attributes or conditions, etc. Τίς, τί, is called the *indefinite article*, and it stands *after* its noun; while the *definite article* ὁ, ἡ, τὸ stands *before* it.

§ 2. ARTICLE WITH ADJECTIVES.

(1.) An adjective qualifying any noun, may be placed either between the article and its noun, or after the noun. In the last case, the general rule is, that if the noun has the article, the adjective must adopt it.

E. g. τὸ ἄγιον πνεῦμα, οἱ ἀληθινοὶ προσκυνηταί etc. More usually the adjective is placed *after* the noun ; as ἡ ζωὴ ἡ αἰώνιος, ἡ πόλις ἡ μεγάλη, ὁ ἀνδρεωπος ὁ ἀγαθός, etc. Cases of both kinds occur every where and more examples are unnecessary.

(2.) Different from the cases in No. 1, are all those cases in which the adjective is the *predicate* of a sentence. Here it usually and naturally dispenses with the article, and more commonly (not always) precedes the noun or pronoun to which it bears a relation.

E. g. καλὸς ὁ νόμος οὐ καλὸν τὸ καύχημα· τοῦτό ἐστι καλόν. As the adjective in this case does not in reality agree with the noun expressed, it may be of a different number or gender, when the writer pleases; like the Latin : *Varium et mutabile semper femina*, and so the Greek ποικίλ' μὲν γυνή.

(3.) In nearly all the cases in which the noun has an article, and the adjective has not the po-

sition and adjunct article described in No. 1, it must be regarded as a *predicate*, after a verb or participle expressed or understood. But there is a class of cases comparatively small, in respect to which the question, how they are to be construed, seems hardly to be settled.

E. g. τὸ γὰρ πνεῦμα ἁγίον, (so Griesbach and Schott); Luke xii. 12; 1 Cor. x. 3, τὸ αὐτὸ βρώμα πνευματικόν τὸ αὐτὸ πόμα πνευματικόν Gal. i. 4, τοῦ ἐνεστώτος αἰῶνος ποτηροῦ 1 John v. 20, ἡ ζωὴ αἰώνιος. In the classics a large number of the like constructions are found, which are copiously exhibited in Matthiae's Gramm. § 277, *b*. Some of these are as follows: 'It is proper for me to speak μὴ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔργοις καλοῖς, *concerning works not good*,' Eurip. Phenis. 540; ὁ μάντις τοὺς λόγους ψευδεῖς λέγει, Soph. Oedip. Tyr. 526; ποτηροῖς καὶ τοῖς λόγοις καὶ τοῖς πράγμασι χρώμενοι, Isoc. [Orell.] § 208. So in Buttmann (§ 125 Note 3), ὅλην τὴν νύκτα ἔχει τὸν πελέκυν ὀξύτατον ἐπ' ἄκροις τοῖς ὄρεσι ἦδ' ἐπὶ πλουσίοις τοῖς πόλεσι. The reader will perceive, that the adjective in this class of cases may precede or follow the noun with the article. In these and all the like cases, Matthiae and Buttmann propose to make the adjective a kind of predicate; e. g. "the prophet speaks words *which are false*;" "making use of words and actions *which are bad*;" "he has an axe *which is very sharp*," &c. But if we may solve all these cases in such a way, we may do the same in respect to all other adjectives, especially such as follow the noun; e. g. ὁ ἀνδραγαθὸς ὁ ἀγαθός, *the man*

who is good; nay, this comes actually nearer than any other version, to the exact shape of the Greek, the so called article before the adjective assuming the nature of a relative pronoun. Moreover, how shall we render $\tauὴν νύκτα$, following the principles of these grammarians? *The night which is whole*, i. e. unbroken, undivided, would not give the sense of the Greek, which means, 'the whole time of the night, season without any subtraction.' More discussion, therefore, would seem to be necessary, before $\tauὸ πνεῦμα ἅγιον$ in Luke xii. 12, is changed by reasoning about the errors of scribes into $\tauὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα$, as it is by Knapp and others; and before we are at liberty to give an unnatural and strained emphasis to adjectives thus conditioned.

(4.) Nothing is more common, than the use of the article with adjectives which are not connected with any noun expressed. Such an usage indicates, that they are *substantively* employed; but at the same time it is regulated by the usual principles of specification.

Εἰς γὰρ ἀγῶνις, οἱ κακοί, οἱ ἄγιοι, and particularly the neuter sing. and often the plural, as $\tauὸ καλὸν$, $\tauὸ κακόν$, $\tauὸ γυναικῆ$, $\tauὰ ἀνθρώπων$, $\tauὰ δόγματα$, etc. The neuter thus employed is very commonly used in the place of abstract nouns; and often for adverbs.

NOTE I. The article here, as in the case of nouns,

can be omitted if the expression is designed to be indefinite; e. g. *Odys. 9', 195, ἀλαδς a blind man.*

§ 3. ARTICLE WITH PARTICIPLES.

(1.) As participles in numerous cases become adjectives, or at least partake largely of the nature of adjectives, so the construction of them in respect to the article, is, nearly throughout, like that of adjectives.

E. g. (a) They are placed *between* the article and its noun; as ὁ τεχθεὶς βασιλεύς, *Matt. ii. 2*; τοῦ φαινομένου ἀστέρος, *Matt. ii. 7*; τῆς μελλούσης ὁργῆς, *Matt. iii. 7*; τὸν λεγόμενον Πάτρον, *Matt. iv. 18*; et al. *saepe*. (b) They are placed *after* the noun, and with the article when the noun has it; as ὁ θεός . . . ὁ καλέσας, *1 Peter v. 10*; τῷ θεῷ τῷ δοκιμάζοντι, *1 Thess. ii. 4. Acts i. 11*. In cases of this nature the participle is usually translated as a verb; e. g. *God who called; God who trieth*, etc., while the article in such cases is treated as a *relative* pronoun. The simple grammatical construction, however, is altogether like that of the adjective, § 2. 1 above. (c) The cases are exceedingly numerous, where the participle seems to retain so much of the *verbal* construction, that it dispenses with the article, even when agreeing with nouns that take it; e. g. τὸν ἄνδρα . . . συλληφθέντα, *Acts xxiii. 27*; ὁ θεός ἀναστήσας, *Acts iii. 26*; τοῦ εὐαγγελιστοῦ ὄντος, *Acts xxi. 8*. Of course we may expect that *the article will be omitted where the noun omits it*; and such is usually the

fact, as ἐκείνους Πίερος, Acts i. 15; but oftentimes a definite or monadic noun omits the article, and then the participle may take it if the sense require it, as Acts i. 23, Ἰωσήφ τὸν καλούμενον, etc. (d) Where no substantive is expressed, and where a participle begins a sentence, or a clause in one, and has the nature of a verb, it is a matter of course to omit the article; as προσευξάμενοι εἶπον, Acts i. 23; ἐλθὼν ἐπίθες τὴν χεῖρά σου, etc., Matt. ix. 18; and so al. saepe.

(2.) The participle, like the adjective, usually takes the article when it is employed as a noun; or is used (without a noun subjoined) in order to distinguish any particular person or object, or to designate any particular class of men or things by their qualities or actions.

E. g. ὁ πειράζων, ὁ σπείρων, οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες, οἱ ἀπορρογόντες, οἱ ἀπεισταλμένοι, etc.

NOTE 1. But here also, as in the case of adjectives, if the object be not *specific*, the article may be omitted, even according to the best Greek usage; e. g. βοήσας *one who cries, a crier*, Odys. v. 473; νοήσας *an intelligent person*, Hes. Ery. init.; ὁμολογῶν *any one who confesses*, Lys. p. 104, 28; and Plato even commingles both constructions in the following sentence: διαφέρει δὲ πάμπλου μαδῶν μὴ μαδόντος, καὶ ὁ γυμνασάμενος μὴ γεγυμνασμένου, *he differs much who has learned, from him who has not learned, and he who has practiced, from him who is not practiced*. Matt. § 556, 4.

GENERAL REMARK. Commonly the article is *not* employed with participles, (excepting in such cases as No. 2), unless the writer designs to convey some special emphasis, or to lay some particular stress upon the idea which they designate. The cases in which the article is omitted exceed almost immeasurably those in which it is exhibited; and even those in which it is exhibited, are not of so imperious a nature as to suffer no exceptions. In most cases it depends, plainly, more on the particular design and subjective views of the writer, than it does on the nature of the word itself, whether the article shall be inserted or omitted. It may be added, that the near resemblance of participles to adjectives, and the numerous cases in which the former are coupled with nouns while they omit the article, may help to cast some light on the contested case of adjectives, presented in § 3, 3 above.

§ 4. ARTICLE BEFORE OTHER ADJUNCTS TO PRINCIPAL NOUNS.

(1.) A multitude of leading nouns have adjuncts which qualify them, or are exegetical in their nature; and thus they partake of the nature of adjectives. Such adjuncts are disposed of in the same way as adjectives, in regard to the article.

E. g. (a) Such adjuncts are put between the article and the noun; as τὸ ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ πάντες ταῖς ἐν διαστροφῇ φυλαῖς τὰ ἐν σαρκὶ ἔσθῃ, etc. In all such cases the

adjuncts are, to all intents and purposes, adjectives *ad sensum*. (b) They are put *after* the principal noun, and usually (but not always) with the article before them when the noun has the article; as τῆς διακονίας τῆς εἰς τοὺς ἀγίους, 2 Cor. viii. 4; τοῖς ... ἀδελφοῖς τοῖς ἐξ Ἐβρῶν, Acts xv. 23; James i. 1. Rom. iv. 11, et saepe alibi. (c) The adjunct sometimes has the article when the principal noun omits it; and *vice versa*; e. g. πιστεῖ τῇ εἰς ἐμέ, Acts xxvi. 18; ἔργων τῶν ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ, Tit. iii. 5; 2 Tim. i. 13, et saepe al., see Winer § xix. 4. *Vice versa*; τῶν συγγενῶν μου κατὰ σάρκα, Rom. ix. 3; τὰ ἔθνη ἐν σαρκί, Eph. ii. 11; 2 Cor. vii. 7. Col. i. 4. 1 Cor. x. 18. And so Polyb. III. xlviii. 11, τὴν ἀλλοτριότητα πρὸς Ῥωμαίους, et al. saepe.

NOTE 1. It will be understood, of course, that where the principal noun *omits* the article, the adjunct more commonly omits it also; as εἰς μετάληψιν μετὰ εὐχαριστίας, 1 Tim. iv. 3; 1 Tim. i. 5. Rom. xiv. 17, et al. saepe.

(2.) The adjuncts taken into view above, are all in some oblique case governed by a preposition. But the most common adjunct of all is the Gen. case connected with the principal noun, and which is disposed of, in respect to the article, nearly in the same way as adjectives are, or as the cases already mentioned in No. 1.

E. g. (a) The Gen. is put between the article and

its noun, as ὁ τῆς στρατίας ἡγέτης, τὰ τῆς πόλεως πρᾶγματα, τὴν τοῦ ῥήτορος τέχνην, etc. (b) The Gen. is usually put after the principal noun ; and this, either without or with repeating the article which belongs to the principal noun. The predominant construction is without this repetition ; as ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ (not ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ) ; and thus in cases without number. But we find also (although not often in the New Testament), such constructions as repeat the article of the principal noun ; e. g. ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ τῆς Κυθῆς (Anac.) ; ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων, Plat. Georg. p. 481 ; τὰ τεῖχην τὰ Ἀθηναίων, id. p. 455, et al. saepe.

NOTE 1. Usually *both* nouns, in such a case, have or omit the article. But this is not a necessary rule ; for often the first noun is *anarthrous*, while the second noun has the article ; and sometimes *vice versa* ; e. g. ἐν μέσῳ τῶν ἀκανθῶν, Luke viii. 7 ; ἡδονῶν τοῦ βίου, Luke viii. 14 ; Luke viii. 41. Phil. ii. 25, et al. saepe. In the examples above, viz. τὰ τεῖχην τὰ Ἀθηναίων, ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων, etc., the noun in the Gen. omits the article. It does not seem to depend merely on the *relation* of the two nouns, whether they shall both take or both reject the article ; but on the nature of each noun by itself, and on the particular design of the writer as to specification.

NOTE 2. The construction in (a) is sometimes carried so far in the classics, that three articles are sometimes brought together ; e. g. τὴν τοῦ τῷ ὄντι ῥητορικοῦ . . . τέχνην τὰ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ψυχῆς ὁμματα, Plato. This involute construction is not at all predominant in the New Testament ; the writers of which

generally prefer the most simple and obvious position of their words, and plainly seek for no effect resulting from mere artificial harmony of arrangement.

5. SPECIAL USAGES OF THE ARTICLE.

(1.) Οὔτος, ἐκεῖνος, and αὐτός, used as *pronominal adjectives*, require the noun (some *proper* names excepted) to which they belong, to take the article, throughout the New Testament.

NOTE 1. In the classics, nouns thus connected sometimes take and sometimes omit the article, especially in poetry ; see Matth. § 265, 1, § 266.

NOTE 2. When the noun is the *predicate* of a sentence, and the pronoun the *subject*, the article may of course be dispensed with ; as ταῦτα τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ, *these* [are] *the children of God*, Rom. ix. 8. Comp. Gal. iii. 7. 1 Thess. iv. 3. Luke. i. 36, et alibi.

(2.) Ἐκαστος, in the New Testament, used as an *adjective*, expels the article ; see Luke vi. 44. John xix. 23. Heb. iii. 13, al.

NOTE 1. The Greeks, on the other hand, sometimes admitted the article in this case : see Matth. § 265, 5.

(3.) Τοσοῦτος admits or rejects the article, as the nature of the noun is definite or indefinite.

E. g. 2 Cor. xii. 2, 3. John iv. 23. Mark ix. 37. Excluded in Matt. ix. 8. Mark vi. 2. Acts xvi. 24, et al. Same usage in the classics.

(4.) Πᾶς in the singular, (*a*) Admits the article with its noun when it indicates *totality*, i. e. a *tout ensemble*. (*b*) It excludes it, when *each* is the idea conveyed by it.

(*a*) E. g. πᾶσα ἡ ἀγγέλη, Matt. viii. 32 ; xxi. 10. Mark iv. 1, et al. saepe. (*b*) E. g. πᾶς ἀνδρῶνος, πᾶσα πόλις, etc.; see Matt. iii. 10 ; xiii. 47. Luke iii. 5, et al. saepe.

NOTE 1. Proper names under *a* do not always take the article; as πᾶσα Ἱεροσόλυμα, Matt. ii. 3. Acts ii. 36. On the other hand, when a *participle* is employed in the room of a noun, in the case *b*, the article remains; as πᾶς ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, Matt. v. 22 ; πᾶς ὁ βλέπων, Matt. v. 28 ; and so in innumerable cases, both in the New Testament and in the classics. It is the participle that occasions the retention of the article in such cases, in order that the article should mark its assuming the nature of a noun, adjective, etc.

(5.) In the plural, πάντες, etc., when it stands with a definite noun, requires the article; when with an indefinite one, the article is omitted.

E. g. Matt. ii. 16 ; iv. 24. Mark v. 12, et saepe. On the contrary ; Rom. v. 12. Gal. vi. 6. 1 Tim. ii. 4, et al. saepe. The presence of πάντες, etc., then,

does not alter the omission or insertion of the article before the noun ; for this depends on the nature of the noun.

NOTE 1. The position of *πᾶς*, etc., and *πάντις*, etc., varies in a few cases; e. g. *πᾶσα ἡ πόλις, ὁ πᾶς νόμος*, Gal. v. 14, *τέκνων αὐτῆς πάντων*, Luke vii. 35; but in almost all cases this adjective *precedes* the noun to which it belongs.

(6.) The pronominal adjectives *ἐμὸς, σὸς, ἡμέτερος*, etc., usually require the article, because of their *definitive* nature. But sometimes it is omitted, where the nature of the case shews that the writer does not desire to particularize; as *ἐμὸν βρῶμά ἐστιν*, John iv. 34.

(7.) Adverbs often take the article and thus become adjectives, or supply the place of nouns.

E. g. *οἱ πάλαι [ἄνθρωποι], ἡ αὔριον [ἡμέρα], ἡ ἄνω [πόλις]*, etc.

(8.) The Inf. mode when used *substantively*, usually takes the article; in which case this mode is employed as an indeclinable noun, in all the usual cases of a noun. See § 50, 1 seq.

(9.) The article *τό* is put before a word, phrase, etc., quoted; as *τὸ Ἑλλὰς the [word] Hellus* ;

or before a phrase or sentence which is employed as a mere subject or object in a sentence.

E. g. 'there arose a dispute among them, τὸ τίς ἂν εἴη μείζων αὐτῶν,' Luke ix. 46; 'and they sought...τὸ πῶς ἂν ἔλωσιν αὐτόν,' Luke xxii. 2. So Rom. viii. 26. Acts iv. 21; xxii. 30. Mark ix. 23. Luke i. 62; xxii. 23. 1 Thess. iv. 1. In such cases, τὸ is equivalent to *videlicet*, *namely*, etc.

§ 6. ARTICLE AS A PRONOUN.

(1.) The simple article as a pronoun demonstrative, is employed rarely in the New Testament; but peculiar modifications of the article in which the sense of a *demonstrative* attaches to it, are very common.

E. g. in Acts xvii. 28, τοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμὲν (from Aratus), means: *We are the offspring of THIS ONE*, i. e. τοῦτου τοῦ Θεοῦ. In general the demonstrative is made by adding μὲν or δέ as ὁ μὲν...ὁ δέ, *this one...that one*, or *one...another*; oftentimes ὁ δέ alone, without the preceding μὲν, is equivalent to οὗτος, as ὁ δέ ἀποκριθεὶς, Matt. xv. 24, 26; xii. 39, 48, al. saepe. Again; οἱ, etc., with the Gen. dependent on it, or followed by a noun with a preposition, is often used as a kind of demonstrative; e. g. οἱ τοῦ Ζεβεδαίου, John xxi. 2; τὰ τῆς σαρκὸς, Rom. viii. 5. Luke ii. 49. Matt. xvi. 23, et al. saepe; and so οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰταλίας, οἱ ἐκ νόμου, οἱ ἐκ περιτομῆς, etc.

(2.) The use of *ὁ, ἡ, τὸ*, as a proper *relative* pronoun in the New Testament, is denied by late critics. Matthiae limits this use to the Ionic and Doric writers, and to the tragedians in the Attic, § 292. But the dispute seems to be more about names than things.

For example: Passow states in his lexicon, that *ὁ, ἡ, τὸ*, (with the accent on all its forms), is a relative pronoun throughout, standing for *ὅς, ἥ, ὅ*: that in Homer this relative (*ὁ, ἡ, τὸ*) is very common, as also among the Dorians and Ionians, and likewise the tragedians. But how does *ὁ, ἡ, τὸ* differ from the article, except in the accent which grammarians have put upon it, merely to distinguish when it has a *relative* sense? And in the New Testament, in the numerous cases where the Part. with the article must be translated *is qui*, etc., as *ὁ Θεὸς ὁ καλίσας*, *ὁ Θεὸς ὁ ἀφείρας*, etc., *God who called*, *God who separated*, etc., why is not the *ὁ* to all intents and purposes a *relative*? Nay, may we not say that it is substantially so, in all those cases where apposition is used, or where an adjective following the noun, or a clause with a noun which supplies the place of an adjective, is used? E. g. *Ἰωάννης ὁ βαπτιστής*, *ὁ ἄνθρωπος*, *ὁ ἀγαθός*, *οἱ ἀδελφοί οἱ ἐξ ἔθνων*, i. e. *John who is the baptizer*, *the man who is good*, *the brethren who are of the Gentiles*, etc. Middleton, who maintains that the article is always a *relative* pronoun, was indeed far from being correct; but is not the position, that it never is so, almost as far from the reality of the case? If the real object of

inquiry be *things* and not *names*, can there be much dispute on this subject?

NOUNS.

§ 7. NUMBER AND GENDER OF NOUNS.

(1.) In cases almost without number, in the Old Testament and in the New, also in all classic authors, the singular number of nouns and pronouns stands *generically* for a whole class; *i. e.* (as we say), it is a noun or pronoun of *multitude*.

E. g. James v. 6, 'ye have killed τὸν δίκαιον' ii. 6, 'but ye have dishonoured τὸν πρωτόγον' 1 Peter iv. 18, 'if ὁ δίκαιος scarcely he saved, where will ὁ ἀσεβής καὶ ἀμαρτωλὸς appear?' Pronouns (which of course occupy the place of nouns), conform every where, *pro re nata*, to this usage.

(2.) *Vice versa*, the plural form is often used where only an individual, or a particular thing is meant.

E. g. (a) In a multitude of cases where the plural form of nouns is employed to designate a single object; as οὐρανοί, αἰῶνες, ἀνατολαί, θυεσμαι, τὰ δεξιὰ, ταῖς πόλοισι, Luke xvi. 23, ἐξ αἱμάτων ἐγενήθησαν, John L/13, (probably referring to the blood of both parents),

τὰ ἐγκάνα, γενέσια, ἄζυμα, αἱ γραφαί, and the like. Usage only determines the extent of this idiom. (b) In many special cases, where emphasis is given to the expression, or generality expressed; as Heb. ix. 23, κρείττοσι θυσίαις, spoken of the death of Christ; John ix. 3, ἔργα Θεοῦ, the peculiar or miraculous work of healing the blind; Heb. vii. 6, ἐπαγγελίας the special promise respecting the Messiah; 2 Cor. xii. 1, ὀπτασίας καὶ ἀποκαλύψεις, the heavenly vision related in the sequel; James ii. 1. ἐν προσωποληψίαις, partiality of any kind; and so oftentimes, both in the New and Old Testament.

(c) Where the thought is designed to be *general* only, the plural is not unfrequently used, when strictly speaking the subject or agent is only one; e. g. Matt. xxvi. 8, οἱ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ...λέγοντες, but in John xii. 4, εἷς ἐκ τῶν μαθητῶν αὐτοῦ, Ἰούδας...λέγει, etc. where Matthew relates the fact in a general way, while John specificates; so Matt. xxvii. 44, οἱ λησταὶ ...ἀντιδίδου, but Luke xxiii. 39, εἷς δὲ τῶν...κακούργων ἐβλασφήμει. Matt. xx. 30—34, δύο τυφλοὶ, κ. τ. λ., Mark x. 46—52, Βαρτίμαῖος ὁ τυφλός, Luke xviii. 35—43, τυφλός τις, where the former evangelist relates the occurrence in a more general way, Mark specificates a noted individual, and Luke particularizes but does not specificate. So John xx. 1, 11, 18, speaks of Mary Magdalene only as going to the sepulchre, while Mark xvi. 1, 2. Luke xxiv. 1, 9, 10, speak of her and several others, and Matt. xxviii. 1, 7, 8, of Mary Magdalene and another Mary; in Matt. viii. 28 seq. two demoniacs are mentioned, while in Mark

v. 1 seq. Luke viii. 26 seq., only one is named. Comp. also Mark vii. 17, with Matt. xv. 15; Matt. xiv. 17, and Mark vi. 38, with John vi. 8, 9; Matt. xxiv. 1, with Mark xiii. 1; Matt. xxvii. 37, with John xix. 19; Matt. xxvii. 48, and Mark xv. 36, with John xix. 29. So in Luke xxii. 67, λέγοντες, when, in all probability, one only is meant; see also the same idiom in John xi. 8. Luke xx. 21, 39; xxiv. 5 (εἶπον). Matt. xv. 1, λέγοντες. xv. 12 (εἶπον). In John vi. 45. Acts xiii. 40, we have ἐν τοῖς προφήταις. Matt. xxiv. 26, ἐν τοῖς ταμείοις, when evidently, only a particular place and a particular recess is meant; so ἐπεκράθισεν ἐπάνω αὐτῶν, Matt. xxi. 7, where only one can be meant. The reader is particularly desired to collate all these passages; for the subject is of great importance in respect to the conciliation of one part of Scripture with another.

NOTE 1. In classical Greek a multitude of the like idioms occur. Matthiae says (§ 293), that '*expression in the plural serves to give emphasis to general expressions.*' So τὰ φίλτατα for *mother, spouse*, etc.; so δώματα—κάρηνα Ὀλύμπου, etc. So also Eurip. Hipp. 11, Hippolytus is called Πυθίως παιδύματα, *the pupil of Pitheus*; Hesiod. Sc. H. 312, τρίπος ... κλυτὰ ἔργα. The exchange of ἐγὼ and ἡμεῖς, and of corresponding verbs, occurs, times without number, in the classics. Matthiae, moreover, lays it down as a principle, that, in the Greek language more than in any other (has he studied the Hebrew?), there is a passing from the plural to the singular, and *vice versa*; and also, that the *plural* may receive attributives or definitives [i. e.

verbs, participles, adjectives, etc.] in the *singular* number, § 293. Hence a verb in the *singular* is sometimes employed after a Nom. in the plural; or a participial noun sing., or a common noun sing. stands connected with a plural verb. In like manner the sing. of nouns is often put where we might expect the plural. Such being the case, why should we imagine that the New Testament writers have departed from the idiom of the Greek language, when examples of this kind are now and then found among them?

(3.) The reader will of course draw the conclusion, that the rule respecting the agreement of a verb, adjective, etc., with a noun in regard to *number*, is *by no means universal*. Nouns generic or nouns of multitude, although in the singular, may be construed *ad sensum*, and take a plural verb, etc.; and *vice versa*, plural nouns designating single things, or the entirety of several parts combined together, may have a singular verb, etc.

(4.) The well known principle, that *neuter* plurals may take a verb in the singular, (the plural verb is also used), is commonly regarded in the New Testament.

E. g. τὰ καλὰ ἔργα . . . ἐστὶ, 1 Tim. v. 25; ἡ . . . ἅπαντα κοινὰ, Acts iv. 32, et al. *saepe*.

(5.) The neuter gender is not unfrequently used in reference to *persons*, where the expression is designed to be of a general nature.

E. g. $\pi\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ δ , John xvii. 2, in reference to the elect ; so $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\iota$. . . $\tilde{\epsilon}\nu$ $\tilde{\omega}\sigma\iota\nu$, John xvii. 21 ; $\tau\delta$ $\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\epsilon}\chi\omicron\nu$, 2 Thess. ii. 6, for the masc. see ver. 7 ; comp. also 1 Cor. i. 27, 28. Heb. vii. 7. 1 John v. 4, et al.

NOTE 1. *Constructio ad sensum* often takes place, in which case the gender or number of the word employed is overlooked, and the verb, adjective, etc. ; accords with the real gender or number of the *thing* or *person* intended to be expressed.

(6.) $\epsilon\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\varsigma$, like the Heb. $\psi'N$, *one, each one*, sometimes takes the plural verb, etc.

E. g. Acts xi. 29, $\tilde{\omega}\rho\iota\sigma\alpha\nu$ $\epsilon\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\varsigma$ Rev. v. 8, $\tilde{\epsilon}\chi\omicron\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ $\epsilon\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\varsigma$ and so in classic Greek, as also $\tilde{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\theta\iota\epsilon\nu$ $\tilde{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\varsigma$, Matt. § 302, a. Any pronoun, or other word, which is a *collective* in respect to sense, admits of the like construction.

§ 8. APPPOSITION.

(1.) A noun in apposition must be in the same case as its co-relative noun ; and for the most part it takes the article, but not always, (§ 1. 6.) The gender and number of the noun in apposition may vary according to its nature.

E. g. Ἰωάννης ὁ βαπτιστὴς Σίμων βυρσαῖος Σκίδαι, βάψας τὸ ἔθνος.

§ 9. NOMINATIVE AND VOCATIVE.

(1.) The Nom. case usually constitutes the subject of a sentence, *i. e.* of some verb expressed or implied. But,

(2.) The Nom. in some cases is used *absolutely*, *i. e.* independently of the construction which follows it, both in the New Testament and in classic writers.

E. g. ὁ Μωϋσῆς οὗτος ... οὐκ οἶδαμεν τί κ. τ. λ., Acts vii. 40 ; ὁ νικῶν, ποιήσω αὐτὸν κ. τ. λ., Rev. iii. 12. Also Luke xiii. 4. 1 John ii. 27. Matt. x. 32 ; xii. 36. Mark ix. 20, et al. See Matt. § 311.

(3.) The Nom. is often used instead of the Vocative, both in the New Testament and elsewhere.

E. g. ἡ παῖς, ἐγείρου, Luke viii. 54. Mark ix. 25. Matt. xxvii. 29. Mark x. 47, et saepe al. Matt. § 312.

(4.) The Voc. is used either with or without the *ω*.

E. g. Matt. xv. 28, ὦ γύναι Acts xxi. 20, ἀδελφε, and saepe al. So in the classics ; Matt. § 312, 4.

(5.) The Nom. stands in Greek *after*, as well

as before, such verbs as merely constitute the *copula* in a sentence, and even when this Nom. is not the subject of the sentence.

NOTE 1. The student is already acquainted with the well known constituents of a sentence, viz., the subject, predicate, and copula. Most verbs serve the double purpose of copula and predicate, i. e. they not only assert, but assert some particular quality, action, state, etc. But there is a considerable class of verbs, which usually serve merely as the copula of a sentence, and do not contain in themselves any completed declaration of attribute, action, state, etc. All these usually take the Nom. case after them. Such verbs are not only εἶμι, ὑπάρχω, γίνομαι, but also φύω, κυρῖω, καλέομαι, φωνέω, ἐπικαλέομαι, προσαγορεύομαι, ὀνομάζομαι, λέγομαι, ἀκούω, αἰρέομαι, ἀποδείκνυμαι, χειροτονέομαι, κρίνομαι, δοκέω, φαίνομαι, ἔοικα, νομίζομαι, ὑπολαμβάνομαι, κρίνομαι, δηλόομαι, μένω, and καδίστημι. It must not be supposed that all these verbs in all their voices, etc., take a Nom. after them; nor in all the meanings which they bear; but in those cases in which they serve as a *copula* only, they take the Nom. after them; e. g. ἐγώ εἰμι θεός· φωνεῖτέ με, ὁ διδάσκαλος, John xiii. 13; λέγεται, ὁ ἄψινθος, Rev. viii. 11; φίλος ... κόσμου ἐχθρὸς τοῦ θεοῦ καδίσταται, James iv. 4, et sic. al. saepe. Rost § 100, Anm. 1. Matt. § 307.

NOTE 2. When a name is given in connection with ὄνομα, it may be done in three ways; e. g. τὸ ὄνομα αὐτῆς, Μαριάμ or ἡ ὄνομα, Μαριάμ or ὀνόματι Μαριάμ. In the last case, the proper name stands in apposition

with some preceding noun, and ὀνόματι is the Dat. of circumstance, as ἑκατοντάρχῃ ὀνόματι 'Ιουλίῳ, Acts xxvii.

1. Luke i. 5. "Ἄνδρα ὀνόματι 'Ανανίαν, Acts ix. 12.

(6.) Several nouns connected as subjects of a sentence, may take a plural verb, etc.; or the verb may be conformed to the nearest noun.

E. g. οὐκ ἔγνω 'Ιωσήφ καὶ ἡ μήτηρ αὐτοῦ, Luke ii. 43, an example of the latter kind; the former is so common that it needs no examples. The same usage is common in the Greek classics, Matt. § 304; and also in the Hebrew and Latin languages.

GENITIVE.

§ 10. NATURE AND USES OF THE GENITIVE.

(1.) The fundamental idea designated by this case seems to be that of *an essential and immediate relation or connection of objects*.

NOTE 1. This may be the relation or connection of a part with the whole; of a quality or attribute with a subject, *i. e.* of accidentence with substance; of ownership or propriety with owner; of effect with cause; of action with agent; of feelings, opinions, etc., with sensitive and intellectual beings; of that which is comprised in any thing, with that which comprises it, etc.

(2.) This connection of objects may be view-

ed either in the light of *parts* as belonging to or constituting a *whole* ; or as something proceeding from, flowing out of, occasioned by, relating to, some other person or thing.

NOTE 1. Hence the Gen. case of itself seems to include the sense of the prepositions ἀπὸ, ἐξ, and the like ; which, when they are used before it, rather serve the cause of greater *perspicuity* than that of necessity, since most of the relations expressed by these prepositions, are occasionally expressed by the Gen. alone, specially in the older Greek poetry.

§ 11. GENITIVE AFTER NOUNS.

(1.) The great variety of relations which is exhibited by this construction, is very important to the interpreter, and should be made a subject of particular attention. It is nearly impossible, however, specifically to enumerate them all. The following are some of the leading or principal ones ; viz.,

(a) The Gen. of possession or property ; as ὁ ἀνὴρ τοῦ βασιλέως ἡ χεὶρ τοῦ Κυρίου.

(b) The Gen. of cause, source, occasion, etc., (Gen. auctoris) ; e. g. φόβος Θεοῦ *the fear which God inspires* ; ἡ κακία τῶν πονηρῶν, *the vexation which wicked men occasion*. Most of such expressions are also capable of another sense which is *subjective*, viz., ἡ φόβος

which one has of God, the injury which one does to evil men,' etc. But in many cases only one sense is admissible, as υἱὸς πατρὸς ἀγαπητοῦ ὁ καρπὸς τοῦ δένδρου, etc. So in the classics; κύματα παντοίων ἀνέμων, *waves occasioned by various winds*; πένθος δαιμόνιον, *grief occasioned by the gods*. See Matth. § 375.

(c) The Gen. of object; as παραβολὴ τοῦ σπείροντος, *the parable respecting the sower*; Luke vi. 7, κατηγορίαν αὐτοῦ, *accusation against him*; Acts iv. 9, εὐεργεσίᾳ ἀνθρώπου, *beneficence toward the man*; 1 Cor. i. 18, ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ σταυροῦ, *doctrine respecting the cross*; John xvii. 2, ἐξουσίαν πάσης σαρκὸς, *power over all flesh*; Rom. xiii. 3, οὐκ εἰσὶ φόβος τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔργων, *are not a terror in respect to good works*; see also Matt. xiv. 1, ἀκοήν Ἰησοῦ; Luke vi. 12. 2 Cor. x. 5. Mark xi. 22; πίστιν Θεοῦ, *faith in God, or faith which God requires*; Rom. iii. 22. Gal. ii. 16, et al. sæpe. This is a wide field for the interpreter, and it needs much caution and discrimination to traverse it with good success.

(d) The Gen. of subject; as ὀργὴ Θεοῦ, *the wrath which God feels*; ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ, *the love which God feels*. This class of cases might possibly be ranked under *a*, but the relation oftentimes is somewhat discrepant.

(e) The Gen. of material; as στέφανος χρυσοῦ, ἄγαλμα Ἰδοῦ, etc.; not common in the New Testament, but very common in the classics.

(f) The Gen. of quality; as Rom. i. 26, πάθη ἀτιμίας, *base passions*; Acts vii. 2, ὁ Θεὸς τῆς δόξης,

the glorious God; and thus often, both in the Old and New Testament, in which cases the noun in the Gen. supplies the place of an adjective.

(g) The Gen. of place; as in Matt. i. 11, 12, *μετοικεσία Βαβυλῶνος*, *the carrying away to Babylon*; Matt. x. 5, *ὁδὸς εἰς τὰ ἔθνη*, *the way to the Gentiles*.

(h) The Gen. of time; Jude v. 6, *κρίσιν μεγάλης ἡμέρας*, *judgment at the great day*; Heb. vi. 1, *τὸν τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ Χριστοῦ λόγον*, *instruction at the beginning of a Christian course of life*. So *νυκτὸς*, *by night*; *χειμῶνος*, *during the winter*; *τῶν προτέρων ἐτῶν*, *in former years*; with a preceding noun (*χρόνος*, etc.) implied.

(i) The Gen. of value; as *δραχμῆς ἀγοράζειν τι*, *to purchase something for a drachma*; *πλείστου τιμῶμαι*, *I prize this as of the highest value*.

(2) Many shades of more remote relations and connections still, are expressed occasionally by the genitive.

E. g. Col. i. 20, *αἷμα τοῦ σταυροῦ*, *blood shed upon the cross*; 2 Cor. xi. 26, *κίνδυνοι ποταμῶν*, *dangers on the waters or occasioned by the waters*; John v. 29, *εἰς ἀνάστασιν ζωῆς*, *to the resurrection that is connected with happiness*; Mark i. 4, *βάπτισμα μετάνοιας*, *baptism which obligates to repentance*; Rom. vii. 2, *νόμος τοῦ ἀνδρός*, *the law which binds to the husband*; Rom. vii. 24, *σῶμα θανάτου*, *the body which occasions death*; Rom. vi. 6, *σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας*, *the body which leads to sin*; Luke xi. 29, *τὸ σημεῖον Ἰωάννη*, *the sign which hap-*

pened to *Jonah*; Philom. v. 9, δέσμιος Χριστοῦ, a prisoner for the sake of *Christ*; James ii. 5, οἱ πτωχοὶ τοῦ κόσμου, poor in respect to the present world; and so in a great variety of other cases. Some of these examples might be ranked under some of the divisions already named above; but in general, they are not of so direct a nature.

NOTE 1. Such examples as Μαρία Ἰακώβου, Ἰούδας Ἰακώβου, etc., are elliptical as to the idea which they are designed to convey, either γυνή, μήτηρ, πατήρ, υἱός, or ἀδελφός, etc. being understood, according to the nature of the context. So in ὁ Ἰακώβου, ἡ Ἀλεξάνδρου, οἱ Χλόης, etc., υἱός, θυγάτηρ, etc., being understood.

NOTE 2. Three Genitives in succession are sometimes connected; e. g. in 2 Cor. iv. 4. Eph. iv. 13, et al. Sometimes the Gen. is separated from the noun that governs it; as in Phil. ii. 10. 1 Tim. iii. 6. Heb. viii. 5. Sometimes (although seldom) of two genitives, one belongs to *persons* and another to *things*; as in Acts v. 32. Phil. ii. 30. 2 Pet. iii. 2. Heb. vi. 1.

NOTE 3. When the Gen. stands *before* the governing noun, either, (a) It belongs to several nouns; as Acts iii. 7. Or, (b) It is emphatic; as in 1 Cor. iii. 9. Acts xiii. 23. Heb. x. 36. Phil. ii. 25, et saepe alibi.

NOTE 4. The so called *periphrasis of the Gen.* by a noun with ἐν, περί, ἀπὸ, κατά, etc., is seldom, if ever, to be regarded as a simple Gen., but as a mode of expression designed to give a somewhat different shade to its meaning.

§ 12. THE GEN. AFTER VERBS.

(1.) It will be impossible that the reader should obtain an adequate idea of the nature of this idiom, unless he first obtain a correct view of the nature of the relations designed to be expressed by the Gen. case. The general statement is made in § 10. It is proper to add some things in this place, for the better understanding of the matter.

(a) The person or thing to which any thing belongs, as property, attribute, power, usage, duty, etc., is put in the Gen.; for in this way the relation of the property, etc., is defined.

(b) The Gen. marks the *whole*, to which parts or portions of any thing belongs; for thus the relation of the parts is defined.

(c) All those cases, viewed subjectively or objectively, in which a word has an incomplete meaning in itself, and needs another word to shew its relation; or in which the object, the reason, the source or ground, of an action or state must needs be expressed; in a word, all those cases in which, to complete the expression of the idea, *in respect to*, *in relation to*, *on account of*, *by reason of*, must be added, admit of the

Gen. in order to shew what this respect, relation, or account is.

to (d). Even *time* and *place* may be considered as having a relation to that which happens in them; and therefore words designating these, may be put in the Genitive.

NOTE 1. Under some of these general heads may be arranged not only the use of the Gen. after verbs, but also after adjectives, participles, prepositions, adverbs, and indeed after nouns, as already represented.

(2.) The student will more easily obtain a proper view of the Gen. after verbs in Greek, if he compares the very numerous class of verbs in English, which are in like manner followed by the Genitive.

E. g. The verbs ἀκούω and γινώσκω (verba sensūs) govern the Gen., and in English we often say: *hear of*, *know of*. Often too we leave out the *of*; and so does the Greek, for ἀκούω and nearly all other verbs which govern a Gen. may and do sometimes govern other cases, i. e. the Acc., or Dat., as may be necessary. Compare our English, *thought of*, *smell of*, *eat of*, *take of*, *give of*, *partake of*, *drink of*, *to be of*, *to be glad of*, *to be full of*, *to be emptied of*, *to complain of*, *to accuse of*, *to convince of*, *to buy of*, *to sell of*, *to learn of*, *to rob of*, *to make of*, *to require of*, *to take hold of*.

to beg of, and so of a multitude of other verbs. In nearly all these cases, there is an agreement with the Greek idiom as to the genitive; and also in the fact, that nearly all these verbs, and most others which govern the Gen., may also govern other cases.

(3.) It may be seen by the above exhibitions, that ideas indicated by verbs of this nature divide themselves into several classes; e. g.

(a) Such as designate the relation of property.

This is confined principally to εἰμί and γίνομαι, for the obvious reason, that other verbs designate *action*, *state*, etc., which would be inappropriate to the purpose under consideration; e. g. τοῦτ' ἐστὶν Ἰωάννου, *this is John's*; πολλῆς ἀνοίας ἐστὶ *it belongs to consummate folly*; ἐστὶ δικαίου ἀνδρός, *it belongs to a good man*, or a *good man must, should, may, can*, etc., do thus and so. And so of γίνομαι, which is often equivalent to εἰμί.

(b) Verbs which have a *partitive* sense, i. e. which indicate action that can be supposed to relate only to a part or portion of the object to which it is directed.

NOTE 1. The predominant part of the regimen of the Gen. by verbs, is where a *partitive* sense is meant to be designated. Of course such verbs as μετέχειν, μεταλαμβάνειν, κοινώνει, μεταλαμβάνειν, μεταδίδωμι, ἐκπολαύειν, and all others of the like character, will be included among those which govern the genitive. By

an extension of this principle that is natural enough, verbs signifying *to obtain, acquire, etc.*, i. e. *to have a possession of* often conform to the same idiom, such as *ἀπολαύειν, λαμβάνειν, κυριεύειν, κληρονομῆναι*, etc. Matt. § 325. seq. See in New Testament, 1 Cor. ix. 10, x. 21, Heb. v. 13. Rev. ii. 17, al.

NOTE 2. But any verbs whatever, even those which are usually construed with the Acc., may take a Gen. where a *partitive* sense is meant to be conveyed; as Odys. 6, 98, *ἐπρήσσω χειρῶν*, *to roast*, [some] *flesh*; Thucyd. II. 56, *τῆς γῆς ἔριμον*, *they destroyed* [a part of] *the country*; Plato, *Symp. p. 213*, *λαμβάνει τῶν ταινιῶν*, *taking* [some] *fillets*; Soph. Oed. Tyr. 709, *μαντικῆς ἔχον τέχνης*, *having* [something] *of the prophetic art*, etc. Matth. § 323. See Acts xxvii. 36. Matt. xvi. 28. Luke ix. 27; xiv. 24, al.

NOTE 3. Kindred to the above constructions seems to be that in which verbs signifying *to seize, grasp, take hold of, hold fast, touch, manage, etc.*, e. g. *λαμβάνομαι, δράττομαι, ἄπτομαι, ἔχω*, etc. (specially when in the Mid. voice,) govern the genitive; Matth. § 330. When the *whole* of a thing *grasped, etc.*, is meant, the Acc. is used, and not the Genitive; Matth. § 331. See Mark ix. 27; v. 30. Matt. xiv. 31. Heb. xii. 20. Luke viii. 54. For seizing the *whole*, see Matt. xiv. 3; xviii. 28. Mark iii. 21, al.

NOTE 4. As the *antithesis* of this, and by one of those *peculiarities* not uncommon in language, the same usage is extended to verbs (mostly of the Mid.

voice) of the opposite character; e. g. *μαθήματα*, *ἀπέναντι* and so to *ἀμαρτάνομαι*, *to miss the mark*; *ὑπερβῆναι*, *to fail in meeting expectations*, *σπάλλεσθαι* *to be frustrated*, etc.

NOTE 5. Verbs such as *ἄρχειν*, *ὑπαρχειν*, etc., which signify *to begin, commence, introduce*, etc., govern the Gen.; for here the action is as it were *partitive*, i. e. commenced but not completed. So *οἱ μνηστῆρες τῆς ἐλευθερίας*, *who introduced liberty*; Matth. § 335.

(c) When a noun must be added, in order to shew *in respect to*, or *in regard to*, what person or thing, or circumstance, the action, etc., of the verb is to be understood, this noun may be put in the Gen. after any kind of verb.

NOTE 1. E. g. *ὡς ποδῶν εἶχον*, *as they were able in respect to their feet*, i. e. as fast as they could run; *εἶναι ἔχειν φρενῶν*, *to be sound in respect to understandings*; Eurip. El. *πῶς ἀγῶνος ἤχομεν*; *how do we come off as to the contest?* *Καλῶς κεῖται τοῦ ἡλίου*, *it lies well in respect to the sun*; Matth. §§ 337, 338. This is a construction widely diffused, and deserving of particular attention.

(d) All verbs that necessarily imply a relation to something in the action, etc., which they express, but which relation is not designated by the verb itself, take a genitive in order to indicate it. But this Gen. is not the direct object

of the action expressed by the verb; for this would require the Accusative.

NOTE 1. Verbs signifying an action or affection of the mind, such as *to remember, to forget, to be concerned for, to neglect, to reflect, to consider, to understand, to desire, to long after*, etc., rank here, and usually govern the genitive; e. g. *μνημονεύει τῆς γυναικὸς* *ἑαυτοῦ*, Luke xvii. 32. Acts xi. 16. 2 Pet. iii. 2, al.; *ἐπιλαδοῦμαι τοῦ ἔργου ὑμῶν*, Heb. vi. 10; οὐ... *ἀγγέλλον ἐκλαμβάνεται*, Heb. ii. 16 (figuratively interpreted); *μὴ τῶν βοῶν μέλει* 1 Cor. ix. 9. Acts xviii. 17, al.; *καλοῦ ἔργου ἐπιθυμεῖ*, 1 Tim. iii. 1; *ἐπιθυμῶντες ἑαυτῶν*, 1 Tim. iii. 1. Heb. xi. 16. So in the classics; e. g. *ἐνθυμοῦ τῶν εἰδότην*, *consider the things which are seen*, Xen. Mem. III. vi. 17; *ἡρώδης μὴν αὐτῶν*, *I perceived them*, Plat. Apol. Soc. p. 27; *ἡρώδης Σαμαρείης... ἐμοῦ*, Plat. Apol. p. 27. And so occasionally, of most verbs which in any way express an action or affection of the mind. The ground of this seems to be, that the action of the mind does not properly pass to the object, or at all affect it; so that the Acc. would seem to be not exactly in place here. The Gen. points out the objects in relation to which the mind acts, or is affected. But still, analogy of usage often causes all such verbs to take an Acc. after them.

NOTE 2. Kindred to the above verbs, which express the action or affection of the *internal* senses, are those which express the action or affection of the *external* senses, e. g. *ἐκείνου ἀκούει*, Matt. xvii. 5. Luke

ii. 46. John iii. 29, al.; οὐ μὴ γένηται θανάτου, Matt. xvi. 28. Mark ix. 1, used figuratively, but following the usual construction; so ὄζειν μύρων, νεκροῦ μὴ ἀππεύδαι. Verbs of *sight* are excepted; and all such verbs as the above, often take the Accusative.

(e) Verbs signifying *plenty* or *want*, *fulness* or *emptiness*, take the Gen. of the thing which fills or which is lacking, in order to complete the idea of the verb by pointing out its relation.

NOTE 1. E. g. γεμίσατε τὰς ὑδρίας ὕδατος, John ii. 7. Acts v. 28, al. So λείπεται σοφίας, James i. 5. Luke xxii. 35. Rom. iii. 23, al.

NOTE 2. Kindred to these verbs are such as signify *to deprive*, *take away*, *rob*; and (with some shades of difference, but in the way of an analogy that is not unnatural) verbs signifying *to loose*, *free*, *separate from*, *quit*, etc., as μεδίστημι in Luke xvi. 4; ἀποχέω in 1 Tim. i. 6; αἵρειν in Mark ii. 21; παύομαι in 1 Pet. iv. 1, et al. On the other hand; verbs signifying *to hinder*, *restrain*, *keep back*, *prevent*, etc., may take the Genitive; e. g. κωλύω in Acts xxvii. 43, et al.

NOTE 3. More remotely kindred to verbs of *emptying*, etc., are verbs meaning *to separate*, *to remove*, *to turn off* or *away*, *to lead off* or *away*, *to depart*, *to go away*, *to cease*, *to stop*, *to make to cease*, etc.; which occasionally govern the Genitive.

(f) All words denoting *comparison* in respect

to a thing or person, usually put that thing or person in the Gen., as properly expressive of relation. Hence verbs of the like meaning follow the like construction.

E.g. ὑποτάσθαι τινος, *to be inferior* [in respect to] *some one*; *to exercise, rule, command, or dominion*, as κυριεύω in Rom. xiv. 9. 2 Cor. i. 24; αὐθεντεῖν, 1 Tim. ii. 12; καταδυναστεύειν, James ii. 6; ἀνδραπατεύειν, Acts xviii. 12, et al. In like manner, verbs signifying *to prize more highly, to excel, exceed, be subject to, obey, yield to, succumb*, and all others that implicate inferiority in any way, may take a Gen., and oftentimes do take one, although they are not (for the most part) limited to this construction.

NOTE 1. Kindred to the construction under *f*, although not quite of the same tenor, is the case where the Gen. of *price* or *value* is put after verbs of *buying, selling, exchanging, procuring*, etc.; e. g. ἀσσαρίου πωλεῖται, *are sold for a farthing*, Matt. x. 29; πρᾶβῆναι πολλοῦ, *be sold for much*, Matt. xxvi. 9. 1 Cor. vi. 20. Rev. vi. 6; τῆς σῆς λατρείας τὴν ἐμὴν δυσπραξίαν ... οὐκ ἂν ἀλλάξαιμι, *I would not exchange my ill luck for your servitude*, Aesch. Prometh. 974. The ground of this construction seems to be *comparison* of things with *price*, and the consequent valuation or estimation of them.

NOTE 2. So verbs of *prizing, estimating, valuing*; as τοῦτου τιμᾶμαι, *this much I value it*.

NOTE 3. A comparison seems also to be expressed, by implication, in those words which signify *distinction, difference, disagreement, unlikeness, etc.*, e. g. πολλῶν στρουδίων διαφέρειτε, *ye differ from* [ye are of higher value than] *many sparrows*, Matt. x. 31. 1 Cor. xv. 41, al. So ἀρετὴ πλούτου διέστηκε, Plat. Republ. viii. p. 550; ἀλλοιοῦσθαι τινος, *to be different from one*, Plat. Parm. p. 138.

(4.) The cases in which the use of the Gen. has thus far been exhibited, all belong to those where the Gen. has a *partitive* sense, or else is added in order to shew some *relation* of its correlatives, so as to complete the idea which they express. But there is an important aspect of the Gen., which remains yet to be considered, viz., the designation of the *OBJECT to which any thing is directed or has relation*, or else the *designation of its RISE or ORIGIN*; or both of these combined.

As to nouns, see in § 11. 1, *c* and *b*. The nature of this connection is obvious. The expression φιλία υἱοῦ may be taken either *actively* or *passively*. In the first case, it means of course *the friendship which the son cherishes toward some other person*; in the second, *the friendship of which the son is the object*, i. e. which another person cherishes toward him. The context must always furnish the key to such (in them-

selves) ambiguous expressions; of which there are a great number, see § 11. 1, c. As to *verbs*, they may be divided here into several classes, viz.

(a) Almost any verb, but particularly those which in any way denote feelings or affections of the mind, may take a Gen. of the thing, whose relation to the verb (or participle) is such, that we may indicate it by the words *on account of*, *for the sake of*, etc.

E. g. Δαναῶν κεχολωμένοι, *angry on account of the Greeks*, Il. π', 545; χαλεπῶς φέρειν αὐτῶν, *to grieve on their account*, Thucy. II. 62; τούτων ὀνειδίσαι, *to utter reproach on account of these things*, Herod. I. 90; ἀγαθὸν ἀνδρὸς καυχουμένης, *to commend the just man for his readiness*, Eurip. Iphig. in Aul. 1381.

(b) In particular; verbs of *complaining against*, *accusing*, *prosecuting* (at law), *of condemning*, *subjecting to condemnation*, etc., take the Gen. of the thing *on account of which* this is done.

E. g. ἀπολογίζεσθαι σε διὰ τῆς δουλίας, *I accuse you of cowardice*, Aristoph. Eq. 367; ἐπαίτιασάμενός με φόβου, *accusing me of murder*, i. e. accusing me on account of alleged murder, etc. But in the New Testament, prepositions are usually employed before the noun in such cases, which serve to render the relation still more definite; and so, not unfrequently, in the classics.

NOTE 1. In the classics, verbs of *supplicating*, *beseeching*, etc., take the Gen. of the person *by* or *on account of whom* the supplication is made; as θεῶν σε ἱκεῖν, *I beseech thee by the gods*, Herod. VI. 68; but in the New Testament a preposition is employed to mark this relation.

(c) The Gen. of *origin* frequently follows the verbs εἶμι and γίνομαι.

E. g. μητρὸς...Μανδάνης γενέσθαι ἐσθλῶν γενέσθαι, etc.

NOTE 1. Here may be arranged verbs signifying *to smell* or *savour of*; as ὄζω μύρου· συκοφαντίας πνεῖ, *he savours of sycophancy*, Eq. 437; the noun denoting the cause or origin of the smell or savour.

§ 13. GENITIVE AFTER PARTITIVES, ADJECTIVES, PARTICIPLES, ADVERBS, ETC.

(1.) *Partitives* of all classes, from their very nature (designating a *part* or *portion* of), may take of course the Gen. after them, to indicate the *whole* to which they stand related.

E. g. (a) Ὁ μὲν...ὁ δέ· as τὰ μὲν τῶν ὄντων...τὰ δὲ τῶν ὄντων. (b) *Demonstratives*, as οὗτος, etc.; as τοῦτο ἀνάγκης. (c) *Participles*, which (with the article) denote a particular class of men; as οἱ καταφυγόντες αὐτῶν. (d) *Adjectives*, which denote *classes* of men, etc., as ὀλίγοι, πολλοί, πλείστοι, οἱ χρήστοι, etc.; as ὀλίγοι ἀνδρώπων, οἱ χρήστοι τῶν ἀνδρώπων, ὁ ἡμῖς τοῦ χρόνου,

etc. And so even in the singular number of the adjective; as *τάλαινα παρθίνων*. (e) Interrogatives; as *τίς θεῶν*. (f) Names of towns belonging to a country; as *Βηθλέμ τῆς Ἰουδαίας*. (g) Adverbs of place; as *ἄλλαδι γαίης*, in another part of the country; *ποῦ γῆς* in what part of the world? (h) Adverbs of time; as *ὅψε τῆς ἡμέρας*, in the evening; *πηνίκα τῆς ἡμέρας* at what time of the day? (i) Superlatives, (which of course indicate a part only) as *ἄχδιστος βασιλεὺς*. Also of course, adjectives, adverbs, etc., with a superlative meaning; as *ἔξοχος*, ἔξοχα, etc.

(2.) When the relation of an adjective, adverb, etc., must be shewn by a word subjoined, this word is put in the Genitive.

E. g. (a) Adjectives; as *τέλειος τῆς ἀρετῆς*, perfect in respect to courage; *ἄπαις ἀρρένων παίδων*, childless in respect to sons. (b) Adverbs; as *πρόρρω σοφίας κατωτέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου*, underneath in respect to Tartarus. (c) Demonstratives; as *εἰς τοῦτο ἀνάγκης*, un-to this in respect to necessity=εἰς ταύτην τὴν ἀνάγκην.

(3.) All adjectives and participials, indicative of a state of mind, feeling, etc.; of knowledge or ignorance, etc.; put the Gen. of relation after them; see and comp. § 12, 3, d. with notes.

E. g. (a) Adjectives; as *ἀπαίδευτος μουσικῆς σοφὸς κακῶν*. (b) Participials; as *οὐ τρέβων...ἰππικῆς*.

(4.) *Adjectives, etc.*, indicating plenty or want, fulness or emptiness, etc. (comp. § 12, 3. *e.*), may take the Gen. after them.

E. g. (a) *Adjectives*; as κενὸς φρενῶν ἔρημος φίλων πλήρης κενῶν. (b) *Adverbs*; as ἄθεν αἵματος τυραννικῶ, *enough of tyrant's blood.*

(5.) All *comparatives* (which of course intimate *relation*) put the thing compared in the Genitive; comp. § 12, 3. *f.*

E. g. (a) *Adjectives*; as μείζων πατρός, lit. *greater as it respects his father.* Adverbs are of course construed in the same way, when they have the like meaning. (b) As kindred with this construction, may be reckoned adjectives denoting *rule, superiority, preference*, of any kind, or the contrary, etc; as ἡδονῆς ἐγκρατῆς ἤττων ὕπνου.

NOTE 1. Adjectives expressive of *worth, value*, etc., and also of the contrary meaning, by a like principle take the Genitive; as ἄξιος τιμῆς ἀνάξιος τιμῆς. So adverbs of like meaning; as ἀξίως τῆς ἀδικίας.

REMARK. In regard to the classes of words in Nos. 2—5, it is obvious that the same general principle may be applied to all of them, viz., that the Gen. which follows them is designed to designate the *relation* which its correlate sustains, and which may be expressed by the words *in respect to, in regard to*, etc. Thus κενὸς φρενῶν, *empty in respect to mind*; σοφὸς κακῶν, *wary in regard to evils*, etc.; and so of all the rest.

(6.) Adjectives, etc., may be followed by the Gen., when the relation designated by the words *on account of*, etc. is intended to be expressed.

E. g. (α) Τάλανα συμφορᾶς κακῆς, *wretched on account of an evil destiny*, Aesch. Pers. 443; εὐδαίμων ... καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, *fortunate on account of his demeanour and his conversation*, Plat. Phaed. p. 68. (β) Genitives of exclamation, with or without an interjection, are to be solved in the like way; e. g. φεῦ τοῦ ἀνδρός! So τῆς τύχης! *what a lucky chance!* In such cases the context explains the thing referred to by the exclamation.

(7.) Participials may take a Gen. denoting *material*, or the *source* or *origin* of the action or quality which they express; comp. § 11. 1. c. b.

E. g. φοίνικος ... πεποιημέναι, *made of palm-wood*, Xen. Cyrop. V. 7. 22; πληγῆς θυγατρὸς τῆς ἑμῆς, *smitten of my own daughter*, Eurip. Orest. 491.

(8.) In classic Greek, *time* and *place* are usually put in the genitive; in the New Testament, this relation is commonly marked by prepositions.

E. g. Ἰθάκης, *at Ithaca*; τοῦ δεξιοῦ, *on the right*; ἐκείνης τῆς ἡμέρας, *on that day*; χειμῶνος, *in winter*. In the New Testament, νυκτός, *by night*, Matt. ii. 14; πότε, *in what way*, Luke v. 19; τοῦ λοιποῦ, *in future*, Gal. vi. 17.; but the cases of such a construction are rare in the New Testament.

§ 14. GENITIVE ABSOLUTE.

(1.) The genitive absolute is introduced, *whenever a subordinate clause of a sentence exhibits a subject or agent different from that in the principal assertion.* In this case, to avoid confusion, and make the construction clear, the subordinate clause has a subject and participle in the genitive.

E. g. αὐτοῦ ἐνδυμηθέντος, ἰδοὺ, ἄγγελος Κυρίου, κ.τ.λ., Matt. i. 20; τοῦ δὲ Ἰησοῦ γεννηθέντος...ἰδοὺ μάγοι ἀπὸ κ.τ.λ., Matt. ii. 1. Strictly speaking, the *Gen. absolute* has a relation to *time*, and may be construed as a Gen. of this nature; Winer, p. 170, Anmerk. So, in most cases, we supply *when* in translating such clauses.

§ 15. GENITIVE AFTER PREPOSITIONS AND ADVERBS.

(1.) Prepositions express *relation*; and, on this account, (not in and of themselves) they govern the genitive. It is, therefore, only those prepositions which express relations that comport with the nature of the genitive, which govern it; for all prepositions do not govern it.

NOTE. The old method of solving the appearance of the Gen. case when unconnected with a preced-

ing noun, by supplying *ἐν* *ἐν* *ἐν*, etc. leaves the real difficulty unexplained; for when I say *ἐγγιζέσθαι τινος*, and *ἐν* is supplied in order to govern *τινός*, I may well ask: How comes *ἐν* to govern the genitive? The answer to this will be just as difficult, as to shew how *ἐγγιζέσθαι* can govern the genitive.

(2.) Two purposes are answered by using prepositions of known and established meaning before the genitive; the first, that the relation is thus *definitely* expressed, and so guarded against mistake; the second, that the expression of relation is thus *extended*, without the hazard of ambiguity.

NOTE 1. Several prepositions plainly do not fall directly within the relations of the genitive above explained, but only indirectly. Still there is an *analogous* use in all of those which do govern it; and the danger of mistake is guarded against, by the definite meaning of the prepositions themselves. It is thus that the powers of expression in Greek are extended.

(3.) Some prepositions govern the Gen. only, because they express only those relations that are connected with it; some govern the genitive and another case, or two other cases, because they have other meanings than those which are appropriate to the genitive.

(a) The Gen. only; *ἀντὶ*, *ἀπὸ*, *ἐκ* (*ἐξ*) *ἐν* *ἐν*, *πρὸ*. (b)

Gen. and Acc. *διὰ, κατά, ὑπέρ.* (c) Gen. Dat., and Accusative; *ἀμφί, περί, ἐπὶ, παρὰ, πρὸς, μετά, ὑπὸ.*

(4.) Prepositions in composition with verbs, etc., may govern the Genitive, if they govern it when standing alone. In some cases, this usage is extended even to prepositions that (when standing alone) govern other cases.

E. g. Verbs compounded with *ἐν, σὺν, εἰς, ὁμοῦ,* etc., sometimes (often with *σὺν* and *ὁμοῦ*) govern the Genitive.

(5.) In many cases, compound verbs govern the Gen., not because of the preposition in them, but because of their meaning.

NOTE 1. In this way we may account for it (for the most part), when we find verbs governing the Gen. and yet compounded with prepositions which do not govern it.

(6.) The so called ADVERBS which govern the Gen., in such cases become of course mere prepositions expressive of relation, etc. Of these there are a considerable number.

E. g. *ἄνευ, ἄτερ, δίχα, δίχην, ἐγγός, πλησίον, εὐθύ, ἐνώπιον, μεταξὺ, μέχρι, ἄχρι, πέρα, πέραν, πλήν, χάριν,* etc.

GENERAL REMARKS RESPECTING THE GENITIVE. In almost all the cases in which verbs, etc., govern this case,

other constructions are allowable; in many cases they are common; in some, even the more common. In English I may say, *to taste this*, or *to taste of this*, etc., sometimes with some difference of *meaning*, and sometimes without any. And thus it is in Greek. Constructions with prepositions, *for* the sake of more explicitness, are nearly always allowable; and in the New Testament they are far more frequent than in the older Greek classics. This serves to render the interpretation easier. The student must beware not to conclude, that because a verb governs the Genitive, it can govern no other case, even where the same idea (*for substance*) is expressed. The *mode* of expression may be, and is, very diverse; and this gives to any language far more scope of expression than it would otherwise have.

DATIVE.

§ 16. NATURE AND USES OF THE DATIVE.

(1.) The Dative serves for the designation of indirect compliment, i. e. of the more remote object, to which any action, passion, etc., has relation.

NOTE 1. The *direct* compliment of a transitive verb, for example, is the object on which its action, etc., directly operates, or which it effects. But the *indirect* compliment is that *to* or *for* which this action, etc., takes place.

(2.) Hence results this very general principle of rule; viz., the person or thing *to* or *for* which

any thing is, is done, is directed, etc., is put in the Dative after any words which indicate existence, action, or direction.

E. g. ἰδοὺ σοι θεῶ ἀρέσκει ἐχθρῶν σοι ἀντὶ φίλου, and so ξενίζεσθαι τινι, *to wonder at any thing*, 1 Peter iv. 12; προσκυνεῖν τινι, *to show reverence to one*, Matt. ii. 8, 11; γονυπετεῖν τινι, *to kneel to one*, Matt. xvii. 14, (in the better Codices); ὁμολογεῖν τινι, *to make acknowledgment to one*, Heb. xiii. 15; μίμνραδαί τινι, *to attribute blame to him*, Heb. viii. 8; μαρτυρεῖν τινι, *to bear testimony to one*, John iii. 26; and thus σοι ἐστι, *it belongs to thee*; αὐτῷ γίνεται, ὑπάρχει, etc.

NOTE I. The so called *Dativus commodi vel incommodi* may be ranged under this general principle. The *Dativus commodi* occurs very frequently; e. g. 2 Cor. v. 13. Rom. xiv. 6, 7. Matt. iii. 16. Mark ix. 5. Luke i. 55, al. The *Dativus incommodi* may be found in Matt. xxiii. 31, μαρτυρεῖτε ἑαυτοῖς, *ye bear witness against yourselves*. See also James v. 3.

§ 17. PARTICULAR CLASSES OF WORDS USUALLY GOVERNING THE DATIVE.

(1.) Verbs signifying *to approach, meet, unite, connect*; and such as *imply approach, etc.*, in order to complete the action which they express, e. g. *to associate with, speak to, address, pray to, come together, propitiate; strive with, fight with, rival; follow, hearken to, give heed to, etc.*, may take the Dative.

NOTE 1. The *indirect* compliment in these and the like cases may be expressed by the Dative; as stated above, under the general principle. In the mean time many of these verbs may also take an Acc.; just as in English we say: 'I fought him,' or 'I fought with him.'

(2.) Verbs signifying *to blame, reproach, upbraid, accuse, envy, to be angry at*, etc. govern the Dat. of the person blamed, etc.

E.g. σοὶ λοιδορεῖ τῷ θεράποντι χαλεπαίνειν ὑμῶν μέμρεται αὐτῷ φθονεῖ.

(3.) Verbs, adjectives, etc., which signify likeness or unlikeness, sameness or discrepance, fitness or unfitness, usually govern the Dative.

E.g. ὁμοιάσω αὐτὸν ἀνδρὶ, *I will liken him to a man*, Matt. vii. 24; ὁμοίαι εἰσιν παιδίαις, Luke vii. 32; ἴσους ἡμῶν τοῖς βασιτάσασσι, Matt. xx. 12; ἴδοντες ἡμῶν τοῖς βασιτάσασσι, Matt. xx. 12; ἴδοντες ἡμῶν τοῖς βασιτάσασσι, Matt. xx. 12; Heb. vi. 7; πρέπει ἀγίοις, Eph. v. 3; ἴσους κλύδωνι, James i. 6; So even αὐτὸς is often construed in the classics; e.g. ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ κινδύνῳ τοῖς φαυλοτάτοις, *in peril the same with that which belongs to the basest*; τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ ἡλιθίῳ εἶναι, *to be the same with that which is silly*. And in the poets, even εἰς and τοιοῦτος are sometimes followed by the Dative.

NOTE 1. Some adjectives of the nature above described, such as ὁμοιος, ἴσος, πρέπει, etc. sometimes govern the Genitive. The construction varies, *ad libitum scriptoris*.

NOTE 2. Adjectives, moreover, which signify to be profitable or unprofitable, agreeable or disagreeable, friendly or inimical, hard or easy, and so of all kindred meanings, may govern the Dative in the same way as those described above.

(4.) Verbs signifying to *give to, deliver over or up, please, help, counsel, command, happen to, yield to, concede*, etc., almost of course govern the Dative.

NOTE 1. And yet here, as in most other cases, the language admits sometimes of a different construction, some of these verbs occasionally governing the Gen., and some the Accusative.

(5.) Passive verbs frequently take the Dative after them, without any preposition, indicating the agent by which or whom the action is done which is indicated by the verb.

E. g. *χρημασιν ἐπαίρεται*, *he is lifted up by his wealth*; *ἐπράττετο αὐτοῖς τὰ τῆς πόλεως*, *the affairs of the city are managed by them*. See § 18, 4, 5. Comp. Matt. v. 21. Luke xxiii. 15. James iii. 7, 18.

NOTE 1. Specially do passive (and also neuter) verbs, signifying *an affection of the mind*, take the Dat. of the thing which occasions that affection; as *ἀγαθόντες τῷ ἔργῳ*, *exulting in the work*; *χαλεπῶς φέρω τοῖς παρόντι πράγμασι*, *I am grieved at the present state of things*.

(6.) Adverbs of signification like to that of verbs or adjectives governing the Dat., may also take the Dative after them.

E. g. ὁμοίως ἐνέδρα, *like a snare, or as a snare*; ὡσαύτως ἐμὸν, *as even to me*, etc.

§ 18. VARIOUS RELATIONS DESIGNATED BY THE DATIVE.

(1.) *In respect to, in regard to*, is a relation which it not unfrequently designates.

E. g. μὴ παῖδια γίνεσθε ταῖς φρεσίν, ἀλλὰ τῇ κακίᾳ, *be not children in respect to understanding, but in regard to malice*, 1 Cor. xiv. 20; σχήματι εὐρεθείς ὡς ἄνθρωπος, *in respect to form, he was found as a man*, Phil. ii. 7. So Acts vii. 51; xx. 22. Heb. v. 11. Gal. i. 22. Luke i. 51, et saep. al.

NOTE 1. In classic Greek this is also very common; e. g. ἄξιός ἐστι θανάτου τῇ πόλει, *he is worthy of death, in respect to the city*, Xen. Mem. Soc. p. 1; καὶ...τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει ἐλέγομεν, *we have said those things...in respect to human nature*, Plato, Phaed. p. 79. In like manner the Gen. case is often used; see § 12, 3, c.

(2.) The relation signified by the words *in accordance with* the nature, principles, opinion, judgment, circumstances, etc., of any thing or person, is sometimes expressed by the Dative.

E. g. 'Except ye be circumcised τῷ ἔθει Μωϋσέως, *agreeably to the usage of Moses,*' Acts xv. 1; ἀσπιδος τῷ θεῷ, Acts vii. 20; δυνατὰ τῷ θεῷ, 2 Cor. x. 4, (but this may mean: Are feasible to him.) So Plat. Phaed. p. 101, εἴ σοι ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνεῖ, *if in your opinion they mutually agree or differ.*

(3.) The *manner* in which any thing is done, etc., is designated by the Dative.

E. g. 'Praying ἀκαλύπτῳ τῇ κεφαλῇ, *with the head uncovered,*' 1 Cor. xi. 5; 'Ye are circumcised περιτομῇ ἀχειροποιήτῳ,' Col. ii. 11.

NOTE 1. In conformity with this use of the Dative, are many nouns employed *adverbially*; e. g. δημοσίᾳ, *at the public expense*; κοινῇ, *in common*; ἰδίᾳ, *privately*, et al.

(4.) The *instrument* is put in the Dative.

E. g. λήθῃ τὴν κεφαλὴν πατάξας 'Upholding all things τῷ ἔχηματι τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ,' Heb. i. 8; ἐφ' ὀλοισίῳ ἦλθον, *they came by means of a small boat,* John xxi. 8; et al saepe.

5. The *cause* or occasion of any thing may be put in the Dative.

E. g. 'They were broken off τῇ ἀπειθείᾳ,' Rom. xi. 20; 'Ye obtained mercy τῇ τούτων ἀπειθείᾳ, *through their disobedience, i. e. the occasion of mercy being extended to you, was their disobedience,* Rom. xi. 30. So in the classics: ῥάβῳ ἀπῆλθον, *they departed through*

fear; πολλοὶ ἀπέθανον ἀκρατεῖα, *many died through intemperance*; οὐ χαίρουσι, *they rejoyce through means of you*; τούτοις λυπούμεθα, *we grieve because of these*, i. e. our grief is occasioned by them.

NOTE 1. It is easy to see, that such verbs as *to delight in, to rejoyce in, be troubled, be sad, be satisfied or unsatisfied, to be willing or unwilling, to wonder at, be terrified, be astonished, etc.*, may very naturally put the cause or occasion of these emotions in the Dative.

NOTE 2. In like manner, verbs signifying *to distinguish one's self, to excel, to be eminent, etc.*, put the quality which is the cause or ground of distinction, in the Dative.

(6.) Time *when* and place *where*, are put in the Dative.

E. g. τῇδε τῇ νυκτὶ, *this very night*; ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, *on the same day*; μακρῷ χρόνῳ, *during a long time*. So Δῆλῳ, *at Delos*; Δωδῶνι, *at Dodona*; Μυκῆναις, *at Mycenæ*.

§ 19. THE DATIVE WITH PREPOSITIONS AND COMPOUND VERBS.

(1.) Prepositions adapted to express any of the various relations of the Dative, may govern this case.

E. g. (a) Governing the Dat. only; ἐν αὐτῷ (ἐν).

(b.) Governing the Dat. (and also the Gen. and Acc.);
ἀμφί, περί, ἐπὶ μετὰ, παρὰ, ὑπό.

(2.) Verbs compounded with these prepositions, may of course govern the Dative.

NOTE 1. In particular; verbs compounded with σὺν, μετὰ, and ὁμοῦ take the Dative, because the idea of *association* or *union* (so consonant with the nature of the Dative) is expressed by these words.

NOTE 2. Verbs with ἐπὶ and πρὸς not unfrequently take the Dative, even in cases where the Acc. would seem most consonant with the prepositions; e. g. ἐπιστρατεύειν τινί, προσβάλλειν τινί.

(3.) Any verbs compounded with prepositions which do not govern the Dative, may govern this case, if they have a meaning which is appropriate to such a regimen.

GENERAL REMARK I. The Dative without any preposition before it, is more common in the earlier than in the later Greek; and more usual in the classics than in the New Testament. Indeed, in a great number of cases, after verbs of almost every kind which usually govern the Dative, a preposition is inserted by the New Testament writers; which makes the relation still more definite and explicit. In particular does the preposition ἐν mark the relation of the Dative; so that we have ὑμῖν τῇ πίστει, and ἐν τῇ πίστει, διαχέειν τινί and ἐν τινί, etc.

But the Greek has a wide latitude of construction; and the Accus. with *εἰς* or *πρός* before it, often express the like relation as the Dative; e. g. *εὐχόμεαι θεῷ* and *εὐχόμεαι πρὸς θεόν* so *ψεύδεσθαι τινι* and *πρὸς τινι*, *εὐδοχεῖν εἰς τινὰ* and *τινί*. So with adjectives; as *εὐσεβὲς εἰς τι* or *τινί*, et. al. mult.

GENERAL REMARK II. Here, as in the case of the Genitive, most verbs, etc., which govern the Dative, are capable of another construction, and may govern the Acc. or Gen., *pro libitu scriptoris*, as the nature of the case may be. The student should learn, therefore, in most cases rather to say *may* govern, than *must* govern.

ACCUSATIVE.

§ 20. NATURE AND USES OF THE ACCUSATIVE.

(1.) The Acc. case marks the *direct* complement of the verb, i. e. the object which the action of the verb affects, either as producing it, or in some way operating upon it; or else, toward which the action of the verb is *immediately* directed:

(2.) In respect to all verbs which designate an action that is plainly *transitive* in its nature, as *εἰσέρχωμαι*, the use of the Acc. after them is too plain to need any illustration, being common to all languages. But,

(8.) The Greeks employ the Acc. after many Verbs, which are in their own nature not strictly *transitive*, but more or less of a *neuter* or *intransitive* signification; and the extent of this usage can hardly be made the subject of grammatical rule; it must be learned by practice.

E. g. ἀλὴν ὁδὸν εἶαν, *they go [by] the way of the sea*, Hom. τὴν νῆσον ἀφίκετο, *he came [to] the island*; δόφρον βάλειν, *to go [into] a chariot*; εἰδυῖν ὁδὸν *to travel [by] the way*; πλεῖ ὑγρὰ κέλαιδα, *he sails [on] the watery ways*. And so even of *place*; e. g. ἦλθε χθόνα, *he came [to] the country*. But such constructions are much more common in poetry than in prose; e. g. ζέω, λάμπω, ῥέπω, ῥίω, σπεύδω, χορεύω, and the like, take the Acc. after them.

NOTE 1. There is a very large class of verbs, which from their nature do not seem fully to belong to the order of *transitive*, nor fully to the order of *intransitive* ones, but hold a kind of intermediate place between the two; and yet they very commonly govern the Acc. case. My meaning is, that when we examine strictly into the nature of this class of verbs, we shall find that the action which they express, cannot be truly and accurately named *transitive*, inasmuch as it does not affect the object which is put in the Acc. case. Still the verb itself is so far *transitive*, that it requires some object to be named after it toward which the action stands related; for without the designation of this, the meaning of the verb

would be incomplete. If there be any obscurity in this statement, it will be made altogether clear by examples; e. g. in προσκυνεῖν τινά (common in the best classical writers), the verb does not express an action of which τινά is properly the *subject*; for the worship paid to any being does not (strictly considered) affect him at all, but it affects only the worshipper himself. Yet when we say, *he worshipped*, we feel, of course, that the idea is incomplete and imperfect unless the *object* of worship (for so we must call it) is also named. Kindred to this example are a multitude of cases in Greek; e. g. such as δορυφορεῖν τινά, *to be a spear-bearer for one* (as we express it in English); and so κολακεύω, φθάνω, λανθάνω, ἐπιτροπεύω, ἐπιλείπω, βλέπω, ἀποδιδάσκω, ὁμνυμι, ἀσβεῖν, φεύγειν, and many other like verbs, usually take the Accusative.

NOTE 2. In like manner, all such verbs as designate *the feelings and affections of the mind*, though not strictly transitive, very commonly take after them the Accus. of the object which occasions such feelings or affections; e. g. αἰσχύνομαι αὐτόν, *I am ashamed [of] him*; αἰδέομαι αὐτόν *I reverence him*; ἐποικτιρίζω αὐτόν, *I pity him*; ἐλεῶ αὐτόν, *I compassionate him*; and so of other like verbs, as σπλαγχνίζομαι, φοβέομαι, ἀσεβέω, ὁμνυμι, etc. in the New Testament, where the idiom in question is common.

NOTE 3. Even such verbs, expressive of the feelings or affections, as may be called strictly intransitive, i. e. such as make a complete sense of themselves, do, among the Greeks, not unfrequently take the

Acc. after them, in order to designate the object toward which such feelings are exercised; e. g. ἀλγίω αὐτὸν *I am distressed [for] him*; ἄχθομαι ἕλκος, *I am grieved [for] the wound*; ὠδίνω βάρος, *I am in anguish [on account of] the burden*; οὐ χαίρουσι τοὺς θνήσκοντας, *they exult not [over] the dying*; θαρρῶ θάνατον, *I am fearless [of] death*. This liberty sometimes extends very far among the poets; as Eurip. Iph. Aul. 1489, εἰλίσσει' ἄμφι βωμὸν Ἀρτεμιν, lit. *dance around the altar—Diana*, i. e. dancing around the altar [venerate or worship] Diana.

NOTE 4. This liberty in regard to verbs indicative of *feeling*, is at times extended to some others; e. g. θύειν γάμον, *to sacrifice [on account of] a wedding*; θύειν εὐαγγέλια, *to sacrifice [because of] good news*; ἤμαι σέλμα σιμνόν, *I sit [upon] an honourable seat*; καθίζων τρίποδα, *sitting [upon] a tripod*, etc.

REMARK. Nothing is plainer, therefore, than that there is much which is arbitrary in the usages of the Greek language, as to what verbs are to be construed in a *transitive* manner. The lexicons, which ought to mark these usages in respect to every verb, are to the present hour deficient; I mean the general lexicons of the Greek language. Much, that is useful, remains to be done in this respect.

(4.) Verbs transitive, and still oftener intransitive, take an Acc. of a conjugate noun, i. e. one of a kindred meaning.

E. g. σπάζει τὸν σκύλον, Luke viii. 5; φυλάσσοντες

φυλακᾶς, Luke ii. 8; τὴν δικαίαν κρίσιν, κρίσας, John vii. 24; στρατιῇ τὴν καλὴν στρατίαν, 1 Tim. i. 18, et al. *sæpe*. This has sometimes been called *Hebrew idiom*; but it is as common in Greek as in Hebrew, and extends even more to verbs that are intransitive; as the classic βουλεύω βουλήν, νοσῶ νόσον, ἰσχυροῦνται ἰσχυρίαν, πολεμίζει πόλεμον, κινδυνεύω κινδύνημα, γέλωτα γελῶ, γάμους ἔγνησαν, φυγὴν φεύγουν, etc. show; Matth. § 408. In general, the meaning is more fully and emphatically expressed by this mode of phraseology.

(5.) Many verbs govern *two* Accusatives;

(a) The one of a person and the other of a thing; or, (b) The one of a subject and the other of (an explanatory) predicate.

E. g. (a) Verbs of *clothing* and *unclothing*; John xix. 2. Matt. xxvii. 31. Mark xv. 17. (2.) Verbs signifying *to give to drink*; Mark ix. 41. 1 Cor. iii. 2. (3.) *Of anointing*; as in Heb. i. 9. (4.) *Of loading*; Luke xi. 46. (5.) *Of persuading*; Acts xviii. 23. (6.) *Of adjuring*; Acts xix. 13. 1 Thess. v. 27. (7.) *Of reminding*; 1 Cor. iv. 17. John xiv. 26. (8.) *Of asking*; Mark iv. 10.

NOTE 1. This idiom is widely extended in classic Greek. Verbs signifying *to treat well or ill, to make, to speak well or ill, beg, teach, take away, rob, spoil, conceal, hide, compel, distribute*, etc., govern two Accusatives.

(b) Verbs of *nominating, choosing, naming, consti-*

tuting, regarding as, etc.; as *ἵνα ποιήσωσιν αὐτὸν βασιλέα*, John vi. 15; *ὕμᾱς ἔθετο ἐπισκόπους*, Acts xx. 28; *ὃν ἔθηκε κληρονόμον*, Heb. i. 2. So in the classics; *τὸν Γωβρύαν ἀπέδειξε στρατηγὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τιμὴν...ἀγαθὰ νομίζουσιν σοφιστὴν ὀνομάζουσι τὸν ἄνδρα*, etc. In these and all similar cases, the second Acc. may be considered as *exegetical apposition*.

NOTE 2. It is a Hebraism when *εἰς* with the Acc. is employed in such cases; as ‘He raised up for them *τὸν Δαβὶδ εἰς βασιλέα*, *David for a king*,’ i. e. David the king. Comp. Heb. i. 5.

(6.) The Passive of verbs governing two Accusatives, retains the latter of them.

E. g. *παραδίδεις, ἃς ἐδιδάχθητε*, 2 Thess. ii. 15; *τὸ βάπτισμα ὃ ἐγὼ βαπτίζομαι*, Mark x. 38; *δωρήσεται πολλὰς*, Luke xii. 47.

NOTE 1. Even verbs which govern the Dat. and Accus., do sometimes retain the Acc.; as *πεπίστευμαι εὐαγγέλιον*, Gal. ii. 7.

(7.) The Accusative (like the Gen. and Dative) is often employed, in order to define or point out some particular relation of a person or thing.

E. g. *σκηνοποιοὶ τὴν τέχνην*, *tent-makers* [in respect to] *occupation*, Acts xviii. 3, *τὸν ἄριθμὸν...πεντακισχίλιοι*, *five thousand* [in] *number*, John vi. 10. So in the classics; *Λυδὸς ἐστὶ τὸ γένος*, *he is a Lydian* [by]

déscend : ὁ Κῦρος...εἶδος μὲν κάλλιστος, ψυχὴν δὲ φιλαν-
θρωπώτατος ‘ The river Marsyas has 25 feet τὸ εὖρος,
as to breadth.

NOTE 1. Cases of this nature are usually solved by supplying κατὰ before the Accusative. But nothing can be more evident than that the preposition is here (as in the case of the Gen. and Dative) unnecessary. When inserted it only renders the relation of the noun more explicit.

(8.) The Acc. is often employed when *time* and *space* are designated.

E. g. ὥραν ἐνάτην, Acts x. 3. So τρίτην ἡμέραν, εἴκοσιν ἔτη, δέκατον ἔτος, *these ten years*. As to space; πέντε σταδίους, τὸ βάθος δισχίλιοι, *two thousand* [as to] *depth*.

(9.) The Acc. frequently stands *adverbially*.

E. g. τὴν ἀρχὴν, *at first*; τέλος, *finally*; τὴν ταχίστην, *as soon as possible*, etc.

(10.) Several prepositions govern the Accusative.

(a) The Acc. only : ἀνά, εἰς (εἰς), ὡς (sometimes used as a preposition). (b) The Acc. and some other case; διὰ, κατὰ, ὑπὲρ. (c) The Acc. with the Gen. and Dative; ἀμφί, περὶ, ἐπὶ, μετὰ, παρὰ, πρὸς, ὑπό.

GENERAL REMARK ON THE GEN. DAT. AND ACCUSATIVE. It is very obvious, that all these cases are

used to designate the relation which we express by the words *in respect to*, *in regard to*, *with reference to*. In many instances it is altogether a matter of indifference which of the cases is employed, and it is left to the choice of the writer; e. g. *Λυδός εἰμι τὸ γένος*, or *τῷ γένει*, or *γένους*. In many other cases, nicer shades of diversity are manifest; in others still, the cases cannot be exchanged at all for each other. Nothing but an accurate knowledge, however, of the idioms of the Greek tongue, can enable one to judge in cases of such a nature.

PRONOUNS.

§ 21. GENERAL PRINCIPLES RESPECTING GENDER AND NUMBER.

(1.) It is a general law respecting pronouns of every kind, that they should conform, as to *gender*, to the noun which is their correlate. But concord in this respect is often merely *ad sensum*.

E. g. ‘Teach πάντα τὰ ἔθνη, baptizing αὐτούς,’ masc. pronoun, because ἔθνη designates *men*, Matt. xxviii. 19; τέκνιά μου, οὓς πάλιν ὠδίνω, where οὓς refers to τέκνιά for the like reason, Gal. iv. 19; ‘There is παιδάριον ἔν here, ὃς κ. τ. λ., (in the better Codd.), John vi. 9. So in 2 John v. 1. Acts xv. 17. Mark v. 41. Rom. ii. 14, 26. Rev. xvii. 5. This is frequent in classic Greek; Matth. § 434.

(2.) Plural pronouns are often employed, when the correlate noun is *nomen multitudinis*, i. e. is in the singular number, but has a *collective* sense.

E. g. λαὸν...αὐτῶν, Matt. i. 21; ἐν μέσῳ γενέας...ἐν οἷς, Phil. ii. 15; τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ...αὐτῶν, 3 John v. 9; τοῦ σκότους...ὑπ' αὐτῶν, Eph. v. 11, 12; κατὰ πᾶσαν πόλιν, ἐν αἷς κ. τ. λ. The adjectives *each*, *every*, are collectives in their own nature, and therefore they cause the noun with which they are joined to partake of this sense. So לֵב and כָּל in Hebrew, are followed often by a plural verb.

NOTE 1. Pronouns are often used in a *generic* sense, i. e. as collectives, or in the place of nouns of multitude. In the Old Testament this occurs times without number.

§ 22. USE OF PERSONAL PRONOUNS.

(1.) Personal pronouns, specially in the oblique cases, are more frequent in the New Testament, than is usual in classic Greek.

NOTE 1. The ground of this seems to be the same as in the case of prepositions, which are also employed in the New Testament with unusual frequency. A definiteness is thus given to the expression in Greek, such as a foreigner would very naturally seek for, because it made the language more intelligible to him; and in respect to the Greeks, all the Hebrews were

in a sense foreigners. Seldom indeed is the pronoun omitted, where we might expect it; e. g. Acts xiii. 3. Mark vi. 5. 1 Tim. vi. 2.

(2.) Personal pronouns are not usually added to verbs, as the *subjects* of them. When they are, emphasis or distinction is generally intended.

E. g. *σὺ* in Luke xvii. 8; *ὑμεῖς* in Mark vi. 37. So also in Mark xiii. 23. 1 John iv. 19, et al. saepe. But in some cases, it is difficult to make out an emphatic meaning; e. g. *ὑμεῖς* in Mark xiii. 9; *ἐγὼ* in Eph. v. 32. In a few cases, in the same sentence, one verb has a pronoun expressed and another has not; e. g. in Luke x. 23, 24, *ἂν βλέπετε ... ἂν ὑμεῖς βλέπετε*. See also 2 Cor. xi. 29

(3.) In some cases, the noun itself is repeated, where we might naturally expect the pronoun.

E. g. in Luke iii. 19, *Ἡρώδης*; and so *πρόσωπον* in 2 Cor. iii. 7; see also John x. 41. In some cases of this nature, there is an emphasis or significance attached to the repetition of the noun; e. g. John iv. 1. Matt. x. 23. Luke xii. 8; ix. 26. John vi. 40, et saep. al.

(4.) *Αὐτός* is ranked by most grammarians among the *demonstrative* pronouns; but in its *oblique* cases it is employed as a *personal* pronoun.

NOTE 1. Αὐτός, when joined with a noun or pronoun as a kind of adjective, means *self*; and with the article, *self-same, the same*; as ὁ πατήρ αὐτός· ἐγὼ αὐτός· αἱ ὑπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς μητρὸς τραφέντες, *those who are nourished by the same mother*; οἱ Πέρσαι καὶ αὐτοί, *even the Persians themselves*, etc.

NOTE 2. Αὐτός (when used as described above,) may stand either *before* a noun and its article, as αὐτός ὁ ἀδελφός· or *after* both, as ὁ πατήρ αὐτός· or between the article and its noun (like adjectives,) as τὸ αὐτὸ χάριον. When it stands *after* the noun, the intention of the writer usually is, to render its meaning (*self*) emphatic.

NOTE 3. When employed alone (in the Nom.) as the subject of a sentence, the presence of a personal pronoun joined with it, viz., ἐγὼ, σὺ, etc., is *implied*. In this case *ipse* (and not *ille*) is the proper meaning. Although we often translate αὐτός by *he* simply, yet the Greek means *he himself* or *himself*, etc. But in the *oblique* cases, αὐτός is a simple pronoun, *him, her, it*, etc.; and is so used times without number.

NOTE 4. The noun to which αὐτός relates when it is employed as a pronoun, is sometimes a collective one, as Matt. iv. 23, αὐτῶν refers back to Γαλιλαίαν, (the country for its inhabitants.) So in Matt. ix. 35. Luke iv. 15, al.; (constructio ad sensum.) Not unfrequently αὐτός stands related to some noun merely implied by the nature of the case or by the context; as in Luke i. 17, 'He shall go before αὐτοῦ, *him,*'

in a sense foreigners. Seldom indeed is the pronoun omitted, where we might expect it; e. g. Acts xiii. 3. Mark vi. 5. 1 Tim. vi. 2.

(2.) Personal pronouns are not usually added to verbs, as the *subjects* of them. When they are, emphasis or distinction is generally intended.

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(4.) *Αὐτός* is ranked by most grammarians among the *demonstrative* pronouns; but in its *oblique* cases it is employed as a *personal* pronoun.

NOTE 1. Αὐτός, when used as a kind of adjective, is translated as *the same*, *self-same*, *the said*, etc. as in the following examples: αὐτῆς μητρός, *of the same mother*; αὐτοὶ Πέρσαι, *the Persians themselves*, etc.

NOTE 2. Αὐτός (which may stand either *before* the article and its noun, as ὁ ἀδελφός, or *after* both, as ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτός. When it stands *after* the article and its noun, the writer usually is emphatic.

NOTE 3. When employed as the subject of a sentence, the pronoun αὐτός is joined with it, viz. αὐτός ἐστιν, *he is*; in this case *ipse* (and not *ipse*) is used. Although we often translate αὐτός as *he*, the Greek means *he himself*. In the oblique cases, αὐτός is used, etc.; and is so used till

NOTE 4. The noun αὐτός is employed as a pronoun, as Matt. iv. 23, ὁ λαὸς αὐτοῦ, *the people of the country* (the country for its inhabitants); Luke iv. 15, αὐτοῦ, *of him*; (consequently αὐτός stands frequently implied by the nature of the case, as in Luke i. 17, 'H

viz. the Messiah, not mentioned in the preceding discourse; αὐτοῦ in 1 John ii. 12, in reference to Christ. So αὐτοῦ in 2 John v. 6; and in many cases the reference is more or less obscure.

NOTE 5. Αὐτός, as a pronoun, is not unfrequently repeated, in cases where its use would seem to be *pleonastic*; e. g. ἐξελθόντι αὐτῷ ἐκ τοῦ πλῃσίου, εὐδίως ἀπήντησεν αὐτῷ, Mark v. 2. So Mark ix. 28. Matt. xxvi. 71. Rev. vi. 4, al. But such constructions, following clauses with a participle, are common in the classics. More pleonastic still would seem to be the following constructions, with clauses containing the relative pronoun; viz., ὃς ἐδοξη αὐτοῖς ἀδικῆσαι κ. τ. λ., Rev. vii. 2; ἣν οὐδεὶς δύναται κλεῖσαι αὐτήν. Rev. iii. 8; so Mark vii. 25; xiii. 19, comp. Rev. xii. 14, ὅπου and ἐκεῖ. This is very common in the Sept. and in the Hebrew; but it is also found in classical Greek, Xen. Cyrop. I. 4, 19, Diod. Sic. I. 97, XVII. 35. See many examples of the pleonastic repetitions of personal pronouns, in Matth. § 465, 4. Sometimes this repetition seems to be for the sake of emphasis, and sometimes for the sake of greater perspicuity.

(5.) Ἐαυτοῦ (Attice αὐτοῦ) is a compound of ἐ and αὐτός, and is used only in the *oblique cases*. But its use is not so limited as its etymology would seem to indicate.

NOTE 1. It is sometimes applied to the 1st. pers. plural, as in Rom. viii. 23. 1 Cor. xi. 31. 2 Cor. i.

1, 9, al.; sometimes to the 2nd. pers. plural, as in John xii. 8. Phil. ii. 12. Matt. iii. 9, al.; sometimes to the 2nd. pers. sing., as in John xviii. 34. The same usage is found in the classics.

NOTE 2. *Αἰροῦ*, etc. the Attic form, is used in a multitude of cases where *αἰροῦ*, etc., might have been employed. It often depends merely on the mode of expression which the writer deems the more eligible, and not on any substantial difference of meaning, whether the one or the other is employed. Hence the continual discrepancies of the Codices, in relation to these words. Generally where the pronoun refers to the *principal* subject of the sentence, *ἰαυροῦ* (*αἰροῦ*) is employed. Rost's Grammar, § 99, 2.

§ 23. POSSESSIVE PRONOUNS.

(1.) The possessive pronominal adjectives, (for such they are,) are not very frequent in the New Testament. Instead of *ἐμός, σός*, etc., the Gen. of the personal pronoun, *μοῦ, σοῦ*, etc., is more commonly employed.

NOTE 1. This is the case also in the classics. The position moreover of the proper *possessives*, is like that of adjectives in general. The pronouns employed instead of them, may precede or follow the noun, e. g. *ἡμῶν ἡ σωτηρία*, Rom. xiii. 11; *μοῦ τὴν χάριν*, Phil. ii. 2; and often so in the writings of Paul, Luke, and John. The other construction, such as *ὁ θεός μου, ἡ*

πίστις ὑμῶν, etc., is too common to need examples. The first of these constructions has generally been deemed *emphatic*; but many instances occur where no particular emphasis is apparent.

(2.) The meaning of possessive pronouns may be *subjective* or *objective*.

E. g. ὁ σὸς πόθος may mean, *the desire which you have*, or *the longing of another after you*. So τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν, *the remembering of me*, Luke xxii. 19; τῷ ὑμετέρῳ ἐλέει, *through mercy bestowed on you*, Rom. xi. 31. See 2 Tim. iv. 6. 1 Cor. xv. 31. So ἡ ἡμετέρα εὐνοία may mean *our own benevolence*, or *benevolence toward us*.

(3.) The Dative of pronouns often supplies the place of a possessive pronoun.

E. g. μήτηρ μοι, *my mother*; οἱ ἡμῶν σύμμαχοι, *our allies*; σοὶ ἐχθροί, *thine enemies*. The true solution of such cases seems to be either thus: *a mother in respect to me*; or, *μήτηρ ἣ ἐστὶ μοι*.

(4.) The place of the possessive pronominal adjective, or of the pronoun in its stead, is sometimes supplied, in the New Testament by ἴδιος.

E. g. εἰς τὸν ἴδιον ἀγρὸν *to his field*, Matt. xxii. 5; τὰς ἰδίους δούλους, *his servants*; where to say, *his own field*, *his own servants*, does not seem to be the intention of the writer. See also 1 Peter iii. 1, and comp. Prov.

xxvii. 8. Jos. vii. 10 in the Sept. In the classics no certain example of such a usage has been produced.

§ 24. DEMONSTRATIVE PRONOUNS.

(1.) The demonstratives *οὗτος*, *ὅδε*, *ἐκεῖνος*, (*αὐτός*), stand sometimes immediately before the verb, and *after* the subject of the sentence, in order to give emphasis to the expression.

E. g. ‘He who endureth to the end, *οὗτος* σωθήσεται.’ Matt. xxiv. 13. See Matt. vi. 4. Mark vii. 15, 20; xii. 40, et al. saepe.

(2.) *Οὗτος* more usually refers to a *preceding* noun; *ὅδε* to something which *follows*; but at other times *οὗτος* refers to a more distant object, *ὅδε* to a nearer one. *Οὗτος* (in distinction from *ἐκεῖνος*) also refers to what immediately precedes; *ἐκεῖνος*, to that which is more remote.

NOTE 1. Yet none of these usages are invariable; for there are cases where they are relinquished. Not unfrequently, (as in respect to *αὐτός* as a pronoun), the subject referred to is remote, or merely implied, or simply something which the nature of the topic under discussion suggests. See Acts iv. 11, *οὗτος*. 1 John v. 20 is a doubtful case, so far as *οὗτος* is concerned. See also Acts viii. 26; vii. 19. 2 John v. 8

NOTE 2. The usual place of *οὗτος* is *before* the noun to which it has relation (when adjectively used);

that of *ἐκεῖνος*, *after* the noun. But the reverse of this sometimes happens in both cases.

(3.) Some one of the demonstrative pronouns is omitted, but still implied, in innumerable cases where the relative pronoun is employed; which latter seems often to include the demonstrative along with it.

E. g. ἀγόρασον ὧν χρεῖαν ἔχομεν, *buy* [those things] *of which we have need*, i. e. ἀγόρασον [ἐκεῖνα] ὧν κ. τ. λ., John xiii. 29; ‘How shall they call εἰς ὃν οὐκ ἐπίστευσαν,’ i. e. εἰς ἐκεῖνον ὃν οὐκ κ. τ. λ., Rom. x. 14; ‘What fruit had ye ἐφ’ οἷς νῦν ἐπαισχύνεσθε,’ i. e. ἐπ’ ἐκείνοις οἷς νῦν κ. τ. λ., Rom. vi. 21; ἄρα εἰς ὃ κατέκειτο, i. e. ἐκεῖνο ἐφ’ ὃ κ. τ. λ., Luke v. 25. Comp. John vi. 29. 2 Cor. v. 10. The same idiom is frequent in the classics.

(4.) The Demonstrative τοῦτο is often employed before *ἵνα*, *ὅτι*, and the like particles, when that which follows them is intended to be made particularly emphatic.

E. g. εἰδὼς τοῦτο, ὅτι, κ. τ. λ., 1 Tim. i. 9; οἰδὼς τοῦτο, ὅτι κ. τ. λ., Acts xx. 29. So εἰς τοῦτο... ἵνα κ. τ. λ., Acts ix. 21; εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ.... ἵνα κ. τ. λ., Rom. xiv. 9, and so, very often, in all parts of the New Testament, and sometimes in the classics.

NOTE 1. The neuters ταῦτα, τοῦτο, etc., are often used *adverbially*. Τούτων appears, also, to be employed

in the same way as the singular number, in 3 John v. 4; and so *ταῦτα* in John xv. 17.

§ 25. RELATIVE PRONOUNS.

(1.) As a general principle, the relative agrees with its antecedent in *gender* and *number*; but there are not a few exceptions to this.

E. g. When another noun, etc., is added by way of explanation, the relative not unfrequently conforms to this latter noun; as *τῆς αὐλῆς, ὃ ἴσιν πραιπόσιον*, Mark xv. 16; *τῷ σπέρματι σου, ὃς ἴσιν Χριστὸς*, Gal. iii. 16. So Eph. i. 14; vi. 17. 1 Tim. iii. 15. Phil. i. 28. Eph. iii. 13. 1 Cor. iv. 17. But the anomaly in question is not confined to these cases only; for in Matt. xxvii. 33. Mark xv. 22; xii. 42. John i. 39, 42, 43. Heb. vii. 3, the pronoun (ὃ neuter) agrees with neither the antecedent nor consequent noun, but rather with *ῥῆμα* implied. So in Xen. *Cyrop.* VII. 2. 11. et al.; see *Bib. Repos.* II. p. 63. In the classics, the relative not unfrequently differs from its antecedent, both in number and gender. Matt. § 475, seq.

(2.) While the relative commonly agrees with its antecedent in *gender* and *number*, it usually depends on the verb, etc., which it stands connected with, for the *case* in which it is put; but oftentimes it conforms to the case of its antecedent, let the verb govern whatever case it may.

This is called **ATTRACTION**. E. g. ἐπὶ πάντων, οἷς ἤκουσαν, Luke ii. 20; ἐπίστευσαν ... τῷ λόγῳ, ὃ εἶπεν, John ii. 22; περὶ πάντων τῶν ἔργων ... ὧν ἠσέβησαν, Jude v. 15. So in Acts iii. 21, 25; x. 39; vii. 17; xxii. 10. James ii. 5. 1 Pet. iv. 11. John xv. 20; xxi. 10, et al. saepe.

NOTE 1. In most parts of the New Testament this usage is very common, or rather, it is the regular one. But in Matthew it never occurs; and in Mark but once, vii. 13.

NOTE 2. The word, whether a noun or demonstrative pronoun, etc., which is the antecedent, is often *omitted*, while the relative assumes the same case that it would, provided the antecedent had been expressed; e. g. μεμνημένος ὧν ἔπραξε, i. e. μεμνημένος [τῶν πραγμάτων] ὧν ἔπραξε. So οἷς ἔχω χρεῶμαι, *the things I have, I use*, for χρεῶμαι [τούτοις] οἷς ἔχω and with still greater latitude, as δεινότερά ἐστιν ... ὧν εἶρηκα, *they are more dreadful than the things which I have said*, for δεινότερά ἐστιν [ἐκείνων] ὧν εἶρηκα. Comp. Heb. v. 8. Rom. xv. 18.

(3.) *Vice versa*, the noun sometimes conforms to the case in which the relative is put by the proper regimen of the verb.

E. g. (a) When the noun precedes, as τὸν ἄρτον ὃν κλῶμεν, 1 Cor. x. 16; λῆθον ὃν ἀπεδοκίμασαν, οὗτος κ. τ. λ., Matt. xxi. 42; παντὶ ᾧ ἐδόθη πολὺ, Luke xii. 48. (b) When the noun follows; as ὃν ἐγὼ ἀπεικονίσαι Ἰωάννην,

οὗτος κ. τ. λ., Mark vi. 16; εἰς ὃν παρεδόθητε τὸν
ἀσπλῆν, Rom. vi. 17. Philem. v. 10. Both usages
occur in the classics. Comp. Heb. v. 8.

§ 26. INTERROGATIVES.

(1.) The interrogatives τίς, τί, are not only employed in questions direct and indirect, but even in some cases where the Greeks would employ ὃ τί.

E. g. δοθήσεται ὑμῖν...τί λαλήσετε, *what ye shall say, shall be given to you*, Matt. x. 19; ἐτοίμασον τί δειπνήσω, *prepare that which I may eat*, Luke xvii. 8. Mark vi. 36. So Xenophon; οὐκ ἔχω τί μᾶλλον εἰπῶ, *I have nothing more important which I could say*, Cyrop. vi. 1, 48.

(2.) In the New Testament, ἵνα τί is frequently employed in an interrogative sense, *why? wherefore?*

E. g. Matt. ix. 4; xxvii. 46. Luke xiii. 7, al. It is also employed in the same way in the Greek classics.

NOTE 1. The student will remember, that the interrogatives τίς, τί, always have the accute accent, which is retained on the *first* syllable in the oblique cases; by which the *interrogatives* are distinguished from the *indefinite* pronouns.

§ 27. INDEFINITE PRONOUNS.

(1.) Τίς, τί (indefinite,) are sometimes added to nouns, in order to express the idea of *a certain*, *a kind of*, etc.

E. g. ἀπαρχήν τινα, *a kind of first fruits*, James i. 18.

(2.) Sometimes they are joined to numerals; and sometimes to adjectives.

In the first case, they mean *a certain*, or *about so many*; as δύο τινάς, Acts xxiii. 23. So ἡμέρας ἑβδομήκοντά τινας, *some seventy days*. With adjectives, they have a kind of *intensive* meaning, as φοβερά τις ἐκδοχή κρίσεως, *a certain terrible expectation of punishment*, Heb. x. 27; μέγας τις, *some great affair, some important personage*, Acts viii. 9. 1 Cor. iii. 7. Gal. ii. 6, al.

§ 28. HEBRAISM AS TO THE DESIGNATION OF CERTAIN PRONOUNS.

(1.) The usual classic words οὐδεὶς, μηδεὶς, *no one* are sometimes expressed in the manner of the Hebrew לֹא—אֶחָד—אֶחָד, yet with this modification, that the negative particle (οὐ or μὴ) is closely joined with the verb of the sentence, and not with πᾶς.

E. g. οὐκ ἂν ἰσώθῃ πᾶσα σὰρξ, lit. *then could not be saved all flesh*, i. e. *no flesh or no man could be saved*, Matt. xxiv. 22; οὐ δικαιοῦσεται πᾶσα σὰρξ, *no flesh*, i. e. *no man, shall be justified*, Rom. iii. 20. Eph. v. 5. 1 John ii. 21. John iii. 15. 1 Cor. i. 29. Acts x. 14. Rev. vii. 1. See the like idiom also, in Matt. x. 29. Luke i. 37.

NOTE 1. Different from this is the case, where the negative particle is immediately connected with πᾶς, for then the meaning is as in other languages, i. e. *not every one*, (q. d. only some of.) E. g. οὐ πᾶς ὁ λέγων κύριε, κύριε, κ. τ. λ., *it is not every individual, who addresses me with Lord! Lord! etc.*, Matt. vii. 21; οὐ πᾶσα σὰρξ ἡ αὐτὴ σὰρξ, *not all flesh is the same flesh*, i. e. *there are different kinds of flesh etc.*, 1 Cor. xv. 39. So οὐ πάντες in Matt. xix. 11. Rom. ix. 6; x. 16.

REMARK. Philosophically considered, there is no difficulty in the mode of expression stated in the text above. For example, John ii. 21, ὅτι πᾶν ψεῦδος ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας οὐκ ἔστι, *for every lie is not of the truth*, which must of course be equivalent to *no lie is of the truth*. But in the classics this mode of expression is not found; nor is it frequent in the New Testament.

(2.) *The one and the other*, in classic Greek, may be expressed by εἷς μὲν, εἷς δέ; but in the New Testament we find εἷς...καὶ εἷς.

E. g. Matt. xx. 21; xxvii. 38. Mark iv. 8, et al.

The Heb. idiom, $\text{הָיָה} \dots \text{הָיָה}$, seems to be the basis of the New Testament mode of expression.

ADJECTIVES.

§ 29. CONCORD OF ADJECTIVES WITH NOUNS.

(1.) The general rule respecting adjectives as united to nouns, etc., is, that they must agree with them in *gender* and *number*; but to this there are not a few exceptions.

NOTE 1. An adjective *agrees* with a noun, when it is so combined with it as to form one whole, which, without the adjective, would be imperfectly or incompletely expressed. On the other hand, the adjective is a *predicate* in a sentence, when the expression of the noun, etc., is complete without it, and the adjective only adds some new limitation.

(2.) Concord merely *ad sensum* is frequent in respect to adjectives.

E. g. (a) In respect to gender; as $\tau\alpha \sigma\tau\alpha\tau\epsilon\iota\mu\alpha\tau\alpha \dots \epsilon\acute{\nu}\delta\epsilon\iota\delta\upsilon\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\iota$, Rev. xix. 14; $\tau\alpha \lambda\omicron\iota\pi\acute{\alpha} \epsilon\acute{\nu}\eta \dots \epsilon\sigma\kappa\omicron\tau\iota\sigma\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\iota$, Eph. iv. 17; $\phi\omega\eta\alpha\iota \mu\epsilon\gamma\acute{\alpha}\lambda\alpha\iota \dots \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omicron\upsilon\sigma\tau\epsilon\varsigma$, Rev. xi. 15. So frequently in the classics. (b) In regard to number; $\tau\delta \pi\lambda\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma \dots \chi\alpha\iota\acute{\rho}\omicron\upsilon\sigma\tau\epsilon\varsigma$, Luke xix. 37; $\delta \lambda\alpha\delta\varsigma \dots \epsilon\lambda\theta\alpha\mu\beta\omicron\iota$, Acts iii. 11. So in the classics; e. g. $\tau\eta\eta \pi\acute{o}\lambda\iota\omega \dots \acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta\kappa\alpha\varsigma$,

Thucyd. III. 79, ἀλλά the like oftentimes; see Matth. § 434.

NOTE 1. In Rev. xiv. 19, we find τὴν ληνὸν...τὸν μέγαν but ληνός is itself of the common gender.

(3.) The same adjective belonging to nouns of *different* gender and connected, if it *precede* the nouns, is when *repeated*, usually put in its appropriate gender; but if both nouns are of the same gender, it is commonly inserted but once.

E. g. πᾶσα δόσις...καὶ πᾶν δώρημα, James i. 17; ποταποὶ λίθοι καὶ ποταπαὶ οἰκοδομαί, Mark xiii. 1. Acts iv. 7. On the contrary, where the adjective is not repeated; πολλὰ τέρατα καὶ σημεῖα, Acts ii. 43; ποιή- λαις νόσις καὶ βασάνοις, Matt. iv. 24; xiii. 32; ix. 35, al. Exceptions to the first rule, see in Luke x. 1. 2 Thess. i. 4, al.

(4.) An adjective which in reality qualifies several connected nouns, when inserted but once, may take the gender and number of either of the nouns which it qualifies; but commonly it conforms to its proximate noun.

E. g. ἔρις τε φίλη, πόλεμοί τε μάχαι τε, Il. έ, 891. But also ἄγγεα πάντα, γαυλοὶ τε σκαφίδες τε, τετυγμένα, Odys. ι, 222.

N. B. In respect to the position occupied by the adjectives, see § 2, 1 seq.

§ 30. VARIOUS WAYS IN WHICH ADJECTIVES ARE EMPLOYED.

(1.) With the article, they are often employed (more commonly in the singular but sometimes in the plural), as abstract nouns.

E. g. τὸ ἀσθενές...[τῆς ἐντολῆς], Heb. vii. 18; τὸ μακρὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, and τὸ ἀσθενές τοῦ Θεοῦ, 1 Cor. i. 25. Rom. ii. 4. Heb. vi. 17. 2 Cor. iv. 17; viii. 8. So τὰ ἀόρατα [τοῦ Θεοῦ], Rom. i. 20. This idiom is common in the Greek writers, especially in the philosophical ones.

(2.) On the contrary, the place of an adjective is frequently supplied by a noun in the Gen. which qualifies the noun on which it depends.

E. g. τοῖς λόγοις τῆς χάριτος, Luke iv. 22; οἰκονόμος τῆς ἀδικίας, *unjust steward*, Luke xvi. 8; υἱὸς τῆς ἀγάπης, *beloved son*, Col. i. 13. Luke xviii. 6. Rev. xiii. 3, et al. saepe.

NOTE. 1. The *frequency* of this in the New Testament may be called *Hebraism*; for although this idiom is by no means a stranger to the classic Greek, it is more common to the poets than to the prose writers. See Matth. § 316, f.

(3.) But sometimes the *principal* noun (and not the one which designates *qualification*), is in the Genitive.

E. g. ἐπὶ πλούτου ἀδηλόγητι, *in riches that are deceitful*, or *in deceitful riches*, 1 Tim. vi. 17; ἐν καινότητι ζωῆς, *in a new life*, Rom. vi. 4; ἐνέργειαν πλάνης, *strong delusion*, 2 Thess. ii. 11.

NOTE 1. When a pronoun or pronominal adjective, etc., follows two words connected as in Nos. 2, 3, it relates to both as one whole; as τῷ ῥήματι τῆς ἀνάμειξαις αἰροῦ, *by his powerful word*, Heb. i. 3. Rev. iii. 10; xiii. 3. Sometimes, however, such pronoun or adjective is more appropriately connected only with one of the words; e. g. Rom. vii. 24. Acts xiii. 26.

(4.) In a few cases, the fem. of adjectives seems to stand for the neuter, according to the Heb. idiom.

E. g. αὖτη and θαυμαστή in Matt. xxi. 42. Mark xii. 11. But this is a citation from Ps. cxviii. 22 (Sept.); and in the Sept. such an idiom is not unfrequent, while in the New Testament it is very rare.

(5.) The frequent expression of the sense of adjectives, by the use of *ὡς*, *είκον*, etc., before abstract nouns, is properly *Hebraistic*.

E. g. υἱοὶ ἀπειθείας, *είκονα φωτός*—ὑπακοῆς—ὀργῆς—κατάρα. The Greeks use παῖδες ἰατρῶν—δυστήνων, etc., where, however, the Gen. is not an *abstract* noun.

(6.) The neuter adjective, either singular or

plural, with or without the article, is often used in an *adverbial* manner.

E. g. *πρῶτοι, τὸ πρῶτον* *first*; *αἰνᾶ, dreadfully*; *μικρὰ, σοφώτατα, αἰσχρότα, etc.*

§ 31. COMPARATIVE DEGREE OF ADJECTIVES.

(1.) The usual form of the comparative requires the Gen. after it; see § 13, 5.

(2.) Not unfrequently the comparative degree is expressed in the New Testament, by the positive form of the adjective, followed by ἤ.

E. g. *καλὸν σοι ἐστὶ...ἢ* etc. *it is better for thee... than, etc.*, Mark ix. 43. So Mark ix. 45. Matt. xviii. 8, 9, al. The same usage is occasionally found in the classics; as *ἐμοὶ πικρὸς...ἢ κείνους* κ. τ. λ., Soph. Ajaï. 981. Comp. Luke xv. 7; xviii. 14. Gen. xxviii. 36. 1 Cor. xiv. 19, for the like expressions; which are very common in the Sept. and are a close copy of the Heb. comparative. Let the reader note, that when ἤ is employed, the word which follows is in the same case as that which precedes.

NOTE 1. The older grammarians say, that *μᾶλλον* is to be supplied by the mind before ἤ in all cases of this nature. Recent grammarians think the idiom may be as well explained without the aid of *μᾶλλον* as with it.

(3.) The positive degree followed by *καὶ*

or *ὑπέρ*, is sometimes employed to designate the sense of the comparative.

E. g. ἁμαρτωλοὶ παρὰ πάντας τοὺς Γαλιλαίους, *greater sinners*, or *sinners above, more than*, Luke xiii. 2. Rom. xiv. 5. Heb. i. 9, the same sense is made by *παρὰ* after nouns. But the same preposition is very common after the *comparative* degree; as πλείον παρὰ, Luke iii. 13; διαφορώτερον παρὰ, Heb. i. 4.

Ὑπέρ is employed in the same way as *παρά* e. g. Luke xvi. 8. Heb. iv. 12. In all these respects, parallels are found in the classics.

(4.) The comparative is sometimes used, when the thing with which it is compared is merely implied but not expressed.

E. g. Acts xvii. 21, τι...καινότερον *something more recent* than even what was called *new*; Acts xxv. 10, κάλλιον, *better* than I; 2 Cor. vii. 7, μᾶλλον χαρῆναι *rejoice still more* than I did before, on the arrival of Titus. So in Phil. i. 12. Acts xkvii. 13. John xiii. 27. Heb. xiii. 19. Matt. xi. 11, al., examples of the like kind may be found; and so in the classics, Matth. § 457.

NOTE 1. Μᾶλλον and ἔτι put before the comparative, make an *intensive* sense; as μᾶλλον περισσότερον, *the more abundantly*, Mark vii. 36. Phil. i. 23. So ἔτι μᾶλλον, *still more*, Phil. i. 9. Heb. vii. 15. The same usage is found in the classics.

NOTE 2. For *πρότερον* (compar.) *αὐτῷ* seems to be used in John i. 15 ; xv. 18. Comp. Heb. viii. 7. Acts i. 1.

(5.) An imperfectly expressed, but concise and energetic comparison is made, by comparing a thing with a person, when, strictly speaking, the comparison is with something which belongs to the person.

E. g. *μαρτυρίαν μείζω τοῦ Ἰωάννου*, *testimony greater than John's*, i. e. greater than that of John, John v. 36. This construction is frequent in the classics. Matth. § 453.

§ 32. SUPERLATIVE DEGREE.

(1.) Besides the usual superlative forms, this degree is sometimes expressed by the positive and a noun which designates the class of persons or things to which it belongs.

E. g. *ἐὺλογημένη σὺ ἐν γυναιξίν*, lit. *blessed art thou among women*, i. e. most blessed of women art thou, Luke i. 28. This is like the Heb. בְּרוּכָה בְּנָשִׁים; but examples of the like kind are not wanting in the Greek classics, e. g. *ὦ φίλα γυναικῶν*, Eurip. *Alcest.* 473; *ὦ σخیλῳ ἀνδρῶν*, *most miserable man!* Aristoph. *Ran.* 1081; *αἰτὸς ὡκύς ἐν πετανοῖς*, *the eagle is the swiftest of the winged*, Pind. *Nem.* III. 76.

(2.) The Heb. superlative, such as שׁוֹרֵר דִּשְׁוֹרֵר, is found in very few cases, and the classic Greek is not wanting in the like expressions.

E. g. ἁγία ἁγίων, Heb. ix. 3: βασιλεὺς βασιλέων, Rev. xix. 16. But in Soph. Elect. 849, we find δειλαία δειλαίων Oed. R. 446, ἄρρεν' ἀρρένων Aeschyl. Supp. 524, ἀναξ ἀνάκτων.

NOTE 1. The so called superlatives made by θεῷ, κυρίου, etc., appear to be all capable of solution in another way; e. g. αὐξήσιν τοῦ Θεοῦ, *an increase of which God is the author*, Col. ii. 19; σάλπιγγξ Θεοῦ, *the trumpet which God will order to be sounded*, 1 Thess. iv. 16. So in Luke i. 15. 2 Cor. i. 12. Rev. xxi. 11; xv. 2. Ἀστυὺς τῷ Θεῷ, *fair in the view of God*; see § 18, 2.

NUMERALS.

§ 33. USE OF ORDINAL AND CARDINAL NUMBERS.

(Γ.)—For the ordinal πρῶτος, the cardinal εἷς is constantly employed in designating a day of the week.

E. g. πρῶτη ἡμέρα τῆς εβδομάδος, *early on the first day of the week*, Mark xvi. 2. Matt. xxviii. 1. John

xx. 19. Acts xx. 7. al. The Greeks employ *εἰς*, in such cases, only when *δεύτερος*, *ἄλλος*, etc., follow. The New Testament usage is therefore Hebraistic.

(2.) Cardinal numbers repeated denote *distribution*; as in Hebrew.

E. g. *δύο δύο*, *two and two* or *two by two*, Mark vi. 7. The Greeks would say: *δύο κατὰ δύο*, or *δύο ἀνὰ δύο* and like the latter is Luke x. 1.

NOTE 1. The formulas, *ἀνὰ εἰς ἕκαστος*, Rev. xxi. 21; *εἰς καθ' εἰς*, Mark xiv. 19. John viii. 9; *ὁ καθ' εἰς*, Rom. xii. 5; are peculiar. The usual Greek is, *ὁ καθ' ἓνα*.

(3.) Ordinals in the neuter are sometimes used *adverbially*.

E. g. *τρίτον, δεύτερον*, *thrice, twice*, etc.

VERBS.

§ 34. VERBS ACTIVE, TRANSITIVE, AND INTRANSITIVE.

(1.) Many verbs, having a variety of meanings, are active and transitive in one sense, and neuter or intransitive, sometimes reflexive, and in some cases even of a passive nature, in another.

E. g. *στρίψεν αὐτὰ εἰς αἷμα*, *to turn them into blood*,

Rev. xi. 6, where *σείρων* is used actively ; while generally in the New Testament it is employed as a verb neuter or reflexive, i. e. as meaning *to turn back*, or *to turn one's self*, etc. So τὰ κύματα ἐπίβαλλεν εἰς τὸ πλοῖον, *the waves cast themselves into the boat*, Mark iv. 37 ; ἀποῤῥίψαντες, *casting themselves*, viz. into the sea, Acts xxvii. 43 ; ὅταν παραδῷ ὁ καρπός, *when the fruit shews itself*, Mark iv. 29 ; and so even with a *passive* sense, περιέχει ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, *it is contained in the Scripture*, 1 Pet. ii. 6.

NOTE 1. This principle is common to other languages. In Hebrew it is of very frequent occurrence. In the Greek classics it is as common as in the New Testament. Especially does the Perf. 2d in Greek bear an *intransitive* meaning so commonly, that it has not unfrequently been called its *predominant* sense. And indeed, in the few cases where verbs have two Perfects active in real use, the Perf. 2d is nearly always intransitive.

NOTE 2. Some verbs which are transitive throughout, in most of their tenses, are intransitive exclusively in some others ; e. g. in Perf. 2d, Pluperf. 2d, and Aor. 2d. So it is with ἵστημι, φύω, δύω, σβέννυμι, and some others.

(2.) Some *intransitive* verbs are not unfrequently constructed in the same way as *passives*.

E. g. Ἐκτὼς ἀπὶ θανεν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀχιλλεύως, *Hector died by Achilles*, i. e. was slain by him ; Ἀχαιοὶ ὑφ'

"Ἐκτορος ἰπῦν, *the Greeks fled by reason of Hector*,
i. e. they were put to flight by Hector.

REMARK 1. See an abundance of examples of all sorts, viz. of actives used as neuters; of neuters employed as actives and as passives; of active for passive and middle; of passive for active and neuter; of the middle for active and passive, in Matth. § 496. All this, however, goes not to shew that one voice, or one kind of verb, is actually substituted for another; but only that some verbs have a variety of significations, transitive or intransitive, active or passive, and sometimes middle. Usage and a good lexicon or commentary, are the only guides which a student can have, in respect to particular examples. But the nature of the case in general, and the possibilities of such usages, he may learn from grammar.

REMARK 2. The cases governed by active verbs, have been already designated above, in considering the Gen., Dat., and Acc. cases, §§ 10—20.

§ 35. PASSIVE VERBS.

(1.) Verbs *passive* are such as require the subject and object to be united in their Nom. case.

E. g. *ἐγὼ ῥύπτομαι*, *I am beaten*, where the subject of the verb is *ἐγὼ*, which is also the object affected by the action that the verb expresses.

(2.) As the active subject of the verb, *i. e.* the agent, is not expressed by the passive form, and is not necessarily implied; and as this form is from its nature intransitive; the agent, if noted at all, must be noted *indirectly*. This is done in several ways;

E. g. (a) By ὑπὸ, πρὸς, or παρὰ before the Genitive; as Ἐκτωρ κτείνεται ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως, or πρὸς τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως, or παρὰ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως. It is most common, however, to employ ὑπό. (b) The Dative simply, without any preposition, is often employed in the same way, denoting the cause or instrument; as ἐπράττετο αὐτοῖς τὰ τῆς πόλεως, *the affairs of the city were managed by them*.

(3.) In the usual cases of the *passive*, that which was the Accusative in the active voice, becomes the Nom. in the passive; but if verbs govern the Dat. or Gen. of person, these may in like manner become Nominatives in their passive voices.

E. g. *τιπτεν με*, *he beats me*, μέ in the Acc.; but in *ἐγὼ τιπτομαι*, *I am beaten*, the μέ takes its place in the Nom. of the verb. So in other cases; ἀμελειν τούτων (Gen.) *to neglect these things*, while ταῦτα ἀμελεῖσθαι, may be said just as well as if ἀμελεῖν in the active voice governed the Acc.; and in the like manner, ἐπιβουλεύειν ἡμῶν and ἡμαῖς ἐπιβουλεύεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν.

(4.) The Passives of verbs active that govern two Accusatives, the one of a person and the other of a thing, retain the regimen of the latter.

E. g. ὁ παῖς διδάσκεται τὰς τέχνας, *the boy is taught the arts* ; but in the active, διδάσκει τὸν παῖδα τὰς τέχνας, *he teaches, etc.*

(5.) When a verb active governs the Acc. of a thing and Dative of a person, the latter may become the Nom. of the passive, while the Acc. of the thing is retained.

E. g. ἐπιτρέπει τῷ Σωκράτει τὴν δίκαν, *he entrusts the decision to Socrates*, may be passively expressed thus ; Σωκράτης ἐπιτρέπεται τὴν δίκαν. See in Gall. ii. 7. Rom. iii. 2. 1 Cor. ix. 17.

(6.) The Aorists passive are not unfrequently used in the New Testament, in an intransitive and reflexive sense.^a

So ἀπεκρίθη, ἀποκριθεῖς, διεκρίθη, προσκολληθῆναι, καταλαλήτω, ἐπιφάνην, and other verbs, &c. are frequently employed ; see Luke xxii. 68. Matt. xvi. 2. Matt. xxi. 21. 1 Cor. vii. 11. Tit. ii. 11 ; and even the Future προσκολληθήσεται, Eph. v. 31.

NOTE 1. That the Perf. passive is used in the

^a See the Author's Gram. of the New Testament Dialect, p. 84, § 61.

sense of the middle voice, the student may see by consulting *προσκέκλημαι* in Acts xiii. 2; *προσκέκληται*, Acts xvi. 10; *Καίσαρα ἐπικέκλησαι*, Acts xxv. 12; *συνετέθειντο*, John ix. 22; *πεπορευμένοις*, 1 Pet. iv. 3. See peculiar cases in Acts xx. 13. 2 Pet. i. 3. Also Fut. *ὀφθῆσομαι* in Acts xxvi. 16, which probably has a Middle sense.

§ 36. VERBS OF THE MIDDLE VOICE.

(1.) The inter-community between the passive and middle voices, as also the distinctions between them; and in like manner with respect to the active voice; the peculiar sense, moreover, of the middle voice, and its distinction from *deponent* verbs; are all explained at large in Gram. of New Testament Dialect, p. 80—84, § 60—62, and these subjects, therefore, need not be here repeated.

(2.) Like the other voices, the Middle may deflect from its usual and natural meaning, and in some cases have a sense merely active or passive. Especially is this the case, when the appropriate forms of any verb, in the active or passive voices, do not exist, or are gone into desuetude.^a

^a Comp. Gram. of New Test. Dialect, p. 81—84, § 60—62.

(3.) The student should not forget, in respect to the middle voice, that although it is called *reflexive*, for distinction's sake, yet it is *directly* so only in a very few cases; and these have regard only to actions which properly respect one's person. In general, it is only *indirectly* reflexive, and it commonly indicates *actions done for one's self, on his account, by his command, desire, or procurement, etc.*

See Gram. of New Testament Dialect, p. 81—83, § 60, 3—8, where are exhibited appropriate examples.

(4.) The Middle voice of course may have an *active* or *passive* construction, according as it has an active or passive sense. In its *appropriate* sense it usually follows the construction of the *active*, in relation to the case of the noun which designates the object to which the action of the verb stands related.

§ 37. TENSES OF VERBS.

(1.) The subject of the tenses at large has already been explained in Gram. of New Test. Dialect, p. 70—75, § 50—52, and p. 83, 84, § 61, 62.

(2.) The *interchange* of tenses, e. g. the Perf.

and Present, the Perf. and Aorists, the Pluperf. and Aorists, the Imperf. and 2d Aorist, etc., the reader will find exhibited under § 50, seq. of Gram. of N. T. Dialect, p. 70.

(3.) In the New Testament the use of the tenses does not differ in any respect worthy of note, from that of the classic Greek.

NOTE 1. (a) *The Present* is used in narrating the *past*; e. g. John i. 29, 44, 46; ix. 13. Acts x. 11. Rev. viii. 11; xii. 2, al. saepe. It is even set by the side of the Praeter, in the same sentence; e. g. Mark ii. 4; iv. 38. John i. 44; v. 14; xi. 29, et al. saepe. So often in the classics; Matth. § 504, Winer § 41, b. (b) *The Present* is used in respect to the *future*; Matt. xxvi. 2. John iv. 21; x. 32; xii. 26; xiv. 3; xvii. 24; vii. 34. Matt. xvii. 11, al. But in translating such passages we need not use the future, any more than we need use the Praeter in translating those under a. This *modus* of expression creates no embarrassment as to sense; and the classical writers not unfrequently indulge in it, (Matth. § 504, 3,) although not with the same frequency as does the evangelist John. (c) *The Present* seems to supply the place of the *Imperf.*, in some cases; e. g. 'Now the Pharisees had heard that Jesus...ποῦν καὶ βαπτίζου,' etc., John iv. 1, where we might render: *was making and baptizing*, etc. So in John ii. 7. Mark viii. 23; v. 14. Luke xix. 3. Acts iv. 13, et al. saepe. But this construction is not foreign to the classics (Winer § 41,

2a) and it is no more strange, than that other tenses should often be commuted.

NOTE 2. *The Imperfect*; (a) It is sometimes employed as denoting continued action in past time; Luke xiv. 7; xxi. 32. John v. 16; xii. 6. Mark iii. 11, et al. (b) Continued and customary action or state; Rom. xv. 22. 1 Cor. x. 4; xiii. 11. Acts xiii. 11. Mat. xiii. 34, et al. *saepe*. (c) Commenced but not fully accomplished action; Luke i. 59. Mat. iii. 14. Gal. i. 13. (d) Imperf. for the Aorist; Acts xvi. 22. Mark vii. 17; x. 17, al. See Matth. § 505. (e) The Imperf. and Aorist are sometimes employed in the same sentence; as in Luke viii. 23. James ii. 22. (f) For that kind of Present which denotes *duration*, and includes the past as well as the present time, the Imperf. is sometimes used, specially in neuter or impersonal verbs, such as ἡ ἀνθρώπων, etc.; as Col. iii. 18. Matth. § 505. In all these usages, the classical writers agree; see Winer, § 41, 3, and Matth. § 505, throughout.

NOTE 3. *The perfect*; (a) Denoting continued and continuing action, state, etc.; Luke xiii. 2; iv. 6; v. 32. Acts viii. 14. Mark x. 40. Rom. ix. 6. Mat. iv. 4, γεγραμμέναι, i. e. *it has been written and stands recorded*; al. *saepe*. (b) The Perfect is frequently joined in the same sentence with an Aorist; e. g. Luke vii. 16; ix. 7 and 8; iv. 18. Heb. ii. 14. Acts xxi. 28. John xiii. 3. 1 Cor. iv. 8. John i. 10. In some of these cases the true *permanency* of the Perfect is plain; in others, its use can hardly be dis-

tinguished from that of the Aorist. (c) For the Present; in which case an action or state that was and still is, for the most part, is designated; as in John xx. 29. 2 Cor. i. 10. Gal. ii. 7. John viii. 40; xiv. 25. Matth. § 505. III. Several verbs use the Perfect for the Present, because they have no Present with the same sense which the Perfect bears.^a (d) As a kind of *Futurum exactum* the Perf. is sometimes employed; e. g. in Rom. xiv. 23. So Eurip. EL 690; 'If he shall fall a corpse in the contest, ὄλωλα, lit. *I am undone*, i. e. I shall have been undone. See Matth. § 500.

NOTE 4. *The Aorist*; (a) Is not unfrequently used for the Pluperfect; e. g. in John xviii. 24. Matt. xiv. 3, 4. Acts i. 2; iv. 13; ix. 35. John xi. 30, al. (b) It has relation to what is future, in several cases; e. g. in John xv. 6, ἰβλήθη. Rev. vii. 10. In the classics it is frequently employed in the like way; Matth. § 506, 2. (c) Customary action is sometimes designated by it; e. g. Matt. xxiii. 2, ἐκάθισαν xi. 19, ἰδικαιώθη. Luke i. 51, may also be understood in the same way, although it is capable of another construction; so Eph. v. 29, ἐμίσησεν. (d) For the Present; e. g. ἔγραψα for γράφω. 1 Cor. v. 11. Philem v. 19 and 21. 1 John ii. 14, 21, al.; comp. ἔπεμψα, Acts xxiii. 30. Philem. v. 11. See also ἠδέξατο, ἠδύχησα, Heb. x. 5. Matt. iii. 17. The same usage exists in the classics, Matth. § 506.

NOTE 5. *The Future*; (a) Expresses not simply

^a See the Author's Gram. of N. T. Dialect, § 50, 3, Notes 1, 2, p. 70.

the pure future, i. e. not merely that a thing will be done, happen, etc., but also that *it must or may be done*; e. g. Rom. vi. 15, 2. 1 Cor. xi. 22. Rom. iii. 6; x. 14. Matt. xix. 16. Luke iii. 10; xviii. 18. xiii. 49. Heb. ii. 8; al. (b) The Future is used to designate a supposed and possible case; James ii. 10, 18. 1 Cor. xv. 35. Rom. ix. 19; xi. 19. Matt. xviii. 21. (c) The Future is used in a sense that the Present would well express, in Rom. iii. 30. Gal. ii. 16. Luke i. 37. So in the classics; see Matth. § 506, VI.

USE OF THE MODES.

§ 38. USE OF THE MODES IN INDEPENDENT SENTENCES.

(1.) By an *independent* sentence is meant, any declaration which is of itself complete, and does not need any supplementary words in order to render it intelligible, or does not depend on such words in the way of necessary connection.

INDICATIVE MODE.

(2.) Most sentences of this nature employ of course the Ind. mode. Every thing which actually is, and every opinion, expressed directly and absolutely without conditions or limitations,

is asserted or declared by the Indicative; which, for the most part is very simple, and is generally alike in all languages. But,

(3.) The *Imperf.* Indicative is sometimes employed in a *conditional* way, not unlike the Conditional or Subj. mode.

E. g. καλὸν ἦν αὐτῷ, εἰ οὐκ ἐγενήθη κ. τ. λ., *it were good for him, if he had not been born*, etc., Mark xiv. 21; κρεῖττον ἦν αὐτοῖς, μὴ ἐπγινώσκειν κ. τ. λ., *it were better for them not to have known the way of righteousness*, etc., 2 Pet. ii. 21; ἐγὼ ὤφειλον ὑφ' ὑμῶν συστάσθαι, *debebam a vobis commendari*, 2 Cor. xii. 11; ἡδύνατο γὰρ τοῦτο πρᾶξῃναι, *for this could be sold*, etc., Matt. xxvi. 9.

NOTE 1. Connected with this usage, are some important passages in the New Testament. To illustrate the *conditional* usage of the Imperf. Ind., i. e. the *modified* sense of it, Acts xxv. 22 may be taken as an example; viz., ἐβουλόμην καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦ ἀνδρώπου ἀκοῦσαι, *I myself could wish to hear the man*; which means, that although he was desirous to hear him, yet, in his view, present circumstances forbade it. Had he simply said, *I desire to hear him*, or *I will hear him*, without any qualification or limitation, he would have used βούλομαι or θέλω (not ἐβουλόμην) comp. βούλομαι in 1 Tim. ii. 8, and θέλω in 1 Cor. xvi. 7. Rom. i. 13; xvi. 19; al. Had he spoken *Optatively* (βουλομένη ἂν,) then the possibility or probability, in the judgment of the speaker, that he should hear him,

would have been distinctly intimated. It was only the Indic Imperf. therefore, which would answer the exact purpose of the speaker.

So in that celebrated passage in Rom. ix. 3, *ὃς γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐγὼ ἀνάθεμα εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ*, *I could wish to be an anathema from Christ*; or (in other words) to be given up to utter destruction by him; that is, I could wish to take the place of the Jewish nation, and to be devoted to destruction in their room, if this were possible; but I know it is not. In the like manner, Gal. iv. 20, *ἤθελον δὲ παρεῖναι πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἄρτι*, *I could wish to be present with you now*, i. e. if circumstances permitted (but they do not,) I would gladly be with you.

(4.) The Ind. Present is sometimes employed in asking questions, where we should make use of *shall* or *will* before the verb, i. e. express it by the Future.

E. g. *τί ποιῶμεν*; John xi. 47, lit. *what do we?* meaning, *what shall we do?* or, *what can we do?* *Vice versa* in Rom. vi. 1, we have *ἐπιμένεον* in the Future, instead of *ἐπιμένωμεν* in the Subj. Present.

SUBJUNCTIVE MODE.

(5.) The Subjunctive mode, as its very name imports, is not commonly employed in independent, but in *dependent* sentences; for it is *joined* to another mode, or is used in a *subjunctive*

an affirmation or declaration. Yet there are a few cases in which it is employed in sentences not dependent on, nor necessarily connected with others. E.g.

(a) In cases of exciting or exhorting, in the 1st pers. plural; or the 2d pers. singular.

E.g. ἄγωμεν ἐντὺς, *let us go hence*, John xiv. 31; φάγωμεν καὶ πίωμεν, *let us eat and drink*, 1 Cor. xv. 32; and so in John xix. 24. Phil. iii. 15. Luke viii. 22. al. saepe. Very common in the classics; Matth. § 516, 1. So in the 2d person; μὴ μοιχεύῃς· μὴ φονεύῃς· μὴ κλέψῃς· μὴ ψευδομαρτυρήσῃς, Luke xviii. 20. Mark x. 19. al. saepe.

(b) In questions where real doubt is expressed.

E.g. δώμεν ἢ μὴ δώμεν *shall we give, or shall we not give?* Mark xii. 14; ποῦ...ἰταμάσσομεν, Luke xxii. 9, al. saepe. So in the classics; Matth. § 516, 2.

NOTE 1. The *Future* Indicative is sometimes employed in such cases; as ποῦ...ἰταμάσομεν (in the better Codices), Matt. xxvi. 17; xiii. 28 (in some Codices), al. And such is occasionally the usage of classic Greek; Matth. § 516. Ant. 2.

(c) In negative sentences after μὴ or οὐ μὴ.

E.g. with μὴ see under *a* above. With οὐ μὴ as οὐ μὴ ἀποβῇ, Mark x. 18; οὐ μὴ ἀποβῇ, Mark xiii. 12; αἰσχροὶ σὺν ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἁγίοις τῶν οὐρανῶν.

NOTE 1. But *μη* is not confined to the Subj. mode ; it is often employed with the Opt., Imper., and Indicative ; e. g. *μη δύνασθῃς, μη κρίνετε, μη γένοιτο*, etc.

OPTATIVE MODE.

(6.) The Optative was employed very extensively by the Greeks, in independent sentences ; viz.,

(a) In the expression of a *wish, desire*, that any thing may be, be done, or happen.

E. g. ‘ His bishopric *λάβει ἕτερος, let another take,*’ Acts i. 20 ; ‘ Let thy money *εἴη εἰς ἀπώλειαν, perish with thee,*’ Acts viii. 20. Rom. xv. 5. 2 Tim. ii. 7 ; iv. 14, et. al. So the formula *μη γένοιτο !*

NOTE 1. In classic Greek, the Optative in this sense often has with it the particles *εἰ, εἰ γάρ, εἴθε, ὥς*, in order to increase the intensity of expression ; Matth. § 513, 1.

NOTE 2. When a wish respecting something absolutely *past* is expressed, these particles with the Aor. Indic. are used ; something still continuing requires the Imperf ; as *εἴθε σοι τότε συνεγένεμην, would that I had been there with thee ! εἴθ’ εἴχες...βελτίους φρένας ! I wish you had a better mind !* Eurip. Hel. 1068.

(b) Occurrences which the mind of itself deems possible in and of themselves, or suppos-

able, without special reference to *external* circumstances (which would require the Subjunctive), are expressed in the Optative, and usually (but not always) with the particle *ἄν* (poetic *xe*) before it.

E. g. *ἴσως ἂν τοῖς ἐπιτιμήσουαν τοῖς ὑλημασίς, perhaps some might think of punishing the things that were said; γένοιτ' ἂν πᾶν, all of it may happen; βουλοίμην ἂν, I should wish.*

(c) In requests, commands, and even direct assertions, the Opt. is often employed, instead of the Indic. or Imperative; in which case it always gives a tone of moderation or modesty to the assertion, command, etc., it being the language of comity and moderation, in opposition to that of positiveness or arrogance.

E. g. *οὐκ ἂν ἀποφεύγοις τὴν νόσον, you could not then have avoided the disease; ὥρα ἂν εἴη πράττειν τὰ δέοντα, there may be a time to do what is requisite; λόγους ἂν ἂν λέγῃς, you may say what it is proper to say; Math. § 515.*

NOTE 1. Here also the particle *ἄν* (poetic *xe*) is usually employed, yet, in not a few cases, it is omitted; Math. § 515, γ. Anm.

§ 39. USE OF THE MODES IN DEPENDENT SENTENCES.

(1.) The nature of a *dependent* sentence being well understood, it will be easily seen, that all such particles as imply conditionality, uncertainty, possibility, probability, an unlimited or merely supposed case, etc., for the most part will be found very naturally united with the Optative and Subjunctive modes. And such is the usual fact. Yet there is scarcely any of these particles with which the Indicative mode is not sometimes joined. Indeed, as a general principle, it is joined with them, when the assertion (let the thing asserted be conditional or not) is designed to be absolute and positive as an assertion.

NOTE 1. As the Future Indicative, in a multitude of cases, has for substance the same meaning with the Subjunctive, (Matth. § 518, l. 7, p. 996, sq.), so it is not strange that even *iva* and *εως*, as well as other particles, should often be employed with it.

(2.) The fundamental distinction between the Ind., Subj., and Optative, appears to be this, viz., the Indicative simply affirms or denies; and this without any qualification so far as the mode itself is concerned, although conditional and qualifying particles may be joined with it. The Optative declares opinion, belief, desire, merely without

categorical assertion; in other words, it exhibits *subjective* views. The SUBJUNCTIVE indicates *the possibility of a thing*, in reference to its condition or circumstances.

E.g. λέγεις, ὅτι Ζεὺς τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀπέμψεν (Ind.) means, *you have said that Jupiter sent the man*, implying a full belief on the part of him who thus said, that it was in fact so, and an assertion of the fact. But λέγεις, ὅτι Ζεὺς τὸν ἄνθρωπον πέμψῃς (Opt.), indicates only the opinion or apprehension on the part of the same speaker that it was so. On the other hand, λέγεις, ὅτι Ζεὺς τὸν ἄνθρωπον πέμψῃ (Subj.), implies a belief that Jupiter can or will send the man, i. e. that circumstances are such, in the view of the speaker, as to render the thing possible.

NOTE 1. Although these nice distinctions are laid down by Hermann, Winer, Rost, and other acute grammarians, they are applicable, after all, only to the writers of refined and cultivated taste; and even among them cannot be carried through, without the aid of many fictitious niceties. Homer and the epic poets in general confessedly neglect them; for they employ the Opt. and Subjunctive oftentimes without regard to them. In later Greek, the Opt. became more and more rare, until finally it was altogether dropped; and the modern Greek does not at all recognize it. The New Testament Greek, it should be remembered, is in the *transition-state*, in which the Opt. is quite infrequent. When it is employed, how-

ever, it is commonly in accordance with the general principles of classical usage.

§ 40. MODES AFTER PARTICLES OF DESIGN OR INTENTION IN DEPENDENT SENTENCES.

(1.) The usual particles of this kind are *ἵνα*, *ὥς* (*ὅπως*), and *μή* lest (conjunction); which, from the nature of their signification, usually have relation to the *Future*.

(2.) The general rule respecting the verb which follows these particles in the dependent clause, is as follows: viz., (a) The verb of the principal clause being in the *Present* or *Future*, the Subjunctive is taken for the verb in the dependent clause; (b) On the other hand, if the principal verb is in any of the *Praeterites*, then the dependent verb takes the Optative.

E. g. *παύειμι ἵνα ἴδω*, *I am present that I may see* (Subj.) or *παύεσσομαι ἵνα ἴδω* but *παύην ἵνα ἴδοιμι* (Opt.) *I was present that I might see*. And thus after the other particles of *design*.

NOTE 1. Buttmann seems to intimate (§ 139, 2), that the exceptions to this general rule are few, or anomalous. Yet they are exceedingly numerous. *The Subj. may be used after PRAETERITES*;* (a)

* See the Author's *Gram. of New Test. Dialect*, p. 78, § 30, (1, 2, 3,) and p. 79, § 56, (3).

When in the form of a *Praet.*, the sense of the Present is included; as φίλους κέκτηται οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἵνα ἔχουσιν βοηθοὺς, *men have acquired* (acquire) *friends, in order that they may have helpers.* (δ) When the action¹ is past, but its effects still continue; as Thucyd. I. 73, παρήλθοντες ὅπως μὴ...χρεῖται βουλευσέσθαι, *we have come* [and are here] *in order that you may not decide for the worse*; see Matth. § 518, 1, 1. (c) In narration, when definite intention is signified, which (it was fully believed) would be carried into execution; as τῶν...πρώτους ἀπέπεμψαν Σπαρτιῆται, ἵνα...σύμμαχοι στρατεύωνται, *the Spartans sent away the principal persons.. that...the allies might make war*, Herod. VII. 206.¹ (d) Generally, the Subj. after *Praeterites* is used, when the design or object of *the agent of the principal verb* is distinctly and definitely announced, while the Opt., in such a case, would only declare the opinion of the *narrator*; e. g. Περδίκκας ἐπρασσεν, ὅπως πόλεμος γένηται, *Perdiccas made efforts, that there should be war*, etc., Thucyd. I. 57. Rost, § 122, Anm. 4. Matth. § 518, 1, 1.

NOTE 2. On the other hand; the Optative is frequently employed in a *dependent* clause, after a principal verb in the *Present* or *Future*, when not a specific and actual purpose of the agent of the principal verb is designated, but only the apprehension of the ~~wishes~~ ^{possibilities} of some other person respecting what may take place, or in regard to the design to be accomplished; e. g. καλὸν ἴσθαι μάχεσθαι, ὅπως μὴ τις δοῦλος μέλλοι γενήσεσθαι, *it is commendable to fight, that one may not become a slave.* Here is merely a general

apprehension expressed, that if one does not fight he will become a slave. (So *οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκείνους ἐκείνη ἵνα μὴ κτίνας βίου ἴη, the father sent in with gold, that she might not be stinted as to the means of living.*) Here the purpose is general, and the event being reduced to poverty so as to need the gold of a contingent nature.

NOTE 3. The particle *ὥς* (see § 46) is connected with *ὡς* and *ὅπως* only, of all the particles of *design*; but when it is added to these, it does not vary the principles already laid down.

(3.) The New Testament usage conforms to that which has now been exhibited.

E. g. (a) The Subj. after the Present and Future; as *ποιοῦσιν...ὅπως δοξασθῶσιν*, Matt. vi. 2; *οὐδεὶς... ἐμπλέκεται...ἵνα ἀρίστη*, 2 Tim. ii. 4. 1 Tim. i. 18; v. 21. Mark iv. 21. Phil. i. 9, al. *saepe*. So with the Future; as *ἵνα μὴ...διανεμηθῇ...ἀπειλησάμεθα*, Acts iv. 17; *χρήματα δοθήσεται αὐτῷ...ἵνα λύσῃ* (text, receipt), Acts xxiv. 26; and often thus, specially after the Imper. (which is of the nature of a Future tense), having reference to that *which is to be done*, as Rom. iii. 8. 1 Tim. iv. 15. Matt. ii. 8. Acts viii. 19, al.

(b) The Subjunctive after Praeterites; as *ἵνα...ἐκείνη*, 1 Tim. i. 16; *κατέλατόν σου...ἵνα...ἐκείνη*, 2 Tim. ii. 14. So Tit. ii. 14. Rom. vii. 4. 1 John iii. 8. 1 Cor. iv. 13. 1 John vi. 10, al. *saepe*. Indeed this usage is the only one in such cases of the New Testament writers; no instance occurring in which

the Optative is employed after a Praeterite, as is the usual practice of the classics. But this peculiarity is not confined to the New Testament. It is the predominant usage of Plutarch, and the usual one of the Septuagint, Apocrypha, Pseudepigrapha, etc.; and is in itself a characteristic of the later Greek, in which the Opt. was gradually going into desuetude:

(a) The Opt. after the *Present*; as οὐ παύομαι... μὴ ἐπιμὴν παύομαι... ἵνα ὁ Σιδὸς δῶῃ, Eph. i. 16; κἀμὲν τοι καὶ γένοιται... ἵνα δῶῃ, Eph. iii. 14—16. These are the only examples in the New Testament; and in respect to these the Codices vary, some of them giving δῶ (instead of δῶῃ.)

(4.) The Fut. Indicative is not unfrequent after particles of design.

This results from the resemblance of the Future to the Subj.; for these are often commuted, and used in the like manner; e. g. μακάριοι οἱ ποιῶντες... ἵνα ἴσται, Rev. xxii. 14; ἰδοὺ αὐτῶ ἰζουσίαν... ἵνα... δώσῃ (in the better Codices), John xvii. 2. Comp. Rom. v. 21, Rev. xiii. 16. 1 Cor. xiii. 3, al. where the Subj. is employed; as it more commonly is.

NOTE 1. This construction is common in the classics; but it is confined principally to the cases where ἵνα or μή is employed before the Future; Matt. § 519, 7. In such cases it indicates *objective* occurrence, for the actual happening of events; while the Opt. and Subj. would express *possibility*, or supposed *probability*. Rom. § 122, 11.

(5.) Other tenses of the Indicative are sometimes employed, even after the particles of design, when the idea is expressed, that something *might* or *should* have been done, etc., which has not been done, or cannot now be done.

E. g. ‘Why didst thou not kill me outright, ὡς ἔδειξα μήποτε, *that I might have disclosed myself* to men, in respect to my origin,’ Soph. Oedip. Tyr. 1377; ‘Then I should not have invoked my miserable body, ἵνα ᾦν τυφλός, *that I might be blind and dumb*,’ Ib. 1373; ‘You should have harnessed in Pegasus, ὅπως ἐφαίνου τραγικώτερος, *that you might have put on more of a tragic mien*. See Matth. § 519. Rost. 122, 12.

NOTE 1. In the New Testament only two (contested) instances appear; viz. ἵνα μὴ φυσιοῦσθε, 1 Cor. iv. 6, and ἵνα αὐτοὺς ζηλοῦτε, Gal. iv. 17. Some render ἵνα *when*, in these passages, *invitâ Minervâ*. In the cases from the classics above, the preceding and principal verb is in the Praeterite, and so ἵνα, etc., seems to indicate something future to the action designated by the principal verb. But in Gal. iv. 17, the preceding verb has a present sense, and makes the construction peculiar.

(6.) The particle μὴ (*lest*) usually requires the Subj., even after Praeterites; when the Opt. follows, it marks only *subjective* views. The Indicative after μὴ (*lest*) marks the action desig-

nated as actually past, or the apprehension of it as grounded in *fact*, not in opinion merely; Rost, § 122, 13.

§ 41. MODES IN HYPOTHETICAL OR CONDITIONAL SENTENCES.

(1.) The conditional particle is *ei*, or *ei* with $\alpha\nu = \epsilon\alpha\nu$ or its contracted form $\eta\nu$ ($\alpha\nu$.)

(2.) Conditional sentences consist mostly of a protasis and apodosis, either expressed or implied.

(3.) A conditional sentence may be expressed *absolutely*; or merely as *assumption*; or as a *supposition*, the realization of which is probable, but is dependent on circumstances; or *conditionality* may be expressed, with a belief that the thing supposed does not exist or will not take place.

(a) Simply or absolutely; in which case *ei* with the Indic. stands in the protasis, and the Ind., or Imper. (where requisition is made,) in the apodosis.

E. g. *ei ἐβρόντησε, καὶ ἤστραψε*, if it has thundered, it has lightened; i. e. assuming the fact that it has thundered (without inquiring whether it has or has not,) then it follows that it must have lightened. So

in the New Testament; *εἰ οὕτως ἐστίν, ἡ αἰτία τοῦ ἀνδρώπου...οὐ συμφέρει γαμήσαι*, *if such is the case with men...it is not good to marry*, Matt. xix. 10; i. e. assuming that such is the case, then, etc. *Εἰ θήλεις εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν ζωὴν, τήρησον κ. τ. λ.*, *if thou wilt enter into life, keep, etc.*, Matt. xix. 17, i. e. assuming the fact that you are desirous of becoming happy, then, in order to be so, you must keep, etc. So 1 Cor. vi. 2; ix. 17. Rom. viii. 25. Col. ii. 5—John vii. 4. 1 Cor. vii. 9—Rom. viii. 11. Matt. xvii. 4—1 Cor. xv. 16. 2 Pet. ii. 20—Matt. xii. 26. Luke xi. 20; where the Pres. in the protasis is followed by either the Pres., Fut., Perf., or Aor. of the Indic., or else by the Imper., in the apodosis.

Acts xvi. 15. John xi. 12. Rom. vi. 5; where the Perf. in the protasis, is followed by the Imper., or the Fut., (Indic.,) in the apodosis.

Rom. iv. 2; xv. 27. John xviii. 23; xiii. 32; where the Aor. in the protasis is followed by the Pres., Imper., Fut., in the apodosis.

Matt. xxvi. 33. James ii. 11; where the Fut. is followed by the Future and by the Perfect.

(b) Assumption on the ground of *subjective* possibility; in which case *εἰ* with the Opt. stands in the protasis, and the apodosis, (when one is expressed), takes *ἂν* with the Optative.

Εἰ γὰρ ἐλθόντες ἴδωμεν...ὅτι ἂν ὑμεῖς πολεμήσῃτε, *if the Persians should come [and in my opinion they may*

come,] *we should not then be able to conquer.* Subjective possibility or probability in the view of the speaker, is generally indicated by all sentences of this nature.

NOTE 1. In the New Testament only the protasis of such assumptions (making supposed cases) appears; as in 1 Pet. ii. 17. 1 Cor. xv. 37. Acts xxvii. 39; xx. 16, et al.; the two last cases after a Praeter, Ind. preceding. (In 1 Pet. iii. 14. Acts xxiv. 19, the Indic. expressed or implied, follows such a protasis.) In the classics ἤν = ἰάν (instead of εἰ) is sometimes used before the Optative, in suppositions consisting of only one member; Rost, 121, 8 b. Anmerk.

(c) Possibility, considered in respect to external circumstances; in which case the protasis has ἰάν, ἤν (ἄν) = εἰ ἄν with the Subjunctive, and the apodosis takes the Indic. or Imperative.

E. g. ἰάν τι ἔχωμεν, δώσομεν. So in John vii. 17, ἰάν τις θύλῃ...γνώσται and ἰάν ἀκούσῃ τοῦτο...πέσομεν, Matt. xxviii. 14. John vii. 37. Matt. v. 23; xviii. 13. 1 Cor. vii. 28. The apodosis may have the Ind. Fut., Imperf., Present, Perf., Aorist, or the Imperative.

(d) Conditionality is expressed, with the apprehension that the thing does not exist, or could not take place. In this case, the protasis has εἰ with a Praeterite of the Indic. (the Per-

fect excepted), and the apodosis has the Indic. Praeterite accompanied by *ἄν*.

E. g. εἴ τι εἶχεν, ἰδίῳ αὐτῷ, *if he had any thing, [I doubt whether he has, or I do not believe he has,] then would he give it.*

NOTE 1. So, in all cases where the apodosis is made by the *Imperfect*, it refers to *what would take place or be done*, i. e. it has a sense *relatively future*. So Luke vii. 39. Acts xviii. 14. John v. 46; ix. 41; xv. 19. 1 Cor. xi. 31. Gal. iii. 21. Heb. iv. 8, 'for if Joshua had given them rest, οὐκ αὖ περὶ ἄλλης ἐλάλει, *then would he not speak respecting another [day].*' But if the *Aorist* is employed in the apodosis, then the *past time* is designated, i. e. the meaning *would have been done*, etc. is designated; as εἰ ἐρίνοντο... ὅλως αὐτοὶ... μετενόησαν *if that had been done, then long ago they would have repented*, etc. Matt. xi. 21. So 1 Cor. ii. 8. John xviii. 30; xiv. 28. Matt. xii. 7.

But in this last case, the *Pluperf.* is sometimes employed in the apodosis, instead of the *Aorist*; as 1 John ii. 19, 'if they were of us, μεμενημένοι αὐτοὶ, *then they would have remained with us.*' John xi. 21; xiv. 7, where the *Plup.*, however, is used as an *Imperfect*.

NOTE 2. The distinction here made between the sense of the *Imperf.* and *Aor.* or *Pluperf.* in the apodosis, is of serious moment, and has very often been overlooked, even by some of the best translators. For the reality of it, see Buttm. § 139, 9, (4.) 10; Winer

§ 48.¹ 2. In the protasis, all the Praeterites (Perf. excepted) may stand, as the nature of the case requires; but in the apodosis, the distinction noted as to the sense must be observed.

NOTE 3. The particle *ei* is often used, moreover, in *indirect* questions, like the Latin *an*; as *ἔρωτάς, ei καὶ εἴη*.

GENERAL REMARK. Besides the kinds of conditionality designated by these four classes or modes of expression just named, there is a great variety as to *tense*, and even *mode*, in the Greek language, according to the exigency of each particular case. E. g. the Greek might say; *ei τοῦτο ἀληθές ἐστι, ἄραρον ἦν*, or *ἄραρον ἐστι*, or *ἄραρον ἵσται*. But instead of the Indic. (*ἦν, ἐστι, ἵσται*), which expresses a sentiment absolutely or categorically, if the speaker wished merely to convey his own *subjective* views of opinion, he might say; *ἄραρον ἂν εἴη*. So, if *possibility dependent on circumstances* were to be expressed in the apodosis, he might say, *ἄραρον ᾗ*, etc.

(4.) The particles *ei* and *ιάν* are not always confined, in the New Testament, to the modes (Indic. and Opt. for *ei*, and Subj. for *ιάν*) to which common usage has limited them in the earlier Greek writers, when they stand in the protasis of a hypothetical sentence. For,

(a) *Ei* is sometimes found before the Subjunctive; e. g. *ei τις... εἰλή*, Rev. xi. 5. So in Luke ix. 13.

1 Cor. xiv. 5, with some variations of MSS. For a long time it was contested whether this accords with classical usage; but it seems now to be conceded to later writers, and also to those who are not Attic, Matth. § 525, b.; Winer, p. 243.

(b) Ἐάν is sometimes found before the Indicative; Rom. xiv. 8, *ἐάν ἀποδνήσχομεν*, (in the better Codices). So Gal. i. 8, *εὐαγγελίζεσθαι* in the better copies. John viii. 36. Luke xi. 12, 1 John v. 15; with variations of MSS. For the most part, Knapp has put such Ind. forms in the Subjunctive. But the Ind. after *ἐάν* is not only found in older Greek writers, e. g. Herodotus, but is very frequent in the later ones; Matth. § 525, d.

§ 42. MODES WITH PARTICLES SIGNIFICANT OF TIME.

(1.) The usual particles of this nature, are *ἕως*, *ἕως*, *ἕως*, *ἕως*, (*ὥρα*), *πρὶν*, simply significant of time; and *ἐπει*, *ἐπειδὴ*, *ὅτε*, *ὡς*, mostly significant of time, but sometimes of *cause* or *ground*.

(2.) When a verb is connected with these, (a) It stands in the Indic., Pres. or Fut. if a distinct and definite thing is positively declared,

E. g. *ὅτε συνεβλήσαντο ὁ Ἰησοῦς*, when Jesus had finished; So Luke vii. 1. Mark xiv. 12. Luke i. 23. Acts xvi. 4. Luke vi. 3. Matt. ii. 9; i. 25, al. With the Fut.; e. g. *ὅτε...προσκυήσετε*, John iv. 21. Luke xvii. 22. John iv. 23; xvi. 25, al. *saepe*.

(b) In the Subjunctive, when any thing is declared as possible or conditional, i. e. which will happen under certain circumstances; in which case the particles of time take *ἄν* into connection with them.

E. g. *ὅταν* (= *ὅτι ἄν*) *ποιήσῃς πάντα*, Luke xvii. 10; xi. 36. Matt. xxi. 40. Other particles; 2 Cor. iii. 16. 1 Cor. xi. 25; xi. 34. Matt. xii. 20. James v. 7. 1 Cor. xv. 25.

NOTE 1. The Fut. Indic. is sometimes employed in such cases, instead of the Subjunctive; e. g. *ὅταν λάβω*, Rev. iv. 9. Luke xiii. 28. (*ὅψομαι* in some good copies.) (Once with the Imperf., Mark iii. 11.) This usage in the classics is doubtful; Matth. p. 1007.

NOTE 2. The particles of time, with the Subj. Aor., designate the *Futurum exactum*, Mark viii. 38. John iv. 25, al.; but with the Pres. Subj., they designate an action that is to be often or habitually repeated in Future. Matth. p. 1006.

NOTE 3. After the particle *ἕως*, the *ἄν* is frequently omitted; as *ἕως τελευτῆς* (in the better Codices), Rev. xx. 5. Matt. xiv. 22. 2 Pet. i. 19. Luke xiii. 8; xii. 50; xv. 4, al.

(c) With the Optative, when suppositions or subjective views merely are expressed, and a repetition or frequent occurrence of the action is (usually) denoted; in which case *ἄν* is *not* employed.

E.g. *ὅτι, τὰ ἄλλα πρῶτον ἰσχυρὰ ἐν ἀποστόλῃ.* In the New Testament, only once after a particle of time, viz. Acts xxv. 16, *πρὶν ἢ ἔλθαι.* The *ὅτι* is commonly used in its stead, as in Matt. xiv. 22. Acts xxiii. 12; iv. 21, al.

REMARK. When *ὅτι, διότι* are employed in the (casual sense of *ἵνα, ἵπτιδι*, etc. they are construed in the same way as the particles of time; which is the case with the casual particles generally.

§ 43. MODES AFTER THE PARTICLES, *ὅτι, ὡς.*

(1.) That part of a sentence which follows these particles, when they have the sense of the conjunction *that*, may be called the *compliment* of the preceding verbs, and regarded as standing in the place of an Acc. case.

E. g. *ἔλεγεν, ὅτι πέμψει αὐτὸν ὁ βασιλεὺς, he said that the king sent him.* If the question be asked, what did he say? The answer is, *that the king*, etc., which makes the real compliment (although indirectly) of the verb *ἔλεγεν*.

NOTE 1. All verbs which designate the action or exertion of senses external or internal, or an action immediately connected with and proceeding from these; e. g. such as *hearing, seeing, feeling, noticing, perceiving, understanding*, etc.; and so also, *judging, supposing, believing, remembering, saying, shewing, mentioning, proving*, etc.; and also the impersonal verbs corresponding to some of these, such as signify

it is manifest, it is plain, it is proved, it is evident, etc.; all such admit, or rather require, a *complementary* part of a sentence, such as that above described.

(2.) The Indicative and Optative modes are employed in constructions, in the *complementary* clauses; the Indicative, when any thing is positively and definitely asserted; the Optative when it is declared as a matter of opinion or probability. When *ἄν* is added to the Optative, it makes an accession to the probability which the mode itself would naturally designate.

Indicative; e. g. as ἔλεγεν, ὅτι Μίγαρα ἀφίστηκε, *he said that Megara had revolted* οὐχ ὅν δέ, ὅτι ἐπὶ πτωκεν ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ, Rom. ix. 6. *So often elsewhere, it being the usual method in the New Testament.*

Optative; as ἀπεκρίνατο, ὅτι βούλοιστο ἂν ἅπαντα ποιῇν, *he answered, that he should wish to do every thing*; εἶπεν, ὅτι μένειν βούλοιστο.

(3.) When the words or sentiments of another are *indirectly* or *directly* recited, ὅτι is usually employed. Here the Optative is, in the classics, more common in indirect speech, although the Indicative may be and is also used, when actual events are designated, or positive assertions made. In *direct* quotations, the ὅτι, which

often precedes, has no influence upon the modes that are used in the quotation itself.

NOTE 1. *Indirect speech* (oratio obliqua) is distinguished from *direct*, principally by the form which it takes. Thus, *he said that the king sent him*, would be the *indirect* mode of reciting the words of another; he said, *The king sent me*, would be the *direct* one. This latter method is almost universal in the New Testament. Hence the Optative is very seldom if ever employed in cases of this nature, inasmuch as the direct kind of citation does not often admit of it.

NOTE 2. Examples of the *indirect* in the Indicative are very rare in the New Testament. Matt. vii. 23, ὁμολογήσω αὐτοῖς, ὅτι οὐδέποτε ἔγνων ὑμᾶς, may be taken either way. In cases such as in Luke viii. 47. Matt. xviii. 25. Mark v. 29; ix. 9. Acts xxii. 24. Matt. xvii. 10. Luke xviii. 9; xii. 18, etc., where the Optative might be expected, at least in a part of these instances, we find the Indicative. Cases of the Opt. in *indirect* speech of the nature in question, are to be found in the text of Knapp, in John xiii. 24. Acts x. 17.

The cases in which ὅτι is placed before *direct* quotations, are very numerous; e. g. Matt. ii. 23; v. 31; xxi. 16. Acts xi. 3, et al. sæpe. For the most part we do not, or need not, translate ὅτι in such cases; it being merely equivalent to our double comma used as the sign of quotation in English.

§ 44. MODES AFTER RELATIVE PRONOUNS AND PARTICLES.

(1.) The relative pronouns are *ὃς, ὅστις, ἃς, ὅσος*, etc.; the relative particles are *ὅς, ἡτοι, ἡθα, ἡθεν, ὅθεν, ὅπως, ὡς*, (*when, whenever*), *ἡνα* (*where, when.*)

NOTE 1. The clauses in which these *relatives* stand, are called *relative clauses* or *sentences* for distinction's sake.

(2.) The *Indicative* stands in the *relative* clause, after any tense whatever in the principal one, whenever positive and absolute assertion is made. The *Optative*, after any tense in the principal clause, whenever mere opinion or apprehension is expressed. The *Subjunctive*, however, can stand only after the Present and Future, because it implies conditionality from circumstances, which must arise either from something that now is or will be. In this case *ἄν* is generally added to the *relative* pronouns or particles.

NOTE 1. *ἄν* is also joined with the *Optative*, whenever conditionality is assumed merely or supposed; e. g. 'There are men here, *ὅς πάντες ἄν φιλετιμήθαιεν φίλῳ σοι χεῖρόναι*, *who would very gladly have you for their friend*, Rost, § 123.

NOTE 2. The Indicative also may be used with *ἄν* in a relative sentence (i. e. the Ind. Imperf. and Aorist), in order to show that a condition supposed was not fulfilled; or to show some condition arising out of something asserted in the context. Rost, § 123. Anm. 2.

§ 45. MODES AFTER INTERROGATIVE PARTICLES OR PRONOUNS.

(1.) These are such words as *πῶς, εἰ, τί, τίνα, ὁποῖος, ποῦ*, and others of similar signification, when used in an interrogative way.

NOTE 1. It is these particles as employed before *indirect* questions, which is the subject here treated of.

(2.) In clauses containing these particles, the Ind. is employed, whenever that which is matter of fact is simply asserted.

E. g. ‘Ye know...*πῶς μεθ’ ὑμῶν...ἔγνωμένην, how I was with you,*’ Acts xx. 18; ‘We know not...*πῶς νῦν βλέπει, how he now seeth,*’ John ix. 21; iii. 8; vii. 27. Col. iv. 6. Eph. i. 18. John x. 6. Acts x. 18, al. saepe. In some of these cases, there is a mingling of the direct and indirect question; as is very common in the classics. Winer, § 42, 4.

(3.) The Subjunctive is employed where things *objectively* possible are asserted.

E. g. ‘The Son of Man hath not, *ποῦ τὴν κεφαλὴν κλίνει where he may or can lay his head,*’ Matt. viii. 20.

Rom. viii. 26. Matt. x. 19; vi. 25. Luke xii. 11.
Mark. vi. 36; xiii. 11; iii. 6 (after the *Præter*), al.

(4.) The Optative, when *subjective* possibility is indicated.

E. g. 'They began to inquire among themselves, τὸ τίς ἄρα εἴη ἐξ αὐτῶν, *who of them it could be*,' Luke xii. 23. 'And she reasoned with herself, σораπὸς εἴη ὁ ἀσπασμὸς οὗτος; *what kind of salutation this could be*,' Luke i. 29; iii. 15; viii. 9; xviii. 36; xv. 26. Acts xiv. 20; xvii. 27; xxvii. 12; xxi. 33, where the difference between the Opt. and Indic. is made apparent by contrast.

§ 46. USE OF THE MODES WITH ἄν.

(1.) This particle has various and important uses; and the doctrine respecting it seems to be the most subtle and difficult of any thing that pertains to Greek syntax.

NOTE 1. The efforts of some of the first Greek scholars have been laid out upon this particle. Among these the most distinguished are exhibited in Poppo, *Programmæ de Usu partic. ἄν*, 1816, 4. Reizig, *de Vi et Usu ἄν*, in his *Aristoph. Nubes*, pp. 97-146; of which Rost speaks in the highest terms, Gram. p. 250. Hermann, *de Particula ἄν*, first printed in the late English edition of Stephani's *Thesaurus*, and since that, printed by itself in a small octavo, Lips. 1831.

NOTE 2. It is matter of still more difficulty to the

student, that grammarians of the highest rank, such as Buttmann and Thiersch, differ considerably in their development of the uses of *ἄν*, from Hermann and others of his school; Hermann also in some respects, from Reisig; and so of others. It is some satisfaction however to know, that this difference respects, for the most part, the minutiae and subtilties of the doctrine, which are not of great practical moment in most cases, if indeed they are in any. That the Greeks themselves never thought of all the subtilties which recent grammarians have found, is my full persuasion.

(2.) The original and fundamental meaning of the particle *ἄν* (as stated by Passow), is *perhaps, about, nearly, somewhat, somehow, probably, in some degree or manner*, etc. It serves, when joined with the Ind. of absolute assertion or declaration, to moderate of course the tone of positiveness in the assertion, and to make it more of the probable than of the absolute *cert.* When joined with the Optative, which expresses subjective possibility or probability, it gives emphasis to or strengthens this probability, etc. According to Hermann (p. 10, seq.), all the gradations of doubt, difficulty, uncertainty, and probability, are not usually designated by adding the particle *ἄν* to verbs; but only those which he calls *fortuita*, by which term he designates

those things which one regards as likely to be or to happen.¹ In other words, it is a sign of the

¹ This great master of the Greek idiom has given us, in his work above mentioned, p. 9, seq., a view of the exquisite adaptedness of the Greek to express the finer shades of thought, such as I have no where else met with, and which I cannot deny myself the pleasure of here abridging and submitting to the view of the reader, for his profit. The student must be careful to note, that the other particles of which mention is here made, and which resemble *ἄν* in regard to *meaning*, are now considered solely in this point of view, and not in respect to the construction of the verb, etc., which they may require.

There are several other particles besides *ἄν* (*αν*), which have a like meaning; viz., *ἵνα*, *καὶ*, *τι*. But all these differ in the manner and gradation of their meaning. This is, indeed, common to them all, viz., that they abate the force of positive assertion, and introduce something of doubt or ambiguity. Of such doubt or uncertainty, the Greeks seem to have made four gradations. (1.) Things merely POSSIBLE; to express which *ἵνα* is used. (2.) Things *fortuitous*, i. e. things, the occurrence of which is suspended on something future, which may or may not take place; in which case *ἄν* (epic *αν*) is used. (3.) Things *verisimilar* (*verisimilia*), i. e. suspended on future occurrences, which are more likely on the whole to happen than not to happen; where *καὶ* is employed. (4.) Things *probable*, i. e. in regard to which one may say, it would be strange if they should not happen; here *τι* is employed.

All this is illustrated by a verse from Homer; (α) *οὐκ ἔτι δὲ ἔχοντο, καὶ ἵνα πρὸς τὸ ἰόνον, two being associated, possibly the one may see further than the other.* Here the bare possibility is stated by *ἵνα*, without any intimation that the thing will or will not be so. The opposite of this, i. e. absolute affirmation, would be made simply by dropping the parti-

potential and conditional; but the kinds and gradations of these may be, and often are designated

cle *ἔως*, which would leave the assertion direct and unqualified.

(b) The *fortuitous* would be expressed thus: καὶ αὖ (αὖτις) πρὸς ὃ τοῦ ἰόντος, *the one perhaps (or perchance) would see better (or further) than the other*; i. e. it may turn out to be so, or may not, events will disclose. The expression of the *contrary* sentiment in this case would be by inserting *ἀντίως*, *surely, certainly*, in the room of αὖ or αὖτις.

(c) The *verisimilar* would be thus expressed; καὶ πάλιν πρὸς ὃ τοῦ ἰόντος, *one, it is likely, would see further than the other*. Here the declaration is, that such is the opinion of the speaker, or so it seems to him, although he does not make an absolute affirmation of it. Such an affirmation would be made by ἢ or δέ, or (which is more usual) both united; as καὶ ἢ δὲ πρὸς ὃ τοῦ ἰόντος, *undoubtedly the one could see, etc.*

(d) That which is so *probable* that the contrary cannot well be supposed, would be expressed thus; καὶ τί πρὸς ὃ τοῦ ἰόντος, *the one, to be sure, would see, etc.* In this case, the speaker considers the thing asserted, as altogether *probable*, but not absolutely *necessary*. If he meant to affirm the latter, he would put ἀναγκάτως in the place of τί.

When compared together, these particles thus nicely making gradations, are found to range themselves under two classes; viz., *ἔως possible*, and *πάλιν the verisimilar*, are referrible to the *subjective* feelings and views of the speaker, i. e. they are merely expressions of opinion, feeling, etc.; while αὖ (αὖτις) *the fortuitous*, and τί *the probable* are referrible to *objective* matters, viz. to things or events, and not to the mere opinion of the speaker. This, however, must be understood of these particles, as to their own proper nature in themselves considered; for αὖ (to select an example) is often joined with the Opt. mode, which appropriately indicates *subjective* views.

and limited by other particles, pronouns (relative), etc., connected with *ἄν*.

NOTE 1. Passow gives *etwa*, *wohl*, as expressing the fundamental meaning of *ἄν* the sense of which is given above, as nearly as our language will permit. In many cases the English words there employed as corresponding with *ἄν*, may be retained in a version of the Greek; in many other cases, the *conditional* and *potential* modes in English answer the same purpose of themselves as the Greek verb with *ἄν*, and this without expressing *ἄν* by a separate particle; in other cases, the *ἄν* is to be translated (if I may so speak) by the mere tone of the voice, i. e. by emphasis, or a tone denoting confidence, doubt, etc. Often *ἄν* in an *apodosis*, requires to be translated by *then* and some turn of the expression which shews conditionality or possibility. The nature of the case shows, that *ἄν* cannot be always rendered alike in English, because of the great variety of *potential* and *conditional* expressions; nor indeed always translated at all, except in the manner last designated above.

NOTE 2. In epic poetry, *καί, κέν*, (Dor. *καῶ*), have the same meaning as *ἄν*, and are employed in the same manner. Hermann thinks *ἄν* is a derivate from *ἀνά*, which being first and originally a preposition, then becomes an adverb, and finally a *conjunction*. So *ἐβουλόμην ἄν*, he says, is equivalent to *ἐβουλόμην ἀνά τοῦτο· εἰάν λέγῃ*, to *εἰ λέγῃ ἀνά τοῦτο*, etc. So *κέν, καί* (epic,) he thinks to be derivates from *καί*. (De Partic. *ἄν*, pp. 4. seq.) The same author states the general

power of ἄν, as being that *which renders indefinite and unlimited, what otherwise would be definite and limited*; e. g. ὅς λέγει, *he who says*, i. e. the individual who says; but ὅς ἄν λέγει, *whoever says*, i. e. whatever individual may say.

(3.) IN INDEPENDENT SENTENCES, ἄν may be connected with all the modes, excepting the Imperative; and even with this it is sometimes connected in the later Greek poets, in order to indicate some supposed difficulty in executing the command; Rost, § 120. 5. d. With the Subj. it does not appear in independent sentences, in the New Testament. It is rarely found, also, in connection with the Subj. in the classic Greek writers, except in Homer and other poets; and when employed in such a connection, it signifies, as usual, probability depending on circumstances.

(4.) In the Indic ἄν is not unfrequently used in *independent* sentences. (a) It is connected with the *Future*.

E. g. Σαγήσουσιν ἄν, *they will surely be of good courage*. So Rost (after Reisig;) who represents ἄν as *strengthening* the Future, § 125, 5, c. But Passow says, that ἄν *moderates* the assertion in the Future (Lex. ἄν) and Hermann says: "The ancient epic poets employed it very often [in the Future,] whenever they meant to indicate some *fortuity* in re-

spect to any thing future," (p. 28.) These latter views are surely the more probable and analogous ones. I find no instance of its connection with the Fut. Indic., in the New Testament.

(b.) With the *Praeterites*, especially the Imperf. and Aorist; in which case, it implies that the thing designated would or might have been done, in case something else had been done; or that something was done so often as some other thing happened or was done.

E. g. 'Why didst thou not put my money out at interest, that when I came, *ὅν τόκῳ ἂν ἐπραξα αὐτό, I might have received it with usury,*' Luke xix. 23. Comp. Matt. xxv. 27. So in Heb. x. 2, *ἔπει οὐκ ἂν ἐπαύσαντο προσφερόμεναι, then would they not have ceased to be offered.* Of the latter meaning above designated, I find no instance in the New Testament; but it is common in the classics; e. g. 'But he, whenever being driven away he went to another house, *ἀπελάυνε' ἂν καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης, was then driven away from this also,* i. e. he was usually or habitually driven away.

(5.) In the Optative; where, in connection with independent sentences, it is found most frequently of all. Here it expresses *subjective possibility*, i. e. it indicates the attitude or persuasion of the mind, (whether with or without good

cause is not signified,) in regard to the probability or possibility of a thing.

The Opt. mode itself does this, but when *ἄν* is added to it, it gives prominency or emphasis to its original power of declaring opinion of *subjective* possibility. E. g. *οὐκ ἀνασχοίμην* (without *ἄν*,) *I could not endure it*, a simple declaration of opinion; but *οὐκ ἄν ἀνασχοίμην* (with *ἄν*,) a declaration of opinion in view of circumstances, *then I could not well endure it*. So in questions with the Opt. the insertion of *ἄν* indicates a doubt in the mind of him who asks them, whether that can be, or be done, about which he inquires; e. g. *τί ἄν φαίης*; *what can you well say?* with the implication, that in the opinion of the inquirer, the person addressed would be able to say nothing. But *τί φαίης* would mean simply, *What can you say?* in reference to the state of mind which the person has who is addressed. Both of these questions are distinguished from the mere *deliberative* or *doubting* question, which is expressed in the Subjunctive; e. g. *τί φῶ*; *What can I say?* i. e. I know not what to say.

NOTE 1. In indirect speech or questions, the Optative with *ἄν* follows the *Present* and *Fut.* Indicative; but *ἄν* is omitted, when the Ind. *Praeter* precedes; e. g. *οὐκ ἔχω* (or *ἔξω*) *ἔπει ἄν τραποίμην*, *I know not* (or *I shall not know*), *where I should* (or *could*) *turn myself*; but *οὐκ εἶχον* *ἔπου τραποίμην*, *I knew not where I could turn myself*. The reason of this seems to be, that the Pres. and Fut. may be regarded as suspended on a condition, yet to be completed; while that which is *past* cannot be suspended on any

condition, for it has already taken place. Hence $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ where conditionality is signified; and the omission of it where it is not.

NOTE 2. For further development of the Opt. mode with $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ and without it, see § 28, 6, *a, b, c*. The simple expression of a wish; the simple expression of feelings or persuasion, without a reference to external circumstances and events that may happen; the mere representation of the opinions of others; (all of which may be expressed by the Optative); would of course require that $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ (which is *conditional*) should be *omitted*. On the other hand, events deemed merely supposeable, possible, probable, etc.; cases where the speaker intends to make the impression, by his words, that he states them merely as viewed by his own mind; requests, commands, assertions even, which are intended to be so uttered as to be divested of the positive and absolute; all these may and do take $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ in the Optative; although usage sometimes permits the omission of it.

(6.) In the New Testament, the use of $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ in the Opt., in an independent sentence, is rare. Where it is employed, it denotes *subjective possibility*, dependent on some condition.

E. g. $\pi\tilde{\alpha}\varsigma \tilde{\alpha}\nu \delta\upsilon\upsilon\alpha\iota\mu\eta\eta$, 'how can I, unless some one guide me,' Acts viii. 31. In Acts ii. 12, $\tau\acute{\iota} \tilde{\alpha}\nu \theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\iota \tau\omicron\tilde{\upsilon}\tau\omicron \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$; *what can (or would) this mean?* has an *implied* condition attached to it, viz. 'if it could be explained.' So, in Acts xvii. 18, $\tau\acute{\iota} \tilde{\alpha}\nu \theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\iota$ *what can*

this babbler mean? *i. e.* if his words have any meaning.

(7.) Ἄν is often joined with the Inf. mode and the Participle, in independent sentences; in which case it indicates *conditionality* and *probability*.

E. g. 'They supposed, if they could take the principal city, ἐφ'ὅτις ἂν τὰ ἄλλα προσχωρήσειν, *that other things would probably then yield with ease.* 'I find ταύτην ἂν μόνην γενομένην...ἀποτροπήν, *this to be in all probability the only avoidance.*' So in 2 Cor. x. 9. ὥς ἂν ἐκφοβεῖν ὑμᾶς, *as if I would fain terrify you.* This is the only instance I have been able to find in the New Testament of ἂν with the Inf.; I have not found any with the participle. This shews (what is known to be the fact) the more unfrequent and limited use of ἂν in the later Greek.

(8.) IN DEPENDENT SENTENCES, ἂν is frequently employed. (a) Where *hypothetical possibility* only is expressed, with the implication that the thing supposed has not taken place, because the condition was not fulfilled. See § 41, 3, *d* and Notes.

NOTE 1. In this case, the protasis has *ei* with a Praeterite of the Indic., and the apodosis ἂν with the Imperf., Aor., or Perfect. But the ἂν in the apodosis may be omitted; and in later Greek it often is. See

examples in John ix. 33; viii. 39 (variations). Rom. vii. 7, (abridged and the order inverted.) John xv. 22; xix. 11 (inverted.) Acts xxvi. 32. In 2 Cor. xi. 4, the Present is used in the protasis; so in Diog. Laert. II. viii. 4, *εἰ τοῦτο φαῦλόν ἐστι, οὐκ ἂν...ἔγιντο*.

NOTE 2. For other cases in which *ἂν*, *ἰάν*, etc., are employed, in hypothetical sentences, see in § 41, 3, *b. c.* 4. *b.*

When the *particles of time* are employed, and stand before the Subjunctive, *ἂν* is joined with them, in order to indicate that the thing designated may happen, or is *objectively* possible.

E. g. *ὄραν* = *ὄρε ἂν*, *ἕως ἂν*, etc. See § 42, 1 and 2 *b* with notes.

(*c*) *ἂν* is frequently joined with the Optative, when it stands after the particles *ὅτι*, *ὥς*, (*that*;) in which case it renders prominent the *subjective* sense of the Optative. See § 43, 2.

(*d*) Relative pronouns and particles (*ὃς*, *ὅστις*, *ὅσος*, etc. *ὅπου*, *ἐνθα*, *ὅθεν*, *ὅποι*, *ὅπως*, *ὥς* *when*, etc.) often take *ἂν*. See § 44.

NOTE 1. In cases of this nature, the force of *ἂν* seems to fall mainly on the pronouns and particles; e. g. *ὃς* *he who*, *ὃς ἂν* *whoever*, *ὅπου* *where*, *ὅπου ἂν* *wherever*; and so of the rest. The construction of the verb, however, follows the general principles in regard to conditional relative sentences; see § 44 and Notes. **ἂν* with pronouns relative and particles of

time, serves to render that indeterminate and indefinite, which otherwise would be definite and specific; e. g. $\tilde{\epsilon}$ (*he who*) means a specific individual; but $\tilde{\epsilon}; \tilde{\alpha}$ (*whoever*) means any particular individual whatever. See § 46, 2, Note 2.

NOTE 2. Of course the *unlimited* nature of the pronouns and particles, in such cases, forbids that the verb should designate merely and exclusively one specific and particular action, etc. They, therefore, imply what may happen often, customarily, etc., or action which may be repeated as often as the causes supervene. In cases of this nature, (1) The Indic. expresses what is *actual*, and might be often repeated; as in Mark vi. 56. Acts ii. 45; iv. 35. 1 Cor. xii. 2. (2.) The Subjunctive is employed to express what is uncertain or not limited, but objectively possible; as in Matt. x. 11; xxi. 22, $\tilde{\delta}\alpha \tilde{\alpha} \alpha\iota\rho\eta\sigma\eta\tau\iota$, *whatever ye may ask*; Mark ix. 18; xiv. 9. Acts ii. 39. Rom. x. 13. James iv. 4, *al saepe*.

§ 47. DISTINCTIONS MADE IN THE SENSE OF
PARTICLES, ETC., BY $\tilde{\alpha}$.

(1.) We have already seen (Notes 1, 2 above,) what effect $\tilde{\alpha}$ has, when added to the particles of time and to the relative pronouns. The conditional particle ϵ is changed as to its construction and meaning, by its being united with $\tilde{\alpha}$.

In this case it becomes $\epsilon\tilde{\alpha}$, or its equivalent contracted form, $\tilde{\eta}$, ($\tilde{\alpha}$ sometimes, at the *beginning* of a sentence, by which position this contracted form is distinguished.)

The distinction between *ei* and *eĩv* = *eĩv* *aĩv* may be made palpable. *Ei* is a mere logical *if*, belonging simply to the expression of an act of the mind, which doubts or which conceives of a thing conditionally. It may therefore be employed in connection with most, if not all, of the tenses. *Eĩv* (for the most part confined to the Subj.) is properly used only in reference to that which is yet to be developed by the future; e. g. *eĩv roũro gínetai* (Indic.) *if this is so*; i. e. I assume this as being so, without making the inquiry as to the fact whether it will really occur or not. *Ei roũro gínetai* (Opt.) would mean, *if this should be so*, with the assumption merely that it is possible or probable. *Ei roũro égyeto* (Indic. Praet.) *if this were so*; i. e. I assume it, although it is not so, or cannot be so. But when *eĩv* is employed, the Subj. is used, and the meaning has a *future* aspect; e. g. *eĩv roũro gínetai*, *if this may be so*; i. e. I assume it, and it is altogether possible; but whether it will actually be so or not, must depend on events yet future. In other words, the Subj. expresses conditionality depending on external circumstances, and not mere *logical* conditionality existing only in the conceptions of the mind. It is thus that Hermann develops the difference between *ei* and *eĩv* (*ἤν, αἴν*), in his Notes to Vigerus *de Idiotismis*, Note 422. For variations in the construction of *ei* and *eĩv*, see § 41, 4. *a. b.*

§ 48. GENERAL REMARKS ON THE NATURE OF *aĩv*.

(1.) The *generic* design of this particle seems, in view of all that has been said, to be this, viz., to express *moderated* assertion. Thus with the

Indicative, it changes the tone from that which is positive and categorical, to that which is more gentle and courteous; as *ὅς οὐδ' ἄν* *I do not certainly know, I do not well know*, etc. In the Subj. and Opt., (modes of *possibility, probability, conditionality*, etc.,) it aids the more definite expression of that which is not designed to be positive and categorical. When joined with relative pronouns or adverbs, it renders them indefinite, which otherwise would be definite; as *ὅς* *he who*, *ὅς ἄν* *whoever*. One general principle, therefore, runs through all the cases of its usage.

(2.) The ancient Greeks employed *ἄν* much oftener, especially the Attics, than the modern; and in a much wider extent. The niceties of expression connected with its use, went gradually into desuetude, as the language declined. Hence its comparatively unfrequent use in the New Testament.

IMPERATIVE.

§ 49. USE OF THE IMPERATIVE MODE.

(1.) The Imperative is employed not only to designate direct *commands*, but also requests, exhortations, warnings, permissions, etc.

E. g. 'If the unbelieving depart, χωρίζεσθω, *let him depart*, (permissive,) 1 Cor. vii. 15. So ἀγνοαίτω, *let him be ignorant*, 1 Cor. xiv. 38. In Eph. iv. 26, ὀργίζεσθε καὶ μὴ ἁμαρτάνετε, the first verb is permissive, i. e. you may be angry, but not so as to sin. Let it be remembered that Jesus himself looked on the Pharisees μετ' ὀργῆς, Mark iii. 5. In Matt. xxiii. 32, the Imp. seems to be *permissive*. The *precative* sense of the Imper. hardly needs illustration, it is so common; see in the Lord's prayer, δός, ἄφες, Matt. vi. 11, 12, et alibi saepe.

(2.) When two Imperatives are connected by καὶ, the first usually designates something which is conditional in respect to the second.

E. g. ἐρευνήσον καὶ ἴδε, *search and see*, i. e. search and then you will see, John vii. 52.

NOTE 1. The Imp. is often used instead of the conditional modes, in the first part of a conditional sentence, when the last part or apodosis takes a verb in the Indic., etc.; as λύσατε τὸν ναὸν τοῦτον, καὶ...ἐγερῶ αὐτόν, John ii. 19. So James iv. 7. Eph. v. 14. al.

(3.) A moderated Imp. sense is made by ἵνα with the Aor. Subjunctive.

E. g. ἵνα παραγγείλῃς τισί, *exhort some*, or *that you should exhort some*, 1 Tim. i. 3. Mark v. 23. 2 Cor. viii. 7. Eph. v. 33, al. In most cases of this nature,

there seems to be an ellipsis of some verb before *ἵνα* κ. τ. λ. such as παρακαλῶ σε, or δέομαι σου, etc.

(4.) When an Imper. in a *negative* sense is required μή (not οὐ) is always employed. Very often the Subjunctive with μή is employed, in the like manner, for prohibition.

NOTE 1. Yet the use of the two modes does not seem to be precisely the same. The Subj. with μή is employed usually in GENERAL prohibitions; e. g. Mark x. 19, μή κλέψῃς, μή φονεύσῃς, etc.; while the corresponding Imper. would seem to be a command to desist from an action already begun; e. g. μή μοι ἀντιλέγῃς *do not contradict me* [as you have begun to do]; μή μοι ἀντιλέξῃς, *you must never contradict me*. But the Fut. Indic. with οὐ is also employed for the like purpose with the Subj.; as οὐ κλέψεις, Matt. xix. 18, al.

(5.) More generally the *Present* Imper. has reference to a continued or often repeated action, while the *Aorist* is used in reference to a particular thing, which is done once for all; but this nicety is not always observed.

E. g. AORIST; ἄρῃ σου τὸν κράββατον, *take up thy bed*, Mark ii. 9. So Mark i. 44; iii. 5; vi. 11. John ii. 7; xiii. 27. Acts i. 24, et al. saepe. In other cases the usage is different, as μέναιτε (Aor.), *abide*, Matt. x. 11. John xv. 4. Acts xvi. 15. 1 John v.

21, al. *saepe*, all indicating actions of an *enduring* nature.

PRESENT ; *μὴ ὑψηλοφρονεῖν* *be not high minded*, which is applicable at all times. So in Rom. xi. 20 ; xii. 20 ; xiii. 3. James ii. 12. 1 Tim. iv. 7, et al. *saepe*. It does not appear that the Pres. Imper. is used for one particular action only ; but the Aor. (which sometimes is used in the same sense as the Present) is not unfrequently found in the same connection with the Pres. Imper. ; e. g. in John ii. 16, *ἄρατε...μὴ ποιεῖτε* 1 Cor. xv. 34. Matt. iii. 3.

(6.) The Perf. Imper. is seldom employed in the New Testament. When it is, it designates the entire completion of the action, etc., commanded.

E. g. *ἀπολέλυσαι τῆς ἀσθενείας σου*, *be thou entirely freed from thine infirmity*, Luke xiii. 12. Mark iv. 39. So in the classics, where it denotes that the action is to be completed and to remain so ; Matth. II. p. 947.

INFINITIVE.

§. 59. NATURE AND USES OF THE INFINITIVE MODE.

(1.) The Inf. mode is a kind of abstract form of the verb (*nomen actionis vel passionis*), which of itself expresses limitations neither of time, number, nor person. It is of a mixed character,

partaking both of the nature of a verb and of a noun. For the most part, its regimen as to nouns, etc., connected with it, is the same as that of the verb in the definite modes and tenses; and this even when it is employed as a noun. Hence it is capable of nearly all the offices of a noun and of a verb; and often it stands in both relations at one and the same time.

E. g. τὸ μέμψεσθαι τῇ κακίᾳ, *the blaming of evil*; for so we translate it, although κακία is in the Dat. governed by μέμψεσθαι. So τὸ θανατοῦν ἀνθρώπους, *the killing of men*, and so in a multitude of cases, where, although the Gen. of relation is implied, the usual regimen of the verb is retained.

(2.) The Inf. with or without the article, is often used as the *subject* of a proposition; it is so used also, when connected with nouns, pronouns, participles, adjectives, etc., which help to form with it one composite subject.

E. g. εἰ ἔξιςσι...θεραπεύειν, *is it lawful to heal*, i. e. is healing lawful? Matt. xii. 10. So τὸ ἔχειν χρήματα ἡδύ ἐστι, *the possession of wealth is pleasant*; τὸ χαίρειν καλόν ἐστι. *Composite subjects of a sentence, formed in connection with the Inf., are also very common, as καλόν ἐστὶν ἡμῶς ὧδε εἶναι, that we should be here—is good*, Matt. xvii. 4, where the whole phrase ἡμῶς ὧδε εἶναι is the *subject* of the proposition. So καλόν σοί ἐ-

σιν εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν ζωὴν χαλδὸν ἢ κυλλδὸν, Matt. xviii. 8, where all but the three first words constitute the *subject* of the sentence. Heb. xiii. 9. John xviii. 14. 1 Cor. xi. 13. 1 Pet. ii. 15, al.

NOTE 1. The article, when added to the Inf. in such cases, does not seem to depart from its customary usage before nouns. It is inserted when special stress is laid by the writer on the Inf.; and omitted in other cases: e. g. καλδὸν τὸ ζηλοῦσθαι ἐν καλῷ, *to be zealous in a good thing is laudable*, Gal. iv. 18. Rom. iv. 21. 1 Cor. vii. 11. Phil. i. 21, 29.

NOTE 2. Instead of the Inf., or the Inf. and words connected with it, as the *subject* of a proposition, other *conditional* modes and expressions are frequently employed; e. g. καλδὸν ἦν αὐτῷ, εἰ οὐκ ἐγενήθη, Mark xiv. 21; so εἰάν μείνωσιν ὡς κἀγὼ makes the subject, in 1 Cor. vii. 8; ἵνα ἐγὼ ἀπέλθω, in John xvi. 7; and often so. This is not common in the earlier classics; but it is not unusual in the later ones.

(3.) The Infinitive is often employed to designate the complement of verbs, *i. e.* to complete the idea which is necessary to fill out the sense of the preceding verb.

E. g. θέλω ἀπελθεῖν, ἐλπίζω διαπορεύειν, εἰ δύνασαι πιστεῦσαι, λέγων εἶναί τινα ἑαυτὸν, and so after any verbs which of themselves do not indicate a complete idea, and have no noun, etc., as a direct object or complement.

NOTE 1. The article is not unfrequently employed before Infinitives of this kind also, and for its usual purpose of emphasis or specification; as τὸ λαλεῖν γλώσσαις μὴ κωλύετε, *forbid not the speaking with tongues*, 1 Cor. xiv. 39; οὐχ ἀξπαγμὸν ἡγάτατο τὸ εἶναι Ἰσα Θεῷ, *he regarded not the being equal with God as a thing to be eagerly coveted*, Phil. ii. 6. Rom. xiv. 13. Acts iv. 18. Luke vii. 21, al.

(4.) The Inf. after another verb may have the *same* subject (agent) as its preceding Verb; or it may have a *different* one.

(a) When it has the *same* subject, that subject is of course understood to be in the Nominative, although not expressed, and any adjuncts, adjectives, participles, etc., relating to this subject must be in the same case.

E. g. ἐλπίζω διαπορευόμενος θεάσασθαι ὑμᾶς, *I hope, when I pass through, to see you*, i. e. I, passing through, hope, etc., Rom. xv. 24; δέομαι τὸ μὴ παρῶν θάρσῃσαι, *I pray that when present I may not be bold*, i. e. ἐγὼ δέομαι παρῶν, κ. τ. λ. *I pray that I when present, etc.* 2 Cor. x. 2. Rom. i. 22. Acts xiv. 10. So in the classics; ἔφασκες εἶναι δεσπότης· ἔπεισα αὐτοὺς εἶναι θεός, *I have persuaded them that I am a god*.

(b) When the Inf. has a *different* subject from that of the preceding verb, that subject is regularly put in the accusative.

E. g. βούλομαι προσεύχασθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, *I desire that men should pray*, 1 Tim. ii. 8. 2 Pet. i. 15. 1 Cor. vii. 10. Acts xiv. 19, al. saepe.

NOTE 1. Yet *peculiar regimen* may change the case of the subject, and throw it out of the usual construction, i. e. out of the Acc.; e. g. κρείττον ἦν αὐτοῖς, μὴ ἐπεγνώκειναι τὴν ὁδὸν, κ. τ. λ., where αὐτοῖς is put in the Dat. after κρείττον, while, so far as the Inf. is concerned, αὐτοὺς would be the regular construction, 2 Pet. ii. 21. So in the classics: δός μοι φανῆναι ἀξίῳ, *help me to appear worthy*; ὑμῖν...ἔξεστι εὐδαίμοσι γενέσθαι, *it is permitted to you to be fortunate*; ἅπανσι συνέπεσεν...γενέσθαι λαμπροῖς, *it has happened to them all, to become conspicuous*. So, also, as to the Genitive; εἶδοντο αὐτοῦ εἶναι προθύμου, *they besought him to be ready*; εὐρήσεις...κυράνους...διεφθαρμένους...ὑπὸ ἰταίρων...δοκούντων φίλων εἶναι, where φίλων agrees with the preceding noun (ἰταίρων), which is the subject of εἶναι. All cases of this nature, in which the subject of the Inf. is thrown out of the Acc. into another oblique case, and where adjunct words (as above) conform to that other oblique case, are called cases of ATTRACTION, because the predicate or adjunct word is attracted to the same case with its principal noun or pronoun.

But the student should note, that such attraction, although admissible at the pleasure of an author, is not always practised; e. g. Herod. III. 36, ἐνετείλατο τοῖς θεράπουσιν, λαβόντας μιν ἀποκτεῖναι, *he commanded the servants, that they should take and kill him*, where the writer might have said λαβοῦσι, but he has

followed the usual construction, viz. the Acc. case. Often is the regular construction (the Acc.) adopted for the adjunct word, where the subject is so remote from the Inf., that attraction would make the sense obscure.

NOTE 2. Where the subject of the Inf. and of the preceding verb is one and the same, it is not usual to repeat it before the Inf.; e. g. ὁ φίλος ἔφη σπουδάζειν, i. e. αὐτὸν σπουδάζειν see also the examples under *a* above. Yet where emphasis is demanded, the subject may be repeated, and then it is put in the Acc. case, like the examples under *b*; e. g. ἐγὼ ἑμαυτὸν οὐ λογιζομαι κατειληφέναι, Phil. iii. 13. So καὶ μ' οὐ νομίζω παῖδα σὸν πεφυκέναι, *I do not think myself to have been born your child*, Eurip. Alc. 657; and thus not unfrequently in the classics. Winer, p. 265. Rost, p. 507.

(5.) The Inf. alone, or with more or fewer words joined with it (as may be necessary to complete any particular expression of thought), is often employed for the purposes of defining, limiting, specifying, explaining, etc., the preceding expression.

E. g. ἔχων ὦτα ἀκούειν, *having ears to hear*, i. e. ears adapted to hear, or made for the purpose of hearing, Luke viii. 8; ἐξουσία γυναῖκα περιάγειν, *power to lead about a wife*, where the Infin. περιάγειν, defines the nature of the power, 1 Cor. ix. 5; ἃ παρέλαβον κρατεῖν, *which they have received in order to retain*

or *hold fast*, Mark vii. 4; ἔδωκαν αὐτῷ πικρὸν ὄξος, *they gave him vinegar to drink*, i. e. that he might drink it, Matt. xxvii. 34; οὐ μετενόησαν δοῦναι αὐτῷ δόξαν, *they did not repent to give him glory*, i. e. so as to give him glory, Rev. xvi. 9; ἤλθομεν προσκυνῆσαι αὐτῷ, *we have come in order to worship him*, Matt. ii. 2. Rev. xii. 2. 2 Pet. iii. 1, 2. 1 Cor. i. 17; x. 7. Matt. xi. 7; xx. 28. Luke i. 17. John iv. 15, al. saepe. See Matth. § 532, d., for evidences of the like usage in the classics. In fact, the use of the Inf. in them, is even more lax than in the New Testament.

NOTE 1. In cases where *design* is to be indicated by the Inf., it often takes ὥστε before it; e. g. κατηγγήθημεν ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου...ὥστε δουλεύειν, *in order that we might serve*, etc., Rom. vii. 6. Luke ix. 52. 2 Cor. iii. 7, al. saepe. Once ὡς is used for ὥστε, Acts xx. 24; so also, occasionally in the classics, Rost, § 125, 8.

(6.) The Inf. is often employed after adjectives, which of themselves do not imply a meaning that is of itself complete, but only ability or fitness to do or be something, or a general quality which needs specification in order to be as definite as the writer intends it should be.

E. g. such adjectives as δυνατός, οἷός τε, ἀδύνατος, ἰκανός, ἀγαθός, ἐφάδιος, χαλεπός, ἄξιός, βαρὺς, κακός, ὅμοιος, τοιοῦτος, and the like, take the Inf. after them; and so all adjectives whose nature requires something to be

added, in order to complete or define the idea which they express ; as *δύνατος κωλύσαι*, Acts xi. 17 ; *ικανὸς ...λύσαι*, Mark i. 7, etc. So *ῥάδιον νοῆσαι*, *χαλεπὸν λέγειν*, etc.

(7.) The Inf. is often employed as a noun in all cases, (the Voc. of compellation only excepted) ; in which state it takes the article with its variations, but in other respects remains indeclinable.

For the Nom. case (when it is the subject of a proposition), see Nos. 1, 2, above. OF THE GENITIVE, examples almost without number might be adduced ; e. g. (in a gerundial sense), *ἐξουσία τοῦ μὴ ἐργάζεσθαι*, 1 Cor. ix. 1 ; *ἐλπίς τοῦ μετέχειν*, 1 Cor. ix. 10. 1 Pet. iv. 17. Acts xiv. 9 ; xx. 3 ; xxiii. 15. Luke xxiv. 25. So after verbs and prepositions governing the Genitive ; as *ἔλαχε τοῦ θυμιάσαι*, Luke i. 9. Rom. xv. 22. Luke iv. 42. Acts x. 47 ; xiv. 18 ; xx. 27. 1 Pet. iii. 10. 1 Cor. xvi. 4. Heb. ii. 15, *al saepe*. And thus in the classics.

THE DATIVE ; as *ἐν τῷ ἀκούειν*, Acts viii. 6 ; *ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν*, Matt. xiii. 25. Luke i. 8. Gal. iv. 18. Acts iii. 26, *al saepe* ; and so in the classics.

THE ACCUSATIVE ; as *εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι*, 1 Cor. x. 6. 2 Cor. viii. 6, *πρὸς τὸ θεαθῆναι*, Matt. vi. 1. 2 Cor. iii. 13 ; *μετὰ τὸ ἐγερθῆναι με*, Matt. xxvi. 32. Luke xii. 5. Mark i. 14. In like manner the Inf. with *πρὶν* or *πρὶν ἢ* may be considered as an Inf. *nominatens* ; e. g. *πρὶν ἀποθανεῖν τὸ παιδίον μου*, John iv. 49.

Matt. xxvi. 34; i. 18. Acts vii. 2. John viii. 58. Often with $\tau\omicron$ and without a preposition. And thus in the classics.

(8.) The Inf. with $\tau\omicron\upsilon$ and $\tau\tilde{\varphi}$ before it (the usual signs of the Gen. and Dative), particularly with $\tau\omicron\upsilon$, has a widely extended use in the New Testament, which is hardly capable of being defined by precise limits.

(a) Specially is the Inf. with $\tau\omicron\upsilon$ used to indicate *design, end* to be accomplished; and this in almost every kind of connection. E. g. 'To open their eyes, $\tau\omicron\upsilon$ ἀποστρέψαι ἀπὸ σκότους, *in order to turn them from darkness,*' Acts xxvi. 18; 'No man shall set on thee, $\tau\omicron\upsilon$ κακῶσαι σε, *in order to do thee harm,*' Acts xviii. 10; 'A sower ἐξῆλθεν... $\tau\omicron\upsilon$ σπείρειν, *went out... for to sow,*' Mark iv. 3. Luke xxii. 31. Heb. x. 7. Rom. vi. 6. Acts xxi. 12. James v. 17, al. saepe. Luke and Paul abound in this idiom; also the Sept. in like manner. Nor is this mode of constructing the Inf. foreign to the classics, but of frequent occurrence, particularly in the later Greek.

NOTE 1. Cases of this nature should be carefully distinguished from those in which the verb governs the Inf. *nominascens* in the Genitive; e. g. *ἐνεκοπτόμην... $\tau\omicron\upsilon$ ἐλθεῖν*, Rom. xv. 22. So in Luke iv. 42. Acts x. 47; xiv. 18; xx. 27, al.

(b) There are many cases, however, where $\tau\omicron\upsilon$ with the Inf. is employed in a much more lax sense, and merely as epexegetical; sometimes, indeed, it

seems to be used merely as a common Infinitive; e. g. 'He evilly treated our fathers, τοῦ ποιῆν ἔκδικτα τὰ βρέφη, *so that they made outcasts of their children,*' Acts vii. 19; 'Why gaze ye at us, ὡς...πειποιηκόσι τοῦ περιπατεῖν αὐτὸν *as having made him to walk,*' Acts iii. 12; κρίνω...ἐπιστεῖλαι αὐτοῖς τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι, *I am of the opinion...that we should send to them to abstain,* etc., Acts xv. 20; He will give his angels charge concerning thee, τοῦ διαφυλάξαι, *to keep thee,* etc.' Luke iv. 10; 'And when it was thought good τοῦ ἀποπλεῖν ἡμᾶς, *that we should sail,*' Acts xxvii. 1; 'he set his face τοῦ πορεύεσθαι, *to go,*' Luke ix. 51. The three last cases may be said to partake of the nature of the Inf. with design, as described under *a* above. But not unfrequently, of two infinitives standing in the same predicament, the one has τοῦ before it, while the other omits it; e. g. Luke i. 79, ἐπιφάναι...τοῦ κατευθύναι Luke i. 77, ἐτοιμάσαι...τοῦ δοῦναι ib. v. 72, ποιῆσαι...μνησθῆναι...τοῦ δοῦναι, etc. In the Sept. this lax manner of employing the Inf. with τοῦ is everywhere to be met with; e. g. Josh. xxii. 26. 1 Kings xiii. 16; xvi. 19; viii. 18. Judith xiii. 12, 20. 1 Macc. vi. 59. Ruth i. 16. Joel ii. 21, and al. saepissime.

NOTE 2. Such a lax use of τοῦ with the Inf., even in cases where *design* or *end* is not the specific object, belongs only to the later Greek; the *frequency* of it, only to Hellenism or Hebraism. The Hebrews used their Inf. with ל in a similar manner. One can hardly doubt that the Sept. and New Testament have, in some measure, been modified by this Hebrew usage.

(c) The Inf. with $\tau\tilde{\omega}$ before it, may be reckoned as a species of Inf. *nominascens*, where the Dat. case designates (as elsewhere, § 18, 5) the *cause* or *occasion*; e. g. ‘I had no rest in my mind, $\tau\tilde{\omega}$ $\mu\eta$ εὑρεῖν Τίτον *because I did not find Titus*,’ 2 Cor. ii. 12. And so in the classics. But this is not a common usage of the New Testament. In 1 Thess. iii. 3, $\tau\tilde{\omega}$ $\mu\eta\delta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha$ $\sigma\alpha\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$, *that no one should be shaken*, seems to be used in the same manner as $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ $\tau\acute{o}$ $\mu\eta\delta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha$ $\sigma\alpha\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$, or $\tau\omicron\upsilon$ $\mu\eta\delta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha$ $\sigma\alpha\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$.

(9.) The Inf. is sometimes employed in an *Imperative* and *hortatory* sense.

NOTE 1. This is very frequent among the ancient Greek poets; Matth. §§ 546, 547. Of course it is employed for the Imper. 2d and 3d persons; also for the Subjunctive 1st pers. plural, etc. This is not common in the New Testament; but $\delta\omicron\upsilon\acute{\nu}\alpha\iota$ in Rev. x. 9, $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\epsilon\acute{\nu}\alpha\iota$, in Col. iv. 6, $\sigma\tau\omicron\chi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$ in Phil. iii. 16, seems to be used in an imperative or hortatory sense. In such cases, it is usual for grammarians to supply $\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}$, $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\mu\eta\eta\sigma\theta\epsilon$, etc., before the Inf.; but this is superfluous, inasmuch as the idiom is so common in the better classics.

(10.) The usual distinction between the Inf. Aor., as marking a thing that happens *but once* or is soon passed; and the Present, as marking *continued* action; is generally observed in the New Testament, as well as in the classics.

(a) Aorist after the Praeterite of another verb; as οὐδεὶς ἠδύνατο αὐτὸν δῆσαι, Mark v. 3; οὐκ ἤθελεν... ἐπαῖσαι, Luke xviii. 13. John vi. 21. Mark ii. 4.

(b) Aorist when an action of short continuance is plainly intended; e. g. δύνασθε... εὐκοιῆσαι, *ye can... give alms*, Mark xiv. 7; ἑαυτὸν οὐ δύναται σῶσαι, Mark xv. 31; xiv. 31. Matt. xix. 3; v. 13. John iii. 4; xi. 37; ix. 27; xii. 21. Acts iv. 16. Rev. ii. 21, al. saepe.

(c) So after verbs signifying *to hope, promise, command, wish, will*, etc.; e. g. ἐλπίζετε ἀπολαβεῖν, Luke vi. 34. Mark xiv. 11. Acts ii. 30; iii. 18. Rom. xv. 24. 1 Cor. xvi. 7. (d) In like manner after *πρὶν* and *πρὶν ἢ* e. g. Matt. i. 18. Luke xxii. 34. Acts ii. 20; vii. 2, al.

NOTE 1. Yet this usage of employing the Aorist to designate *temporary* action, is not so strenuously observed as to admit of no exception; see Rom. xv. 9. δαξάσαι, et al. similia in al. locis.

On the other hand; (e) The present is sometimes employed to designate *continued* action or influence, etc.; as ἐμὲ δεῖ ἐργάζεσθαι, *it becomes me constantly to ply my work*, John ix. 4; ‘If any will ποιῇν [habitually] *do* the will of God,’ etc., John vii. 17; ‘No one is able δουλεύειν, *to serve* two masters, Luke xvi. 13. Matt. vi. 24. Mark ii. 19, et al saepe.

NOTE 2. Whether the writer will represent an action as of short duration and taking place once for all, or as continued, often depends entirely on the design of his own mind, or on the view which he takes of it, rather than on the nature of the thing itself. Hence

many apparent cases of exception to the principles here laid down occur; e. g. Luke xiv. 28; xx. 22; xix. 5. John xvi. 19. The two constructions (Inf. Aor. and Pres.) are sometimes even commingled in the same sentence; as Mark xiv. 71; which happens also, not unfrequently, in the classics; Winer p. 276. The helping verb *μίσλλω* takes either Pres., Aor., or Fut. after it.

(11.) The Perf. and Future commonly retain their appropriate meaning in the Inf. mode.

(12.) The Inf. is not unfrequently exchanged for the Subj. with *ἵνα*.

E. g. ‘My meat is *ἵνα ποιῶ*, *that I may do* the will, etc., John iv. 34; ‘I am not worthy, *ἵνα λύσω*,’ etc., John i. 27; and thus very often in the New Testament. The like constructions also occur in the classics; Winer, § 45. 9.

PARTICIPLE.

§ 51. NATURE AND OBJECT OF THE PARTICIPLE.

(1.) The principal difficulty with respect to a correct understanding of the Participle, (the real participle, and not a mere participial adjective), consists in rightly distinguishing it from the Inf. mode, as to its true signification. Both

depend on another verb, i. e. they must precede or follow a verb, and have a necessary relation to it; and in certain cases the same sentiment (for substance) might be expressed by either; although in general they are quite distinct.

(2.) The *Inf. mode* (as the *object* of a sentence) expresses, (a) The *result*, i. e. *design*, or *designed consequence*, of the action designated by its preceding verb. (b) The simple object of the main verb; like a noun in the Acc. case. (c) The limitations with which, or respect in which, the word to which it stands related is to be taken. The *Inf.* may be employed either with or without an *agent*, according to the nature of the case; and when it has one, it designates not the *quality*, etc., of the agent, but only how he may act, feel, etc.

On the other hand; the *Participle* always designates some *quality*, *power*, *attribute*, (either active or passive), as belonging to a person or thing. For the most part it designates that which exists independently of the agency expressed by the principal verb, i. e. something belonging to the agent or object of the sentence; while the *Inf.* designates that which is to be

brought about by the agency of the principal verb, or that which is actually effected or affected by it, or that which serves to explain the manner or measure of its action.

On these distinctions between the Part. and Inf. mode depend some of the greatest niceties of the Greek language. They merit, therefore, an attentive consideration. The subject may, in some measure, be illustrated by examples.

(a) *The Inf. expresses design* ; e. g. *Θέλω γράφειν*, *I wish to write*. Here, the meaning of *Θέλω* by itself is incomplete ; its complement is *γράφειν*, which shows the object that is willed or desired. The same is the case with all other verbs, whose meaning is incomplete in itself. Specially do all verbs that designate the action of the senses internal or external, whether primary or secondary, require a *complement* ; e. g. to see, hear, perceive, understand, prove, show, tell, disclose, remember, forget, etc., etc., all require a *complement* or *object*, towards which the action is directed, or on which it falls. *Θέλω γράφοντα*, would make a sense entirely different from *Θέλω γράφειν*, as every one instantly perceives.

NOTE 1. Verbs, which in some of their meanings are *complete* or intransitive, may take the Inf. after them in other meanings that are incomplete ; and so it may stand after whole phrases, or after adjectives, or nouns, which require a complement in order to complete their meaning.

(b) *The Inf. of object* is nearly allied to the preceding, and hardly needs to be made distinct ; e. g. *ἔπεισέ με πορεύεσθαι*, *he persuaded me to go* ; *ἐνουθέτησε αὐτὸν σωφρονεῖν*, *he advised him to be considerate* ; in all which cases, the Acc. of the Part. would give the sentence wholly a different turn, inasmuch as the participle would designate a quality already existing, or an action already performed or designed to be so ; e. g. *ἐνουθέτησεν αὐτὸν σωφρονοῦντα*, *he advised him being considerate*, etc,

(c) *The Inf. expresses limitation or explanation* ; e. g. *ἐκαίνυτο...νῆα κυβερνῆσαι*, *he excelled as to steering a ship* ; *ῥέειν ἀνέμοισιν ὁμοῦ*, *like the winds in respect to running* ; *ἀλγεγεῖνοι δαμῆμεναι*, *difficult as to being subdued* ; where the participle would make a sense not at all resembling that of the Infinitive.

On the other hand ; (d) The Participle designates quality, etc., of some person or thing, as existing in past, present, or future time, (according to the tense of the Part. ;) e. g. *ὁρῶ σε γράφοντα· ἀκούω σε διδάσκοντα* or where the subject of the Part. and the verb are the same, as *οἶδα θνητὸς ὦν*, lit. *being mortal I know it*, i. e. I know that I am mortal. It is only where the Part. is of the *Future*, that it designates a meaning hardly to be distinguished from the Inf. ; e. g. *ἔρχομαι φράσων*, *I am come in order to tell* ; where *ἔρχομαι φράσαι* would designate for substance the same meaning. All that needs to be said, in cases such as this latter one, is, that the *mode* of expression is different.

REMARK. The difference between the Inf. and

Part. may be more briefly stated in the following manner; viz., the Part. is employed whenever a state or condition is designated, in which the subject or object of the sentence is, or is considered as being; the Inf. is employed whenever a writer means to assert, that a particular state or condition is yet to take place, or can take place. But even here, the Part. of the *Future* (as ἔρχομαι φράσω) can hardly be distinguished as to meaning from the Inf. (as in ἔρχομαι φράσαι.)

NOTE I. Additional illustrations of these distinctions may be made; e. g. Luke xvi. 3, ἐπαιτεῖν αἰσχύνομαι, *I am ashamed to beg*, i. e. to betake myself to begging, which I do not now practice; but ἐπαιτῶν αἰσχύνομαι, *I am ashamed of begging*, or *being a beggar I am ashamed*, would indicate of course that he was already in the practice of begging. In like manner, ὁ χειμὼν ἤρχετο γίγνεσθαι, *the winter was about to set in*, or *began to set in*; while ὁ χειμὼν ἤρχετο γινόμενος means, *the winter had already commenced*. So ἤκουσα τὸν Δημοσθένη λέγοντα, *I heard Demosthenes say*, i. e. I heard him with my own ears; while ἀκούω τὸν Δημοσθένη λέγειν, *I hear that Demosthenes says*, i. e. I have heard it from another. In like manner, κλαίειν ἐφαίνετο, *he seemed to weep*; while κλαίων ἐφαίνετο would mean, *he visibly or plainly wept*. Ἀπηγγείλατο ἡ πόλις πολιορκουμένη, *it is reported that the city is besieged*, lit. *the city besieged is reported*, such being actually the case in the view of the speaker: while ἀπηγγείλατο ἡ πόλις πολιορκεῖσθαι would mean, *it is reported [merely] that the city is besieged*.

§ 52. CONSTRUCTION OF PARTICIPLES.

(1.) Participles, in general, stand only in connection with a *finite* verb, or with a noun.

(2.) As a general rule, they conform as to *gender, number, and case*, to the nouns which they qualify, define, etc. In this respect they put on the nature of *adjectives*; and they are also subject to anomalies of concord, in the same manner as adjectives.

NOTE 1. Nouns of multitude may have a Part. plural; or a Part. *singular* may be connected with the *plural* agent of a verb, when it is intended to designate the generic idea of *each*, as χωρῶμεν, λαβὼν, *let us go, each one taking*. In general, where Participles differ from their nouns in respect to case, it is the result of ἀνακλύδον in the sentence; see § 73.

NOTE 2. (a) If the subject of a Part. is the same with that of the verb, it is of course put in the Nominative; as οἶδα θνητὸς ὢν ἀρξομαι διδάσκων. (b) If the subject be in the Acc., so is the Part.; as ἤκουσα αὐτὸν λέγοντα. (c) So also as to the Gen. and Dative; as ἤσθησαί μου τί ἄδικον πράττοντος *have you known me as doing any thing unjust?* Οὐδέποτε μετεμέλησέ μοι σιγήσαντι, *I never repented of being silent*.

(3.) The Greek language possesses a peculiar power of construction, in regard to the latitude with which Participles are employed in the place

of verbs, i. e. to express that which might be expressed by verbs in another mode of construction. Every action which a writer or speaker may suppose to be *preparatory* or *introductory* to some more principal and important action, may be expressed by a Participle.

E. g. ἐλθὼν ἰδοὺ ἀποκριθεὶς εἶπε ἀκούσας θανάτου· where as to the sense, one might say, ἦλθε καὶ ἰδὲ, etc. The advantage of the Part. is, that it varies the construction and avoids the use of the conjunction which must be inserted between verbs.

NOTE 1. Two or more participles may be used, in such a connection, without any intervening καὶ as καταβάς...προσελθὼν ἀπεκύλισε τὸν λίθον, Matt. xxviii. 2; ἀκούων...πιστῶν ἐξέψυξε, Acts v. 5. Luke ix. 16; xvi. 23; xxiii. 48. Mark i. 41, al. The omission of καὶ denotes that all the participles are closely allied to one and the same final and principal action. Sometimes one Part. is before the principal verb, and another after it; as ἔρχαν...ἔξῃλθεν...μηδὲν βλάψαν, Luke iv. 35; x. 30. Acts xiv. 19, al.

NOTE 2. There are a few cases, on the contrary, in which the *principal action* is designated by the Part.; while the verb joined with it has only a *subordinate*, and often an *adverbial* sense. Such secondary verbs are τυγχάνω, λανθάνω, φθάνω, διατελέω, διαγίνομαι, διάγω, δίδωμι, χαίρω, and οἶχομαι e. g. οἱ ἔτυχον παρῶντες, *who were present*, where ἔτυχον is a mere helping verb; διατετέλεκα φεύγων τὸ μανθάνειν, *I always*

avoid learning; οἱ θεοὶ χαίρουσι τιμώμενοι, *the gods gladly receive honour*; ὃς ἂν φθάνη εὐεργετῶν, *whoever first shows favour*, etc.

NOTE 3. In some cases it is a matter of indifference, as to the sense, which of two verbs is used as a participle; e. g. ἦκω καλῶς ποιῶν, or καλῶς ποιῶ ἦκων, et al. saepe.

(4.) The *Present Part.*, with the *article*, often becomes a mere substantive, i. e. *nomen agentis*, excluding all idea of *tense* or *time*. But even such participles often govern the same cases as their verbs; although they are sometimes constructed as nouns.

E. g. ὁ σπείρων, ὁ κλέπτων, ὁ νικῶν, ὁ πράσσων, ὁ πειράζων, etc. As to regimen; ὁ πράσσων ταῦτα, ὁ διώκων ἡμᾶς, ὁ ποιῶν τοὺς θώρακας, etc. The construction of substantive-participles as nouns is by no means unfrequent; e. g. πρὸς τὸ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν συμφέρον, where συμφέρον has the Gen. ὑμῶν, etc., 1 Cor. vii. 35. So τὰ μικρὰ συμφέροντα τῆς πόλεως, Demosthenes.

(5.) Participles *with the article* (when not employed as nouns), often express the sense of *who*, *he who*, etc.; i. e. the article joined with them appears to bear this sense.

E. g. εἶδον...τοὺς νικῶντας, *I saw those who had conquered*, Rev. xv. 2; ὁ διώκων ἡμᾶς ποτὲ, νῦν εὐαγγελίζεται, *he who once persecuted*, etc., Gal. i. 23.

The mere participial noun may be simply translated as a noun; e. g. ὁ σείρων, *the sower*. Where the noun of this kind is required to be *indefinite*, the article may be omitted before the participle; and where a *participial* sense is retained, the article may be omitted when there is no stress laid upon the participle; see § 3, 2. Note 1.

(6.) Participles often express the relations of *time*, and we must, in translating them, supply *when, while, during*, etc.

This cannot be thought strange, inasmuch as Participles retain the distinctions of *tense*. E. g. οὐχ/ μείνον, σοι ἔμεινε; *while it remained*, etc., Acts v. 4. 1 Thess. iii. 6. So Il. I. 46, ‘The arrows on the shoulder of him in a rage, sounded αὐτοῦ κινηθέντος, *when he moved*; Καλλιιάδου ἄρχοντος, *while Calliades governed*. The same with ἐπ/ before the participle; Matth. § 565, 1.

(7.) Participles often express a *casual* relation; in which case *because, since*, etc., must be supplied in translating them.

E. g. Acts iv. 21, ‘They set him at liberty, μηδὲν εὗρισκόντες, *because they found nothing*,’ etc.—It is difficult to speak to the appetite, ὅρα οὐκ ἔχοντα, *because it has no ears*; Matth. § 565, 2.

(8.) Participles often express *limitation* or *conditionality*; in which case we supply *if, although*, etc.

E. g. 'She will not be an adulteress, γενομένην ἐτέρῳ ἀνδρὶ, *if, or provided, she become another man's [wife],*' Rom. vii. 3. 'Ἀνέγκλητοι ὄντες, *if, or provided, they are blameless,* 1 Tim. iii. 10; iv. 4; vi. 8. 2 Pet. i. 8. So with *although*; 'τοσαῦτα αὐτοῦ σημεῖα πεποιηκότος, *although he did so many miracles,* they did not believe, etc., John xii. 37; καὶ τοσούτων ὄντων, *and although there were so many,* yet, &c. John xxi. 11. Luke xviii. 7. James iii. 4. 1 Pet. ii. 19. 1 Tim. i. 7, al.

(9.) The Future tense of the Part. is rarely employed, except after verbs of motion; and with these it is very common.

E. g. ἔρχομαι φράσω, *I come to tell*; σέ γε διδάξων ὤρμημαι, *I hasten to teach thee*; 'It is meet to bring him who does wrong before the judges, δίκην δώσοντα, *that he may receive punishment.*

(10.) Participles are often joined with ὥς, which makes their meaning *subjective* rather than *objective*.

The meaning is, that ὥς, qualifies them so, that they merely declare the opinion, supposition, conclusion, etc., of the agents to which they refer; or else merely what is probable or apparent, in distinction from what is real and matter of fact. E. g. Artaxerxes took hold of Cyrus, ὥς ἀποκτενῶν, *as if he was about to kill him*; 'Overlooking other cities, ὥς οὐκ ἂν δυναμένους βοηθεῖσαι, *as if, or as believing that, they were unable to assist*; ὥς ἀπίνυτες, *as desirous to go away*; 'They punish him who withdraws, ὥς παρανομοῦντα, *inasmuch as they consider him as a*

transgressor ;' ' The Athenians made ready, ὡς πολεμήσονται, *expecting to engage in a war* ; Luke xvi. 1, ὡς διασκορπίζων, *as one supposed to waste* ; ὡς ἀποστρέφοντα, *as one supposed to pervert*, etc., Luke xxiii. 14, al. But this idiom, so common in the classics, is not very frequent in the New Testament.

(11.) Participles are frequently joined with verbs of existence (εἰμι γίγνομαι, τυγχάνω,) and then stand in the room of a finite verb.

This we can fully appreciate, inasmuch as we can say in English with equal propriety, *I do, I am doing, I write, I am writing, I have been writing*, etc. So the Greeks ; ' The stars of heaven ἔσονται ἐκπίπτοντες, lit. *shall be falling*, i. e. *shall fall*, Mark xiii. 25. Luke v. 1. 2 Cor. v. 19. Mark xv. 43. Luke xxiv. 32 ; i. 22 ; v. 10. Acts i. 10, al. saepe. The examples in the New Testament appear to be mostly (if not all) of the Pres. tense of the Part. ; but in the classics, other tenses are employed, as κρατήσας ἦν, Herodian. The later classics abound in this idiom ; the early ones more rarely employ it.

NOTE 1. The verbs γίγνομαι, ὑπάρχω, τυγχάνω, are employed in the same manner as εἰμί, with participles. Also the verbs ἤκω (*to come*), εἶμι (*to go*), ἔρχομαι (*to come*) are frequently joined in like manner with participles. So ἔχω is also used ; in which case its only force seems to be, to give the idea of *permanency* to the meaning of the participle ; e. g. θαυμάσας ἔχω, *I have wondered*, i. e. *have long been wondering*.

§ 53. PARTICIPLES IN THE CASE ABSOLUTE.

(1.) The construction of Participles, thus far considered, has relation only to those cases where they qualify the agent of the principal verb, or some object to which it stands related; and consequently are connected with, or dependent on, the principal verb. But there are many cases, *where the Part. has a subject of its own, which is different from the subject or object of the principal verb.* In this case there is a peculiarity of construction, called **THE CASE ABSOLUTE**; which needs a particular explanation.

(2.) Generally participles thus conditioned express a relation either of *time* or *cause*; and therefore (as the Gen. is adapted to the expression of these) they are put in the Genitive.

E. g. αὐτοῦ εἰπόντος, πάντες ἐσίγων, *while he was speaking, all were silent*; Θεοῦ διδόντος, οὐδὲν ἰσχύει φθόνος, *when God permits, envy avails nothing*; The city was not the richer, προσόδων αὐτῇ πλείονων γενομένων, *because it had many sources of revenue*; οὕτω τοῦ αἰῶνος προεχωρηκότος, *thus because his age was advanced, he went, etc.*

NOTE 1. When the agent or object of the verb and of the Part. is the same, then the Part. stands in the same case with such object or agent; (a) The

agent or *Nom.* of the verb being also the subject of the *Part.*, the *Part.*, of course usually takes the *Nom.* case; as αἰσχύνομαι ταῦτα ποιῶν or ποιήσας, *I am ashamed that I do, or have done these things*; διαβεβλημένος οὐ μανθάνεις; *being calumniated dost thou not perceive it?* So in the *Pass. voice*; ἐξελέληγκται ἡμᾶς ἀπατῶν, *he is convicted of deceiving us*; ἡγγίλθη ὁ Φίλιππος τὴν Ὀλυθιδον πολιορκῶν, *it was announced that Philip was besieging Olynthus*, lit., *Philip besieging Olynthus, was announced*; in which the Greek form of expression has the advantage over ours in point of brevity and energy. 1 Cor. xiv. 18. Acts xvi. 34.

(b) When the *Part.* refers to the *object* of the verb, its accord with this in respect to gender, number, and case, is a matter of course, a few peculiar cases only excepted; e. g. ‘The Persians relate τὸν Κῦρον ἔχοντα φύσιν, etc., *that Cyrus had a disposition*, i. e. they tell of Cyrus as one having, etc. So in the *Gen.* and *Dative*; ἡσθόμην αὐτῶν οἰομένων εἶναι σοφωτάτων, *I perceived that they deemed themselves to be very wise*; οὐδέποτε μετεμέλησέ μοι σιγήσαντι, *I never repent of having kept silence*. See § 52, 2, Note 2, where the same subject is treated of in a general point of view. Luke viii. 46. Acts xxiv. 10. 2 John v. 7.

(c) In case the verb has a reflexive pronoun after it, differing in case from the subject or *Nom.*, the *Part.* may be in the *Nom.* or in the same oblique case as the reflexive pronoun; e. g. σύννοδα ἑμαυτοῦ σφοδρὸς ὦν, or σφοδρῶ ὄντι.

(3.) As the Dative also is sometimes used in designating *time, cause, occasion*, etc., so the case absolute of participles is sometimes the Dative.

E. g. *καταβάντι αὐτῷ*, *when he had descended*, Matt. viii. 1 ; *ἐλθόντι αὐτῷ*, *when he had come*, Matt. xxi. 23. But this is rare in the New Testament. In the Greek classics it is also rare ; but still it is clearly an idiom belonging to the Greek ; Matth. § 562, 2.

(4.) The Acc. and Nom. are also employed occasionally in the Greek classics, as the case absolute. In the New Testament, no examples of this kind occur, which may not be explained on the grounds of *apposition*, or *anacoluthon* ; see § 73, § 58.

E. g. *τοὺς βοῦς θάπτουσι, τὰ κέρατα ὑπερέχοντα*, *they bury the oxen, the horns sticking out*, where *κέρατα*, etc. indicates a circumstance belonging to *βοῦς*, and is put as it were in apposition with it. ‘ That he might have twelve years instead of six, *αἱ νύκτες ἡμέραι ποιεῦμεναι*, *the nights being computed as days*,’ where is a kind of apposition ; Buttm. § 145, Note 4. Such a kind of Nom. absolute is not unfrequent in the classics, where the Part. is of an *impersonal* nature ; Rost, § 131, 5. Matth. § 564. The Part. in the *neuter* gender, often stands, in cases of this nature, in a kind of apposition to a whole clause or sentence ; as *σὺ δὲ δεδιώς ἂν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν σουτοῦ σκιάν*, *but you, fearing your own shadow, as it is said, would answer, etc.*

§ 54. PARTICIPIAL USE OF THE TENSES.

(1.) The *Present* Part. designates not merely something now present, but may also designate what is now commencing and is to be continued, or what is immediately to commence.

E. g. ἀποθνήσκων, *moriturus* or *dying* in the sense of being already *in extremis*. Matt. xxvi. 28, τὸ αἷμα τὸ ἐκχυνόμενον, *the blood...which is about to be shed*. So διδόμενον, in Luke xxii. 19; κλώμενον, in 1 Cor. xi. 24. So all these cases may be solved, by considering the Part. as expressing what is *mentally* regarded as Present. Rom. xv. 25, διακονῶν. 1 Peter i. 7.

(2.) The Pres. Part. is often employed in the sense of the Imperfect.

E. g. ἐρευνῶντες, *who searched*, 1 Pet. i. 11; 'I saw seven angels, ἔχοντας πληγὰς, *who had plagues*, Rev. xv. 1, 6. Acts xxi. 16; xxv. 3. Matt. xiv. 21. In particular, the Part. Pres. is often connected with a verb Praeterite, in order to designate something done, etc., at the time when another thing was done which the principal verb announces; e. g. 'on the following day, ὠφθη αὐτοῖς μαχομένοις, *he shewed himself to them when they were contending*, Acts vii. 26; xviii. 5. Heb. xi. 22. Luke v. 18, al. saepe. Very often is the Part. ὢν employed in the sense of the Imperf.; e. g. John i. 49; v. 13; xi. 31; xxi. 11. Acts vii. 2; xi. 1; xviii. 24. 1 Cor. viii. 9, al.

(3.) The Perf. participle is used to denote

things done, the result of which was somewhat permanent, or the consequences of which continued. The Aorist, on the other hand, is usually employed where a thing is done once for all, and is not designedly represented as continuing in its consequences.

E. g. Perfect ; Heb. ii. 9. John xix. 35. Acts xxii. 3. 1 Pet. i. 23 ; ii. 4. Rev. ix. 1. Aorist ; Rom. viii. 11 ; xvi. 22. Acts ix. 21, al. *saepe*.

§ 55. HEBRAISM IN THE USE OF PARTICIPLES.

(1.) This consists of employing the Part. with a verb in a definite mode, in the room of the Heb. Inf. with a definite mode.

E. g. *ἰδὼν εἶδον, εὐλογῶν εὐλογήσω, πληθύνων πληθυνῶ, βλέποντες βλέπετε*, etc. ; forms of speech which are very frequent in the Septuagint. It is however the *frequency* only of this idiom which may be called Hebraism in the Sept. ; for such phrases are found, not only in the Greek poets, but in the prose-writers ; Winer, § 46, 7. See numerous examples also, in Matth. § 553.

IMPERSONAL VERBS.

§ 56. MANNER IN WHICH THESE ARE EMPLOYED.

(1.) The Greeks usually employ the 3d. pers. plural or sing. of these verbs ; and sometimes

the 2nd pers. singular. In the New Testament, the 3d pers. plural is the more usual form.

E. g. John xv. 6 ; xx. 2. Mark x. 13. Matt. vii. 16. Luke xii. 20, 48, et al. saepe. The 3d pers. sing., *φησὶ*, is used in 2 Cor. x. 10. So the passive *γράφεται*, *λέγεται*, etc., are naturally employed in the same impersonal way.

NOTE 1. In Hebrew the same custom prevails. The 3d pers. sing. and plural, also the 2d pers. sing., are used in an impersonal way, or with indefinite Nominatives ; Heb. Gramm. § 500.

CONCORD OF VERBS, ETC., WITH THEIR SUBJECTS.

§ 57. CONCORD IN RESPECT TO NUMBER AND GENDER.

(1.) The general rule is, that verbs and participles agree with their nouns, the former in respect to *number*, and the latter in regard to *number* and *gender*. But to this rule are not a few exceptions ; viz.,

(a) Nouns of multitude, i. e. generic nouns, may take a plural verb, etc.

E. g. ὁ ὄχλος.... ἐπικατάρατοί εἰσι, John vii. 49 ; τὴν οἰκίαν Στεφανῶ, ὅτι.... ἔταξαν ἑαυτούς, 1 Cor. xvi. 15. Matt. xxi. 8. Luke ix. 12. John vi. 2, sing. and plural both ; al. saepe. And so in the classics.

NOTE 1. *Distributives* in the *singular* sometimes

take a plural verb; e. g. σκορπίσθητε ἑκαστος, John xvi. 32; ἤκουον εἰς ἑκαστος, Acts ii. 6; ὤρισαν ἑκαστος, Acts xi. 29; ἔχοντες ἑκαστος κιδάρας, Rev. v. 8. So the Heb. **כִּלְכֵּל** (*each*) very often takes a plur. verb. Comp. § 9, 1.

(b) Neuter plurals generally (not always) take a verb singular; and when these plurals designate *animated* beings, the *plural* of the verb is the more common usage.

E. g. τὰ ζῶα τρέχουσιν τὰ καλὰ ἔργα....ἔστι, 1 Tim. v. 25, al saepe. Examples of animated beings are τὰ ἔθνη ἐλπιοῦσι, Matt. xii. 21; τὰ πνεύματα....εἰσῆλθον, Mark v. 13; τὰ δαιμόνια πιστεύουσι καὶ φρίσσουσι, James ii. 19. Rev. xi. 18; xvi. 14, al saepe. Yet the singular of the verb is also used in such cases; e. g. in Luke iv. 41; viii. 30, 38; xiii. 19. Mark iii. 11; iv. 4; vii. 28, al. but generally with variations of the Codices. Sing. and plur. in the same sentence, Luke iv. 41. John x. 27. 1 Cor. xx. 11, Comp. 1 Sam. ix. 12. Il. β'. 135.

NOTE 1. Even the neuter plur. of *inanimate* things sometimes takes a *plural* verb; e. g. ἂ ἐστὶ, Rev. i. 19; ἐράνησαν...τὰ ῥήματα, Luke xxiv. 11. 2 Pet. iii. 10. All the usages above noted, are common in the Greek classics.

(c) The *gender* of the participle may be conformed to the *sense* of the passage.

E. g. ἐν Τύρῳ καὶ Σιδῶνι...καθήμενοι, according to Cod. A. B. C. al., Luke. x. 13; τὸ κατίχον, 2 Thes. ii. 6.

NOTE 1. Those cases in which the *predicate* of a sentence is in the neuter gender, cannot be considered as strictly belonging to the above class; e. g. ἱκανὸν .. ἡ ἐπιτιμία αὕτη, *this chastisement is sufficient*, i. e. that which suffices. So ὁ πόλεμος φοβερόν ἢ φύσις...κυφλὸν σοφὸν ἢ προμήθεια, et al. simil. in the classics. Such predicates are rather to be understood as designating an *abstract* noun, or a quality merely which is predicted of the subject. The like is true where a neuter participle is employed in the same way.

APPOSITION.

§ 58. VARIOUS WAYS IN WHICH THIS IS MADE.

(1.) Not only single words, appellatives, etc., are put in apposition with a leading noun, but whole phrases or sentences.

E. g. 'I beseech you...to present your bodies, a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable to God, τὴν λογικὴν λατρείαν, *your reasonable service*, i. e. which is your reasonable service, Rom. xii. 1. So in 1 Tim. ii. 6, τὸ μαρτύριον, etc. 2 Tim. i. 5, ὑπόμνησιν λαμβάνων, i. e. ἐγὼ λαμβάνων etc., in connection with v. 3.

NOTE 1. The Acc. case is generally chosen for apposition, where the *object* of a verb is the leading,

noun; but sometimes the Nom. is employed; e. g. *καθαρίζον* in Mark vii. 19. So *τὸ λεγόμενον, τὸ μέγιστον, τὸ κακόν*, etc., are often inserted, in classic authors, in the midst of a sentence, when apposition to the rest of the sentence is intended; Matth. § 432, 5, p. 805.

(2.) The word in apposition may differ as to gender or number from the leading word to which it relates.

E. g. ‘And he shall give *αὐτῷ ζωὴν, τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσι μὴ πρὸς τὸν θάνατον*, *to him life, to those who sin* (plural) *not unto death*, 1 John v. 16; where *αὐτῷ* is generic, like *ἐκάστω*. So, as in the cases produced in Note 1 above, the gender may differ from that of the leading noun.

(3.) The position of the word or words in apposition is naturally next to the leading noun, etc.; but oftentimes there is an intervening phrase inserted.

E. g. *αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπαγγελία, ἣν αὐτὸς ἐπηγγέλατο ἡμῖν, τὴν ζωὴν τὴν αἰώνιον*, where *ἣν...ἡμῖν* not only intervenes, but the relative *ἣν* by attraction puts *ζωὴν* in the Accusative, 1 John ii. 25. So, frequently, in the classics. See also James i. 7, *ὁ ἄνθρωπος...ἀνὴρ δίψυχος, κ. τ. λ.*, Phil. iii. 18.

NOTE 1. In Matt. x. 25, *καὶ ὁ δοῦλος* (where we should expect *τῷ δούλῳ*) must be constructed thus: *καὶ [ἀρκετὸν ἵνα γίνηται] ὁ δοῦλος κ. τ. λ.*, taking the supplement from the preceding phrase.

REMARK. *Abstracts* are often put in apposition with *concretes*; e. g. 1 John iv. 10. 2 Cor. viii. 23. James v. 10. Where apposition might be employed, an independent phrase is often used; e. g. in James iii. 8. Rev. i. 5, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἁγίου, ὁ μάρτυς ὁ πιστὸς κ. τ. λ., i. e. ὃς ἐστὶ ὁ μάρτυς, etc.

PARTICLES.

§ 59. NATURE AND KINDS OF THE PARTICLES.

(1.) All those small and *indeclinable* words, which serve the purposes of expressing or aiding *connection, definiteness, perspicuity, intensity, brevity*, etc., are usually named, in a generic way, PARTICLES.

(2.) These may be divided into *prepositions, conjunctions*, and *adverbs*. INTERJECTIONS, which are mere exclamations of joy, woe, wonder, etc., can hardly be ranged under the PARTICLES, in the sense given to this word as above defined. They do not properly belong to Syntax.

NOTE 1. An interjection is the expression of an *emotion*, and not of an idea or notion of the mind; it is the representative of suffering, joy, etc., rather than an expression of a notion respecting joy, sorrow, etc. Hence, it makes a sense (so to speak) complete in itself; and it may be understood without the

sequel of any other words. Such words may indeed be added ; but they are not necessary to complete the sense of the interjection. Different is the case with the *particles*, i. e. with prepositions, conjunctions, and adverbs ; for all of these express either relation, connection, or quality, and therefore require some supplement in order to indicate the thing to which they are related, with which they are connected, or which they qualify.

(3.) The most generic idea of the particles seems to be this, viz., that they are in some sense *predicates of things*, i. e. affirmations of some relation, connection, quality, or quantity, in respect to them ; and therefore *they are words expressive of condition* in some sense or other.

NOTE. 1. *Condition*, in its most generic sense, may be viewed as having respect to *quality*, or *relation*, or *connection*. Particles which mark the condition of QUALITY, are called ADVERBS, i. e. additions to words ; those which designate the condition of *relation*, (a relation supposed to exist as to things themselves, and not merely in the notions of the mind), are called PREPOSITIONS, i. e. words placed before others, (for what purpose, the name itself does not designate) ; and lastly, the *connection* of things as associated by the mind, (not of things as they are simply in and of themselves), is expressed by CONJUNCTIONS, i. e. words joining together.

REMARK. Dispute exists, even at the present

time, among grammarians of the highest order, as to *the limits* of the respective classes of particles. The names *adverbs*, *prepositions*, and *conjunctions*, will not serve accurately to define these limits. An *adverb* may be, and often is, a word *set before* another (i. e. a preposition in the *literal* sense), in order to qualify it. A *conjunction* also points out some kind of *relation*; which also seems to be the appropriate office of a preposition. Hence the difficulty of making a definite and satisfactory classification, in all its *minutiae*; a difficulty which our lexicons have hitherto scarcely attempted to remedy.

ADVERBS.

§ 60. NATURE AND VARIOUS USES.

(1.) Those indeclinable particles which serve to designate some qualification of things themselves, or the manner in which the mind conceives of these qualifications and expresses itself concerning them, may be called adverbs.

(2.) The first class of adverbs, viz, *that which respects things themselves*, may be subdivided into two classes; (a) Those which have respect to time and place; (b) Those which regard some quality or condition of the thing itself.

NOTE 1. To every thing of which we have any

distinct conception, we assign, by a necessary law of our minds as connected with experience, *time* and *place* as necessary adjuncts. Hence, (a) Adverbs of time and place ; such as *ἐνταῦθα*, *ἐκεῖ*, *ᾧδε*, *ἐνθάδε*, *πότε*, *ποῦ*, *ποῶ*, *πῇ*, *πότε*, *πηνίκα*. (b.) Adverbs which designate the state, condition, etc., of the thing ; as *εὖ*, *καλῶς*, *πολλαχῶς*, *προσαχῶς*, *μοναχῶς*, *διχῇ*, *πανοικί*, *πανστρατί*, *ὥς*, *καθῶς*, *ὥσπερ*, *καθάπερ*, *τῶς*, *οὕτως*, *οἷοις*, *πῶς*, etc. Those words which are often called *inseparable* prepositions, also belong here ; such as *ὅς*, *ὅ*, *ἀρί*, *ἐρί*, *δα*, *βου*, *βρί*, *ζα*, *νε*, *νη*, etc.

(3.) The adverbs which serve to qualify or characterize our modes of thought or expression, may be subdivided into various classes, according to the nature of their respective design and meaning.

E. g. an adverb may be of such a nature as to make the proposition particular, singular, or general ; affirmative or negative ; limited or unlimited ; declarative or conditional ; copulative or disjunctive ; categorical or dubious, etc. (a) Adverbs of quantity, i. e. of limitation in respect to number, belong here ; as *ἅπαξ*, *δύς*, *τρίς*, *πολλάκις*, *πάντως*. (b) Affirmation and negation ; *ναί*, *οὐ*. Under these may be ranked all the *gradations* of assertion, made by such words as *μόλις*, *λίαν*, *σφόδρα*, *μᾶλλον*, *ἥσσον*, *μάλιστα*, *ἥκιστα*, *ὦς*, etc. (c.) Categorical ; such as *ἤγουν*, *δηλαδή*. (d) Conditional and consecutive, i. e. suspended on something supposed to precede or follow ; as *πρῶτον*, *εἴτα*, *ἔπειτα*, *ἔξῃς*, *ἰφίξῃς*, *πάλιν*, etc. (e) Copulative and disjunc-

tive; ἄμα, ὁμοῦ, ὁμῶς, συλλήβδην ἄνευ, ἄτερ, χωρὶς, δίχα, πλήν. (e) Categorical and dubious, ὄντως, πάνυ, πάντως, ἀληθῶς, οὐδαμῶς ἴσως, τάχα, ὥς.

(4.) Inasmuch as many adverbs are expressive of quality, these admit of gradations in comparison.¹ But such as have shades of meaning, which by their very nature do not exist in different degrees, are incapable of comparison.

E. g. ἄπαξ, δις, τρίς· ναί, οὐ· ὥς, πῶς, οὕτως· ὄντως, ἴσως, πάντως, μηδαμῶς, etc., are, from their nature, incapable of different degrees of comparison.

(5.) In the New Testament, the use of adverbs is not less frequent than in the classics. Some of the *nicer* shades of meaning, however, that are found in the better classics, can hardly

¹ In respect to this, adverbs resemble adjectives; as we might naturally expect from their kindred signification. The comparison is usually made, *by assuming the form of the neut. sing. of adjectives for the COMPARATIVE degree, and the neut. plural for the SUPERLATIVE.*

E. g. σοφῶς, σοφώτερον, σοφώτατα· αἰσχεῶς, αἰσχίον, αἰσχιστα.

Note 1. Not a few adverbs, however, which are derived from prepositions, etc. form the comparison by -τέρω and -τάτω· e. g. ἄνω, ἀνωτέρω, ἀνωτάτω· and even some others, as ἰγγύς, ἰγγυτέρω, ἰγγυτάτω.

Note 2. Some take -ως even in the comp. and superl. degrees; as ἀληθῶς, ἀληθιστέρως, ἀληθιστάτως. A few, moreover, are irregular in their comparison, in like manner with adjectives; as μάλα, μᾶλλον, μάλιστα· ἔλαττον, ἄσσον, ἔγγιστα.

be looked for in the New Testament. On the other hand, adverbs derived from adjectives (by adding *-ως*, etc.), are more common in the New Testament than in the earlier classics; as they are, also, in the later Greek in general. The *neuter* adjective, so often employed *adverbially* in the later Greek, is not more common in the New Testament, than in the earlier classics.

NOTE 1. This latter species of adverbs is employed principally when there are not other appropriate adverbial forms, which would express the same idea; e. g. *πρῶτον, ὕστερον, πρότερον, πλησίον, ταχὺ, πυκνά, ἴσα, πολλά*, etc.

NOTE 2. Adjectives in the oblique cases, with or without a preposition, and used as *adverbs*, such as *περὶ, πάντῃ, ἰδίᾳ, κατ' ἰδίαν, καθόλου*, etc., have nothing remarkable as to frequency or unfrequency in the New Testament. But nouns with prepositions, used adverbially, such as *ἐν ἀληθείᾳ = ἀληθῶς, ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ = δικαίως*, etc., are more frequent in the New Testament than in the classics. The *frequency* is Hebraistic; but the thing itself exists in the Greek classics.

(6.) Not unfrequently *adjectives* are used, where we might naturally expect *adverbs*; and where, indeed, we must translate adverbially..

E. g. 'He that is without sin, *πρῶτος* τὸν λίθον... βαλέτω, *let him first cast the stone*,' John viii. 7;
'The gate opened *αὐτομάτῃ*, *of its own accord*, i. e.

spontaneously, Acts xii. 10; Ἀδάμ πρῶτος ἐκλάσθη, *Adam was first formed*, 1 Tim. ii. 13. 1 Cor. ix. 17. John xx. 4. Acts xxviii. 13, δευτεράῳ ἡλθομεν, *we came on the second day*, etc.; but this idiom is common in the classics.

(7.) Intensity of degree which might be *adverbially* designated, is not unfrequently marked by a verb and its conjugate noun.

E. g. ἐπιθυμία ἐπεθύμησα, *I have greatly desired*, Luke xxii. 15; χαρᾷ χαίρει, *he greatly rejoices*, John iii. 29; ἀπειλῇ ἀπειλησόμεθα, Acts iv. 17; v. 28; xxiii. 14. James v. 17. Matt. xv. 4, al. But this idiom is common in the best Attic writers; e. g. φεύγει φυγῇ· παῖδάῳ πισπαῖσθαι· νίκη νίκησι, etc.

(8.) Certain verbs in Greek, when joined with others, are best rendered *adverbially* in English.

E. g. ἔλαθόν τινες ξένισαντες, *they unwittingly entertained*, Heb. xiii. 2; προέλαβε μυρίσαι, *by way of anticipation she hath anointed*, Mark xiv. 8. Acts xii. 16. So in the classics.

NOTE 1. *Hebraism*, however, may be seen in such expressions as the following: προσέειπε πάλιν (Πῶς ἔειπεν), Luke xx. 12, i. e. *he sent again*, (Matt. xxi. 36, πάλιν ἀπέστειλε.) So Acts xii. 3, προσέειπε συλλαβεῖν. Sometimes even where καὶ stands between two verbs which are both in a definite mode, one of them seems to be *adverbially* employed; e. g.

ἀποτολμᾷ καὶ λέγει, he boldly says, Rom. x. 20. Luke vi. 48. Col. ii. 5.

(9.) Whenever adverbs are associated with a *case*, after the manner of prepositions, they may be considered as *prepositions*; as, on the other hand, prepositions become *adverbs*, when they are not associated with some case of a noun, etc.

In other words, it is not the mere *form*, but the *use*, which determines the nature of a word. So Hermann (De Emend. Gr. Gramm., p. 161); and altogether in accordance with the dictates of sound judgment. In the mean time the student should know, that most of the so called *adverbs* may become *prepositions*; and that then *they usually govern the Gen.*, but sometimes (in a few cases) the Dative. Thus, in the New Testament, *ἅμα, ἕως, χωρὶς, πλησίον, ἐγγύς, ἔμπροσθεν, ὀπίσθεν*, are *often* construed as prepositions; *ἀνευ, always* as such; and so of other adverbs.

PREPOSITIONS.

§ 61. NATURE AND VARIOUS USES.

(1.) A preposition is not designed to express the inherent condition of things, but only the relation which one thing bears to another; e. g.

of attribute to subject, of effect to cause; and of union or disjunction.

(a) Of attribute to subject; viz. *ἐν*, *ἐνί*, with the Dat.; *ἀνά*, *ἀμφί*, *περί*, with the Dat. and Accusative. (b) Of effect to cause; as *ἀπὸ*, *ἐξ*, *ὑπὸ*, *πρὸς*, *ἵνεκα*, with the Gen.; *ἐνί*, *μετὰ*, with the accusative. (c) Union or disjunction; *σύν*, *μετὰ*, with the Gen. and Dat.; *ἀμφί*, *περί*, *παρὰ*, *πρὸς*, with the Dat.; *παρὰ* (*besides*) with the Acc.; and *πλήν*, *ἄνω*, with the Genitive. The reader will note, that several of these prepositions govern other cases than those respectively mentioned; but then, in such a case, they have not the specific meaning here assigned to them.

(2.) It results from the very nature of CASE, (which means, *a different ending of a word in order to express a different relation*), that it designates essentially the same thing which most prepositions express. But prepositions are designed to extend, and to render more explicit and energetic, the expression of *relation*.

NOTE 1. By looking back upon the account given in the preceding pages of the various relations expressed by the Gen., Dat., and Acc., it will be seen at once, that many of the most important relations between things are expressed simply by the use of these cases alone; and such was the original design of *case*. But still, three or four cases cannot possibly express all the various, minute, and nicer relations of things. Hence the necessity of *prepositions* in every language.

It is obvious, moreover, that even in those instances where case alone would express the relation intended, yet a preposition designating the same relation would make the language more explicit and perspicuous. The Gen. case, for example, is expressive of several relations ; but which of these any particular instance of it is designed to express, must be determined by the context and the nature of the case. But if the writer choose to remove all ground of obscurity and uncertainty from the mind of the reader, he could do this by adding a preposition, the meaning of which distinctly marks the specific nature of the relation designed to be expressed.

NOTE 2. The custom of many grammarians, in always supplying a preposition before oblique cases, which are without one and not governed by a verb or participle ; seems not to be well founded in the real nature of language. Cases require no *foreign* regimen, when they stand for expressing the very relation that from their nature they do express.—The older Greek writers make use of prepositions much more seldom than the later ones. Foreigners, writing the Greek language (and such were the writers of the New Testament), would naturally have a less exquisite discernment of the various relations of case in itself, and therefore more naturally employ prepositions with greater frequency, because the relations expressed by them are more obvious and palpable. Hence the New Testament seldom employs oblique cases (out of the regimen of the verb and participle), without attaching prepositions to them.

(3.) Prepositions govern the Gen., Dat., or Acc.; some likewise *two* of these cases; and some *three*; merely because they have meanings adapted to the respective relations of these several cases.

NOTE 1. What prepositions are appropriate to each case, the reader will find under the Syntax of the Gen., Dat., and Acc. cases.

(4.) Nearly all the usual and original prepositions appear to have had, in their origin, a *local* sense. The transfer from this to ideas of *time*, was natural and easy. Then follows the merely *intellectual* meanings, i. e. the expressions of relations conceived of merely by the mind. But the tracing of these, is the proper business of lexicons.

All *local* relations may be reduced to two generic ones, viz. a state of *rest*, or of *motion*. The Dat. is appropriate to the state of *rest*; the Acc., to a state of motion *toward* a thing; the Gen. to that of motion *from* or *out of* it. Accordingly (a) Ἐν *in*, παρά *with*, ἐνι *on*, ὑπὲρ *over*, ὑπὸ *under*, μετὰ *between, among*, πρὸ *before*, μετὰ *after*, περί *around*, ἀντι *against*, (none of them indicating motion), do all, in such senses, govern the Dative. (b) Εἰς *to*, κατὰ *towards*, πρὸς *unto*, ἐνι *therein*, ὑπὸ *thereunder*, take the Accusative. (c) ἐκ *out of*, ἀπὸ *from*, ὑπὸ *from under*, κατὰ *down*

from, *παρά from with*, are construed with the Genitive; Winer, § 51, 3. The *temporal* and *intellectual* relations of any of these prepositions, seem to be deduced from these original meanings. It is, of course, appropriate to the *lexicographical* department, to trace and unfold these.

REMARK. The confounding of prepositions with each other, and making them to have the same meaning, (e. g. *εἰς* and *ἐν*, with many others); and also the constant appeal to Heb. prepositions in order to illustrate or justify a supposed anomalous Greek usage; although this has been very extensively practiced by Schleusner, Haab, and many commentators; is exceedingly injurious to a correct method of philology and exegesis. Winer remarks (p. 312), that "accurate observation shows, in general, how correctly the New Testament writers have employed the prepositions which are nearly related; and that one is bound to honour them and himself, by acknowledging every where their carefulness." The exceptions to this remark are so few and unimportant, that they scarcely deserve to be mentioned.

(5.) The same Prepositions, in a different sense, may be employed in the same sentence; or different prepositions, and even cases, in the like sense, and in the same connection.

E. g. (a) Heb. ii. 10, *δι' ὧν...δι' οὗ, on account of whom...by whom*. Rev. xiv. 6. Matt. xix. 28. Heb. xi. 29. (b) *Πρὸς τὸν κύριον...καὶ εἰς πάντας τοὺς ἁγίους*, Philm. v. 5. 1 Thess. ii. 6. Comp. Matt. xxvi. 28,

τὸ περὶ πολλῶν, and Luke xxii. 20, τὸ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν Matt. xxiv. 16, ἐπὶ τὰ ὄρη, Mark xiii. 14, εἰς τὰ ὄρη. Different cases with the same preposition occur in the like sense; e. g. Matt. xxiv. 2, ἐπὶ λθόν, Mark xiii. 2, ἐπὶ λθῶν Rev. xiv. 9, ἐπὶ τοῦ μετώπου...ἐπὶ τῇ χεῖρᾳ.

In these and all such cases, we need not resort to the labour-saving solution, that cases and prepositions may be exchanged for one another, *ad libitum scriptoris*. Nothing is farther from the truth. The simple fact seems to be, (1.) That in *some* respects all the cases meet on common ground as to the expression of relation, (e. g. Gen., Dat., Acc., *in regard to*), so that which case is employed, is in some instances a matter of indifference. (2.) Several of the prepositions express, primarily and literally, ideas that approximate very near to each other; and in some of their derivate meanings they come occasionally together, so that no perceptible difference in sense can be made out; e. g. ἐκ and ἀπὸ, εἰς and πρὸς, etc. But, (3.) Even in such cases, while the sense is *substantially* the very same, *the mode of announcing it is diverse*; and in this consists a real diversity. E. g. πάσχειν ἐν σαρκί, *to suffer in the flesh*, i. e. in one's body, πάσχειν σαρκί, *to suffer by means of the body*; βαπτίζειν ἐν ὕδατι, *to baptize in the water*; βαπτίζειν ὕδατι, *to baptize with water*. Here the sense is not *substantially* different, and yet the mode of presenting it is not the same. So ἐπὶ λθόν and ἐπὶ λθῶν (Matt. xxiv. 2. Mark xiii. 2) can scarcely be separated by any translation that we can make; yet ἐπὶ with the Dative seems to mean *upon* in reference to the state of *lying at rest upon*; while ἐπὶ with the Acc. would, in strictness,

designate that conception of mind which has reference to one stone having been put or placed *upon* another. It would be fruitless, however, to attempt the expression of such niceties in our common version; and it may even be doubted, whether they were really apprehended by the writers of the New Testament.

(6.) Prepositions are usually repeated before nouns in the same case, when these nouns are such that the mind naturally classes each separately by itself; and therefore they are repeated, almost of course, when a particle of separation (*ἢ ἀλλά*) intervenes.

E. g. ‘Beginning ἀπὸ Μωσέως, καὶ ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν προφητῶν, Luke xxiv. 27. 1 Thess. i. 5. Luke xiii. 29, where *east* and *west* are one class in conjunction, *north* and *south* another. Specially where καὶ...καὶ stand before two nouns; as Acts xxvi. 29, καὶ ἐν δλίγῳ, καὶ ἐν πολλῷ. Examples with ἢ or ἀλλά· περὶ ἑαυτοῦ, ἢ περὶ ἑτέρου Acts viii. 34; οὐκ ἐν περιτομῇ, ἀλλ’ ἐν ἀκροβυστίᾳ, Rom. iv. 10. 1 Cor. xiv. 6. 2 Cor. ix. 7. 1 Thess. i. 5, 8. Eph. vi. 12. The same in the classics. Yet this usage is far from being uniform; for the second preposition is not unfrequently omitted where the objects must have been regarded by the mind as diverse; e. g. ἀπὸ φόβου καὶ προσδοκίας τῶν ἐπερχομένων, Luke xxi. 26. Acts xv. 22; xxvi. 18, a striking instance; xvi. 2; xvii. 9, 15, al.

NOTE 1. When a relative pronoun follows a noun with a preposition, and that relative is put in the

same case with the noun, the preposition is usually omitted before it; e. g. ἀπὸ πάντων, ὧν οὐκ ἠδυνήθητε, κ. τ. λ., Acts xiii. 38, 39; εἰς τὸ ἔργον, ὃ προσκείμεται αὐτοῖς, Acts xiii. 2. Luke i. 25.—In a few cases the preposition is repeated; e. g. ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ὥρᾳ, ἐν ᾗ εἶπεν, John iv. 53. Acts vii. 4, al. Both usages are found in the Greek classics. When the same case follows ὥσπερ in a comparison, as precedes it, the preposition is seldom repeated before the latter case in the classics, (Winer, p. 356), but always repeated in the New Testament; e. g. ἐπέτισε τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἐπ' αὐτοὺς ὥσπερ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμᾶς, Acts xi. 15. Heb. iv. 10. Rom. v. 19. Philem. v. 14.

(7.) Prepositions are used, in the later Greek, frequently before adverbs, so as to modify the sense of them, or because the adverbs are used in the place of nouns.

E. g. In the place of nouns; as ἀπὸ πρῶτῃ, ἀπὸ πέρυσσι, ἀπ' ἄρτι, ἀπὸ τότε, ἑκπαλαι, ἔμπροσθεν, etc. In order to make a compound or modified word; e. g. ὑποκάτω, ὑπεράνω, ἐφάπαξ, ἐπὶ τρίς, etc.

NOTE. Prepositions, which are not unfrequently used in a separate state, and as mere *adverbs*, even in the ancient Greek, are seldom employed in this way in the New Testament. Only one instance occurs, viz. 2 Cor. xi. 23, ὑπὲρ ἐγὼ, *I am more*.

(8.) Prepositions, joined with nouns, frequently constitute an equivalent for an *adverbial* expression.

E. g. δι' ὑπομονῆς, *patiently* ; δι' ἀφροσύνης, *imprudently* ; εἰς τὸ παντελές, *perfectly* ; ἐξ ἀδίκου, *unjustly* ; ἐκ ῥιζῶν, *radically* ; ἐν ἀληθείᾳ, *truly* ; ἐν τάχει, *quickly* ; ἐπ' ἀληθείας, *truly* ; καθ' ὅλου, *entirely* ; κατ' ἐξουσίαν, *powerfully* ; κατὰ τὸ ὀρθόν, *rightfully* ; πρὸς φθόνον, *enviously* ; πρὸς ὀργήν, *wrathfully*, &c.

(9.) Prepositions are often joined to verbs in composition. Of course they may then be considered as *adverbs* ; unless, indeed, they retain their own proper regimen of the case which follows the verb, and so may be considered as still having a kind of *separate* meaning.

NOTE 1. In this latter case, there is a *three fold* construction ; (a) The preposition in composition with the verb, is repeated before the noun ; ἀποχωρεῖτε ἀπ' ἐμοῦ, Matt. vii. 23. Heb. iii. 16, al. saepe. (b) A preposition of similar import with the one before the verb, is put before the noun ; e. g. ἀναβλέψας εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν, Matt. xiv. 19. Mark xv. 46, al. (c) The noun is put simply in the case which the preposition before the verb governs ; e. g. ἐπιπίπτειν αὐτῷ, Mark iii. 10 ; συνεσθίει αὐτοῖς, Luke xv. 2, al. saepe.

NOTE 2. These various usages are not to be regarded as being in all cases entirely equivalent. Nicer shades of meaning are often marked by them ; e. g. verbs with ἀνά in composition take εἰς after them when *up* is meant ; πρὸς, when *to* or *towards* is meant ; ἐπ' when *on* is meant, etc. The designation of these and the like shades, belongs to the lexicon.

(10.) Prepositions in composition always modify the meaning of a verb in some way or other; although we may not, in all cases, be able to express this modification in a translation.

(a) They change the signification of the verb *essentially*; e. g. ἔχειν *to have*, ἐνέχειν *to endure*; αἰτεῖν *to ask*; ἀπαιτεῖν *to deprecate*; καλύπτειν *to conceal*; ἀποκαλύπτειν, *to disclose*, et al. multa. (b) They modify the meaning of the simple verb, so that it specifies some relation or mode which the original verb does not designate; e. g. (1.) Of *time*; as ἔγνω *he knew*, προέγνω *he foreknew*. (2.) Of *space*; as βαίνει *he goes*, ἀναβαίνει *he goes up*; βάλλει *he casts*, καταβάλλει *he casts down*. (3.) They express particular relation to subject or object; as γελᾶν *to laugh*, καταγελᾶν *to laugh at*; κρίνειν *to decide*, κατακρίνειν *to decide against*, (object); θυμέω *to think*, ἐνθυμέω *to revolve in one's mind*, νοεῖν *to perceive*, ἐννοεῖν *to perceive within one's self*, i. e. *to think of, reflect upon*, (subject). (4.) They add intensity, vivacity, efficiency, permanency to verbs; e. g. φιλέω *to love*, καταφιλέω *to hold very dear*; στενάζω *to sigh*, ἀναστενάζω *to sigh deeply*; τηρεῖν *to keep*, διατηρεῖν *to keep continuedly or permanently*; σώζειν *to save*, διασώζειν *to exercise continued protection*; θνήσκειν *to die*, ἀποθνήσκειν *to die off, utterly to perish*; κτείνειν *to kill*, ἀποκτείνειν *to kill off*; φεύγειν *to fly*, ἐκφεύγειν, *to run away*, etc. In all cases there is some modification of the verb, made by the addition of one or more prepositions. The meaning, it is true, often remains *substantially* the same; but not the same as to all its *relations or mo-*

difications. In a word, prepositions express circumstances of time, space, relation, manner, intensity, energy, etc., which are not expressed by the simple verb. Most of our Greek lexicons need a thorough reformation in respect to this nice and delicate, but important point. See the admirable Essay of Tittmann, on *the Force of Greek Prepositions in compound Verbs*, in the BIBLICAL CABINET.

CONJUNCTIONS.

§ 62. NATURE AND VARIOUS USES,

(1.) Conjunctions serve to express the connection of the thoughts of the mind, in all their various modifications.

NOTE 1. The definition of a conjunction is a matter of much more difficulty than the unpractised grammarian would be apt to suspect. Hermann says (de Emendat. Gramm. Graec. p. 164, seq.), that "conjunctions serve to designate the modes of thought;" a definition which seems to need defining. "These *modes* of thought," he proceeds to say, "are three, viz. verity, possibility, necessity." But as adverbs are employed to designate all these, in some respect or other, he endeavours to point out the difference between a conjunction and an adverb. According to him, 'a *conjunction* expresses *the state of the person's mind*, who affirms, or doubts, or declares

a thing to be necessary; while an adverb only qualifies the affirmation, negation, doubtful or positive declaration itself, etc. ;' a distinction tenuous enough, inasmuch as we can usually know a person's mind only by the nature of the declarations which he makes. More to the purpose is what he says on p. 171, viz. that 'proper adverbs will make a *complete* sense when taken alone; e. g. *καλῶς*, εἶ, etc., while conjunctions must have some complement.' But even this does not suffice; for who will not acknowledge, that adverbs resemble *adjectives* more than they do any other part of speech? And do not adjectives need a complement?

NOTE 2. Let the student note well, that *disjunction* as well as *conjunction*, i. e. conjunction or its opposite, comes within the scope of the particles called *conjunctions*. Better had it been, if the name *conjunctives* and *disjunctives* had been given to the two species of particles now ranged under the same general head.

NOTE 3. It is not the simple adding of one word or phrase to another, or the mere separation of one from another, which limits the boundaries of *conjunctives* and *disjunctives*, i. e. of *conjunctions*. All the various kinds of connection in the way of *ratiocination*, *deduction*, *dependent sentences*, etc., are designated by *conjunctions*.

(2.) Conjunctions connect simple thoughts or declarations which are in the like predicament, and are connected together by the mind.

E. g. *God is wise, and loves goodness* ; where two different assertions are in the like predicament ; i. e. both are simple declarations of opinion. The reason why such declarations are *connected*, may lie in the mind of the writer only, or it may appear in the context.

(3.) Conjunctions sometimes connect *antithetic* sentences.

In this case we render *καί* (for example) *but* ; as *ἠυλόσαμεν ὑμῶν, καὶ οὐκ ὤρχήσασθε, we have piped to you, but ye have not danced*, Matt xi. 17 ; vii. 26 ; x. 39 ; xii. 35, al. saepe. Examples like these may be found in ancient Greek writers ; but the frequency of this *antithetic* usage in the New Testament, appears to be derived from the common use of ו in Hebrew in such a sense. Hence Matthew and Peter employ it oftener than Luke, Paul, etc., in this manner ; for the latter had more of a Greek education. *Καί*, simply considered, does not mean *but* ; but the connection in which it stands in some cases, authorizes us to express the sense of a whole sentence by rendering it in this way.

NOTE 1. *Καί* has often the sense of *also, even, and even*, i. e. it is explicative, intensive, etc. See Passow's *Lex. καί*, where the reader will find a striking exhibition of the powers of this particle.

(4.) Co-ordinate phrases or sentences may be joined or disjoined with more than one particle.

E. g. *καί...καί* may be put before the first and the second phrase; and so *τε...καί*, *τε...τε*. The same is true of the disjunctives *ἢ...ἢ*, *οὔτε...οὔτε*, etc.

NOTE 1. To the present hour grammarians and lexicographers are not agreed respecting the comparative limits and use of *τε* and *καί*; see Herm. ad Vig. p. 835. Bernhardt, Synt. p. 482, seq. Nor can this difference be definitely made out in all cases, by any distinctions, however nice. In general, *καί* stands between sentences or words in the same predicament, while *τε* connects something adjectitious to the main idea. Yet this distinction is not always apparent; see Winer, Gramm. p. 369, seq.

(5.) The connection of phrases or sentences with one another is very various, and each has its appropriate conjunctions.

(a) *Antithetic sentences*; between which stand *δέ*, *ἀλλὰ*. *Δέ* (*but*) is disjunctive or antithetic as to sense, but at the same time it marks the connection or consecution of sentences, and so holds a double office. *Ἀλλὰ* is more forcibly antithetic than *δέ*, and has merely an antithetic or disjunctive power, (not a connective one.) Hence *ἀλλὰ* is more generally prefixed to a sentence which breaks off the course of thought, or to a question, or an urgent hortatory sentiment, and often to an apodosis; while *δέ* is often employed merely as a *connective*, in the same way and with the same sense as *καί*.

(b) *Concessive sentences*, where the conjunction

μέντοι or ὅμως is employed. Μέντοι, *yet, however, although, still, then, etc.*, of course concedes what had been said, while it prefaces something in the way of explanation or answer. "Ὅμως, *although, notwithstanding, still, nevertheless*, is a particle plainly of the same nature. "Ὅμως μέντοι (John xii. 42) gives strong intensity to the meaning of ὅμως.

(c) *Conclusive sentences*, i. e. sentences which exhibit the formula of conclusion ; where οὖν, ἄρα, τοίνυν, δὲ, τοιγαροῦν, etc., are employed. Of these οὖν often means simply *then*, etc., as a mere continuative, interchanged with καί and δέ employed in the like sense, both in the New Testament and in the classics. "Ἀρα (in a conclusive sense, *then, therefore*) is of the like meaning with οὖν, but is more commonly employed when a conclusion is drawn from what another person has been saying. "Ἀρα οὖν makes the meaning intense. Τοίνυν, *then, thence, according to that, therefore* ; and τοιγαροῦν, a mere intensive form of τοιγάρ, which differs not in sense from τοίνυν are seldom used in the New Testament.

(d) *Casual sentences* ; in which ὅτι, διότι, γάρ, sometimes ὡς, καθὼς καὶ διότι, are employed. Of these γάρ is by far the most multiplex and difficult in its uses ; which have, at last, become the subject of special notice in the lexicons.

(e) *Conditional sentences* take εἰ, εἴπερ, εἰάν, etc. ; see § 41, 3. c.

(f) *Objective sentences*, take ὅτι, ὡς (that,) ἵνα, ὅπως, etc.

REMARK. The almost boundless exchanges of conjunctions for each other, e. g. ἀλλὰ for γὰρ, εἰ μὴ, etc. etc., which is frequently assumed in many of the commentators and most of the lexicons, is to be carefully avoided. The true solution in most cases of difficulty, is, that the same thought for *substance* may be announced in a variety of ways, or with various shades of relation, conditionality, etc. Winer has done much in his Grammar (pp. 376, seq.) towards correcting this abuse; but the detail of such examples properly belongs to the lexicons.

PARTICLES OF NEGATION.

§ 63. NATURE AND VARIOUS USES.

(1.) The Greek has two classes of negative particles, οὐ, οὔτε, οὐδέ, etc., and μὴ, μήτε, μηδέ, etc.; the former used in positive and direct declarations; the latter in negations that are simply mental or ideal; the former may be called *objective*, the latter *subjective*.

One might almost call μὴ the *conditional* negative, because it stands so frequently in conditional sentences; e. g. John iii. 18, 'He who believeth on him οὐ κρίνεται, ὁ δὲ μὴ πιστεύων ἤδη κέκριται,' where οὐ κρίνεται is absolute, but ὁ δὲ μὴ πιστεύων is a *supposed* state or condition, which applies to any individual whatever who may be an unbeliever, while ὁ οὐ πιστεύων would mean some particular individual unbeliever. In gene-

ral, supposed or conditional cases with a *negative* take *μή*; positive ones that are facts, take *οὐ*.

NOTE 1. *Μή* is most frequently employed, (a) Before the Inf. which depends on a verb; e. g. Matt. ii. 12; v. 34; xxii. 23. Acts iv. 18, al. saepe. (b) Before Participles used in a generic sense, as *ὁ μή ὧν*, *whoever is not*, Matt. xii. 30; xiii. 19. John xv. 2; xii. 48; or when they have a conditional sense, as *καὶ μή εὐρίσκων*, *and in case he finds it not*, Luke xi. 24. Rom. viii. 4. Matt. xxii. 24. 1 Cor. x. 33. John vii. 15. But sometimes *μή* is used in absolute negations, as being occasionally stronger than *οὐ*, 2 Cor. v. 21, where the emphasis lies in this turn of thought: 'Who cannot even be supposed to have sinned.' 3 John ver. 10. Yet see Acts ix. 9, where *μή* is used in the same manner as *οὐ*.

(c) After *ὅς ἂν*, *ὅστις ἂν*, *ὅσος ἂν*, etc., *μή* is used, because these words, from their nature, make a conditional sentence; e. g. *ἤ τις ἂν μή ἀκούσῃ*, Acts iii. 23. Luke ix. 5; viii. 18. Rev. xiii. 15.

(d) Of course after *εἰ*, *εἰάν*, *ἵνα*, *ὅπως*, etc., *μή* is usually employed; as John xv. 24, *εἰ τὰ ἔργα μὴ ποιήσῃς*. Matt. v. 20; xii. 19, al. Where *οὐ* follows *εἰ*, it should sometimes be joined in one idea with the word that follows; e. g. *εἰ οὐ δύναται*, *if it is impossible*, Matt. xxvi. 42. Luke xiv. 26; xvi. 31, al. Yet there are numerous cases where *εἰ* is followed by *οὐ*; e. g. 1 Cor. xi. 6. John x. 37. 1 Cor. xv. 13; ix. 2, al. In fact, *οὐ* after *εἰ* is not unfrequently employed, where direct and positive negation is to be expressed, not only in the New Testament, but in the Greek

classics, especially in the later ones. Yet in all these cases *οὐ* appears to qualify only a *subordinate* part of the sentence, and not the whole of it; which would be qualified or rendered conditional by *μή*.

NOTE 2. Even where the verb in the Imper. is not expressed, but merely implied *μή* is of course employed; as *μη ἀναγαστῶς*, not [i. e. do not feed the flock] *from mere constraint*,... *μηδὲ αἰσχροκερδῶς*, *nor for the sake of despicable gain*, 1 Pet. v. 2. John xiii. 9. Col. iii. 2. James i. 22. Eph. v. 15, al.

(2.) *Repeated* negation in members of a sentence following each other, is made by *οὐδὲ*... *οὐδὲ*, *οὔτε*...*οὔτε*, or by *μηδὲ*...*μηδὲ*, *μήτε*...*μήτε*; but the respective limits of these various expressions seem, as yet, hardly to be settled.

NOTE 1. Thus much, however, seems to be made out, viz. that *οὐδὲ* and *μηδὲ* are disposed of in such a way as accords with the nature of the particle *δέ* contained in them; while *οὔτε* and *μήτε* conform to the use of the particle *τε*. Consequently the latter (*οὔτε* *μήτε*) are disposed of in couplets, etc. (like *τε*...*τε*), so that the use of them in any one case implies a second case of the same word. On the other hand, *οὐδὲ* and *μηδὲ* should follow the simple *οὐ*, *μή*. E. g. *μη*...*μηδὲ*...*μηδὲ*, Matt. x. 9, 10, *οὐ*...*οὐδὲ*. Matt. vi. 26, al. saepe. Let it be noted, that *οὐδὲ*, *μηδὲ* *necessarily* imply a preceding *οὐ*, *μή*, in which they have their support, and that the reading is to be suspected where this is not the case; excepting, however, the

cases, in which οὐδέ or μηδέ may be united in sense to a preceding member of a sentence which is of a *negative* nature.

NOTE 2. Οὔτε...οὔτε must follow each other, and so μήτε...μήτε but not οὔτε...μήτε, nor *vice versa*; i. e. to use these formulas, there must be a repetition of the same word. Where this is not the case, the text is to be suspected. In a few cases οὔτε follows οὐ in a preceding member, when this οὐ has the sense of οὔτε as Rev. ix. 21. John i. 25. So occasionally in the classics, Winer, p. 410.

NOTE 3. Οὐδέ is occasionally followed by οὔτε, Gal. i. 12; and μηδέ by μήτε, Acts xxiii. 8. Whether these readings are correct, seems yet to be questionable.

NOTE 4. In some few cases, moreover, after οὔτε, μήτε, (which naturally demand repetition, see Note 2), instead of a repetition occurs a member of a sentence, with a simple copula (καί), as οὔτε ἀντλημα ἔχεις, καὶ τὸ φρέαρ ἐστὶ βαθύ, *thou hast no bucket, and the well is deep*, John iv. 11. 3 John ver. 10. The same usage is found in the classics.

(3.) A second negative and successive ones are sometimes omitted, and their place supplied by καί, where it is plain that they must be implied.

E. g. μὴ κατακαυχᾷσθαι καὶ ψεύδεσθαι, i. e. μηδὲ ψεύδεσθαι. See in 2 Cor. xii. 21. Matt. xiii. 15. Mark iv. 12. Acts xxviii. 27. Such is likewise the case in the classics.

(4.) The negatives οὐ, μὴ, are often coupled together in sense, (usually in *position*, as οὐ μὴ λαλήσεις, but sometimes separated by one or more words, οὐ...μὴ), in which case the negation is rendered more intense.

NOTE 1. Οὐ often takes other words into composition with it, as οὐδεὶς, οὐδέ, etc.; but the sense of οὐ itself is not changed by such a union.

(5.) Μὴ οὐ has a different sense from οὐ μὴ, inasmuch as it either softens the negation, or else entirely removes its force.

E. g. δεῖδοικα μὴ οὐ θάνω, *I fear that I may not die*; ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἢ διδασκτὸν ἡ ἀρετὴ, *but virtue may be a thing not to be taught*. But where a verb with a negative, or a negative idea, precedes μὴ οὐ, it then takes away all force of negation; e. g. οὐ δύναται μὴ οὐ χαρίσασθαι, lit. *he cannot not give* = he cannot but give, or he must give. Here, and in all the like cases, the first negative takes away the force of the second, and thus makes the proposition in sense *affirmative*; as οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐκ ἐσθίειν, *one must eat*. So Acts iv. 20, οὐ δυνάμεθα...μὴ λαλεῖν, *we must speak*. 1 Cor. xii. 15.

(6.) Two negatives of the *same* kind sometimes make the declaration affirmative; and sometimes strengthen the negation.

E. g. ἐγὼ περὶ σοῦ οὐ λέγω, περὶ ἐμοῦ δὲ οὐ, *I do not speak of thee and not of myself*, i. e. I speak both in

respect to you and myself. So καὶ μὴ θεοὺς τιμῶντες ...ποιεῖδε μηδαμῶς, lit. *do not act as not honouring the gods*, i. e. act like those who honour the gods.

NOTE 1. Such cases depend, of course, on the turn and object of the sentence ; and, in accordance with this remark, oftentimes a repeated negative of the *same* kind makes the affirmation stronger ; e. g. χωρὶς ἐμοῦ οὐ δύνασθε οὐδέν, *without me ye can do nothing at all*, John xv. 5. 2 Cor. xi. 8. 1 Cor. viii. 2. Mark i. 44. Luke iv. 2, al. So in the classics ; Matth. p. 1229.

§ 64. MODES AFTER PARTICLES OF NEGATION.

I. IN ABSOLUTE SENTENCES.

(1.) Μὴ with the Optative when it expresses the sense of *wishing*, as μὴ γένοιτο.

(2.) With the Imper. Present ; also with the Aor. or Present Subjunctive.

E. g. μὴ θησαυρίζετε ὑμῖν μὴ κρίνετε, etc. So μὴ κωλύσης μὴ νομίσητε μὴ ἀγαπῶμεν, etc.

NOTE 1. Where the Indic. Fut. is used in the like sense with the Subj. Aor. οὐ is employed ; e. g. οὐ φονεύσεις οὐ μοιχεύσεις, etc.

II. DEPENDENT SENTENCES.

(3.) Μὴ, μήτε, ἵνα μὴ, etc., are put before the Subj. when it comes after the Pres., or Imperative.

E. g. ὑπωπιάζω...μήπως...γίνωμαι, 1 Cor. ix. 27. Matt. xv. 32. 2 Cor. xii. 6, ἴσθι εὐνοῶν...μήποτε σε παραδῶ, Matt. v. 25; vii. 6. Luke xii. 58.

(4.) Before the Optative when it follows the Praeter.

E. g. Βουλὴ ἐγένετο...μή τις...διαφύγοι.

NOTE 1. But sometimes *μή* stands before the *Indic.*, where the decided persuasion of the writer or speaker is, that a thing is, has been, or will be; especially after such verbs as ὁράω, σκοπῶ, βλέπω, φοβοῦμαι as σκόπει, *μή* τὸ φῶς...σκότος ἐστίν, Luke xi. 35; βλέπετε, *μή* τις ἔσται, Col. ii. 8. Heb. iii. 12. Gal. iv. 11. And thus in the classics. But where the thing is such, that the speaker is uncertain in his own mind, he employs the *Subj.*; e. g. ἐπισκοποῦντες, *μή* τις ῥίξα...ἐνοχλή, Heb. xii. 15. Matt. xxiv. 4. 2 Cor. xi. 3; xii. 20. Luke xxi. 8. Acts xiii. 40, al. Even after the Praeterite, is the *Subj.* with *μή* used in such cases; as εὐλαβηθεῖς...μή διασασθῇ and so in the classics.

(5.) The intensive negation οὐ *μή* is usually connected with the Aor. *Subj.*, or with the Ind. Future.

E. g. Matt. v. 18, οὐ *μή* παρέλθῃ and so in x. 23; xviii. 3, al. saepe. Indeed the *Subj.*, in such cases, is the prevailing usage of the New Testament. But the Fut. Indic. is also employed; as οὐ *μή* ἀπαρνήσομαι, Mark xiv. 31. Matt. xvi. 22. John viii. 12; xiii. 38. Luke xxii. 34, al.

NOTE 1. Οὐ μὴ stands in both independent and dependent sentences ; e. g. in Matt. xxvi. 29. John xi. 56. Rev. xv. 4, al.

INTERROGATIVES.

§ 65. NATURE AND USES OF INTERROGATIVE PARTICLES.

(1.) Interrogation is often to be made in Greek, as in other languages, merely by the tone of voice employed in reading a sentence, when it has no particular interrogative word employed as a sign of it.

E. g. εὕδεις Ἀτρείος υἱέ· *Son of Atreus, dost thou sleep?* Ἐσέλεις ἵναυ, *wilt thou go?* Luke xx. 4. Gal. ix. 10. Rom. ii. 4, al. saepe.

(2.) There is a great variety of particles and pronouns appropriately of an interrogative nature, which are either used emphatically, or are necessary to show the *kind* of question that is asked.

E. g. τίς, τί, πῶς, ποῦ, ἦ, πῆ, ποῖος, πῶθεν, ἄρα, πότερος, εἰ, etc.

NOTE 1. Εἰ is appropriate to *indirect* questions, which are merely related ; *but in the New Testament it is sometimes employed in direct ones* ; e. g. εἰ ὀλίγοι οἱ σωζόμενοι ; *are there few that be saved?* Luke xiii.

25; xxii. 49. Acts i. 6; and often thus in the Septuagint.

NOTE 2. In several cases, *ἢ* (*or*) is used to connect a second question with a preceding one that is expressed or implied, and seems to have a kind of *interrogative* force; e. g. Matt. xx. 15. Luke xiv. 31; xv. 8. Rom. vii. 1; xi. 2, al.

NOTE 3. *ἤρα* is sometimes employed in asking questions; and to these a negative answer is naturally expected; as Luke xviii. 8.

(3.) In questions that comprise a *negative* particle, *οὐ* is usually employed where an *affirmative* answer is expected.

E. g. *οὐ τῷ σῷ ὀνόματι προσητεύσαμεν* *have we not prophesied in thy name?* Matt. vii. 22. James ii. 6. Matt. xiii. 27. Luke xii. 6, al. In a few cases, *οὐ* stands in questions where a *negative* answer might be expected; e. g. Acts xiii. 10. Luke xvii. 18. But these instances are rare, and exceptions to the usual custom.

(4.) In questions that comprise a *negative* particle, *μή* is usually employed where the answer is expected to be in the *negative*.

E. g. *μή λυθόν ἐπιδώσει αὐτῷ* Matt. vii. 9. Rom. xi. 1. Mark iv. 21. Acts x. 47, al. Both *οὐ* and *μή* have their appropriate force, in the same sentence, in Luke vi. 39, 'Can the blind (*μήτις*) lead the blind?' Ans. *No*. 'Will not (*οὐχι*) both fall into the ditch?' Ans. *Yes*.

(5.) Where $\mu\eta\ \acute{o}\nu$ occurs in questions, $\mu\eta$ only is interrogative; the $\acute{o}\nu$ qualifies the verb. Where $\acute{o}\nu\ \mu\eta$ occurs, the negation in the question is merely strengthened.

E. g. $\mu\eta\ \acute{o}\nu\ \eta\kappa\omicron\upsilon\sigma\alpha\nu$ is it that they have not heard? Rom. x. 18. 1 Cor. ix. 4; xi. 22. On the contrary; $\acute{o}\nu\ \mu\eta\ \pi\acute{\iota}\omega\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}$; shall I not drink it? John xviii. 11. Luke xviii. 7, al.

ELLIPSIS.

§ 66. NATURE AND KINDS OF ELLIPSIS.

(1.) Ellipsis consists in the omission of a word, which, although it is not spoken, is necessarily implied in order to make out the sense.

NOTE 1. Ellipsis may respect the *subject*, the *predicate*, or the *copula* of a sentence, according to the usual mode of treating this matter. But as the *predicate* is in its own nature generally an undefined thing, we can hardly suppose (the case of *Aposiopesis* excepted) that a speaker or writer would leave this to be supplied. Properly, then, ellipsis respects the *subject* or the *copula* of a sentence.

NOTE 2. Recent grammarians do not reckon as ellipsis, those cases in which the word to be supplied is already mentioned or suggested in the preceding context; e. g. $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\tau\epsilon\ \Theta\lambda\iota\beta\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\iota\delta\alpha$, $\acute{\upsilon}\pi\epsilon\rho\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \acute{\upsilon}\mu\tilde{\omega}\nu\ \sigma\omega\tau\eta\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$, where $\Theta\lambda\iota\beta\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\iota\delta\alpha$ is mentally repeated before the last

clause, 2 Cor. i. 6. 1 John ii. 19. Mark xiv. 29. 2 Tim. i. 5. 1 Cor. xi. 1. Rom. ix. 32, al. saepe. For shades of difference in the mode of supplying the ellipsis, see 1 Cor. vii. 19. Eph. iv. 29. Mark xv. 8. 2 Cor. iii. 13. John i. 8. Heb. x. 6, 8. Rom. v. 3, 11; viii. 23; ix. 10.

(2.) The copula *εἰμί* (and also *γίγνομαι*) is more usually omitted. It is rarely inserted in simple propositions, except for the sake of emphasis.

E. g. μακάριος ἀνὴρ, ὅς, κ. τ. λ., James i. 12; τί σοι ὄνομα· Mark v. 9. Heb. v. 13. Luke iv. 36, al. saepe. So in the plural (*εἰσίν*), Heb. v. 12; 2d pers. sing. (*εἶ*), Rev. xv. 4; Imper. (*ἔστω*), Rom. xii. 9, al.

NOTE 1. When other verbs besides those which assert *existence*, are to be supplied, the context, in nearly every case, will lead the reader at once to the supply of the proper verb; e. g. Rom. v. 18, where διῆλθε from ver. 12 is to be supplied, of which the εἰς gives notice; comp. εἰς πάντας in ver. 12. Phil. ii. 3, μηδὲν κατὰ, κ. τ. λ., where ποιοῦντες is spontaneously supplied. Gal. v. 13, μόνον μὴ, κ. τ. λ., where κατέχῃτε is implied; and of course the *subject* (as well as the copula) is left out here. But this is spontaneously supplied by the mind, in referring back to the preceding ἐκλήθητε. So Matt. xxvi. 5, μὴ ἐν τῇ ἐορτῇ, sc. μὴ [τοῦτο γενέσθω]. Mark xiv. 2, id. Τοῦτο δὲ, viz. τοῦτο δὲ [λέγω]. comp. Gal. iii. 17. 1 Thess. iv. 15, where the verb is supplied; or the verb φημί may be supplied; as in 1 Cor. vii. 29; xv. 50. In

Matt. v. 38, ὁ φθαλμὸν ἀντὶ ὁφθαλμοῦ, κ. τ. λ., one must look for the verb [δῶσεις] in the original connection, Ex. 21, 24.

(3.) The *subject* of a sentence is omitted, only where from the nature of the case it is spontaneously suggested, or may be easily gathered from the context.

E. g. βροντᾷ, *it thunders*, i. e. ὁ Ζεὺς βροντᾷ· ἀναγνώσεται, *let [the scribe] read*. So in the New Testament; φησί, μαρτυρεῖ, λέγει, etc., in respect to Old Testament quotations; where the meaning is, *The Lord saith*, or *The Scripture saith*.

So where the subject is easily supplied from the context; as συνῆλθον καὶ τῶν μαθητῶν, *there came together* [τινὲς certain] *of the disciples*. So ἡ αὖριον, ἡ σήμερον, ἡ ἑξῆς, where ἡμέρα is readily supplied; εἰς εὐθείαν [ὁδόν], Luke iii. 5. So ἡ δεξιὰ [χεῖρ], ἡ ξηρὰ [γῆ], ψυχρὸν [ὑδωρ], Matt. x. 42; τὸ γλυκὺ [ὑδωρ], James iii. 11; τῇ ἐχομένῃ - τῇ ἐπιούσῃ - [ἡμέρα]· ἐν λευκοῖς [ἡματίοις], John xx. 22. John v. 2, προβατικὴ [πύλη], etc. etc.

NOTE 1. Sometimes the case absolute is used in an impersonal way, when ἀνδρώπων or τινῶν may be understood; e. g. Luke viii. 20, ἀπηγγέλη αὐτῷ, λεγόντων, *it was told him*, [some], *saying*, ὅτι κ. τ. λ.

(4.) Although the *predicate* cannot be wholly omitted by ellipsis, yet parts of it may be, when those parts are obviously suggested by the context.

E. g. *δαρήσεται πολλὰς*, *he shall suffer many* [*πληγὰς stripes*], Luke xii. 47. 2 Cor. xi. 24. But all such cases we may call *breviloquence*, rather than ellipsis.

NOTE 1. Before *μὴ* or *μήπως*, used in the way of breviloquence, *ὀρᾶτε* or *δέδοικα* (*I fear*) may be supplied by the mind; often so in the classics. E. g. If God spared not the natural branches, *μήπως οὐδὲ σὺ φείσεται*, [*I fear*] *he will not spare thee*, Rom. xi. 21.

REMARK. The unbounded license of the older grammarians, in extending ellipsis to all parts of the Greek Testament, such as is developed in Bos's book on ellipsis, and other works of the like kind,¹ is now, by general agreement among grammarians, quite abjured. Adjectives and participles which stand in the place of nouns, are now regarded as nouns, without the feeling that any ellipsis exists. Such modes of expression are considered merely as *breviloquence*. So the neuters of adjectives and participles are taken as nouns, when they are employed as such. So in respect to the use of the *cases*; they are now regarded as expressing relations of themselves, and not needing prepositions to govern them; for these only render their meaning more explicit. So in respect to cases governed by verbs; the old theory was, e. g. that *εἶναι τινος* required to be considered by the mind, as being equivalent to *εἶναι υἱός τινος*; but now the Gen. itself is regarded as indicating

¹ Of this book and of Weiske on Pleonasms, Hermann says: *Singulari profecto casu accidit, ut L. Bosii liber de Ellipsi maximam partem sit pleonasmus*; Weiskii *de Pleonasmis, elipsis*.

the same relation as *ὡς* in such a case would express. So too in Ἰωσήφ τοῦ Ἑλλ or Μαὰθ Ματθαίου, Luke iii. 26,) *ὡς* need not be regarded as necessary, because the Gen. of itself indicates *origin*. In a multitude of the like cases, we may consider the modes of expression simply as being *breviloquent*, not as elliptical. All languages employ a multitude of breviloquent expressions; which, in general, are by reason of usage or by the aid of context, as intelligible as the more ample expressions.

Specially were the older grammarians prone, almost every where, to introduce prepositions before the Gen. and Dat. cases which follow verbs; e. g. *ἀντί* after verbs of buying and selling; *ἀπό* after those of feeling, restraining, etc.; *διὰ* before the Gen. of time; *εἰς* before the Inf. of object or design; *ἐκ* after verbs of abounding; *ἐν* before the Dat. of time, place, instrument, etc.; *παρά* after verbs of hearing; *ἐνεκα* after verbs of displeasure, anger, or before the Inf. with τοῦ *ἐπὶ* after verbs of ruling, etc., *κατά* before the Acc. of manner, in respect to, etc.; *περί* after verbs of remembering, forgetting, etc.; in all which cases the most enlightened grammarians of the present day speak no longer of *ellipsis*.

So also in respect to *Conjunctions*; before ἢ (*rather than*) they supplied μᾶλλον and so ἵνα before the Subjunctive, in cases like τί θέλετε ποιήσω ὑμῖν which are more easily solved by simple interpunction, e. g. τί, θέλετε, ποιήσω ὑμῖν *what (according to your wish) shall I do for you?* etc. etc.

One need not deny, that in many cases the sense would, in some respects, be more explicit, had the

writer supplied such words as those that have been mentioned. But if *breviloquence* is to be excluded from language, the great and effectual means of vivacity and energy of style would be taken away.

APOSIOPESIS.

§ 67. NATURE AND USE OF IT.

(1.) Aposiopesis (*ἀποσιώπησις*) consists in the suppression of a part of a sentence, on account of the feelings of the writer, or for the sake of brevity, energy, etc.

E. g. in Luke xix. 42; xiii. 9. Acts xxiii. 9. So after *εἰ δὲ μὴ*, *εἰ δὲ μὴ γὰρ*, a part of a sentence, or even a whole one, is often omitted; e. g. vi. 1; ix. 17. Mark ii. 21, 22. Luke x. 6; xiii. 9. Rev. ii. 5, al.

BREVILOQUENCE.

§ 68. NATURE AND USE.

(1.) In a multitude of cases, the repetition of a word or words obviously suggested by the context is omitted. Formerly this was put to the account of *ellipsis*; it is now reckoned as *breviloquence*.

NOTE 1. The exact metes and bounds of ellipsis and breviloquence can hardly be defined. They run

into each other in a certain class of cases. In general, however, the omission of words, where the supply of them is most plain and obvious, and there can be no room for mistake by an intelligent reader, is called *breviloquence*.

E. g. οὐ σὺ τὴν ῥίζαν βαστάζεις, ἀλλὰ ἡ ῥίζα σὲ, i. e. ἡ ῥίζα [βαστάζει] σὲ, Rom. xi. 18; καὶ τίς ἐστι...ἵνα πιστεύσω εἰς αὐτόν John ix. 36; xv. 25; xiii. 18. Mark xiv. 49. Phil. iii. 13, 14, ἐγὼ ἑμαυτὸν οὐ λογιζομαι, ἵν δὲ κ. τ. λ, i. e. ἵν δὲ [λογίζομαι] Luke xxiii. 5.

NOTE 2. Under the head of *breviloquence* or *brachylogy* (βραχυλογία) may be classed the so called *constructio praeagnans*; e. g. σώσει εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν, *he will save [and bring me] into his kingdom*, 2 Tim. iv. 18. Acts xxiii. 11, 24. 1 Pet. iii. 20. 2 Tim. ii. 26. Luke iv. 38. Gal. v. 4. 2 Cor. x. 5. Mark vii. 4.

ZEUGMA.

§ 69. NATURE AND USE.

(1.) Where a verb is connected with two nouns, and has such a sense that it does not fit them both, but we must supply another verb in order to make an appropriate sense, this is called *Zeugma*.

E. g. ἀνέψχθη δὲ τὸ στόμα αὐτοῦ...καὶ ἡ γλῶσσα αὐτοῦ, i. e. ἡ γλῶσσα αὐτοῦ [ἐλύθη], Luke i. 64; γάλα ὑμᾶς ἐπότισα, οὐ βρῶμα, *I have given you milk to drink, and [have fed you] not with meat*, 1 Cor. iii. 2. 1 Tim. iv. 3. This is frequent in the classics.

PLEONASM.

§ 70. NATURE AND USE.

(1.) Pleonasm means the addition of one or more words in order to designate what is already designated by other words.

(2.) Of this there exists a considerable number of examples in the New Testament.

E. g. ἀπὸ μακροῦθεν, ἀπὸ ἄνωθεν, ἔπειτα μετὰ τοῦτο, πάλιν δεύτερον, πάλιν ἐκ δευτέρου, προδραμῶν ἔμπροσθεν, ἐκβάλλειν ἔξω, πάλιν ἀνακάμπτειν, πάλιν ἀνακαινίζειν, ὁπίσω ἀκολουθεῖν, ὡς Γόμοῦρρα ὠμοιῶθημεν, τὰ ὁμοιῶματα ... ὅμοια, etc. most of which occur also in the classics. So οὐκ after ἀρνούμενος, μὴ after ἀντιλέγω. So ἐκτὸς εἰ μὴ instead of εἰ μὴ· πρὸ προσώπου (יְנִיבִי) for πρὸ, etc.

(3.) Different from pleonasm, properly so named, is particularity and circumstantiality in designation.

E. g. γράψαντες διὰ χειρὸς· κατήγγειλε διὰ στόματος· ἐπάρας τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς εἰδέασατο ἀνοίξας τὸ στόμα αὐτοῦ εἶπε· καὶ ἐγένετο (וַיִּבֹּרֶךְ) ὅτε συνετέλεσεν, etc. A great variety of such expressions occurs in the New Testament; most of which, however, add more or less of colouring to the picture.

(4.) Repetition of the same words is not *pleonasm*, but designed for the sake of energy in expression, or to shew deep feeling.

E. g. κύριε, κύριε! Ἀλλὰ ἀπειλούςασθε, ἀλλὰ ἡγιασθήτε, ἀλλ' ἐδικαιώθητε. 1 Cor. vi. 11. Col. i. 28. John i. 11; xix. 10. Mark xii. 30.

NOTE 1. The like is the effect of synonymes; e. g. ἄνδρες, Γαλιλαῖοι, like the classic ἄνδρες, Ἀθηναῖοι, etc.

NOTE 2. A similar effect is produced by repeating a sentiment both in the affirmative and negative form; e. g. ὠμολόγησε, καὶ οὐκ ἡνέκατο, John i. 20; i. 3. Eph. v. 15. 1 John ii. 27. Acts xviii. 9.

REMARK. The verbs ἄρχομαι, δοκέω, θέλω, τολμάω, ἐπιχειρέω, καλέομαι, and εὐρίσκω, which even later commentators and recent lexicographers sometimes represent as *pleonastic*, all give some *colouring* to the mode of representation, and are not to be ranked under pleonasms.

In like manner the ὡς with participles has often been considered as *pleonastic*; which is beyond all question a mistake; see § 52, 10.

ASYNDETON.

§ 71. NATURE AND USE.

(1.) The Greeks named any phrase or sentence *ἀσύνδετον*, where the conjunction καὶ (τε) is omitted, when it would be *grammatically* appropriate.

NOTE 1. This figure is altogether of a *rhetorical* nature, and not grammatical. As, however, it occasions a departure from the common method of constructing a sentence, it is proper here to notice it.

(2.) Of *asyndeton* several classes may be made;
(a) Cases of enumeration, division, and recounting of parts.

E. g. ἐλθάσθησαν, ἐπρίσθησαν, ἐπειράσθησαν, κ. τ. λ., Heb. xi. 37; πρόσεχε τῇ ἀναγνώσει, τῇ παρακλήσει, τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ, 1 Tim. iv. 13; and so Rom. ii. 19, 20; i. 29, seq. Mark xvi. 17. 1 Cor. iii. 12; xiii. 4—8. 1 Thess. v. 14. James v. 6, al. saepe.

(b.) Cases of antithesis, which are made stronger by the omission of *connectives*.

E. g. σπείρεται ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ, ἐγείρεται ἐν δόξῃ· σπείρεται ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ, ἐγείρεται ἐν δυνάμει· σπείρεται σῶμα ψυχικόν, ἐγείρεται σῶμα πνευματικόν, 1 Cor. xv. 43, 44. James i. 19. Eph. ii. 8. Mark ii. 27. 1 Cor. iii. 2; vii. 12. John ii. 10; iv. 22. 2 Tim. iv. 2. And thus where two distinct parallels are expressed; as Καί-σαρα ἐπικέκλησαι, ἐπὶ Καίσαρα πορεύσῃ, Acts xxv. 22.

(c) Cases where a clause merely *epexegetical* is added.

E. g. ἐν ᾧ ἔχομεν ἀπολύτρωσιν, τὴν ἄφεσιν τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν, Col. i. 14. 2 Cor. vii. 6. 2 Pet. ii. 18.

(d) Cases where the reason or ground of any thing is suggested.

E. g. μὴ σφραγίσῃς τοὺς λόγους τῆς προφητείας τοῦ βιβλίου τούτου ὁ καιρὸς ἐγγύς ἐστιν, Rev. xxii. 10. John xix. 12. 1 Cor. vii. 15. Rev. xvi. 6.

REMARK. In most of these and the like cases, the *conjunctive* particles are inadmissible; although in cases

such as *b* they are sometimes inserted. For the most part they would greatly weaken the force and vivacity of the expression.—All these phenomena are found in the classics.

PARENTHESIS.

§ 72. NATURE AND USE.

(1.) Parenthesis means a word or phrase inserted in the midst of a sentence, which is thus interrupted or suspended; after which the sentence is resumed and completed.

NOTE 1. All clauses with *relatives*, added for the sake of explanation, etc., might come under this definition, taken in an *enlarged* sense. But these are *not* here meant; although many editors of the New Testament, and critics, have not unfrequently treated them as parentheses.

NOTE 2. The same might be said of clauses in *apposition*; which, however, accurate philologists do not now reckon among parentheses.

(2.) Real parenthesis is either, (*a*) Where the words of one individual are recited, and those of another are inserted in the midst of them.

E. g. ‘That ye may know that the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins (τότε λέγει τῷ παραλυτικῷ) Ἐγὼ θείς ἄρθρον, κ. τ. λ., Matt. ix. 6;

ῥαββί, (ὃ λέγεται ἐρμηνευόμενον, διδάσκαλε), τοῦ μένεις· John i. 39; iv. 9; ix. 7. Mark iii. 30; vii. 26; xv. 42. Matt. i. 22, 23. Luke xxiii. 51. John i. 14; vi. 23; xi. 2; xix. 23, 31, al. saepe. In respect to *time*; Luke ix. 28.

(b) Where the sentence is suspended for the introduction of matter not directly necessary to its full enunciation.

E. g. Rom. iv. 11, εἰς τὸ λογισθῆναι...δικαιοσύνην, interrupts the course of thought; and so, more or less, in Rom. vii. 1. 1 Cor. vii. 11. 2 Cor. viii. 3; xi. 21, 23; xii. 2. Col. iv. 10. Heb. x. 7, al. saepe, especially in the writings of Paul.

REMARKS. Of course the limits of parenthesis will often be defined by the subjective views of the reader, as to meaning and connection. Hence the great variety in regard to the usage of these grammatical signs; so that scarcely any two editors or interpreters agree in all cases. It is oftentimes, however, not very material, in regard to the sense of the author, whether parenthesis be inserted or omitted; for whether the sign of parenthesis is inserted or omitted, cannot materially vary the sense. Hence the subject cannot be of *essential* consequence; but still it is connected with *perspicuity* of representation.

ANACOLUTHON.

§ 73. NATURE AND FREQUENCY.

(1.) By *anacoluthon* (ἀνακόλουθον) is meant, a sentence which, being interrupted by some in-

serted circumstance, is resumed not with a regularly continued construction, but with one differing from that with which it was begun.

NOTE 1. In writings full of thought and argument, where the author is more intent on his matter than on his manner, *anacoluthon* most frequently occurs. Paul exhibits it most frequently of all the New Testament writers, in his epistles, although it occurs elsewhere.

E. g. Mark ix. 20, *καὶ ἰδὼν [ὁ παῖς] αὐτὸν, εὐθέως τὸ πνεῦμα ἐσπάραξεν*, where the regularly continued construction would be: *εὐθέως ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος ἐσπαράσσειτο* (passive.) Acts xxiii. 30, *μηνυθείσης δὲ μοι ἐπιβουλῆς [τῆς] εἰς τὸν ἄνδρα μέλλειν ἑστῆσαι*, which would regularly be, *μελλούσης ἑστῆσαι*.

Sometimes the construction begun and intermitted, is entirely dropped, and another one commenced *de novo*; as John vi. 22—24, *ὁ ὄχλος...ἰδὼν...(v. 24), ὅτε οὖν εἶδον*, after a long parenthesis of two verses. Gal. ii. 6, *ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν δοκούντων εἰναί τι...ἔμοι γὰρ οἱ δοκοῦντες οὐδὲν προσανέθετο*, where the first construction required the sentence to be completed with a *passive* verb, but the construction is changed and an *active* verb is therefore employed. Rom. ii. 17—21, where the sentence is begun with *εἰ δὲ σὺ, κ. τ. λ.*, and then resumed in ver. 21, by *ὁ οὖν διδάσκων* without the *εἰ*. *Anacolutha* may be found in Rom. v. 12, seq.; ix. 23, 24. 2 Pet. ii. 4, seq. 1 John i. 1, seq. Acts x. 36, al

(2.) *Anacolutha* are frequent, when the con-

struction is continued by means of a *participle*, which often appears in a case different from that which would naturally be expected.

E. g. παρακαλῶ ὑμᾶς...ἀνεχόμενοι...σπουδάζοντες, Eph. iv. 1, 2, both participles in the Nom. plural, instead of being (as we should naturally expect) in the Acc. as agreeing with ὑμᾶς. Col. iii. 16, ἰνοικίτω ἐν ὑμῶν...ἀδάσκοντες καὶ νοθευοῦντες, Participles in the Nom. instead of the Dat. plural. So 2 Cor. ix. 10, 11. Acts xv. 22. Col. ii. 2. And so, not unfrequently, in the classics. By recommencing (as it were) a sentence with the Nom. of the Part., the meaning of it is made more emphatic and conspicuous.

(3.) Another species of *anacoluthon* is when, after the sentence is begun with a participle, the construction passes over into a *finite verb*, where we should naturally expect the participial construction to be continued.

E. g. Col. i. 26, τὸ μυστήριον τὸ ἀποκεκρυμμένον...νυνὶ δὲ ἐφανερώθη, instead of νυνὶ δὲ φανερωθῆν. Eph. i. 20, ἐγγείρας αὐτὸν...καὶ ἐκάθισεν. 2 John, ver. 2 Heb. viii. 10.

(4.) Sometimes the Nom. or Acc. at the head of a sentence, has a verb after it which is not congruous with it.

E. g. ταῦτα ἃ θεωρεῖτε, ἐλεύσονται ἡμέραι, ἐν αἷς οὐκ ἀφελήσεται λῆθος ἐπὶ λῆθι. Here I should construe thus: 'In regard to these things which ye see, etc.' See also 2 Cor. xii. 17. Rom. viii. 3.

(5.) It is a kind of anacoluthon, when *μὲν* is employed without a corresponding *δὲ*.

In most cases where this is done, there is an ellipsis or aposiopesis as to the *apodosis* in which *δὲ* would stand. The lexicons (under *μὲν δὲ*) will give a considerable number of examples, and the requisite explanations. There can hardly be a doubt that *μὲν* *always* requires a *δὲ* either expressed or implied; but a considerable number of cases exist, where no *δὲ* is expressed. Like to this is the case of *γὰρ*, which always implies a relation to some preceding thought, and a *sequency* after such thought; but oftentimes the particular thought to which *γὰρ* is consequent, is not expressed but only implied. It should be noted, however, in regard to *μὲν*, that *δὲ* only is not always required in the *apodosis*; for (in the Greek classics) *ἐπειτα, καὶ, τὲ ἀλλὰ, αὐτὰρ, μέντοι, μὴν, εἴτα*, (see Passow on *δὲ*), sometimes take the *apodotic* place of *δὲ* and often the *apodosis* is altogether omitted, in which case the sentence is a real *anacoluthon*. Winer, § 64, II. 2. e.

VARIED CONSTRUCTION (*Oratio Variata*.)

§ 74. NATURE, EXTENT, AND OBJECT.

(1.) By *Oratio Variata* is meant a departure from a construction already exhibited by one member of a sentence, in another and corresponding member that might take the same construction as the first.

(2.) This happens often, even among the best writers; and, in general, the object of it is, to attain more perspicuity or emphasis by the new construction, than would be effected by retaining the one already exhibited.

E. g. Rom. xii. 1, 2, παρακαλῶ ὑμᾶς...παραστήσαι καὶ μὴ συσχηματίζεισθαι...μεταμορφοῦσθαι, where the two latter verbs stand in the Imper. instead of being put in the Inf. with παραστήσαι, as they might have been, and as they regularly would be. But the *varied construction*, by adopting the Imper., throws more emphasis into the sentence. So Mark xii. 38, τῶν θεολόντων ἐν σχολαῖς περιπατεῖν, καὶ ἀσπασμούς ἐν ταῖς ἀγοραῖς, where the same construction would have required ἀσπάζεσθαι instead of ἀσπασμούς. Phil. ii. 22, ὅτι, ὡς πατρὶ τέκνον, σὺν ἡμοὶ ἐδούλευσεν εἰς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, where sameness of construction would have demanded ἡμοὶ only, instead of σὺν ἡμοί. So Eph. v. 27. Col. i. 6. John v. 44. Eph. v. 33. 1 Cor. xiv. 5. 2 Cor. vi. 9. Phil. i. 23, seq. Rom. xii. 14, seq. Such constructions are frequent in the classics. Winer, p. 450.

NOTE 1. In Rev. xiv. 14; vii. 9, εἶδον καὶ ἰδοὺ take both Nom. and Acc. after them, *i. e.* the Nom. in respect to ἰδοὺ, and the Acc. in respect to εἶδον.

(2.) A species of *varied construction* is frequent in the New Testament, which consists in a change from the *direct* to the *oblique* method of

style (*oratio directa et obliqua*), in the same sentence.

E. g. Luke v. 14, ‘He commanded him *μηδεν εἰπεῖν* (Inf.), ἀλλὰ ἀπελθὼν δεῖξον,’ &c. &c. λ., where it is changed to a *direct* style, and the Imper. of direct address is used. Acts xxiii. 22, ‘He dismissed the young man, commanding him to tell no one *ὅτι ταῦτα ἐνεφάνισας πρὸς με*, where the last clause according to the *indirect* style of the first part of the sentence, would be *πρὸς αὐτόν*. See Mark xi. 32.

(3.) Another species of *oratio variata*, is the transition from the singular to the plural, and *vice versâ*.

E. g. Rom. xii. 16, 20. 1 Cor. iv. 6, seq. Gal. iv. 7 ; vi. 1. Luke v. 4, seq.

REMARK. All these kinds of varied construction are found in the Greek classics. In this respect the New Testament has nothing very peculiar ; except that the Apocalypse abounds, most of all, in style of this kind.

POSITION OF WORDS AND SENTENCES.

§ 75. NATURE AND DESIGN.

(1.) The Greek, by the aid of its various endings of cases, etc., may depart from the most easy and natural arrangement of words without

any special prejudice to perspicuity. The variety, in this respect, depends very much on the mode of thinking peculiar to the several writers.

NOTE 1. The most natural order is to arrange the adjective near to its noun ; the adverb to its verb or adjective ; the Gen. to the noun, etc., which governs it ; prepositions to the nouns which they govern ; antithetic words opposite to each other, etc. But departure from this, for the sake of emphasis, rhetorical effect, euphony, and other reasons, is frequent in all good writers.

NOTE 2. It is natural that the historical style should adopt the obvious order of words most frequently ; and that the animated, argumentative, oratorical, and poetical, on the other hand, should most frequently depart from it. Paul uses more freedom, in this respect, than any of the writers of the New Testament.

(2.) Position often has speciality of meaning attached to it.

E. g. The adjective is designed to be emphatic, when it is placed before a noun, and does not stand included between an article and its noun ; so φόβος μέγας, ἔργον ἀγαθόν, etc., would be the usual order of the Greek, but μέγας φόβος, ἀγαθόν ἔργον would render the adjective emphatic. To this remark, however, an exception must be made of such adjectives as ἄλλος, εἷς, ἴδιος, and some others of the like tenor. But οὗτος ἁνθρώπος is plainly different in the shade of

meaning from *ἀνδραποῦς οὗτος*, the first being equivalent, or nearly so, to *this is the man*, the second to *this man*.

NOTE 1. This whole subject, rich in information as to the characteristics of respective writers, has, as yet, been but very imperfectly investigated and explained.

TRAJECTION OF WORDS.

§ 76. NATURE AND DESIGN.

(1.) Adverbs, other particles, and sometimes other words, are, for the sake of euphony, or other reasons, separated from the words to which they are most nearly related

E. g. Rom. v. 6, *ἐν Χριστῷ ὄντων ἡμῶν ἀποθνήσκων*, where *ἐν* belongs to *ὄντων*. 1 Cor. xiv. 7, *ὁμῶς τὰ ἄψυχα φωνὴν διδόντα*, when *ὁμῶς* naturally would come before *φωνήν*. Gal. iii. 15, *ὁμῶς ἀνθρώπου κεκυρωμένην διαθήκην οὐδεὶς ἀθετεῖ*, where *ὁμῶς* belongs to *οὐδεὶς*, κ. τ. λ. See John xii. 1; xi. 18; xxi. 8.

NOTE 1. Trajection of a *negative* particle is not unfrequent, even in the Greek classics. In Acts vii. 48, *οὐκ* is separated by several words from *κατοικεῖ* which it qualifies; so *μή* in Heb. xi. 3, from *γεγονέναι*.

POSITION OF CERTAIN PARTICLES.

§ 77. VARIOUS USAGES IN RESPECT TO THESE.

(1.) *Μέν οὖν, γὰρ, γέ, (μενοῦνγε,)* cannot *begin* a sentence. *Δέ* and *γὰρ* may have the second,

third, or even fourth place, according to the nature of the sentence in which they stand. "Αἶψα (in the classics) cannot begin a clause; in the New Testament, however, it not unfrequently does this.

E. g. ἄρᾳ in Gal. ii. 17, 21; v. 11, al.; and so ἄρ' οὖν, Rom. v. 18; vii. 3. Eph. ii. 19, al. Likewise μενοῦνγε in Luke xi. 28; ix. 20; x. 18, al.

PARONOMASIA.

§ 78. NATURE AND USE.

(1.) In general this consists of words being ranged together of similar sound, but differing in sense. It is a favourite figure of rhetoric in the best writers of the Old Testament, e. g. Isaiah, and is not unfrequent in the New Testament.

E. g. λιμοὶ καὶ λοιμοὶ, Luke xxi. 11; ζῶν καὶ πνοήν, Acts xvii. 25; ἔμαθεν ἀφ' ὧν ἔπαθε, Heb. v. 8; θρόνου, φόνου...ἀσυνέτους, ἀσυνδέτους, Rom. i. 29, 31; πνευματικοῖς πνευματικῶν, 1 Cor. ii. 13; αὐτοὶ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἑαυτούς, 2 Cor. x. 12; πείθισθαι...ἡ πεισμονή, Gal. v. 7, 8, which last word seems to have been coined for the sake of the paronomasia.

NOTE 1. Not unlike to this, but approaching nearer to what we sometimes call *playing upon words*

are the examples in various places ; e. g. παρακοή and ὑπακοή in Rom. v. 19 ; κατατομή and περιτομή, Phil. iii. 2, 3 ; ἀπορούμενοι and ἑξαπορούμενοι, 2 Cor. iv. 8 ; ἐργαζομένους and περιεργαζομένους, 2 Thess. iii. 11 ; ἐκδύσασθαι and ἐπεινδύσασθαι, 2 Cor. v. 4 ; γινώσκεις ὁ ἀναγινώσκεις ; Acts viii. 30. Comp. Gal. iv. 17. 1 Cor. iii. 17 ; vi. 2 ; xi. 29, 31. 2 Cor. v. 21 ; x. 3.

NOTE 2. All these usages abound even in the best Greek classics ; see Elsner, Diss. II. *Paulus et Jesias inter se comparati*, p. 24. (1821. 4.) See also Winer, p. 431. But let the student beware how he makes the mere ὁμοιοτέλειον of the Greek verbs into paronomasia, e. g. such endings as are in ἐλ-δάσθησαν, ἐπρίσθησαν, etc.

APPENDIX.

HINTS AND CAUTIONS RESPECTING THE GREEK ARTICLE.

IT may not be amiss, very briefly to suggest the reasons why I have given the title above to the following remarks. I call them *Hints*, because it is not my present purpose to write a grammatical essay *in extenso* on the subject of the Greek article, in which I might endeavour to exhibit all its various phases and uses; nor is it my design here to exhibit, in a formal way, even an abridged account of these, which might hold a place in an ordinary grammar. Preparation to write a work of such a nature *in extenso*, after the labours of Kluit, Matthiae, Middleton, and others, must cost the labour of many years, in case the design should be (as it ought to be) to add something to the stock of knowledge already accumulated. Such labour my duties will not allow me to perform; and perhaps we shall see some reason to doubt, in the sequel, whether the subject itself is of sufficient importance to justify the laying out of such expensive effort upon it. But still, it is my intention to discuss, on the present occasion, some of the leading doctrines of the Greek article; and this discussion must

necessarily take a grammatical hue, because it cannot be conducted in any other manner, so as to be solid and satisfactory.

I have added the word *Cautions* to the title of this essay, because of my sincere and full persuasion that the doctrine of the Greek article, has very often been made too much of; for the presence or absence of this little word, has been made the turning point in some of the most important appeals that can be made to evidence, in the science of theology or philology. For example; Origen asserts, and after him a multitude of others have asserted, that in *καὶ Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος*, John i. 1, *Θεὸς* cannot designate the great and supreme God, because the article is wanting, which (in case it designated God supreme) must be supplied. So again in Tit. ii. 13, the phrase *ἐπιφάνεια τῆς δόξης τοῦ μεγάλου Θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, has occasioned great and long protracted controversy, by giving rise to the question, whether the omission of the article before *σωτῆρος* necessarily unites it to *Θεοῦ*, and makes both to relate to one and the same person; or whether the language, as it now stands, is grammatically capable of being understood in such a way as to make a distinction between *Θεὸς* and *σωτῆρ*, the former being applied to God the Father, and the latter to Christ his Son. These are only a specimen of the questions that the Greek article has occasioned. Years of laborious effort have been devoted to some of these questions; and, after all, without satisfactorily accomplishing the desired end. Much of this labour has, in certain points of view, been lost to the world; because a little more accurate knowledge of the true nature of

the Greek article would have effectually shewn, that in whatever way the investigation might terminate, the labour would in some respects be in vain ; since the presence or absence of the article would, after all, decide nothing in a satisfactory way, so long as the usages of the Greek language would, in most cases, permit either, without any essential variations of the meaning. A true knowledge of this subject, I doubt not, would contribute greatly to narrow the bounds of controversy as it respects the declarations of the New Testament in several respects. Critics also, as well as theologians, would have less controversy than they have had, about many a various reading which has respect to the insertion or omission of the article. Those who reject with disdain this or that reading, because the article is present or absent, as the case may be, might, in many instances perhaps, find that their disdain was more the progeny of unacquaintance with the nicer shades of Greek grammar, or at least the laws of syntax, than of critical skill ; yea, that in many a case, they were making much ado about—nothing.

I do not expect that the reader will believe all this on the ground of my assertion ; nor do I wish that he should. If he does not see reason enough, in the sequel, for such remarks as I have made, then let him cancel them, if not from this book, at least from his mind. I ask for no credit upon trust. I have been obliged, in stating my reasons for the title given to this essay, in some measure to anticipate what I deem to be the result of its contents ; and when the reader shall have gone through with these contents, I ask

him then to turn back, and read the preceding remarks again, and inquire whether I have presumed more than I have proved.

It is one of the most singular phenomena that I know of in regard to language, that the Greek article has not yet received, as it would seem, a definition which is satisfactory to the great body of grammarians and critics. Nouns, adjectives, verbs, participles, and particles, can be defined, and often have been, so that the great majority of those who speculate in these matters acquiesce in the definition. The verb and participle might, perhaps, be made an exception to this remark in certain particulars. Still, there is no controversy whether a verb is a noun, or an adjective, or other part of speech ; and so in regard to the participle. But in respect to the article, there is still a contest concerning what it is, or at least what it originally *was* and still substantially is, although it may be employed with more latitude by the later than by the earlier Greek authors.

I cannot do requisite justice to my subject, without entering into this part of it with some degree of particularity. In the way of illustrating what I have just said, let me produce some of the definitions which have been given by some of the most celebrated grammarians and critics.

Aristotle, whom we might presume to be master of his own language, says: "Ἀρθρον δὲ ἐστὶ φωνὴ ἄσημος, ἢ λόγου ἀρχὴν ἢ τέλος ἢ διορισμὸν δηλοῦν ὧν τὸ φημὶ καὶ τὸ περι, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, i. e. the article is a sound without a signification, which marks the beginning or end of a sentence, or distinguishes, as when we say *the* [word]

φημι, the [word] τις, etc." Middleton remarks on this, that "he despairs of discovering in it any thing to his purpose;" and well he might say so, inasmuch as his purpose was, to shew that the article is in all cases essentially a *relative* pronoun, which it would be difficult enough to find in the definition of Aristotle. He conjectures, however, that as the article is usually prefixed to the *subject* of a sentence, i. e. to the nominative case, this may tally with the first part of the definition, which refers, as is generally supposed, to the *prepositive* article; and the *subjunctive* article, ὅς, ἥ, ὃ, which is essentially a relative pronoun, is commonly used only when it is preceded by some phrase or declaration to which it refers, and therefore may be said to "mark the end of such declaration." But the misfortune is, the prepositive articles are often found in the *predicates* of propositions, as well as in the subjects, and that the subjunctive article is far from being always placed so as of itself to mark the end of a clause or sentence to which it relates.

But what shall we make of Aristotle's φωνὴ ἄσημος, *a sound without a meaning*? Are there any such words in any language? I am not aware of any. I know, indeed, that careless writers or speakers may employ many words that are superfluous and useless, so far as it respects the proper designation of what they mean. But this does not prove that there are any words which have of themselves no meaning; it proves only that the ignorant and the unskilful may abuse language.

One may here say, perhaps, that we must understand Aristotle as averring, that the article does not

of itself designate any object, quality, attribute, action, etc. like the noun and adjective ; nor, like the verb or participle, assert of these things any action or existence. But here again, where we seem to have obtained some light as to his meaning, we are met with the question : Which of all these does the *preposition* indicate ? And is this a part of speech without a meaning ?

Does he design, then, to convey the idea, that the article, in and by itself alone, has no significancy, but is dependent on its noun, etc. expressed or understood, for any and all of its significancy ? Be it so ; but how in this respect does it differ from the true and proper adjective, or the preposition, which in and by themselves alone have no proper significancy, being dependent parts of speech that show quality and relation only where the subject is expressed or understood to which they relate ? If it be said, that the adjective often goes over into the noun, and so may have a significancy by itself ; the answer is, that then as a *noun*, and not as a proper adjective, it has such an independent significancy. Besides, it is true of the article also, that it often goes over into the demonstrative, and sometimes into the relative pronoun, and has the same significancy with these words. And even the preposition in some cases is used in like manner, as where the Greeks say, *ἀνα* for *ἀνάσκηδι*, *πάρα* for *πάρειμι*, *ἐπὶ* for *ἐπισσι*, *ἐν* for *ἐνισσι*, *ὑπο* for *ὑπισσι*, etc.

Still, my apprehension is that Aristotle did design, by his *φωνῇ ἄσημος* to mark the usual fact, that the article in and of itself has no proper significancy like to

that of nouns and verbs. But when we rigidly examine this definition, we find it to be defective; for, in the first place, the peculiarity here noted applies to some other parts of speech; and secondly, it is true, after all, of the article, that it does usually *specificate* the meaning of the words to which it is attached, or at least give them a meaning which may be called in some respects emphatic.

With Middleton we may say, however, that we despair of obtaining from the mighty master of logic and grammar, any just and adequate view of the nature of the article, by the definition which he has given.

The celebrated grammarian, Apollonius Dyscolus, who flourished about A. D. 150, although he has said much of the article, has left us no express definition of it, by which we can learn his views exactly. He asserts, indeed, that articles and pronouns are different things, and yet, that if the article loses its noun, it then becomes a pronoun. Middleton avers, in respect to him, that "he has many facts, for the most part corroborating the theory which he [Middleton] suspects to be the true one." This may be so; but the inquiry of most importance is, whether the Greek language itself corroborates this theory.

Let us hear another celebrated Greek grammarian, who lived in the fifteenth century. I refer to Theodore Gaza, whose grammatical work was the source and exemplar of almost all the earlier Greek grammars in western Europe. "The article," says he, "is a declinable part of speech prefixed to nouns. It is, indeed, divided into the prepositive and subjunc-

tive ; but properly the prepositive only is the article." He then adds, (what is the essence of his definition,) *ποιεῖ δ' ἀναπόλησιν προσηγορωσμένου τοῦ ἐν τῇ συντάξει*, i. e. "it serves to recal that which had previously been known (or mentioned) in the discourse."

Here, indeed, we have one important remark, viz. that the *prepositive* article is the only real and true article. Why the so called *subjunctive* article should ever have been named otherwise than *pronoun*, it seems difficult to imagine. But we are not brought much in advance upon our way, by the rest of Gaza's remarks. It is a very limited part of the article's office, to refer merely to what has been suggested or recognized in previous discourse. Even if the old rule of definition here—a *potiori nomen fit*—were applied, we should hardly be able to defend the definition of Gaza. Moreover, the relative and the demonstrative pronouns also serve to recal that which was mentioned or recognized in the preceding context ; and how does the definition of Gaza serve to distinguish the article from them ?

Mr. Harris, who in his *Hermes* has written so many curious and in several respects interesting things concerning the philosophy of language, speaks of the article as being *nearly allied* to the pronoun, and remarks that they may be best distinguished by the circumstance, that "the genuine pronoun always stands by itself, while the genuine article requires a noun for its support."

Lord Monbodo, who has speculated much and often to very good purpose on language, and who was

uncommonly well versed in the writings of the Greek philosophers and metaphysicians, remarks, that "the article is of as subtle speculation as perhaps any thing belonging to the language; particularly as it is used in Greek." In this he was beyond all doubt correct. He then goes on to show, that "its office is different from that of a pronoun of any kind, and that it deserves to be ranked by itself among the parts of speech." But after all, when he comes specifically to define it, he makes it "the prefix to a noun, denoting simply that the noun to which it is prefixed, is the same with that which was before mentioned, or is otherwise well known." But these uses of the article are far from being the only ones which it subserves. The definition, therefore, is incomplete. Middleton objects to this definition, however, that "it makes the article *a distinct part of speech*; and that if it be thus distinct, it is not conceivable that it should become a pronoun when (as Apollonius affirms) its substantive is dropped; inasmuch as one distinct part of speech cannot go over into another." But the correctness of this last remark will hardly be conceded. Does not an adjective often go over into a noun? Do not the primitive *prepositions*, when they are joined in composition with a verb, become adverbs? Do not forms of the infinitive mode very often become mere *nomina actionis*—simple nouns? What then is the difficulty in the case before us? Why cannot the article, in certain cases, go over into a *kindred* class of words (to say the least), i. e. into a pronoun, although it be of itself a distinct part of speech?

From this brief review of the former ancient and modern definitions of the article, let us come to those of some of our cotemporaries, who are, or have been great masters in criticism, lexicography, or grammar. Dr. Middleton, to whom I have already more than once referred, published, some twenty years since, a treatise on the Greek article, which he entitled : *The Doctrine of the Greek Article, applied to the criticism and illustration of the New Testament*. In this he says, (p. 4 of the New York edit.) “ The Greek pre-positive article is the *pronoun relative* *ὁ*, so employed that its relation is supposed to be more or less obscure ; which relation, therefore, is explained in some adjunct annexed to the article by the participle of existence expressed or understood.” His meaning is, for example, that *ὁ φιλόσοφος* is in all cases equivalent to *ὁ ὧν φιλόσοφος* in which case *ὁ* is the subject of an assumed proposition, *ὧν* the copula, and *φιλόσοφος* the predicate. According to him, then, the article stands in all cases, in connection with its noun, in a proposition which differs from one that has a verb, only as an *assumptive* proposition differs from one that *asserts*, i. e. as *ὁ ὧν φιλόσοφος* differs from *ὁ ἐστὶ φιλόσοφος*.

To explain and defend this definition, he occupies twenty pages of his Essay. I have read this part of his work many times heretofore, and recently with all the attention that I could summon, and yet I feel compelled to say, that Aristotle's definition, which has been cited above, and with which Middleton finds much fault, is at least as intelligible to me as that of his corrector.

What is a part of speech “ so employed, that its

relation is supposed to be more or less obscure?" Men employ language in order to clear away obscurity; and they always complain of an unskilful or ill use of it, when it is so employed as to be obscure. The author, however, to do him justice here, means to say, that the *relative* pronoun *ὁ* is so employed as to be *anticipative*, (which is sometimes the case with pronouns really relative,) and that the noun anticipated, i. e. the noun to which the article has reference, is to be fully known only by the mention of it in the sequel. For example; *ὁ ἡς ὅς* (for so, if Middleton be correct, we must translate it, when rigid exactness is applied to it,) stands with an uncertain meaning or reference, until *ἀνθρώπος, φιλόσοφος*, or some other noun is supplied. In this way a kind of *relative* meaning is made out for the article, and on this ground the author in question calls it a *relative pronoun*; contrary to the great mass of critics, ancient and modern, who, when they admit its *pro-nominal* quality, always make it, in the main, a *demonstrative* pronoun. Matthiae (Gramm. § 292) does, indeed, admit that the article is used for the *relative* pronoun; but he limits this to the Doric and Ionic dialects, and to the tragic poets only among the Attics. It should be noted, however, that this *relative* use which he thus admits, constitutes but a small part of the instances in which the article is employed.

In fact, if we are to name the article a pronoun in all cases, we must evidently divide the generic denomination into several species, viz. into the *demonstrative*, the most frequent of all in ancient times; the *relative*, which is less common, and somewhat pe-

culiar to certain dialects; and what I would beg leave to name, the *anticipative*. The two former cases need no illustration; the latter may be easily explained. When I say ὁ φιλόσοφος περιπατεῖ, without having made any previous discourse on this subject, the ὁ in this case is *anticipative* of some noun that is to follow. In one sense, if it be a pronoun at all, we may call it a *relative* pronoun; for it has a relation to a noun which is to follow. But, for the same reason, we might call an adjective a relative part of speech, or a preposition, or an adverb; for none of these are employed but in relation and subserviency to other words. Still, to confound an *anticipative* relation, one which in its own nature is so and always must be, with the idea of *relative* pronoun in the usual grammatical sense of this term, does not seem to be throwing any light upon our subject. In common grammatical parlance a relative pronoun always implies an *antecedent*, either expressed or understood. I admit that sentences are sometimes so constructed in poetry, and occasionally in prose, as that the relative pronoun holds a place actually before its antecedent. But it is, if I may be allowed the expression, only a physical place which it thus occupies. In the order of logic, of grammar, of sense, the antecedent of course must precede the relative pronoun. That there are innumerable cases of the article, in which it is not relative in any other than the general sense above explained, and not in the technical one, need not be proved to any one who reads the Greek language. Indeed Middleton himself admits, and even labours

to prove, that the reference of the article is *always* anticipative (p. 19.) Yet in this position, the whole matter can hardly be placed. When the article is actually used as a relative pronoun, (and cases of this nature are not unfrequent, Matth. Gramm. § 292,) we may consider it as *retrospective* in the same sense as the relative pronoun is, for it is in reality a mere relative pronoun in this case. In all cases where it is so used, we may indeed repeat the noun to which it relates; but then, this is never done by good writers, except for the sake of avoiding ambiguity in some peculiar cases.

To call the article a *relative* pronoun, then, and yet to make it always *anticipative*, seems to be nothing more than to change the usual meaning of words, without gaining any serious advantage.

We must delay one moment on another part of Middleton's definition. He says that "the relation of the pronoun [article] is more or less obscure." I admit, indeed, that when the article is altogether anticipative, as when it stands at the beginning of a new discourse, chapter, or paragraph, if the speaker or writer should stop with his *ὁ*, and suspend further declaration, no one else would be able to tell what noun should be supplied in order to make out the sequel. In such cases, I admit also, there would be more or less obscurity. But in the very numerous cases like the following, viz. *ἡ πίστις ὑμῶν ἡ πρὸς τὸν Θεόν*, what obscurity is there in the reference or relation of the second *ἡ*? Certainly none at all. It is just as certain that this belongs to *πίστις* implied, as it is that the first *ἡ* belongs to *πίστις* expressed. So in *ταῖς*

φυλαῖς ταῖς ἐν τῇ διασπορᾷ, in τῆς διακονίας τῆς εἰς ἀγίους, in τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς τοῖς ἐξ Ἰδυνῶν, and a multitude of the like cases. If it should be said that the article is here, in the second instance where it occurs, a relative pronoun; this will make nothing in the way of vindicating Middleton's assertion. He contends for its *relative* nature always and everywhere. But how, in such cases as the above, *the more or less obscure* is to be made out, I am not aware. Never were any cases of relation more plain, definite, and certain, than those of the repeated article above.

Pass we, now, to some other definitions. Let us examine the brief one exhibited by Passow in his masterly lexicon of the Greek language. "The article," says he, "represents its noun as a definite object, which is not blended with other individuals of the same kind, but is made prominent merely as an independent particular thing." This definition, of course, he intends for the article when conjoined with a noun, as its prepositive.

It may be said, now, in relation to this account of the article, that it does not reach the whole extent of the case. The prepositive article surely is not limited to those cases only where individuals belonging to a species are specified. On the other hand, innumerable cases occur, where it is prefixed to a noun which designates a whole *genus*; e. g. οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οἱ ἄστροι, οἱ λύκοι, etc. So almost all abstract nouns take the article, as it would seem, for the very reason that they are generic; e. g. ἡ ἀρετὴ, ἡ φιλοσοφία, ἡ ἀδικία, ἡ δικαιοσύνη, etc. Then, again, the article is very often used in the case of *renewed* mention of a thing, where

in the first instance, the same thing was mentioned without the article, and where the noun itself is no more specific in its actual meaning in the one case than in the other. Whatever ground there is of its being specific, the basis of this lies in the fact, that in the second case there is a reference to its having been once named; and the article in this case has principally a *demonstrative* rather than a *specificating* power. For example; Matt. i. 20, ἄγγελος κυρίου (without the article,) *AN angel of the Lord*, but in ver. 24, ὁ ἄγγελος κυρίου, *THE angel of the Lord*, viz. the angel, or that angel before mentioned.

Passow, therefore, has given us only a partial account of the Greek article, in his definition of it; and this may be said with equal truth respecting the exhibition of its uses in his lexicon, although this exhibition is distinguished in several respects for its acuteness.

Bretschneider, in his lexicon of the New Testament, has given for substance the same definition, although in fewer words. "Articulus...ubique ponitur, ubi aliquid vel definite cogitatur vel enuntiatur, vel suâ naturâ jam definita est." But is not Σωκράτης a definite subject? Are not Θεός, κύριος, Χριστός, κακία, ἀδικία, δικαιοσύνη, definite subjects; definite in their own nature, and definitely conceived of? And yet these and a host of other like words often appear without the article. What becomes then of the "*ubique ponitur*" of the author? Not to mention that the definition of the use of the article is quite too narrow for its limits.

The definition of that great master in the science of philosophical grammar, Philip Buttmann, is almost exactly the same as that of Bretschneider, and was probably the one which this latter author had in his eye, when he penned his remarks upon δ , η , $\tau\delta$, in his lexicon. It runs thus : " The prepositive article is annexed...to every object which is to be represented as *definite*, either by means of the language itself, or from the circumstances." To remark on this, would be only to repeat what has just been said.

Come we then to Matthiæ, the δ $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega$ of all *The-saurus-makers* in Greek Syntax. It is seldom, indeed, that he will be found tripping in these matters, to which he has devoted a most laborious life. " The article," says he (§ 264,) serves to show, that the noun with which it is connected, designates a definite object among several of the same kind, or a whole species." This last clause is an important and essential addition to the definition of Passow and others. But there seems to be still a deficiency in the definition ; for what is the meaning of *definite* ? Does he mean that the object must of course be *monadic* ? Certainly not ; as the sequel of his remarks abundantly shews. He afterwards tells us, that when a person or thing is defined by attributes, qualities, circumstances, office, station, etc. the article may be employed in naming those things which serve as an *appellative* to distinguish them ; e. g. δ $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omega\upsilon\tau$, δ $\gamma\epsilon\gamma\alpha\iota\delta\epsilon\varsigma$, δ $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$, $\alpha\iota$ $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\iota$, δ $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\alpha\varsigma$, δ $\nu\iota\chi\tilde{\omega}\nu$, etc. It would be difficult, perhaps, to introduce all these qualifying particulars into a definition ; but they might at least be adverted

to, so that the reader would be put on his guard against excluding them.

It might also be asked : Do not the thousands of cases in which adjectives and participles (when not used as nouns) take the article, deserve consideration in a definition of this part of speech ? In what sense is a *definite individual* or a *genus* marked, when the article is thus employed ? That there is *specification* of some sort, in such cases, I do not call in question ; my only difficulty is, whether the definition before us comprises it.

Frederic Rost, who has made a very useful summary of Greek grammar, and especially of its syntax, has not given a formal definition of the article in any one passage ; but he has given an account of its usages in such a way, that we may easily gather his definition from it. According to him, " it marks a particular individual belonging to a species ; or it designates a genus, when it is regarded as a simple totality (without reference to individual parts), or when it is viewed in the light of antithesis to its opposites ; and finally, whatever word designates special condition, attributes, circumstances, or relations, may take the article. Of the first part of the definition, no example is needed. Of the second we may give *οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οἱ ἄστροι*, etc. for the first particular ; for the second particular, we may take *ὁ πόλεμος οὐκ ἄνευ κινδύνων, ἢ δὲ εἰρήνῃ ἀκίνδυνος*, i. e. " war is not without perils, but peace is not perilous." Now, if the first part of this sentence were to be asserted, without subjoining or meaning to subjoin the second or antithetic part, the form of it would be *anarthrous*, i. e. without

the article ; as πόλεμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ κινδύνων. The article then has in some cases, yea, in many, an *emphatic* and *antithetic* power and design.

As to the last part of the definition, it may be easily illustrated. Examples may be found every where, such as ὁ γέγων, ὁ σοφός, ὁ τεθνηκώς, ὁ πλούσιος, ὁ τλήμων, etc. In a word, any designation which marks peculiar condition, circumstances, relations, qualities, actions, etc. may take the article, and thus be rendered in a certain sense emphatic, or specially worthy of notice.

We seem to be making some progress by the definitions of the two last named writers. Perhaps it would be difficult to produce a definition, to which one might not make as many objections as he could raise against that of Rost. I am well aware how much easier it is to pull down than to build up, in matters like that before us. If the reader should insist upon it now, that, after criticising so much on the definition of some of the great masters of Greek literature, I am myself under obligation to offer a definition which would exclude the faults on which I have animadverted, he would summon me to a task which I fear would not be satisfactorily performed. I have no pretence to hope that I should succeed, where those who are so greatly my superiors have failed. My full persuasion is, that more time and study are requisite in order to do justice to this subject, than either myself or others have yet bestowed upon it. That "truth is the daughter of time," seems to be applicable to this matter, as well as to some other matters of greater importance.

It seems to have been the conviction of Scaliger, that little of *terra firma* could be won, by efforts upon the Greek article. At least, when he called it *loquacissimae gentis flabellum*, we may suppose him to have been in an attitude of mind not unlike to the one attributed to him. This is, to be sure, a summary process with the whole matter; but not one which is adapted to give much light, or excite to much inquiry.

If I were to describe the office of the Greek article in the most generic terms that are admissible, I should say, perhaps, that "it is a declinable part of speech, intended to serve the purposes of *specification*, either on account of *individuality*, or of *quality*, *condition*, or *circumstances*." Adverbs, adjectives, and participles (used as adjectives,) may *qualify*; but they can hardly be said to *specify*. Pronouns, personal and demonstrative, may specify *individuality*, but they are not used for other specifications in the same manner as the article. It is true, that the article often serves a purpose like that which they subserve; and then, when the article and pronoun are both used, they render still more specific and emphatic the word with which they are united. For example; ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ is more intensive than ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ. But there are innumerable cases where no pronoun could serve the same purposes of specification as the article. In respect to οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οἱ ἄνδρες, etc. it is plain that the sense would be entirely changed by writing οὗτοι ἄνθρωποι, οὗτοι ἄνδρες, or ἐκεῖνοι ἄνθρωποι, ἐκεῖνοι ἄνδρες, etc. In the last case there would be inevitably a reference to ἄνθρωποι or ἄνδρες, express or

implied, which had already been brought to view. But when the article only is employed before these nouns, this is not necessary. It may indeed be employed in case of the *repeated* mention of a thing; but it may also be employed where a genus or an individual is specified, to which no reference has yet been made; and employed for the purpose of distinguishing an individual or a species in some respect or other, either on account of individuality, or of relation, attribute, circumstances, etc. It answers, therefore, many a purpose which demonstrative pronouns do not; and consequently is not to be confounded with them, although, since it often approaches so very near to the same use with theirs, it not unfrequently is said to put on their nature.

The *proper* article always serves the purpose of *specification* in some respect or other. When we say ἡ πόλις, it refers either to the metropolis of the country, or to some neighbouring city to which the mind of speaker or hearer is most naturally turned, or else to some city that has already been adverted to in previous discourse. In the last case, there is a near approach to the ancient *demonstrative* use of the article, of which so much is said by many of the recent grammarians and critics. The difference, in such a case, between *THE city I mentioned* and *THAT city I mentioned*, either in Greek or English, would be little or nothing, excepting in the mere form of expression. And so, in all the cases where an individual belonging to a class is distinguished by the article, it is of course *specification*.

It is equally so when a *generic* noun has the arti-

cle; e. g. *οἱ ἄνθρωποι*, *οἱ ἄνθρωποι*, etc. Here *οἱ ἄνθρωποι* is not distinguished from other *ἄνθρωποι*; for such there are not, the designation *ἄνθρωποι* itself comprising the whole of these animals. But yet there is specification in this case, as plainly as in the other; for *οἱ ἄνθρωποι*, generically considered, is a totality that is monadic or one, and as such it is distinguished from other classes of birds or any other animals. As a *genus* it is just as distinct among other *genera*, as *ἡ πόλις*, designating an individual city, is distinct from other *πόλεις*. It is the logical conception, then, i. e. the idea of generic totality or unity, which the article marks, whenever it is prefixed to nouns in the plural that have a generic signification. Such a genus, taking into view the manner in which the mind conceives of it, is just as much *specific* as a single individual is. The same law, therefore, in regard to the use of the article, evidently applies to each. And from this it results, that generic nouns may be *anarthrous*, whenever the idea of specifying is not in the mind of the speaker or writer; and this, whether they be in the singular or plural. For example; in *πόλεμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ κινδύνων*, the word *πόλεμος* is intended to mean, not war specifically, or in distinction from something else, but war of any kind, or at any time, i. e. any war whatever. But in the phrase, *ὁ πόλεμος οὐκ ἄνευ κινδύνων, ἢ δὲ εἰρήνῃ ἀκίνδυνος*, *war* is specifically conceived of in distinction from *peace*, and therefore the article becomes necessary in order to specificate. Thus also in the plural, *οὗτος κακοποιεῖ ἄνθρώπους*, *this man abuses mankind*, i. e. any man or all men with whom he is concerned or, (in other words) he is a habitual abuser

of his fellow-men. But οὗτος κακοποιεῖ τοὺς ἀνδρά-
 πους would mean, that *this one abuses the man or the
 men*, who had already been mentioned or referred to,
 or who for some reason were already marked out or
 specified in the speaker's mind.

In the same way may we explain the use of the article
 in such cases as ὁ γέρον, ὁ ἄριστος, ὁ τλήμων, etc. Here
 the individual who is distinguished by such an appel-
 lative, is conceived of by the mind as distinguished by
 the attribute or quality to which these names (and
 others like them) refer. He is therefore specified
 by the article. It is not individuality merely, as con-
 stituted by being *one* among a class of the like beings,
 which the article is employed to mark. Any attribute,
 quality, office, condition, relation, or circumstance,
 may also be marked by the use of the article, when-
 ever either of these is designated by an appellative
 significant of it.

On the like ground we may account for the usage
 of the article in other cases. When employed before
 a neuter adjective which becomes an *abstract* noun,
 as τὸ καλόν, τὸ κακόν etc. it is in reality used with a
 generic noun having the sense of *totality*, and there-
 fore (when thus considered) of unity; and moreover,
 in all such cases there is a particular *specifying*
 power in the article, inasmuch as it serves to dis-
 tinguish the quality or attribute to which it is affixed,
 from other qualities and attributes which exist at the
 same time. The plurals of such adjective nouns are
 subject to the same laws as the plurals already noticed
 above.

The same thing may be said, also, in relation to

the article as used before a noun with the pronominal adjectives οὗτος, ἐκεῖνος, σός, ἐμός, etc., all of which, from their very nature, make the noun with which they are united to be specific. For example; ὁ ἐμός υἱός would mean simply *my* [only] *son*, or a *son of mine* who had already been the subject of preceding thought or discourse; while ἐμός υἱός would mean simply a *son* (i. e. any son) *of mine*. In like manner πᾶς and πάντες admit the article when they mean generic totality, or when the noun with which they are connected has been previously mentioned; but they reject it when they mean only *every one* in the sense of *any one, whoever, etc.*

It is common, moreover, for adverbs to become adjectives or nouns, by prefixing the article. There is nothing strange in this. We have already seen that *appellatives* very often take the article, and usually do so when they are designed to attribute any quality, condition, etc. in a special manner to any person or persons. Now, adverbs partake altogether of the nature of adjectives, as they always designate some quality, circumstance, relation, etc. When employed, therefore, by a license of language derived from common parlance, for nouns or adjectives, they become appellatives or attributives, and of course follow the same laws as these words do, in regard to the article; e. g. οἱ πάλαι *the ancients*, τὰ ἄνω *the upper regions*, ἡ αὔριον *the morrow*, etc.

The article is also put before the Infinitive mode, when this is employed (which often happens) as an indeclinable noun, or a *nomen actionis vel passionis*. But the principle in this case of employing the article,

does not seem to differ from its common usages. The *nomen actionis* from its very nature is abstract and generic; and whenever the *genus* of action designated by it is intended to be marked in distinction from other classes of actions, or in such a way as to make it emphatic, then the article may of course be regularly employed.

Finally, the article is employed by the Greeks, when they cite a word, or a sentence, or a clause of a discourse, or use a word simply as such, without any reference to its signification. For example; τὸ Ἑλλάς, *the word Hellas*; τὸ α, *the letter Alpha*; "Then, said I, one thing yet remains, τὸ, ἢν πείσωμεν ὑμᾶς, ὡς χρὴ ἡμᾶς, ἀφείναι, [which is] *this*, [viz.] *if we can persuade you that it is expedient to dismiss us*;" "What else means this saying τὸ, οὐκ ἔχω ὃ τι χρὴ σέωμαι τοῖς λόγοις, [viz. the saying] *that οὐκ ἔχω κ. τ. λ.*" In these cases the *demonstrative* nature of the article is apparent; and, of course, its specificating power is quite plain. We might solve these and all other like cases, by the supposition that the article is used *elliptically*, i. e. that some noun to which it belongs, and which is naturally supplied by the mind, is implied. The like happens in cases almost without number; e. g. ὁ Φιλίππου *the [son] of Philip* πορεύεσθαι εἰς τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου *to go into the [country] of Alexander*. Very often such nouns as παῖς, υἱός, θυγάτηρ, χώρα, οἰκία, ὁδός, ἡμέρα, χρόνος, ἔργον, πρᾶγμα, etc. are omitted, while the article supplies their place. Or we may solve them, by taking the whole clause that follows τὸ as constituting what is equivalent to a noun. But in all these cases, the nature of the article itself appears

to be the same, and the use of it to be subjected to its ordinary laws.

In illustrating my views of the nature of the Greek article, I have, almost unconsciously, gone over nearly the whole extent of its usage. I advance these views, however, without any overweening confidence in them. I know too well, from past experience and from the example of others, on what slippery ground I am treading; and that while I may seem to have made out some plausible theory to my own satisfaction, a disinterested and acute observer may find cases which will at least seem to contradict the principles that I have assayed to explain and defend. Be it so. I shall still have the consolation, if my effort should call forth any sound criticism on the subject that will abide the test of thorough examination, of having contributed, even by my errors, to the advancement of knowledge in respect to the Greek idiom. I can only say, that no one would more sincerely rejoice than myself, in such an effort on the part of any one who does not accord with my views.

Before I quit, however, the general subject respecting the nature of the Greek article, I must add a few considerations which seem to be of importance.

In all the languages of which I have any knowledge, the parts of speech are essentially the same, the article only excepted. Their use, moreover, is substantially the same. In all languages we find nouns, verbs, adjectives, participles, adverbs, prepositions, conjunctions, and interjections. The form and derivation of some of these parts of speech, are indeed somewhat diverse. In some languages a lati-

tude, for example, is given to adverbs, which is not found in others. But I do not see how a language can exist, unless it has in substance, if not in form, all the parts of speech just named. By usage then, at least, they are *essential* parts of speech.

Not so, however, with the article. In Latin there is no such part of speech. In Syriac and Chaldee it can hardly be said to exist. Yet the Hebrew, the Greek, the English, German, French, Italian, etc. make it a kind of indispensable constituent. There is something singular in this phenomenon, and it deserves our attentive consideration.

It is clear, from the examples of the Latin, Syriac, and Chaldee, that the article is not an *essential* part of speech. The demonstrative pronouns in these languages, do indeed serve to supply to a certain extent the deficiency of the article. *Ille, iste, hic*, etc. in Latin, will of course cover that part of the ground belonging to the Greek article, which is occupied by its *demonstrative* power. But *aquilae illae* would answer but poorly to *οἱ ἀετοί*, when used merely as descriptive of the *genus* of the bird in question. The eloquence of Cicero, and all his power over language, could not enable him to translate *adequately* and *fully*, into his own mother tongue, the simple words *οἱ ἀετοί*.

Another circumstance, moreover, deserves especial consideration. This is, that no two languages which do employ the article, are throughout like to each other in their mode of employing it. The Greek introduces it in many cases where the English does not. The same is the case with the French and German. No

two are bound by the same rules. Indeed there is so much that is idiomatic in each language, in respect to the use of the article, that an Englishman or American will find himself, in endeavouring to write or speak any of these foreign languages, as often in fault with regard to the article as in respect to any other circumstance whatever.

All the preceding considerations taken together serve to shew, that the article is not an essential part of language; nor, in cases where it is employed, is it always subjected to the same uses, or at least it is not in all cases deemed to be of the same, or even of any, importance. The Greeks used it often where we do not; yea, where the idiom of our language absolutely forbids it.

Further light may be cast on this part of our subject, which is very important to our purpose, by considerations drawn from the early usage of Greek authors. The assertions of ancient and modern critics in regard to its use in Homer, are well known. So long ago as the time of Aristarchus, it was believed that the article of Homer is always a *demonstrative* pronoun; for that critic asserts this (Matth. Gramm. § 264, 5.) Wolf, Koeppen, Heyne, Buttman, Rost, Passow, and many others, assert the same thing. Heyne indeed goes so far that when he finds cases in Homer that will not bend to this theory, he calls in question the genuineness of the reading, or rejects the verses which exhibit them as spurious. Wolf, however, after making the like assertions in his *Prolegomena to Homer*, revokes his decision in a note to Reitz *de Prosodia* (p. 74); where he says: "Pin-

guius quaedam scripsi de Homérico usu articuli, etc." Middleton (c. ii. § 1), and Matthiæ (Gramm. § 264, 4, 5) have assailed the opinion of Aristarchus and the late critics; and, as I must believe, with most convincing evidence on their side. The poet says, Il. α. 11, Οὐνεκα τὸν Χρύσην ἠτίμησ' ἀζητήσα, where Heyne, Buttmann, and others translate τὸν Χρύσην by *THAT Chryses*. But, as Matthiæ very justly observes, on this ground the poet must be supposed to appeal expressly to something as well known, independently of his poem; which is as little congruous with the manner of his poem, as with historical narration. So again, Il. φ', 317, τὰ τεύχεα καλὰ, Odys. γ', 10, τὸν ξέον δούσηνον, Odys. ι', 378, ὁ μοχλὸς ἐλάϊνος, *THAT beautiful armour*, *THAT unhappy foreigner*, would give, says Matthiæ, a streak of modern sentimentalism to the passages; and *THAT olive-wood* would designate a particularity which would be altogether incongruous, since every one knows what *wood* is meant.

The numerous examples he produces of the ordinary usage of the article in the Iliad and Odyssey, in § 264, 4 of his Grammar, it would seem, must put this long agitated question to rest, if rest could ever be given to critics on the father of epic poetry. Still it is not so. Passow explains them all away thus: τὸν ἀριστον him—the bravest, τὸν δούσηνον him—the unfortunate, οἱ ἄλλοι they—the others, etc. In like manner do Buttmann, Rost, Heyne, and others, explain the same phenomena. But what is plainer than that, on the very same ground, one may eject the article from Plato, Xenophon, or any other Greek author, always making it a pronoun personal, relative, or de-

monstrative, and its noun a mere epexegetis, put in apposition with it? Is this *arguing* philologically? Or is it forcing our way through, in spite of all obstacles, in order to support a theory.

One thing is conceded on all hands, viz. that poetry employs the article much less frequently than prose; that the oldest poetry employs it least of all; and that poets not Attic, seem to have omitted or inserted it almost at pleasure. Buttman (§ 124, Note 4) asserts, that the use of it among them was altogether a matter depending on their own choice.

How can all this be true, if the article is an *essential* part of speech? I am aware, indeed, that poetry takes great liberties; in particular that poetry which depends for its rhythm on the quantity of syllables. But are none of the liberties of poetry allowed to prose? Does not that part of prose which approaches near to the language of conversation, take the same liberties which abound in the latter? We may very reasonably believe this; and we may also believe, that among other liberties taken by speakers and writers, that in respect to the article, which is so common in poetry, may also have been taken in prose, especially in such pieces as exhibit conversation-style.

The insertion or omission, then, of a part of speech *not* absolutely essential, cannot be expected to be fixed by the same certain laws which govern the use of the essential parts of speech. If poetry could omit or insert the article at pleasure, and yet sacrifice nothing of importance in regard to its perspicuity and propriety of language, we may well expect to find something of this in prosaic usage. The sequel will

show that such an expectation is not without some solid ground to rest upon.

I beg the reader's indulgence, while I make one more remark, which may serve to cast some light on the facts which will be presented in the sequel. This is, that the *definiteness* or *distinction* of an object cannot be rationally supposed to be always dependent merely upon the real definiteness or distinction of that object in itself considered, either in regard to its individuality, or in respect to its attributes, relations, or circumstances. If the writer or speaker merely imagined or supposed it to be definite, or distinct, or intended to represent it as distinct, he would of course speak in the same manner as though it were really so. What he supposes, imagines, or intends, is reality to him. His *subjective* views are to him as *objective* ones. Hence it is not enough, in any particular case, for us, in order to exclude or introduce the article in any text of a writer, to show merely what was reality in regard to the distinctness or the specificness of any object named by a noun, but we must be able also to perceive the state of the writer's mind, and to tell what views he had of the distinctness of the object in question, before we can venture to say, with any good degree of certainty, whether he inserted or omitted the article. A due regard to this matter would probably compose not a few disputes of critics, about the insertion or rejection of the article in many a passage of Greek authors.

We shall see, moreover, that in a multitude of cases the *essential* meaning of a passage is not at all affected by the presence or absence of the article. So

it is in our own language. When I say : ' Sight is more perfect than any of the senses,' does this differ *essentially* from the assertion : ' The sight is more perfect than any of the senses?' Certainly not. Still there is a slight difference between the two cases. *The sight* is more specific, and therefore more emphatic (in one sense of this word,) than *sight*. The two assertions differ a little in the *costume*, while, if I may be allowed the expression, the *person* is the very same. And why may it not be so in Greek? It is undoubtedly so; at least if the reader doubts it, I hope to overcome his doubts before I finish the present discussion.

The way is now prepared to commence the execution of the main purpose of this essay. I am in the sequel to shew, that the article, as we might expect from the general survey which we have taken of its nature, is very often inserted or omitted *pro lubitu scriptoris*; at least, that so far as we can discern, the use of it is much more extensively left to the judgment, feelings, taste, or peculiarity of writers, than has been generally supposed or admitted. If this can be shown, the important bearing that it will have upon criticism in respect to the text of Greek books, and also in respect to doctrinal controversies about the meaning of particular passages, must be very evident.

It would carry me quite beyond the bounds of such an essay as the present, to notice in succession all the instances in Greek, where the article, when apparently in the same circumstances, is sometimes inserted and sometimes omitted. Enough, if I bring

to view all the great and important principles that respect the usage of this little word, and summarily glance at the rest.

I must make one other remark. The reader is not to suppose, where I produce but few examples, that only a few can be found. I purposely limit myself in most cases to a few clear and plain examples, in order that I may not tire his patience. When I deem it important, I shall point out the books, where he may find examples in greater abundance. As my object is not a *controversial* view of the article, I purposely refrain from frequent reference to those books (such as that of Middleton and others), that treat of the article, and lay down rules, often without any exception or modification, which are here called in question or contradicted. My object is rather to inquire what is true, than to show that others are in the wrong.

1. One of the first and plainest rules respecting the article is, that it is prefixed to names of *monadic* objects, *i. e.* objects that exist singly and of which there is but one, or at least only one that, from the nature of the case, would probably be thought of.

Examples may be found on almost every page of Greek, in the New Testament and elsewhere; *ὁ ἦλος, ἡ γῆ, ἡ δικαιοσύνη, τὸ ἀγαθόν*, etc. To establish the principle, that the article may be inserted in such cases, needs not any effort. Even the most common observer of Greek idiom must perceive it.

Yet wide as this principle reaches, and extensive as is its sway, directly the opposite principle reaches almost equally wide, and has a sway scarcely inferior.

I begin with the New Testament for the proof of this ; for this, the reader will continually keep in mind, is the main object of my present inquiries.

Here then a multitude of *monadic* nouns may be found, which occasionally are without any article ; e. g. of concrete nouns or names of actually existing objects, as ἥλιος, γῆ, οὐρανός, θάλασσα, νύξ, ἀγορά, ἀγρός, θείος, πνεῦμα ἅγιον, πατήρ, ἀνὴρ, πρόσωπον, ἐκκλησία, δειπνόν, θάνατος, θύρα, νόμος, νεκροί, κόσμος, ὥρα, ἀρχή, κύριος, διάβολος, etc. Whether such nouns as ἀρχή, ὥρα, and some others are really *concretes* or not, is of no consequence to our present purpose. The principle is equally clear in regard to undoubted abstracts : e. g. δικαιοσύνη, ἀγάπη, πίστις, κακία, πλεονεξία, ἁμαρτία, etc. I have not subjoined the places where these are to be found in their *anarthrous* state, because every one's Greek Concordance, and for the most part his Lexicon, will so readily supply them, that I do not deem it of any importance to mark them here.

What shall we say now to this great law of the article, viz. that monadic nouns demand it ? What can we say, when the usage is almost equally divided, and in not a few cases predominant on the *anarthrous* side ? Let the reader examine the cases in which the article is sometimes inserted and sometimes omitted, without any imaginable difference in the idea to be attached to the noun itself, and then he will himself be satisfied, that the article in such cases is inserted or omitted mostly *pro lubitu scriptoris*. When the writer wished to make the definiteness of the monadic object named, more obvious or more striking, he added the article ; when he was satisfied that the word itself

was as specific as he wished it to be, he omitted the article. But in many of these cases the reason must have been *subjective* and not objective; for it is in vain that we look for the grounds of his decision in the nature of the thing itself.

Nor must the reader suppose these apparently contradictory principles to belong only to the Greek of the New Testament. They are widely spread through the circle of even the very best classical Greek. "When the noun," says Matthiæ (Gramm. II. p. 545,) "is of itself sufficiently specific, so that no distinction from other like things is required, the article may be omitted;" i. e. one might almost be tempted to say, the very reason why the article is demanded, is the reason why it may be omitted! And yet to say this would not be quite correct. The simple truth seems to be, that the names of specific and definite objects may be distinctly marked by prefixing the article, if the writer or speaker pleases so to do; but if (for brevity's sake) he chooses to omit it, there is no hazard in doing it. The usages of the language permit him so to do.

This, indeed, gives a different view of the matter; one like to a multitude of cases in our own language. If I say: "The sight is more perfect than any sense;" or, "Sight is more perfect than any sense;" either is good English, and either conveys my meaning with about the same force. All the difference that I can perceive is, that the one is more *specific* than the other in the mode of its diction. When I say *the sight*, I indicate that I am viewing this sense directly as compared with my other senses, and therefore thus distinguish it; when I say *sight* merely, compari-

son is not indicated by this expression, but merely by the sequel of the sentence. These are, indeed, some of the nice shades of language ; but they are not the less real because they are nice.

So again I may say : “ The thing I desire,” or, “ The thing which I desire.” The former is indeed elliptical ; but who will forbid ellipsis, especially in poetry and conversation, and indeed in all that requires breviloquence ? Whether I insert or omit the *which*, makes no important difference whatever in the sense. When inserted, you may say that the sentence is more exactly put in full grammatical costume.

If the reader, now, will apply the substance of such principles as are concerned with these and the like phenomena, to the case immediately before us, he will cease to wonder at the presence or absence of the Greek article, in cases such as those that have been specified. Of one thing, however, he must be duly advertised before I shall consent to let him go. This is the *wide extent* of the principle in question, in the language of the Greeks.

Wide indeed is the range of monadic objects, concrete or abstract, which may receive or reject the article, as the writer on the whole judges best. It embraces all the great objects in nature or art that are single ; it comprises all the names of arts, sciences, trades, peculiar employments, virtues, vices, affections ; yea, all the *proper* names of specific objects, whether of men, animals, or any other thing. Hence we have no difficulty when we find Plato saying, ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ζῶσιν, Phaed. p. 68 ; or Xenophon asserting, ἐργασίαν εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμην κρατίστην, γεωργίαν,

Oecon. 6, 8. All is easy of solution, too, when we find such nouns as *ἵππική*, *μαντική*, etc. anarthrous; and so the large class of nouns like *δικαιοσύνη*, *σωφροσύνη*, *ἀρετή*, *κακία*, *ἀκολασία*, *δέος*, etc. in such writers as Xenophon and Plato. So likewise *ὀλιγαρχία*, *μοναρχία*, *δημοκρατία*, and the like; *πόλις*, *ἀγρὸς*, etc., when the nature of the case shews what city or field is meant; also *δεῖπνον*, *πατήρ*, *γυνή*, *παῖδες*, *βασιλεύς*, and a multitude of the like things, when from the connection in which they are mentioned, they are plainly of themselves specific, may take or omit the article at the pleasure of the writer. So in Plato's *Phaed.* pp. 68, 69, *σωφροσύνη*, *δικαιοσύνη*, etc. with and without the article. In some cases it is omitted, even where the noun is made as specific as possible by an epexegetical clause; e. g. *νῦν γὰρ ὑπὲρ ψυχῶν τῶν ὑμετέρων ὁ ἀγὼν, καὶ ὑπὲρ γῆς ἐν ᾗ ἔφυτε, καὶ ὑπὲρ οἰκων ἐν οἷς ἐτράφητε, καὶ περὶ γυναικῶν δὲ καὶ τέκνων.* Here *ψυχῶν*, *γῆς*, *οἰκων*, *γυναικῶν* and *τέκνων*, are all as definite as possible, and yet not one of them has the article. The passage is in Xenophon's *Cyrop.* 3, 3, 44.

In a multitude of instances which are of this nature, the form *without* the article, and this moreover in case of a monadic object, is even the law of the language. Thus *ἐν κυρίῳ* in the New Testament, in such phrases as *οἱ ἐν κυρίῳ* thus *ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ζῆν*, *ἐν σοφίᾳ πράττειν*, and almost all cases where the noun is used in a kind of adverbial way. So too among the Attics, *ἠγείσθαι θεοῦς*, *to believe in the gods*; while Euripides says, *Hec.* 800, *τοὺς θεοὺς ἠγούμεθα*. The reason is, that he wishes to give a little more definiteness than was

usually necessary, to the appellative *Θεός*. How much *Zersplitterung* the observance of this simple and widely extended principle would have saved Middleton, Wahl, and some others, in their exceedingly numerous canons respecting the article, must be plain to every considerate reader.

Proper names have often been the subject of much remark. The more general principle seems to be, that in cases of *original* mention they are without the article; and in cases of *renewed* mention, the article is added. But here exceptions to both principles may be found without number. For example; the genealogical catalogue in Matt. i., inserts the article throughout when a name is first mentioned, and omits it when the name is repeated; as *Ἀβραὰμ ἐγέννησε τὸν Ἰσαάκ. Ἰσαάκ δὲ ἐγέννησε τὸν Ἰακώβ, κ. τ. λ.* Middleton says, that "this is wholly foreign from the Greek practice." It may be, that no example like this in a Greek genealogy can be produced; but then the form of the Greek genealogy is different, and more like to that in Luke. But as to the *principles* here exhibited, a multitude of examples may be found in Greek to justify the insertion and the omission of the article. No law of the language is trespassed. If the writer of the genealogy in Matt. i., wished, in each case, to specificate in a particular manner the *son* of each individual named as a father, he has chosen an effectual method of doing this. Having once done this, he chooses, it would seem, to omit any further specification as unnecessary. And this he might do, without transgressing any law of the Greek language. Undoubtedly he might have

chosen the opposite course, had he thought it expedient. What remains then, except that the article was inserted or omitted at the will of the writer ?

And so in a multitude of cases in the New Testament, in Homer, Herodotus, Thucydides, and others, in respect to proper names of persons, or of countries, towns, etc. In the New Testament, however, the names of countries more usually take the article. Yet Ἀγγλος never has it ; and in many other names the usage is variable. The names of *towns* more often exclude the article ; yet here there is no fixed principle, even in regard to the same words. And as to the names of *persons*, there is confessedly no rule that can be laid down.

How large a proportion of all the words which may receive the article, is included in nouns that are properly *monadic*, it would be difficult to say. It is perfectly evident, however, that a very wide circle of words come within the descriptions above named. In respect to all these, any decision by a *dictum magistri*, whether the article is to be admitted into the text or rejected, is altogether aside from the proper sphere of criticism. As the article may, so far as the nature of the Greek language is concerned, be inserted or omitted, so the question whether it belongs to this word or that, when designating a monadic object, must be a question for the most part of mere fact, viz. whether the best Codices admit or reject it. Decisions on grounds *a priori*, or from the genius of the Greek language, or by virtue of high critical skill, would seem, one and all, to be out of place.

It is equally plain, also, that nothing important in

an *exegetical* point of view, can in cases of such a nature, be built upon the presence or absence of the article. The amount of all which can be said, is, that the writer or speaker who employs it, has given a *specificness* to his phraseology which is intensive; while the definite nature of the noun itself would have authorized him to omit the article, if he did not wish to render prominent the specificness in question. I do not aver, that a people of so nice a taste as the Greeks, had not their *right* and their *wrong*, in respect to the use of the article in most cases. But much of this seems to be within the province of rhetorical taste or *Aesthetics*, than within the province of exegesis. That their best writers differ so much in the use of the article; nay, that the same writer differs oftentimes with himself, is evidence enough that no inconsiderable portion of the ground occupied by the article depended more on the will of the writer, than on an imperious law of the language itself.

2. Intimately connected with the principle already developed, is a second phenomenon in Greek syntax. This is, that *when a word is rendered particularly definite by some adjunct connected with it, it may admit or dispense with the article.*

A Genitive case following a noun, as *ἡμέρα δεγῆς* or a pronoun personal or possessive, as *πρόσωπόν μου*, *ὁς πατήρ*; also some adjectives, like *πρώτη*, etc., and so of some other words; manifestly render the object with which they are connected *specific*. For example; *ἡμέρα δεγῆς* is, from the very nature of the case, distinguished from other kinds of days, such as

days of joy, feasting, etc. and even from common days that are not distinctly marked. So *πρόσωπόν μου* is individually specific; as is *ὁς πατήρ, ἡμέρα πρώτη*, etc. We might expect, therefore, that according to a common principle of the Greek language, such definite nouns would take the article. And so they often do; and we may even say, that they more usually take it. But still, as has been explained under No. 1, the very fact that the *adjuncts* in question render the noun specific, is the reason why the article may be omitted.

Thus Matthiae states the principle in his Grammar, § 265. He remarks, also, that nouns coupled with the pronouns demonstrative, *οὗτος, ὅδε, ἐκεῖνος*, often take the article; which, in such a case, renders their specific nature still more prominent. But in this case also, he adds, the article is *often omitted*, at least in poetry. Of this he produces examples; viz. *τοῦδε ἀνδρός, οὗτος ἀνὴρ*, etc. In prose, when the demonstrative *precedes* the noun, the latter usually takes the article; and such seems to be the New Testament usage, nearly if not quite throughout, where *οὗτος* is used as a pronominal adjective. But when the demonstrative *follows* the noun, the latter may omit the article; e. g. *κίνησις αὐτή, αἰρία αὐτή, ἐπὶ γῆν τήνδε*, etc. At least this idiom is often employed in the classic writers, although I do not find it in any incontrovertible reading of the New Testament.

The cases in the New Testament, where the article is inserted before the noun coupled with an adjunct that renders it definite, are to be found every where. Thus I open my Greek Testament at Matt.

ii. and find in quick succession, *ταῖς ἡμέραις ἐκείναις, τῇ ἐξήμῳ τῆς Ἰουδαίας, ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν, τὴν ὁδὸν κυρίου, τὰς τρίβους αὐτοῦ, τὸ ἔνδυμα αὐτοῦ, τὴν ὁσφὺν αὐτοῦ, ἡ τροφή αὐτοῦ, τὰς ἀμαρτίας αὐτῶν, κ. τ. λ.* But examples just the reverse of these, in respect to the article, are to be found in abundance; e. g. Matt. xvii. 6, *ἐπὶ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ* (So Sept. Is. xlix. 23, *ἐπὶ πρόσωπον τῆς γῆς*.) Luke i. 51, *ἐν βραχίονι αὐτοῦ*. Eph. i. 20, *ἐν δεξιᾷ αὐτοῦ*. Luke xix. 42, *ἀπὸ ὀφθαλμῶν σου*. 1 Cor. ii. 16, *νοῦν κυρίου*. Luke ii. 11, *εἰς πόλιν Δαβίδ*. 2 Thes. ii. 2, *ἐν ἡμέρᾳ τοῦ Χριστοῦ*. Act xii. 10, *φυλακὴν πρώτην* and so in a multitude of cases noted by Winer in the third edition of his New Testament Grammar, § 13, 2.

Nor does this belong to any negligence or want of skill in the New Testament writers. The classic Greek exhibits the same phenomenon; e. g. *περὶ καταλύσεως τῆς στρατίας*, Xen. Cyrop. VI. 1, 13; *ἐν καταλύσει τοῦ βίου*, id. Apol. Soc. 30; *ἐπὶ τελευτῇ τοῦ βίου*, id. Mem. I. 5, 2; *βίον αὐτῶν*, Lucian, Scyth. 4; *ὑπὸ μήκους τῶν ὁδῶν*, Strabo, XV. p. 719; and so oftentimes elsewhere.

The reader will observe, that in a great many of these cases the noun by itself is definite and specific; yet in others it is not, but merely of a generic nature, and becomes specific only by reason of the adjunct. When, however, it is specific, whether by itself or from some extraneous cause, the article may be inserted or omitted. I will not say that it is a matter of entire indifference whether a writer insert or omit it. This I should hardly be willing to admit. But thus much we may say, viz. that unless the writer

wished to make specification emphatic, he was at liberty to omit the article. No *essentially* different meaning is conveyed in either case; it is only a modification of the degree of specificness which is marked.

We have now considered, under the two heads above, a great proportion of the cases in which the Greek article is employed. Both these heads belong essentially to the same category, so far as the principle respecting the insertion or omission of the article is concerned. They differ from each other, however, in this respect, viz. that No. 1. exhibits only cases where the noun is in its own nature specific; while No. 2. embraces other nouns of a different nature, and the specific nature of the noun is here considered principally as determined by its adjuncts.

The importance of the principles developed under these two heads, will be more distinctly seen when we come, in the sequel, to make an application of them to some contested cases in the exegesis of the New Testament.

3. In most treatises on the article, we find it laid down as a rule, that *the subject of a proposition must have the article, and the predicate omit it.*

So much, no doubt, is true with respect to this canon, viz. that the subject is, much oftener than the predicate, a specific and definite thing or agent. In a multitude of cases the object of a proposition is to shew, that a particular subject belongs to this or that class of things or persons; in which case of course the subject would take the article and the predicate omit it. But the insertion or omission, in these cases, depends not at all on the mere fact that a noun is the

subject or predicate as such, but on the simple fact whether the writer means to specify or not, in either case. Consequently we may expect, that if in any instance he wishes to make a specific predicate, he attaches the article to it. Thus in the New Testament; οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τέκτων, Matt. vi. 3; ἐκεῖναί ἐστι τὰ κοινοῦντα, Matt. vii. 15; οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ πληρονόμος, Matt. xii. 7; ἡ δὲ πέτρα ἦν ὁ Χριστός, 1 Cor. x. 4; ἡ ἀμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία, 1 John iii. 4; ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἀμαρτίας ὁ νόμος, 1 Cor. xv. 56; αὐτός ἐστιν ἡ εἰρήνη ἡμῶν, Eph. ii. 14; and so in cases very numerous, as fully established by Winer, § 17, 5. In some instances the very same construction in respect to definiteness exhibits and omits the article; e. g. John viii. 44, ὅτι [ὁ διάβολος] ψεύστης ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ πατήρ αὐτοῦ. Matthiae remarks, also, that in some cases it is a matter of *indifference*, whether the article be inserted or omitted in the predicate; as [πείσαι Θεονόην] σὸν ἔργον, or σὸν τοῦ-ργον, i. e. τὸ ἔργον.

So far, then, is the alleged rule from being universally true, that the reverse, in a certain sense, is true. The predicate, or the subject, takes or omits the article with equal certainty, whenever the nature of the case is such as to require it. Propositions in which both omit it, are very common; e. g. πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀνθρώπου· καλὸς θησαυρὸς παρ' ἀνδρὶ σπουδαίῳ χάρις ὀφειλομένη. In other cases the subject may omit the article and the predicate take it; e. g. εἰρήνη ἐστὶ τὰγα-θόν (τὸ ἀγαθόν) τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἡ κόλασις ἐστὶν τουτὶ τὸ κρα-νίον ἢ Ἐλένη ἐστὶν, where, however, the subject also has the article.

Glass and Rambach long ago called in question the rule that we have now been examining; and Winer and Matthiae have most fully shown how small a claim it has upon our acknowledgment.

4. A fourth principle usually laid down in respect to the article, is, that *an appellative subjoined to another noun by way of apposition, when it is asyndetic, i. e. without a conjunction before it, takes the article.*

That such is the *usual* fact I admit. But the rule itself needs much limitation, before it can be called even tolerably correct. If the object of the appellative, i. e. the word put in apposition, is to specify and distinguish the preceding noun as only an individual belonging to a class which is designated by the noun in apposition; or to shew that the attribute, quality, or office designated by the noun in apposition, is appropriate only to the person or thing in question; then the word in apposition takes the article; otherwise not. Thus, for example, 'Αγρίππας ὁ βασιλεὺς, 'Ιωάννης ὁ βαπτιστής, and in the classics, Κυαζάρης ὁ τοῦ 'Αστυάρχου παῖς, Πιττακὸς ὁ Μυτιληναῖος, etc. Examples may be found every where, so that it would be superfluous to exhibit more. In the first example here, Agrippa is named *the king*, because he is thus distinguished from other individuals, of the same name; in the second, John is called ὁ βαπτιστής, because the office of baptizing was appropriate in a specific manner to him. In these and all the like cases, the object of the noun, adjective, participle, or whatever it may be, which is put in apposition as an adjunct designed further and particularly to describe the individual or the thing already

named, should take the article, in order to answer fully the intention of the speaker or writer with regard to the design of specification.

But if a word is added in the way of apposition, when the writer has no *particular* purpose of specifying, but only a general one of giving without emphasis an appellation that is often or usually bestowed, then the noun in apposition does not take the article; e. g. 'Ἡρόδοτος Ἀλικαρνασσεύς, Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος, Βρῆνιος Γαλατῶν βασιλεὺς, etc. In the New Testament we find the same usage; e. g. Σίμων βυρσεύς, Acts x. 32; Ἄννα προφῆτις, Luke ii. 36; Γάϊος Δερβασεύς, Acts xx. 4; Τιβερίου Καίσαρος, Luke iii. 2; Φαραὶ βασιλείως, Acts vii. 10, etc. The omission of the article in such cases does not destroy the designation of *individuality*; for in each of these cases that fully remains. But the writer, when he omits the article before the adjunct, shows that he does not intend to give any peculiar prominency to that adjunct. He names it in order to remove doubt as to the person intended; but he omits the article, because he does not wish to urge upon the reader's mind the particular consideration of the attribute, etc. designated by the adjunct. Thus we may translate Σίμων βυρσεύς, *Simon a tanner*, i. e. who was one of the class of tanners; and so in other cases, *Anna a prophetess*, i. e. one who belonged to this class of persons; *Gaius one of the Derbaeans*; *Tiberius one of the Cæsars*, etc. All that need to be said in these and the like cases, is, that the writer did not mean to be particular in specification.

It is plain enough from these examples, how much

the rule under examination must be modified. But we have not yet done with the subject. We may go a step further, and say that examples may be produced, where just the reverse of the practice which the rule recognizes, takes place. In all the cases hitherto adduced under this head, the reader will perceive, that the original or first noun, to which an adjunct is made, or with which another word is put in apposition, omits, or (we may say) rejects the article. Buttmann (§ 124. 3) says expressly, that "the article is *always* omitted [in the proper name,] when that proper name is followed by a more definite attribute with the article." This may be true; and, so far as my observation goes, is true. But if he means that the adjunct itself always has the article (for this is the general fact,) and that the proper name which precedes, is of course destitute of it, this will not abide the test of examination. Homer himself, at the very outset, presents us with a usage which is just the reverse of this : Οὔνεκα τὸν Χρύσην ἡτίμησ' ἀρητῆρα, Il. α. 11. Here Χρύσην has the article, and the adjunct ἀρητῆρα is without it. But you may say : This is poetical licence. I answer in the negative; for Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon exhibit the same usage. For example ; ὁ Ἄλυσ ποταμός, Herod. I. 72, 75 ; ἐπὶ τὸν Γηρίαν ποταμὸν, Thucyd. VI. 50 ; ἐπὶ τὸν Ζάβαιον ποταμὸν, Xen. Anab. II. 5. 1. Not unlike is ὁ Θῆς Κένταυρος, in Soph. Trach. 1162. In this last case, we may say that Κένταυρος is used with the liberty so common to proper names and monadic objects, as explained under No. 1. above. In the other cases, the proper names with the article, are very specific. The

addition of *ποταμός* merely would, to all intents and purposes, be specific enough to distinguish Halys (for example) from any lake, town, etc. of the same name. And this seems to be all that the writer aimed at. Or we may regard the whole as a kind of compound name, (such as we form in English when we say *derivation-ending*, *termination-change*, etc.) and the article as standing before this composite noun.

The reader must begin by this time, if not before, to suspect that there are few rules concerning the article, which do not admit of modification and exceptions; or rather, which do not imperiously demand them. In the case just reviewed, how often must the insertion or omission of the article depend entirely on the *subjective* view and intention of the writer! If he designed to make the adjunct attributive a matter of speciality, and to render it prominent to the reader's mind, he gave it the article; if he did not, he omitted the article; while the real nature of the noun and its adjunct might in either case remain the same. What is this but saying that the article in such cases is very much dependent on the will of the author? And who can prescribe a law for this?

From the consideration of nouns added by way of explanation and put in apposition, we may naturally advance to the examination of other words added with the like design and placed in similar circumstances. These may be adjectives, or participles, or nouns connected with prepositions, or in the genitive without them. Let us examine these in the order suggested.

(a) The adjective is often placed between the arti-

cle and the noun which it qualifies ; e. g. ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος, ὁ σοφὸς βασιλεὺς, ἡ μεγάλη πόλις, etc. In this case the noun and its adjunct (adjective) are virtually made one, and but one article therefore is required, where the article is employed. But different from this, in regard to the mode of structure (if not of signification,) is the case, when the adjective, as is very common, is put *after* the substantive ; as ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἀγαθός, ὁ βασιλεὺς ὁ σοφός, ἡ πόλις ἡ μεγάλη, etc. In this latter case, there is a kind of apposition, altogether of a nature similar to that which exists, when one noun is put in apposition with another. And here the principle that the adjunct, when an adjective, should take the article if the noun has it, is very general ; most grammarians say, universal.

Yet there is some doubt hanging over this canon, notwithstanding the ingenious efforts of Buttmann and others to explain it away. In 1 John v. 20 we have ἡ ζωὴ αἰώνιος, although with variation of Mss. In Luke xii. 12, Griesbach and Schott give τὸ γὰρ πνεῦμα ἅγιον instead of τὸ γὰρ ἅγιον πνεῦμα. In 1 Cor. x. 3 we have an undoubted reading of the like kind, viz. τὸ αὐτὸ βρῶμα πνευματικόν—τὸ αὐτὸ πόμα πνευματικόν. In Gal. i. 4 we have τοῦ ἐνσταντος αἰῶνος ποιηροῦ. Winer solves these last examples, by saying that “the adjective and the noun flow together into one word.” But this is rather cutting the note, perhaps, than untying it. We might better say this, when two nouns come together like ὁ ἄλυσ ποταμός, or when an adjective is manifestly designed for close connection, like the case of ἡ μεγάλη πόλις. I am unable to see any good reason here, why πνευματικόν

and *πονηροῦ* would have a different meaning, if the article were placed before them.

Examples of the like nature occur in the classics. In Soph. Oedip. Tyr. 526, we find *ὁ μάντις τοὺς λόγους ψευδῆς λέγει*. Matthiae (§ 277, 6) says, that we are to translate this in the following manner: "The prophet utters words, *which are false*." That we *may* so translate it, is no doubt true; that we *must* is less certain. And in like manner he solves the numerous cases of this kind, which he produces from the classics. So Buttmann also (§ 125, Note 3) resolves the like phenomena. In cases such as *δὴν τὴν νύκτα, ἔχει τὸν πέλεκυν ὀξύτατον*, he holds the adjective to be a kind of *predicate* of the sentence, so that if we were to translate *the night which is whole*, or *the whole, the axe which is very sharp*, we should then, and then only, come very near to the meaning of the Greek.

But not to insist here, that between *a very sharp axe* and *an axe which is very sharp*, there is at least no very great difference, certainly not an assignable one, what shall we say to the suggestion which is involved in this theory, viz. that the article which serves almost every where to render words definite and emphatic, would here deprive adjectives of the emphasis, which Matthiae and Buttmann assign to them when they are without the article? I can indeed imagine, that in pronouncing the words *τὸν πέλεκυν ὀξύτατον*, the speaker may pause a moment after uttering *πέλεκυν*, and, then throw emphasis into his voice when he utters *ὀξύτατον*. In this way, I suppose the repetition of *πέλεκυν* by the mind would naturally be suggested, and *ὀξύτατον* may agree with this implied

noun, and may, as we have seen under the preceding head, dispense with the article. But that the mere fact of *omitting* the article should make the adjective emphatic in its meaning, or give it a speciality of meaning by making it a predicate, is somewhat difficult of explanation. What is the meaning of ὅλην as a *predicate*, in ὅλην τὴν νύκτα?

I should deem it arrogance hastily to pronounce sentence against the decision of such judges in respect to a question concerning the Greek idiom, as Matthiæ and Buttmann. But if we may resort to analogy in the case now before us, where shall we find one to justify the idea, that the omission of the article renders the meaning more emphatic or energetic? And if I rightly understand the object to be attained by making the adjective a predicate in the cases above, it is this, viz. that a special force of assertion or emphasis is thus thrown upon the adjective.

But Buttmann has adduced other examples, which seem to speak more favourably for his mode of representation, than those which I have presented above. He says, that ἡδετο ἐπὶ πλουσίοις τοῖς πολίταις does not mean: "He rejoiced on account of the wealthy citizens," but, "He rejoiced on account of the citizens because they were wealthy." So too, ἐπ' ἄκροις τοῖς ὄρεσι does not mean: "On the mountain tops," but, "On the mountains where they are highest." In this last case one is tempted to ask, Where then are they highest, except at the *tops*? It might be said, indeed, that there are, on most ridges of mountains, higher and lower summits; and that to say *on the mountain tops* might mean some of the lower ones. But who,

in speaking of the *top* of the White Mountains, would think of any other peak than that of Mount Washington? Or who, in speaking of the tops of the Andes, would think of any other summits than those of Chimborazo and some of its compeers? This example, therefore, does not seem to make much for the object on account of which it is adduced.

As to the other, one might say, indeed, that there is a difference between *rejoicing on account of the wealthy citizens*, and *rejoicing on account of the citizens because they are wealthy*. In the first case the expression might indicate, that the rejoicing was (for some cause or other not explained) merely with, or on account of, that class of citizens who were wealthy; in the other it might mean, that the rejoicing was because the citizens in general had become wealthy. But is not the meaning of such an expression rather to be explained by the context, than by the mere force of the words themselves? In the case before us, Buttmann does not give the source of the expression, and therefore I cannot resort to the context for examination; but, from the very nature of the case, I venture to say, that previous narration of some kind or other explains the manner in which the phrase quoted is to be understood; and I venture also to add, that it is rather on this ground, than on that of the omission of the article, that the exegesis in question rests. My reason is, that there are cases presented by Matthiae, and by Buttmann himself, and also some exhibited above which are contained in the New Testament, where we are either obliged to forsake the idea of making an adjective a *predicate* sim-

ply because it is anarthrous, inasmuch as the sense will not bear it, or elsewhere the meaning is scarcely, if at all, modified by such a procedure. May we not make the probable inference, then, that the explanation of such cases, as presented by Buttmann and Matthiae, is at least exposed to some doubts that are not easy of solution?

If the reader begins to think that some apology is due for dwelling so long on what he may deem one of the *minutiæ* of Greek grammar, I regard it as sufficient to say, that when any one ventures to call in question the opinions of such men as Buttmann and Matthiae, respecting a point of Greek idiom, he is bound by a sense of decorum to give reasons for taking such a step.

(b) Participles, one would naturally expect to follow the rules either of adjectives or of nouns with regard to the article, when they constitute an adjunct to any substantive. And such is in general the fact. But when participles put on the simple nature of nouns, (a case which is very frequent,) then they are of course treated as nouns; and the reader has only to look back in order to see the general principles by which in such cases they are governed. For example; ὁ πειράζων, ὁ σπείρων, etc. are by usage mere nouns indicative of particular agents. A very large class of participles, are those which are used as *attributives*, i. e. words which designate some quality, action, station, condition, etc. that distinguish a particular class of men; e. g. οἱ λέγοντες, *there are those who say*; οὐδ' ὁ ὑπαρχῶν οὐδ' ὁ κωλύων πάρα, *no one is present who will help or hinder*, Soph. Elect. 1197. Here

we might translate, *the sayers, the helper, the hinderer*; although the English would scarcely be tolerable. But the idea is given by such a version; and at the same time the reason is shewn, why a certain class of participles may be called *attributives*. Now, when they become so, and when they thus appropriate certain actions, qualities, condition, etc. to a particular individual, or to a particular class of men, we may of course expect them to follow the rules of specification, i. e. to take the article as a general thing. Examples besides those already produced, may be found every where; e. g. ὅτι μέλλουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι αἰρεῖσθαι τὸν ἐροῦντα, *that the Athenians would choose THE speaker*, i. e. the individual who is to make the address; while in English we should more usually say, *a speaker*. So εἶχε τοὺς συμπαθήσοντας· χαλεπώτερον... εὐρεῖν τοὺς βουλομένους ἄρχειν, ἢ νῦν τοὺς μηδὲν δεομένους. In the New Testament, examples offer themselves every where; e. g. μετατίθεσθε ἀπὸ τοῦ καλέσαντος ὑμᾶς, Gal. i. 6; τινὲς εἰσιν οἱ ταρασσόντες ὑμᾶς, Gal. i. 7, a striking example, inasmuch as one might naturally say, that τινὲς of course makes the proposition of an indefinite nature. This indeed is true, so far as τινὲς is concerned; for stopping with τινὲς εἰσι we should render the phrase, *there are some*. The addition of οἱ ταρασσόντες, however, limits the τινὲς to a certain class of individuals, viz. that class who make disturbance or occasion trouble. In Gal. ii. 6, οἱ δοκοῦντες is descriptive of a class of persons, whose appearance, or at least whose reputation, betokens them to be superior persons: and so, in countless cases, *participial attributives* take the article, because they specify

an individual or a class as being distinguished by certain qualities, actions, etc.

Yet even here there are exceptions to the rule. E. g. *πέμψαι προκαταληφμένους τὰ ἄκρα*, Xen. Anab. 1, 3, 14. Other cases are referred to in Matthiae, § 268. In general, however, it is sufficiently plain, that participles when they stand not connected with any noun as qualifying or modifying it, but as descriptive of a *class* of persons or things (in which case we usually translate them by *he who*, *they who*, etc. do this or that, Latin, *is qui*, etc.), are in fact real *attributives*, which take the nature of appellative nouns, and should have the article whenever it is needed for the purpose of specification. As this is the usual purpose for which such participles are employed, of course they commonly take the article. But we have already seen, that the usage is not imperious. If a writer meant to use a participial appellative in a way like that of a noun when it is anarthrous, he was at liberty to make the participle anarthrous in the same manner; e. g. *βοήσας* *one who cries*, i. e. any one, Odys. *ἑ*, 473; *νήσας* *an intelligent person*, i. e. any intelligent man, Hesiod, *Ἔγγ. init.* *ὁμολογῶν μὲν ἀδικεῖν, ἀποδνήσκει*, *any one who confesses wrong, dies*, Lys. p. 104, 28. Nay, in the very same sentence the great master of Greek style mingles both constructions: *διαφέρει δὲ πάμπαν μαδῶν μὴ μαδόντος, καὶ ὁ γυμνασάμενος τοῦ μὴ γεγυμνασμένου*, *he who learns, differs very much from him who does not learn; and he who is practised, from him who is not practised*, Plat. Leg. vii. p. 795. In Eng-

lish we render both clauses alike as to their definiteness; but in the Greek *μαθὼν*, etc. is without the article, while *ὁ γυμνασάμενος* has it. But enough; he who desires more abundant confirmation, may consult *Matthiæ*, § 271. Anm.

The cases already presented of the use of the participle, are substantially one and the same, although at first view they may seem to be a little diverse. To be distinguished, however, from both these, and really discrepant in some important respects, are *those cases of the participle which are immediately connected with nouns*, and which are employed to qualify or modify them in various ways. These require, therefore, separate and distinct consideration.

Participles, as qualifying nouns, may become, or at least be employed, as mere adjectives, and may assume the same intimate connection by position with the noun that they qualify. For example; *ὁ τεχθεὶς βασιλεὺς*, *Matt. ii. 2*, where *τεχθεὶς* is to all intents and purposes disposed of as a mere adjective, although we can hardly make an adjective of it when we come to translate it. So again in the sequel: *τὸν χρονον τοῦ φαινομένου ἀστέρος*, *v. 7*, where *φαινομένου* is construed as an adjective; *τῆς μελλούσης ὀργῆς*, *Matt. iii. 7*; *τὸν λεγόμενον Πέτρον*, *Matt. iv. 8*; et saepe alibi.

But this construction does not need our renewed attention, since the nature of it has already been noticed, p. 48. We come to a construction of more difficulty, and where the usage varies perpetually in the Greek language. This is *where the participle follows the noun or pronoun which it qualifies or modifies*; in which case it takes or omits the article, according to

the purpose of the writer, as it would seem, to give the idea which it designates more or less specification and emphasis. The insertion of the article gives it *Anhebung*, i. e. elevation, prominency, emphasis; the omission denotes that the writer did not intend to make specially prominent, the meaning which it conveys. Thus in Eph. i. 13, εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἡμᾶς εἰς ἱστανον ... τοὺς προηλπικότες ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ, where the idea conveyed by τοὺς προηλπικότες is designed to be prominent. So in Heb. iv. 3, οἱ πιστεύσαντες and so οἱ καταφυγόντες, Heb. vi. 18; τοῖς... περιπατοῦσιν, Rom. viii. 4; οἱ πιστεύοντες, 1 John v. 13; ἡ σπιλοῦσα, James iii. 6, and in many other instances.

On the contrary; participles often follow nouns and modify them, which *omit* the article; e. g. τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον συλληφθέντα, Acts. xxiii. 27; ὁ Θεὸς ἀναστήσας, Acts iii. 26; but in Heb. xiii. 20, ὁ Θεός... ὁ ἀναγαγών, and then again in v. 21, with the same subject (ὁ Θεός) we have ποιῶν. So Φιλίππου... ὄντος, Acts xxi. 8; ἡ... ἀκροβυστία... τελοῦσα, Rom. ii. 27; ὁ Ἰησοῦς κεινοπιακῶς, John iv. 6; τῆς γυναικὸς μαρτυρούσης, John iv. 39; τὴν ἀδελφὴν οὖσαν, Rom. xvi. 1; τοὺς λατρεύοντας... κεκαθαμένους, Heb. x. 2; et alibi saepe. In Pet. v. 10, is an example that is instructive: ὁ Θεός, ὁ καλέσας ἡμᾶς... ὀλίγον παθόντας. Here ὁ καλέσας throws emphasis by its article on the idea which it conveys, while ὀλίγον παθόντες omits the article, because special stress is not here to be laid on the idea conveyed by it.

Pro arbitrio scribentis, then, may the article be employed in respect to participles, in a multitude of cases; for a multitude depend on his own intentions to render this or that idea emphatic. In many in-

stances also, it would seem, does it depend on the *subjective* views only of the writer, whether the article shall be used or omitted; for, to say the least, no particular reason in many cases is discoverable by the reader from the nature of the context, why the article was inserted or omitted. Indeed the examples already suggested will serve to satisfy the reader of this. If he has any doubt, let him consult Winer, § 19, c. where he will find an accumulation of examples, from writers both sacred and profane.

It may not be amiss here to suggest, that as participles so often put on the nature of mere adjectives, and generally have so much resemblance to them, so the construction of them with or without an article, almost *ad libitum scriptoris*, may serve to cast light on the case of adjectives that are anarthrous, when put before or after a noun that has the article; a subject that has been discussed under the preceding head. So far as analogy goes in this case, it seems to be against the theory of Matthiae and Buttmann.

(c) We come now to another species of adjuncts, which are very often employed to qualify or modify some principal noun in a sentence. I refer to adjuncts made by means of nouns with prepositions, the *sense* of which may be regarded as equivalent to that of an adjective. For example; when Paul says, ἡ πίστις ὑμῶν ἡ πρὸς τὸν Θεόν the clause ἡ πρὸς τὸν Θεόν qualifies πίστις and specificates its particular nature. It serves the purpose, therefore, of an adjective. And in this respect, the versatility of the Greek language is truly wonderful. It abounds, indeed, in proper adjectives. But numerous as these are, still they do not by any

means reach all the wants of the speaker or writer. In the case cited, for example, what is the adjective that would express the same relation? $\Delta\lambda\alpha$ would not, for this means simply *divine*, qualifying the nature of a thing or person, and not expressing the object towards which the affections or feelings of such a person are directed. To $\Theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha$ the same objection may be made. Of course the qualification which the Apostle designed to express, must be expressed in the manner he has chosen.

The example adduced serves to illustrate the nature of the case which we now have under consideration. Let us see how the article is treated in cases of this description.

It is a very common, and indeed the general fact, that where the principal noun has the article, the article is also prefixed to a subordinate clause which qualifies it. Examples are every where to be found; $\tau\eta\varsigma \delta\iota\alpha\kappa\omicron\nu\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma \tau\eta\varsigma \epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma \tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\gamma\acute{\iota}\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, 2 Cor. viii. 4; $\tau\alpha\acute{\iota}\varsigma \varphi\upsilon\lambda\alpha\acute{\iota}\varsigma \tau\alpha\acute{\iota}\varsigma \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu \tau\eta\ \delta\iota\alpha\sigma\pi\omicron\rho\epsilon\acute{\alpha}$, James i. 1; $\tau\omicron\acute{\iota}\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\delta\epsilon\lambda\phi\omicron\acute{\iota}\varsigma \tau\omicron\acute{\iota}\varsigma \epsilon\acute{\xi} \epsilon\theta\acute{\nu}\omega\acute{\nu}$, Acts xv. 23; $\tau\eta\varsigma \pi\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\epsilon\omega\varsigma \tau\eta\varsigma \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu \tau\eta\ \acute{\alpha}\kappa\rho\omicron\beta\upsilon\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha$, Rom. iv. 11; and so on, in a multitude of cases. But cases also occur where the usage is different, the second article being omitted. For example; $\tau\acute{\omega}\nu \sigma\upsilon\gamma\gamma\epsilon\acute{\nu}\omega\acute{\nu} \kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha} \sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\kappa\alpha$, Rom. ix. iii; $\tau\omicron\acute{\nu}\dots \zeta\eta\lambda\omicron\nu \��\pi\epsilon\rho \epsilon\mu\omicron\upsilon$, 2 Cor. vii. 7; $\tau\eta\acute{\nu} \pi\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\iota\nu \dots \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu \chi\rho\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\omega}$, Col. i. 4; $\tau\grave{\alpha} \epsilon\theta\acute{\nu}\eta \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu \sigma\alpha\rho\kappa\iota$, Eph. ii. 11; $\tau\omicron\acute{\nu} \text{ 'I}\sigma\rho\alpha\eta\lambda \kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha} \sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\kappa\alpha$, 1 Cor. x. 18; $\tau\eta\acute{\nu} \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\tau\rho\iota\acute{o}\tau\eta\tau\alpha \pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma \text{ 'P}\omega\mu\alpha\acute{\iota}\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, Polyb. iii. 48, 11. It will not be asserted, I trust, that there is any notable difference of sense between the two diverse modes of constructing adjuncts of this nature, *i. e.* of constructing them with and with-

out the article. Then, of course, the insertion or omission of the article, in these cases, must have depended much on the will of the writer.

(d) As kindred to this last head, we may produce the case where the principal noun *omits* the article. Here usage varies again. The rule, we may say, is, that when the principal noun omits the article, the subordinate adjunct also omits it; e. g. εἰς μετάλληψιν μετὰ εὐχαριστίας, 1 Tim. iv. 3; ἀγάπη ἐκ καθαρᾶς καρδίας, 1 Tim. i. 5; χαρὰ ἐν πνεύματι ἀγίῳ, Rom. xiv. 17; and so very frequently, both in sacred and profane authors.

On the other hand, the adjunct sometimes takes the article when the principal noun omits it; as πίσει τῇ εἰς ἐμὲ, Acts xxvi. 18; ἀγάπη τῇ ἐν Χριστῷ, 2 Tim. i. 13; ἔργων τῶν ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ, Tit. iii. 5. A flood of examples is produced of this nature by Winer, in § 19, 4, of his Grammar.

(e) One more qualification or limitation of a principal noun by a subordinate one, remains to be considered. This is the case where the principal noun has a genitive case simply connected with it; as ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ, or λόγος Θεοῦ. The rule here, as laid down by grammarians, is, that *where the principal noun has the article, the subordinate one must have it; and where the first omits it, the last rejects it*; i. e. both must have, or both reject, the article. But one need not read far in any Greek author without finding this rule frequently violated. Thus in Luke viii. 7, ἐν μέσῳ τῶν ἀκανθῶν and so ἡδονῶν τοῦ βίου, Luke viii. 14; ἄρχων τῆς συναγωγῆς, Luke viii. 41; λειτουργὸν τῆς χρείας μου, Phil. ii. 25; and thus in a multitude of

cases. I am aware that it has been said, that the article is left out in the principal word in such cases, because of some other rule or principle which would justify the omission. It may be true, I grant, that the omission can be justified, in the cases adduced and in others of the like nature; but is it *demand*ed? and especially, is it demanded in opposition to the canon which we are now contemplating, and which is often laid down with little abatement and exception? Middleton says, he is "not aware that any Greek prose writer, except the florid Philo Judæus, disregards this canon," (p. 30.) But what would he say to the following sentence from Xenophon; *συνεκάλεσε καὶ ἰππέων καὶ πεζῶν καὶ ἁρμάτων τοὺς ἡγεμόνας*? Cyrop. vi. 3, 8. And what can be said to such examples as these? viz. *περὶ καταλύσεως τῆς στρατιᾶς*, Xen. Cyrop. vi. 1, 13; *ἐν καταλύσει τοῦ βίου*, Apol. Soc. 30; *ἐπὶ τελευτῇ τοῦ βίου*, Mem. i. 5, 2; *ὑπὸ μήκους τῶν ὁδῶν*, Strab. xv. p. 719; *δυσχέρεια τοῦ νοσήματος*, Soph. Philoct. 888; et saepe eodem modo alibi.

In general it must be philosophically true, that where the principal noun is specific, some quality or circumstance marked by a following genitive will of course be specific. But there are cases where the writer does not mean to make specificalness, either as it respects the principal noun, or else in regard to the subordinate one. In such cases, he accomplishes his design by omitting the article before either, as circumstances may require.

We have now gone through with the classes of words usually added to modify, limit, and qualify the principal nouns, in any sentence; and we have seen

that there is scarcely a single rule in regard to the use of the article, that does not admit of exceptions, many or most of which seem to depend more on the design of the writer, than on the absolute nature of the things concerned.

There is still remaining, however, one or two cases in respect to the insertion or omission of the article, which have been the subject of much dispute, and which, from the importance thus given to them, should not pass unnoticed.

6. Several nouns standing in the same case, and being connected by a conjunction, *take each the article when the gender of them is diverse.*

Such is the general principle. As examples may be adduced, τὰς σεβομένας γυναῖκας...καὶ τοὺς πρώτους τῆς πόλεως, Acts xiii. 50 ; ἐν τοῖς παραπτώμασι καὶ τῇ ἀκροβυσίᾳ, Col. ii. 13 ; τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὴν ἰσότητα...παρέχουσιν, Col. iv. 1 ; ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου τῆς ἀμαρτίας καὶ τοῦ θανάτου, Rom. viii. 2. This principle is common, moreover, to classic Greek, as well as to the New Testament.

Yet imperious as this law may seem to be, even from the nature of the case and the importance of being perspicuous, it is still far from being universal. E. g. τὰ ἐντάλματα καὶ διδασκαλίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων, Col. ii. 22 ; ἔξελθι εἰς τὰς ὁδοὺς καὶ φραγμοὺς, Luke xiv. 28 ; τῇ δυνάμει καὶ πλοῦτι, Rev. v. 12 ; ταῖς ἐντολαῖς καὶ δικαιώμασι, Luke i. 6 ; οἱ γνωστοὶ...καὶ γυναῖκες, Luke xxiii. 49. So in the classic writers ; τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ λόγῳ, Plat. Repub. ix. p. 586 ; οἱ παῖδες τε καὶ γυναῖκες, ib. p. 557 ; ὁ σωφρονῶν καὶ σωφρονούσα, Plat. Leg. vi. p. 784 ; τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ πόλεμον, Agath. xiv. 12 ; and so not unfrequently in other writers.

Whatever now may be said of the insertion of the article before each noun, in cases of such a nature, the *omission* of it must surely be *ad arbitrium scriptoris*. Let the student note here, as we shall have occasion in the sequel to appeal to this head of illustration, that when the second noun is clearly and altogether discrepant from the preceding one, both as to gender and meaning, it still may, and not unfrequently does, omit the article.

7. Several nouns connected by a conjunction, and being in the same case and of the same gender, usually omit the article after it has been once inserted, viz. before the first noun.

E. g. μετὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων καὶ γραμματέων, Mark xv. 1; διὰ τῆς φιλοσοφίας καὶ κενῆς ἀπάτης, Col. ii. 8; ἐπὶ τῇ θυσίᾳ καὶ λειτουργίᾳ, Phil. ii. 17; and thus in a multitude of cases, both in sacred and profane authors. The case extends to adjectives and participles connected in the like way, as well as to nouns; e. g. τὸν ἄγιον καὶ δίκαιον, Acts iii. 14; τὴν μεγάλην καὶ ἐπιφανῆ, Acts ii. 20; οἱ...λατρεύοντες καὶ καυχώμενοι...καὶ...πεποιθότες, Phil. iii. 3; ὁ μαρτυρῶν...καὶ γράψας, John xxi. 14.

Yet the number of cases is almost equally great, where the article is inserted before the second noun, etc. as well as the first; e. g. οἱ ἀρχιερεῖς καὶ οἱ ὑπηρέται, John xix. 6; τῷ ἀνέμῳ καὶ τῷ κλύδωνι, Luke viii. 24; τοῦ ποτηρίου καὶ τοῦ πίνακος, Luke xi. 39. The reader may find a multitude of the like cases, both in sacred and profane writers, collected by Winer in his Grammar, § 18, 5.

The general principle that seems to predominate

through cases of such a nature as those in Nos. 6, 7, appears to be this, viz. that where the several things enumerated belong, either actually or as viewed by the writer, to one and the same class or genus, the article may be omitted after the first noun; but if they are distinct, and are intended to be distinctly and separately represented, then the article is inserted or omitted (as the case may be) before them all. Yet this last rule, which would seem to be almost imperious for the sake of perspicuity, is often, very often neglected. Thus, for example, οὐ...οἱ πλατεῖς οὐδ' εὐρύωντοι, Soph. Ajax, 649, where οὐδὲ renders the distinction certain; λόγῳ μὲν ἐσθλά, τοῖσι δ' ἔργοισιν κακά, Soph. Oedip. Col. 782; εἶπον καὶ σοφοῖς καὶ τοῖσι φαύλοις ἐνδίκως, Euripides Phoen. 495; ἡ διὰ τῆς ὀψείας καὶ δι' ἀποῆς ἡδονή, Plat. Hipp. Maj. p. 302. So also with participles; e. g. τῷ τοὺς λόγους λέγοντι καὶ τιμωμένῳ, Eurip. Orest. 913. The same with adjectives; e. g. τὸ ὅσιον καὶ μὴ, Plat. Eutyph. p. 9; the contrary of which is elsewhere exhibited, as τὰ τε εὐσεβῆ καὶ ὅσια καὶ τὰ μὴ, ib. p. 12; ὅσιον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, Eurip. El. 1351; ἐσθλά τε καὶ τὰ χεῖρεια, Hom. Odys. σ', 229. More examples the reader may see in Matthiae, § 268. Anm. 1.

I have now exhibited all the very important cases, in which the article is either inserted or omitted. I must merely advert, in the briefest manner I can, to other cases in which the insertion and omission seems to be, in some good degree, *ad arbitrium auctoris*.

8. I shall arrange these under different heads for the sake of perspicuity and convenience.

(a) Verbs *substantive* and *nuncupative*, i. e. verbs of existence and of naming, usually have anarthrous nouns after them. Yet here exceptions are numerous. For verbs substantive, see No. 3 above; of verbs nuncupative, the following are examples, viz. τὸ ὄνομα... λέγεται ὁ ἄψινδος, Apoc. viii. 11; καλεῖται τὸ ὄνομα... ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ, Apoc. xix. 13; so also ἀνακαλοῦντες τὸν εὐεργέτην τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀγαθόν, Xen. Cyrop. 3, 3, 4; τὸν Δίξιππον, ἀνακαλοῦντες τὸν προδότην, Anab. 6, 6, 7. See Matt. Gramm. § 268, and Winer, Gramm. § 17, 6.

(b) Τοιοῦτος, joined with a noun, admits or rejects the article; 2 Cor. xii. 2, 3. John iv. 23. Matt. ix. 8. Mark vi. 2.

(c) Numeral adjectives, which of course are *definite*, may take or omit the article; e. g. Matt. xvi. 21; xvii. 23. Mark ix. 31; xv. 25. Acts ii. 15.

(d) Pronouns possessive often take, and often omit, the article; Matt. xviii. 20. Mark viii. 38. John iv. 34 (in the predicate.) In the New Testament the cases of omitting the article are rare, when the pronominal adjectives are used, but frequent when the pronoun itself is employed in their stead; comp. under No. 2 above. Matthiae produces a flood of examples where the article is inserted, and others where it is omitted, when pronominal adjectives are employed, § 264, 4, Vol. II. p. 543.

(e) With demonstrative pronouns the article is often joined, and not unfrequently omitted, because they are of themselves sufficiently specific. See Matt. § 265, 1.

(*f*) Even *ἵναρος*, which one would naturally take to be indefinite, not unfrequently admits the article, although it is generally without it; Matt. § 265, 5.

But I need not pursue the subject any further. Enough, I trust, has been said, to show how little is to be thought of confident and positive declarations, in a multitude of cases, respecting the insertion or omission of the article; enough to show, how little claim a great part of Middleton's canons have, to the universality which he has generally given to them, and to the imperious nature with which he has often invested them.

I should fail, after all, of the great object that I have had in view, or at least I should be exposed to misinterpretation, if I should stop here, without making some reflections, and subjoining some cautions, in relation to what has already been exhibited. The reader will, therefore, as I hope, indulge me with the liberty of adding such remarks as I deem of importance to the accomplishment of my design.

First, I would caution him against supposing, that it is in all cases a matter of indifference whether the article is inserted or omitted. Nothing can be more certain, than that the article often changes the relation of some words, and that they are definite or indefinite, according to the insertion or omission of it. But still, it is equally true, that where this definiteness or indefiniteness is not a main or an important object, in the view of a writer or speaker, he of course is at liberty to insert or omit the article, in cases where it is grammatically admissible or omissible. And where,

we may now ask, is it not so? We have been the whole round of examples or cases, in which the article is employed, and we have not found a single rule that is without exceptions; unless we regard the rule respecting the adjective as being so. There is no case which in itself is so imperious, that it may not at times be disregarded. But this must not be misinterpreted. I do not mean to say, that the insertion or omission of the article, in many cases, would be equally proper. Most certainly not. Its insertion, for example, before participles, where the practice varies so much, would in some cases give a false emphasis to the participle and elevate it too much into notice. In other cases, this elevation is a specific object with the writer, and therefore the article is demanded.

In many cases the *relative* meaning of words is entirely changed by the presence or absence of the article; e. g. ἄλλοι *others*, indefinite, i. e. any others; but οἱ ἄλλοι *the others, the rest*, in case of some definite division into parts. So πολλοὶ *many*, indefinitely; but οἱ πολλοί means either *the greater number* in any particular case, or else *the great mass* of the community. And thus it is with a multitude of other words. The presence of the article indicates of course a definiteness or specificness of relation.

Beyond all question, moreover, the well cultivated mind of a native Greek would often be susceptible of a feeling of propriety or impropriety, with regard to the admission or exclusion of the article, to which we can at present make no claims. Every language that

employs the article has some niceties in respect to it, which belong to no other language. We have already seen, that no two languages agree in all respects with regard to its use. This fact alone would serve to show, that there must be something *schwankend*, as the Germans say, *i. e.* variable, not stedfast and uniform, in regard to the nature of the thing itself. The *definite* article must of course be for substance the same in all languages. Yet the custom of making this or that object definite or specific, *i. e.* of conceiving of it and representing it as such, appears to be quite different. We say: *Nature* does this. The Greek would say: τοῦτο ποιεῖ ἡ φύσις, or τοῦτο ποιεῖ φύσις. The French would attach the article to *Nature* in this case; so also the Germans. In English the *omission* is indispensable, in a proposition of the kind before us; in French the *insertion* is indispensable; in Greek the speaker has his choice, for if φύσις be viewed as an abstract or concrete noun, it is monadic, and the article may therefore be inserted or omitted. Φύσις used in the way of personification, would of course naturally claim the article.

The number of cases in which the Greek inserts the article, where we omit it in English, is almost beyond computation. Yet our *the* is like the Greek *ὁ*, and answers the very same purpose, where the use is common to both languages. This simple fact is enough to show, that much which respects the article, must be arbitrary, *i. e.* must depend not on the nature itself of this part of speech, but on the particular usages of each language in which it is employed.

Nay, we may without any hazard venture farther than this. Not only do different languages vary in their use of the definite article, but different individuals, who use the same language, vary not a little from each other. Thus the four Evangelists almost always say, *ὁ Χριστός* while Paul and Peter generally say, *Χριστός* simply, unless the word is in the genitive after another word which has the article. Both usages are abundantly sanctioned by the laws of classic Greek.

Nor need we confine ourselves to the New Testament for examples. We have already seen, that the contest has not yet ceased among the very first class of Greek scholars, whether Homer employs the proper article at all. For substance likewise, the same question is pending in regard to Hesiod. Then we may come to the Greek tragedians, whose measured, lofty, polished style, is designed to exhibit the very perfection of the Greek language. And truly, I can form no conception of polish in language, beyond that which Sophocles exhibits. Yet here, the article, as all agree, is seldom employed; I mean, seldom in comparison with its frequency in Plato, Xenophon, Thucydides, etc. How can such facts as these exist, and to such a wide extent, and yet a question be made whether the article may not be omitted by one writer, in a multitude of cases where another inserts it?

This, after all, does not prove, nor is it alleged to prove, that it was in all cases a matter of indifference whether the article was inserted or omitted. In a

multitude of cases, to say the least, the *insertion* of it would give a new turn to the sense of the word which should receive it. In others, the omission would also occasion the loss of specification and emphasis.

But still, this note of specification may be dispensed with in a multitude of cases, on the very ground that nouns are already either specific in themselves, or are made so by adjuncts attached to them. There is yet another class of cases by no means inconsiderable, in which the omission or insertion of the article depends entirely on the subjective feelings and views of the writer or speaker, and not at all on the nature of the things which he describes or asserts. We must not confound all these cases together. There is great need of patient examination in order to ascertain to which of these categories a thing belongs, before we pronounce any sentence in respect to the article that might or might not accompany it. Here is one of those cases, in which *διαγινώσκειν τὰ διαφέροντα* seems to be altogether indispensable.

I purposely omit the details concerning the article when it is used as a pronoun demonstrative or relative; for both of these uses it has, as every good lexicon and grammar will shew. Its insertion or omission in such cases, must depend on the same laws that govern pronouns of the like nature.

That many interpreters and lexicographers have represented the article *ὁ* as being sometimes *indefinite*, like our English article *a*, seems singular. How can a part of speech, the very object of which is to mark

definiteness, or at least to *specify* in some respect or other, at the same time be the sign of *indefiniteness* ? The ground of mistake, however, in this case, may easily be pointed out. Critics who have avowed such a principle, do not seem to have sufficiently reflected, that the usages in respect to the definite article are variable in different languages. What the French or the Germans often express definitely, *i. e.* with the article, the English often express indefinitely. But this does not make the French or German definite article to possess an *indefinite* nature. By no means. It only shows that the mode of expressing the same thing may, to a certain extent, vary among different nations. If I say, *Evil has evil consequences*, I mean to convey the idea, that whatever is evil will be followed by bad consequences. But if I say, *The evil* (τὸ κακόν) *has evil consequences*, I express, indeed, the very same general idea ; but at the same time I naturally indicate, by this mode of expression, that the word *evil* is here viewed in opposition to good, which has already been mentioned, or is distinctly an object that was naturally supposed to be before the mind. Nothing can be more incorrect, then, than to prescribe laws for the use of the Greek article from the usages of the German or English tongue. Nor can it be consonant with sound criticism to aver, that because a word which has the Greek article before it, must be rendered into one of these languages with the omission of the article, that therefore the article is in its own nature indefinite.

I have proceeded as far in the development of this

subject, as the patience of my readers will permit. I shall conclude the whole by exhibiting a few contested cases in respect to the insertion or omission of the article, which have an important bearing on some of the great doctrines of theology.

So long ago as the former part of the third century, Origen intimated that in John i. 1, Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος, the writer did not say ὁ Θεός because this would designate the supreme God. Often has this been appealed to, in order to shew, that only a δεύτερος Θεός is meant by the declaration of the Evangelist; for if more had been meant, the presence of the article, it has been asserted, would have been necessary.

How obviously incorrect it is, to build such a theory on the absence of the article in this case, is sufficiently plain by a comparison of the cases which occur in the very chapter that contains the expression before us. For example; ver. 6, "There was a man sent παρὰ Θεοῦ ver. 12, τέκνα Θεοῦ ver. 13, ἐκ Θεοῦ ver. 18," "No man hath seen Θεόν, at any time." In these, and in a multitude of other cases, there is no doubt whether the supreme God is designated, and yet the article is *omitted*.

On the other hand, if the writer had said, ὁ Θεός ἦν ὁ λόγος, it would have rendered it doubtful here whether ὁ λόγος or ὁ Θεός was the *subject* of his proposition. Or if ὁ λόγος were to be taken as the subject, then the assertion would be, that *the Logos is THE God*; an assertion which the writer did not mean to make, for this would exclude the Father and the Spirit from being truly divine, or else make them one and

the same in all respects with the Logos. Nor is the assertion of the Evangelist to be taken as meaning that the Logos is *a God* merely ; but that he is *God*, i. e. that he is divine, that he possesses a divine nature. This is all that is required ; and all, indeed, that the nature of the proposition admits.

The passage in Tit. ii. 13, “ Looking for the blessed hope, καὶ ἐπιφάνειαν τοῦ μεγάλου Θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ,” has been the subject of long, learned, and animated contest. One party avers, that the absence of the article before σωτῆρος necessarily unites it to Θεοῦ and makes it predicable of the same being. Mr. Wordsworth has shewn, in his treatise respecting this form of expression, that the Greek Fathers generally understood this passage in such a way ; Middleton says, he has shewn, that “all antiquity were agreed on this question,” p. 307. This may be so. But if it be, there still remains a doubt whether they were guided by *theological* or philological reasons, in forming this opinion, so far as the *article* is concerned. Nothing can be plainer, indeed, than that a Greek would naturally say, τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος, if he meant to predicate both appellations of the same person. But if the reader will now turn back to No. 7, he will see that nothing can be plainer, also, than that a Greek might have used the same expression, in case different persons were intended to be designated. When two nouns are of the same gender and in the same case, this is reason enough for omitting the article before the second, if the writer pleases ; and this, whether they both re-

late, or not, to the same individual. Middleton says: "It is impossible to understand *ἑοῦ καὶ σωτηρὸς* otherwise than of one person," p. 307. The reader, by re-examining No. 7, can judge how little ground there is to assert this, so far as the absence of the article is concerned; and it is in reference to this, that Middleton makes the assertion.

But in addition to this, there is another reason which may be given for the omission of the article; and this is, that the pronoun *ἡμῶν* of itself specificates *σωτηρὸς*, and therefore renders the insertion of the article unnecessary, even in case the writer meant that *σωτηρὸς* should be considered as distinct from *τοῦ ἑοῦ*. The reader has only to look back upon No. 2, above, in order to become fully persuaded concerning this obvious principle with regard to the Greek article.

On two accounts, then, the absence of the article in this case cannot prove any thing important; for, as we have seen, it might be dispensed with, whether the writer meant to put *σωτηρὸς* in apposition with *ἑοῦ*, or to designate a different person by it (compare No. 4, above;) or it may have been omitted because of the pronoun *ἡμῶν* which of itself specifies. It would seem, therefore, that there was no good ground for the great contest which has existed in this case, in respect to the presence or absence of the article. If the writer designed to make *σωτηρὸς* merely an explicative or attributive of *ἑοῦ*, in this case he would, beyond all doubt, have expressed himself as he now has; but if he did not design this, but meant to make the usual distinction so often made in Paul's epistles, between

God the Father and Christ, he might still have used the same expression. The whole argument then, on either side, so far as the *article* is concerned, falls to the ground.

Not so however, in my apprehension, in regard to considerations deducible from the context. Where in the New Testament, is the ἐπιφάνεια of God the Father asserted or foretold? It is Christ who is to appear "in the clouds of heaven, with great power and glory." It is "*the* Lord himself who is to come with a shout, with the voice of the archangel and the trump of God;" it is "he who shall come with the clouds, whom every eye shall see, and *they also who pierced him.*" It is he then *who was pierced*, that is to make the ἐπιφάνεια on earth. I know of no New Testament analogy for any other than he, who is to make such a development of himself. How can I then refer this ἐπιφάνεια in Tit. ii. 13, to God the Father? Reasoning *a priori*, or party views, might lead me to do so; but the analogy of the New Testament throughout, would forbid me to do it.

On other and very different grounds, then, than that of the presence or absence of the article in this case, I arrive at the full persuasion, that τοῦ μεγάλου Θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος, are both appellatives applied in this case to Ἰησοῦς Χριστός. If I am pressed with the question: Where is any thing like this in all the New Testament? My answer would be, that καὶ Θεός ἦν ὁ λόγος, John i. 1; ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός, εὐλογητὸς εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας, Rom. ix. 5; ἐσμὲν ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ, ἐν τῷ υἱῷ αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ, οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθινὸς Θεός καὶ ἡ

ζωῇ αἰώνιος, 1 John v. 20; are altogether analogical. In this last case, I would not rely so much on the grammatical connection of οὗτος with Χριστῷ as its antecedent, as I would on the attributive ἡ ζωῇ αἰώνιος. Who is appropriately so called by the apostle John, except Jesus? Let the reader compare John i. 4; v. 26; xi. 25; vi. 35; xiv. 6. 1 John v. 11, 12. Thus is Christ called ὁ λόγος τῆς ζωῆς in 1 John i. 1; and in i. 2 he is not only called ζωῇ but ἡ ζωῇ ἡ αἰώνιος, the very appellation given him at the close of the epistle. If now any writer may be permitted to explain himself, I should think John had done so in the case before us. Consequently I find in him and in Paul, analogies for a case like that of τοῦ μεγάλου Θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος... Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. But, as will be seen, I do not trust the Greek article as being the depository of arguments, in a case of such magnitude as this. In almost all cases it must be a slender support for any conclusion; but here especially it is not worthy of the trust which so many have reposed in it.

In the same manner as Tit. ii. 13, may the case be solved which occurs in Jude v. 4, viz. τὸν μόνον δεσπότην καὶ κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἀρνούμενοι. Whether τὸν δεσπότην and κύριον both apply to Χριστὸν, cannot be decided by the *absence* of the article before κύριος. To give the reasons specifically, would be merely to repeat what has just been said. Ἡμῶν of itself specificates κύριον, and the article might therefore be omitted, even if the writer meant that δεσπότην and κύριον should be taken separately; and it

would almost of course be omitted, if he meant that both should be merely attributives of Χριστός. Consequently nothing can be made out of the absence of the article, which is satisfactory. The word ἀρνούμενοι, however, gives us a clue, as it seems to me, by which we may arrive at the true sense. The New Testament is full of the idiom which applies the word *deny* to the rejection of Christ; e. g. Thou shalt *deny* me thrice, Matt. xxvi. 34, 35. Mark xiv. 30, 31, 72. Matt. x. 33. 2 Tim. ii. 12. Luke xii. 9. John xiii. 18. Acts iii. 13, 14. Rev. xiii. 8, and often elsewhere. Once only in the New Testament do I find the word *deny* applied as designating the rejection of God simply; and even here the mode of expression is peculiar: "They profess to know God, but in works they deny him," Tit. i. 15. When I compare, therefore, the expression in Jude v. 4, with the texts above named, and in particular with 2 Pet. ii. 1, *deny the Lord that bought them*; and also with 1 John ii. 22, 23, I cannot hesitate to believe, that τὸν μόνον δεσπότην καὶ κύριον do both refer to Ἰ. Χριστὸν. Nothing can be more characteristic of Paul's mode of representing Christ, than this mode which presents him as the reigning Lord of the universe.

The case in 2 Thess. ii. 12 appears to me to be of a different nature. Here we have τὴν χάριν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν καὶ κυρίου Ἰ. Χριστοῦ. But in a connexion of this nature, and in phraseology like this, we often find Θεός unequivocally distinguished from κύριος; e. g. 2 Thess. i. 2, Χάρις...ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν, καὶ κυρίου Ἰ. Χριστοῦ

comp. 1 Thess. i. 1. Col. i. 2 (Text. Recep.) Phil. i. 2. Eph. i. 2, etc. Yet this text (2 Thess. ii. 12) has been adduced by Granville Sharp and others, as a proof text for the doctrine of the Trinity, on the ground that the want of the Greek article before *κυρίου* must necessarily attach *κυρίου* to *θεοῦ*. In this case then, if such a conclusion is legitimate, it would follow that *πατὴρ ἡμῶν* is also an appellative of 'I. *Χριστός*; but where in all the New Testament is there any analogy for this?

On the other hand, the case in 2 Pet. iii. 18, is very clearly of the opposite character. Here we have, *τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν καὶ σωτῆρος 'Ι. Χριστοῦ*. That *καὶ σωτῆρος* is an attributive or explicative of *κυρίου*, and that both belong to *Χριστοῦ*, there can hardly be any room for doubt. Both are the familiar and usual appellations of Christ; and they are often united together elsewhere, as well as here; e. g. Tit. i. 4. 2 Pet. i. 11; ii. 20; iii. 2, al.

But my limits compel me to desist from more examples. Those on which most stress has been laid, and which have been the subjects of the longest and sharpest contests, have been already adduced. Should I go beyond these bounds, I should not know where to stop. The exemplification of principles laid down in the preceding essay, may be found, of course, on every page of the New Testament. Most readers, tolerably familiar with Greek, will, as I trust, be able to put them to the test. At all events, I must think that these principles are at least more intelligible and more firmly supported, than those of Mid-

dleton. I have read his book until I despair of getting to the light; so often does he deal in the claro-obscure, and so often utters unguarded assertions, at least such as are incapable of solid defence.

Passow has some good remarks in his *Lexicon*, respecting the article; and so has Bretschneider, who seems to have laid out some effort upon this part of speech. Wahl has endless subdivision, seemingly without any steadfast principles under which he attempted to arrange his facts. Buttmann, in his *Grammar*, has only a few hints; Rost has made a very brief but a striking digest of general principles. Matthiae alone seems to have made the subject one of attentive, deep, and thorough study; and he has more facts respecting it, than all the others put together. Winer seems to have fully and thoroughly studied and comprehended him; but he has not taken the requisite pains to classify the subject in general. The parts of it that he has exhibited, are done in his best manner.

I make these remarks merely for the sake of readers, who may wish to study the subject, and not for the sake of indulging in criticism on the efforts of others, which is far enough from being the particular design of this essay. The reader who has not leisure or opportunity to read all which has been written on the Greek article, will naturally wish to be informed where he may read to the best advantage. I have ventured, in the above remarks, to give him my views respecting this question.

“ But—mutato nomine de te fabula narratur; the

next writer that rises up, may find as many faults with your theory, as you have with other theories." So methinks I hear some of my readers say. Be it so, is my reply. I have but one wish respecting the subject; and this is to come at what is true, if there be any such thing as finding it. If my remarks should excite some one to correct my errors, and to throw more light on this subject, so long neglected, and so little understood by most Greek readers, I shall be among the foremost to tender him my congratulations and my most cheerful approbation.

In the mean time, it is not amiss to give a hint to theologians and critics, that important conclusions in either of their departments ought not to be built on the presence or absence of the article, until the metes and bounds of this part of speech are much more definitely settled, and better understood. Nothing can be more certain, than that a large extent of the ground is arbitrary, at least it is in a great measure so; and the limits to which it is so, remain to be fixed more definitely, before we can say—*ultra quos nequit consistere rectum*. Our faith then, in matters of belief or exegesis, should not, for the present, have for its basis this "*loquacissimae gentis flabellum*." The context, the idiom in general, and the nature of the case, are always, and ever must be, better guides. Them let us follow; at least until our new guide attains to a character more fixed, more uniform, and more trust-worthy than it has at present.

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